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My research develops a sociological framework for exploring the structural 
constraints on the Europeanisation of British politics. I examine the history of 
Britain’s relationship to the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) from the 
immediate post-war period up until 1994 in terms of the politics of modernisation. I 
discuss forms of political and economic modernisation and argue that we can use 
broad conceptions of these processes to establish the underlying structural tensions 
within the relationship between the British state and European integration. I maintain 
that Britain has not followed the same pattern of political and economic development 
associated with modem Europe and has been historically constituted as a vehicle for 
global economic modernisation. This has placed the British state at odds with the 
organisation of Europe as a political and economic space. This structural problem 
emerges in the practices and struggles of political elites over the role of ‘Europe’ 
within a post-imperial Britain, ^examine the chronic failure of elites to legitimate and 
establish a coherent strategy for European integration within the recent trajectory of 
the British state. British elites understandings of the role of European integration for 
domestic political modernisation have been flawed. I propose that this has been 
compounded by the ideological construction of ‘Europe’ as ‘ other’ within populist 
political projects of British exceptionalism that emerged out of a post-imperial crisis. 
This culminated in the Thatcherite re-assertion of British exceptionalism in relation to 
the second wave of European integration, igniting tensions in Britain’s relationship 
with the EC/EU that became fully manifest during the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. I explore in some detail the extensive attack by a Eurosceptic movement on 
the Major government that undermined the attempt of the governing elites to 
accommodate Britain to a second wave of integration. This reassertion of Britain’s 
difference from Europe during the 1990s had long term implications for both the 
Conservative and New Labour governments. It is, therefore, apparent that the British 
contestation over ‘Europe’ is structurally reproducing Britain’s distinctive relationship 
to the process of European integration.
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Introduction
Drawing on sociological accounts of modernisation, this thesis builds on an existing 
body of work that locates the British problem with European integration within a 
distinctive historical experience and institutional heritage. Britain’s relationship to the 
European Union1 has been a matter of intense political debate since the Macmillan 
government first proposed British membership in 1961. In the emergent post-imperial 
context, the issue went to the heart of British political identity and organisation. It 
appeared to encapsulate the extent to which the British social and political order was 
in transition and the tensions that arose as a consequence of these changes. In general, 
social and political scientists have explored the question of why Britain has often been 
an ‘awkward partner’ (George 1990) in its relations with the EU and the possibilities 
and limitations for the Europeanisation2 of British state and society. The issue has, 
however, largely been neglected by sociologists and has primarily been the concern of 
political scientists, historians and international relations specialists. This is surprising 
considering that the distinctiveness of sociology lies in its theoretically informed 
accounts of social change. Indeed, the debate over modernity has been at the centre 
of the discipline’s theoretical and analytical agenda. The advantage of such a macro- 
sociological approach is that it renders explicit the structures, which are often elusive 
in other forms of analysis, at work in social relations. Tftejffntral proposition of this 
study is that the structure of the relationship between the British state and European 
integration is more fully illuminated when viewed from an examination of the global 
dynamics of political and economic modernisation.
From this perspective, the British state is shown to be structurally at odds with 
processes of political modernisation that underpin European integration. These 
constraints manifest in the struggles over modernisation that have been characteristic 
of the post-imperial British political order. British political development has been 
characterised by an approach to modernisation that subsumes the political within the 
economic. I show how the crisis over British post-imperial state formation has
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resolved itself in the form of a mixture of exclusive and populist nationalism and 
economic globalism. This has created a distinct European crisis for the British state 
over the parameters of EU membership. This, I contend, has significant implications 
for understanding the relationship between Britain and European integration in a 
context of globalisation.
The thesis covers the period between 1950 and 1994 but particularly focuses on the 
period between 1986 and 1994. The implications of the arguments and propositions 
developed in the study for more recent developments are also considered in the 
conclusion.
Chapter outline
The approach of the thesis is set out in Chapter 1. This approach is organised in terms 
of its theoretical and methodologial objectives. The first objective is to develop a 
theoretically informed historical account of Britain’s relationship to the EC/EU. In 
particular, I claim that much of the existing approaches to this issue are undertheorised 
and do not draw sufficiently on sociologically informed accounts of social and political 
transformation. In this respect, my central claim is that this issue is most fruitfully 
explicated through an examination of the tensions surrounding political modernisation 
in the British context. In that respect it by no means attempts to provide a total account 
of Britain’s relations to the EC/EU, but aims to develop a theoretically derived 
interpretation. This relates to the second objective which is methodological and locates 
the analysis within a modified critical realism. From this perspective, I emphasise the 
importance of a structural analysis that utilises theory in order to identify the underlying 
mechanisms generating social phenomena. However, the aim is not to peripheralise 
actors, but to provide a more informed and objective account of the meanings and 
ideologies within which they organise their practices. Thus, the structural tensions in 
Britain’s relationship to the project of European integration are reproduced in the 
struggles over the meaning of ‘Europe’ in a post-imperial Britain as part of the politics 
of modernisation.
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The subtantive starting point of the thesis is to locate the British state’s place within 
the global dynamics of political and economic modernisation. In Chapter 2, Britain’s 
relationship to European integration is understood within an account of the changes in 
the international system of nation-states, the global system of capital accumulation and 
the reconfiguration of global hegemonic orders. I argue that the British state is 
exceptional in comparison to forms of European political organisation as a 
consequence of its specific political and economic development associated with its 
role as a hegemonic imperial power. Thus, the problem that British political elites4 
have had with European integration is explained in terms of the reconfiguration of 
long standing constraints on British political modernisation.
In Chapter 3 the problem of British modernisation is shown to be critical in explaining 
the failure of British governments to constructively engage with the process of 
European integration in the 1950s. It is also shown to be central to the decision to 
apply for membership in the early 1960s. European integration is understood as part 
of a range of proccesses associated with the Fordist reconstruction of the post-war 
nation-state and the establishment of a new form of post-national governance. The 
British problem with European integration is explained in terms of the failure of 
Fordism in Britain and the continuation of institutions and policies associated with 
imperialism. This is shown to be continuous once Britain enters a post-imperial 
trajectory and is forced to reconstruct itself as a nation-state. The decision to apply for 
membership of the European Community is viewed as a conservative strategy of 
contained modernisation designed to secure core elements of the British politico- 
economic order and avoid a more fundamental modernisation of state and society. It 
can be conceptualised as flawed Europeanism.
The failure to establish a legitimate European strategy within the British state is the
subject of Chapter 4. In the 1960s the British state enters a post-imperial crisis5 over
modernisation. The attempts by governments to make membership of the European
Community a crucial part of the solution to this crisis lacks coherence and is not
supported across the wider political class. Specifically, on both the left and right the
differentiation of Britain from the European Community became the basis for the
construction of national projects. A trenchant politics of exclusion emerged towards
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European integration that reconfigured and reasserted regressive features of the 
British political order. The consequence of this was to distance governing elites from 
the implications of membership of the Community. A distinctively British national 
discourse rooted in opposition to European political modernisation challenged the 
objectives of British membership. By the end of the 1970s, the implication of this was 
to subordinate European policy within a conception of a strong British state enmeshed 
within an American dominated global economy.
Chapter 5 explores the changing European context within which British governing 
elites found themselves during the 1980s and 1990s. This is referred to as the second 
wave of European integration. In response to processes of globalisation, European 
elites engaged in a re-assertion of the European project as a project of political 
modernisation. The extent and character of this remains uncertain, nevertheless it was 
a distinctly European response to the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation. 
Indeed, it can be characterised as a contested form of post-national political 
modernisation. It is in this context, that the continual problems of British political 
modernisation and its relationship to European integration are reconfigured. 
Specifially, the re-assertion in Britain of an aggressive form of neo-liberalism leads us 
to rethink the relationship between Britain and the EC/EU in terms of globalised 
political struggles and contexts.
In Chapter 6, the relationship between Britain and the EU/EU is explored in terms of
the conflicts between the extension of the European integrationist project and the
emerging Thatcherite settlement of the British state. The particular structure of the
British economy and the failure to construct a Fordist national accumulation strategy
meant that by the late 1970s there was little choice but to accommodate the British
economy to the requirements of the world market. The Thatcher administrations were
primarily concerned with accomplishing this transition and securing the necessary
national acquiescence. It combined an aggressive neo-liberal accumulation strategy
with a powerful, albeit problematic, assertion of distinctly British conception of a
strong nation-state. My central claim is that, at its core, the Thatcherite settlement was
anti-European because it was primarily a project of economic flexible accumulation
and was not concerned with any concomitant forms of political modernisation. This
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was most clearly seen in the populist reassertion of British exceptionalism in the form 
of a Thatcherite Euroscepticism. In effect broader political problems were reduced to 
issues of market adaptation and the renewal of state domination. It is my contention 
that the chronic tensions over political modernisation manifest in the European crisis 
of the Conservative party during the late 1980s and early 1990s, albeit one framed by 
the parameters of the Thatcherite settlement.
In Chapter 7, the European crisis of the British state is revealed in the crisis of the 
Major government over the ERM membership and Eurosceptic rebellion over the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. It is argued that during the period of 1990-1993 
the attempt to revise the Thatcherite settlement through a renewed Europeanism was 
fundamentally flawed and crisis prone. Neither the economic nor the political basis 
for constructive British engagement with the second wave of integration was in place 
and the attempts of the Major government to accommodate to these developments 
backfired. They gave rise to an extraordinary attack on the governing elite by a 
populist Eurosceptic movement. The consequence of this failure was the further 
entrenchment of a Eurosceptic Thatcherism within the British political order. It led to 
the assertion of a neo-Thatcherite European policy that saw the British government 
exclude itself from core aspects of the integration process and the reassertion of 
British exceptionalism.
Myjjyerview and analysis of British European policy leads to the conclusion that 
British state remains structurally incompatible with the project of European 
integration. In Britain economic modernisation has been subordinated to political 
modernisation in such a way that the renegotiations of economic and political 
modernisation associated with European integration are viewed as unnecessary and/or 
threatening. The British state has been incapable of sustaining a coherent approach 
towards the EC/EU precisely because its politico-economic development has been 
incompatible with the complexities of European political modernity. I conclude by 
reflecting on the European policy of the New Labour government and its capacity to 
engage constructively with the process of European integration.
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Chapter One 
The British State and European Integration: 
A Structural Analysis
The aim of this Chapter is to outline the original contribution that a sociological 
approach can make to this significant issue. The starting point is to consider how 
British elite action towards European integration can be explained. I propose that in 
order to explain these actions sociologically, we have to address the particular 
structures involved. In doing so, I suggest that we can make considerable use of 
existing literature that examines British institutions. This locates the problems that 
Britain has with European integration in the organisation of these institutions and the 
beliefs and strategies of their respective elites. However, the main aim in examining 
these institutional dimensions is to move beyond the domestic politics approach both 
theoretically and methodologically. It is argued that this is achieved by addressing the 
relationship of the British state to European integration from the perspective of a 
theoretically informed account of the global dynamics of modernisation. Such an 
approach helps us to understand the structural mechanisms at work in this relationship 
and positions the current work within critical realism. The theoretical and 
methodological originality of the thesis is therefore set out in this Chapter.
1.1 The problem of Britain and European integration: the limits of rational 
action
When membership of the EEC was secured by Edward Heath in 1973, Britain’s move
into the Community was seen as a major plank of an economic policy designed to
reinvigorate the British economy. Heath believed that opening up the British economy
to European competition would contribute to the modernisation of the economy. Yet it
has been suggested that underlying these economic goals was a concern to bring about
a more profound change in British society. It was presented as a policy designed to
move Britain away from a society based on class and privilege and towards one that
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was open and meritocratic (Palmer 1993: 43). It was also seen as a shift in the 
consciousness of the British political class:
‘It symbolised an abandonment of the delusions of imperial grandeur and 
international superpower status that had for so long intoxicated Britain’s 
governing classes.’ (ibid 1993:43)
This view was reinforced from a broadly Marxist perspective by Tom Naim (1973).
In an edition of the New Left Review (1973) totally devoted to his analysis of the 
British left and the European Community, he argued that membership represented the 
abandonment of Britain’s traditional political goals by the ruling classes in the face of 
economic crisis. The collapse of the dollar in 1971 had finally exposed the relative 
weakness of the British economy. Britain did not have a strong national industrial 
sector to fall back on in the face of international economic crisis and its core 
economic interests, in particular financial capital, were dependent on a Western 
economic order under American hegemony. Naim presented the move into the 
Community as a way out for the ruling class in the context of this post-imperial 
decline. The crisis of the British state that was evident by the 1970s meant that the 
‘gentlemanly perambulation’ towards Europe ‘turned into a run’ (Naim 1973:26). 
From this perspective the turn to Europe could be seen as a fundamental reorientation 
and restructuring of an economic system and political regime. It implied the 
reconstruction of Britain as a European nation-state within an association of European 
nation-states as part of the transition from imperial state to modernised European 
nation-state. In this context, Naim noted that the representatives of the working class 
were left behind, defending a conception of the nation that was no longer appropriate 
in a world increasingly dominated by the multi-national company. Meanwhile the 
ruling class appeared to have found a successful new political strategy characterised 
by a ‘sense of forward motion and action, of new perspective and conquests’ (Naim 
1973:37). Membership of the European Community appeared to be crucial to the 
modernisation of the British state and economy.
By the mid 1990s we find the Conservative party chronically split on the question of
Britain’s role in European integration and the Major leadership heading in a distinctly
Eurosceptic direction (Young 1998; Turner 2000; Gowland and Turner 2000). In
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contrast, the modernised Labour party ended its hostility to the EC/EU and 
reconstructed itself as the ‘Party of Europe’. This role was, however, severely tested 
once in office when tensions arose in the government over joining the single currency. 
If the decision to join the EC was indicative of the post-imperial reconstruction of the 
British state as a European nation-state, its persistent status as an ‘awkward partner’ 
(George 1994), within the formal integration process, suggests that Britain continues 
to be at variance with the political trajectory of the continent. This has led a number of 
commentators to catalogue the historical relationship between Britain and the project 
of Europe integration, as one of missed opportunities and elite misjudgements 
(Milward 1992; Young 1998). .
A summary of the main tensions and problems in the British state’s relationship to the 
Community since membership indicates the extent to which British elites have not 
become easy accomplices in the construction of the new Europe:
• The renegotiation of the terms of entry by the Labour government in 1975 and 
splits in the Labour party over membership. The establishment of anti-European 
factions in both the main parties;
• Continual conflict over British budgetary contributions; particularly intense during 
Mrs Thatcher’s first term of office and causing a significant block to Community 
business from 1979-1984;
• Mrs Thatcher’s opposition to further moves towards political and monetary union 
after the signing of the Single European Act in 1986;
• The opposition of the Conservative government to the social dimension of the 
Community pursued by Jacques Delors;
• The resignation of four Cabinet Ministers over European issues during 
Conservative adminstrations between 1986-90;
• The contribution of Mrs Thatcher’s opposition to developments in the 
Community to her loss of the Conservative party leadership election in 1990;
• John Major’s opt out agreements for Britain in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) over 
monetary union and the Social Chapter;
• Britain’s withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992;
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• The problems over the parliamentary ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
growing divide between Eurosceptics and Europhiles in the Conservative party;
• The problems for the New Labour government over adoption of the European 
single currency in the face of internal political wranglings and public scepticism.
It is apparent that British governments have been on the back foot in the integration 
process and have often been concerned with limiting the political implications of 
continued British membership. In retrospect, the central role of the European 
Community in the renewal and modernisation of the British state and society that was 
envisaged under the Heath government has not occurred. However, some 
commentators believe that it still might happen. For instance, Gamble predicted that:
‘If Britain’s integration does progress, the pressure for institutional reform will 
intensify. Britain may emerge as a more typical European state, shedding in 
the process some of the burdens that have delayed its adaptation in the past.’ 
(1994: 225)
From the point of view of this thesis, we are concerned with the actual trajectory of 
the British state and its relationship with the EC/EU rather than the counterfactual 
case of a European modernisation of the British state through European integration. 
However, counterfactuals are essential to sound social science because in order to 
explain what actually occurs involves the specification of what did not, but could 
have, occurred (Tilly 1997: 41). In the case of this thesis, the counterfactual case has 
taken on the status of a British political myth; the always present possibility that 
Britain might have joined the Community at the start, played its full role at the ‘heart 
of Europe’ and been reconstructed as a more typical European nation-state in the 
process.
What I consider to be central to understanding the relationship between the British 
state and the EC/EU are the contexts that constrain elite action. In his autobiography, 
Edward Heath makes the plea for decisions on the membership of the single currency 
to be based on ‘a careful and thorough analysis of where the balance of national 
advantage lies’ and not ‘on Euro-phobic prejudice, nor on romantic illusions based on 
past glories’ (1998: 726). He goes on to call for the Conservative party to come to its
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senses on this question for the good of the country (ibid). This could also be read as a 
personal lament for a political class that has proved unable to, or chosen not to, break 
free of the structural constraints imposed by the domestic political order over the issue 
of European integration. Clearly, the problem is not that British elites have acted 
irrationally over the question of European integration project; they have consistently 
recognised that continued membership is essential to a post imperial Britain. The 
problem is that we find that in the actual contexts of action, British governing elites 
have been faced with a whole series of constraints and error inducing circumstances 
that limit the rationality of their strategic decision making. We should not be surprised 
by this. Merton (1957) famously argued that the problem with social action is that it 
fails to meet the criteria of rationality that we expect to find and that we are constantly 
faced with the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action. Tilly takes up 
this argument, stating that there appears to be an omnipresent ‘invisible hand’ 
directing and misdirecting our actions (1997: 38). In Tilly’s interesting revisiting of 
the Mertonian argument, he argues that this so-called error filled action may in fact 
produce systematic properties because it takes place within constraints set by previous 
understandings and practices (1997: 41). In social action we may not only find errors 
and limitations when considered against the counterfactuals, but also error corrections 
and responses in line with shared meanings and in the face of unexpected outcomes. 
Actors may be engaged in purposive innovation, erroneous actions and responses to 
erroneous actions while at the same time reinstating systemic properties:
‘Here distinctions among conformity, error and innovation begin to blur. They 
operate under similar constraints from shared understandings and established 
social relations.’ (ibid: 41)
What Tilly suggests is that through our engagement with the complexities of social 
action we are led to an analysis of the systemic features of social action. For the 
purposes of this thesis, such a proposition implies that the constrained and 
problematic action of British elites over European integration is indicative of practices 
that reproduce the British state as a durable political structure. It is through the 
investigation of the twists and turns of elite action that we can begin to identify forms 
of structural determinism and the constraints on political transformation. This
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sensitivity to structre and action in historical change is the important contribution 
made by a sociological analysis.
I want now to introduce two methodological principles that inform the present study. 
Firstly, following Weber, we must take meaning seriously and view social action as 
the starting point of a sociological analysis (Weber 1964: 88). Secondly, in explaining 
social action we have to make reference to causal structures that are historically 
embedded and reproduced and cannot be reduced to the motivations of actors 
(Outhwaite 1975: 54; Keat and Urry 1975:193). We have to engage with historically 
structured practices and identities. The implication of this is that the British state has 
been involved with the process of European integration in a particularly British way 
that reflects the underlying features of a distinct political order and, in particular, the 
problems of political modernisation. With these propositions in mind, I want to 
consider the ways in which British elite actions over Europe have been explained and 
understood in the existing literature on the topic.
1.2 Moving beyond domestic politics
My main concern in reviewing the literature on Britain and European integration.is to 
highlight the methodological limitations of current approaches and to consider how 
we can build upon some of the empirical and theoretical insights of these approaches. 
In the thesis I make considerable use of these institutional and historical discussions 
of Britain and Europe as they are crucial for understanding the substance of the 
relationship. However, my main aim is to move beyond what we can characterise as 
the domestic politics approach by reconnecting the institutional history of Britain and 
European integration with the deeper structural features of this relationship.
A broad range of literature from across the social sciences has now documented this
troubled history and highlighted the ‘semi-detached’ and ‘ambivalent’ approach of
governing elites and the wider political class to the project of European integration
(W. Wallace 1980; George 1990,1991,1992,1994; Greenword 1996; Gowland and
Turner 2000a). For the purposes of this study, I refer to the approach taken by these
authors as the domestic politics approach as it is primarily concerned with the various
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institutional dimensions of the British politico-economic order that have constrained 
Britain’s relationship with the EC/EU at various times. These are therefore viewed as 
some of the key determinants of a ‘semi-detached’ British European policy (George 
1992).
There are five broad institutional features identified by the ‘domestic politics 
approach’: the global outlook of the British state; the part played by Whitehall in 
determining policy; the role of the main political parties; non-state factors such as the 
media, public opinion and organised interests; and, finally, the nature and organisation 
of British parliamentary sovereignty.
The first feature is the geopolitical role of the British state and the global outlook of 
British institutions (George 1994: 249- 250; Bulmer 1992:11-13). In particular, the 
importance is stressed of the continued concern of governing elites that Britain should 
play a global role and that a close relationship with the United States is fundamental 
to this. It is argued that the pursuit of an Atlantic Community has been prioritised 
over any commitment to regional integration. Indeed, the latter has often been viewed 
as a threat to the success of the former. This global orientation has been particularly 
evident in the international outlook of British political institutions. Bulmer points out 
that,
‘Anglo-American and Anglo-Japanese economic diplomacy (including at 
ministerial level) is likely to give Britain special interests in EC trade policy 
and these may be the further source of conflict.’ (1992:13)
The domestic politics approach highlights continuities across administrations and this 
is related to the role played by core political institutions that have coordinated the 
direction of British European policy. Therefore the second feature of domestic politics 
therefore has been the significant role played by the Foreign Office and the Treasury, 
in establishing the direction of policy. Young notes the guiding considerations of 
British officials:
‘The preservation of the widest market (with the lowest possible tariffs) for 
British trade, the need for a united Atlantic alliance as an anti-Soviet device, 
and the maximisation of British influence in a situation where all states were
18
increasingly interdependent (but where federalism was rejected as undesirable) 
were consistent themes.’ (1995:103)
The extent to which there has been a consistent and united position within Whitehall 
should not, however, be overestimated. George, for instance, has suggested that the 
Treasury has been more ambivalent than the Foreign Office and has not necessarily 
seen British interests as compatible with European integration (1990: 209; also 
Bulmer 1992: 28).
The third feature is the divisions within the main political parties (Aspinwall 2000; 
Usherwood 2002; Gaffney 1996; Wallace 1995; Ashford 1992; Lord 1992). Here the 
focus has been on the conflict and splits over Europe. Lord argues that parties have 
been engaged in ‘constant search for obfuscating formulae to conceal divisions’ and 
have lacked any coherent strategies (1992: 435). Underlying this has been the 
particular national orientations of the main political parties which has prevented the 
incorporation of the European interest along the lines of continental Social and 
Christian Democratic parties. Ashford has argued that the divisiveness of the 
European issue is also the product of the British organisation of the party and electoral 
systems (1992:119-148). This ‘first past the post’ party system and the adversarial 
nature of British politics means any policy consensus has been impossible to achieve. 
Although, as Helen Wallace, notes this has been ‘greatly accentuated by the recurrent 
conflicts within the two larger parties on European issues’ (1995: 51). The lack of a 
powersharing system of government, which enables the formation of stable centrist 
coalitions, has meant that Eurosceptic factions have had considerable influence within 
the main parties (Aspinwall 2000; Usherwood 2002).
Political parties do not exist autonomously of patterns of interest within the wider 
society. Fourthly, the domestic politics approach has also explored the role of public 
opinion and economic actors in determining European policy. The volatility of public 
opinion has clearly been a major consideration for political parties in their attempts to 
establish a legitimate position on EC/EU membership. They have been reluctant to 
challenge negative attitudes towards Europe that have often been ‘based on 
generations of imperialism’ and have often attempted to make political capital out of
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the Euroscepticism within public opinion (George 1994: 255). This has been 
compounded by sections of the press that have been virulently Eurosceptic (Wilkes 
and Wring 1998).
In terms of powerful economic actors within British society, ambivalence and 
ambiguity again become evident. Initially trade unions were hostile to the 
integrationist project, which reflected their underlying economic nationalism. Yet in 
the context of Conservative government’s hostility to union power during the 1980s, 
there was some evidence that the trade union movement began to Europeanise their 
activities and institutions (George 1991: 81; Wendon 1994; George and Haythome 
1996: 118; Vogler 2001). They certainly became more supportive of the EC/EU as 
part of a national strategy of opposition to Thatcherism. The representatives of British 
capitalism have been more supportive of membership initially as part of the post­
imperial reorientation of the British economy (George 1990: 32; Gowland and Turner 
2000a: 206,319). Nevertheless, the relationship between different dimensions of 
‘British’ capital and membership of the European Union has also varied over time and 
there has been no uniform position. This may reflect the disorganisation of capitalist 
interests in Britain and its historical enmeshment in the international economy. The 
latter is particularly important for understanding the ways in which economic interests 
become articulated in terms of European policy (Bulmer 1992).
Finally, we can point to the organising principles of British political power as a 
constraint on engagement in the European integration process that has been 
emphasised by the domestic politics approach (Wallace 1980: 22; Bulmer 1992: 25- 
26). The continuation of a highly centralised state form organised around the principle 
of monarchical sovereignty potentially represents a powerful constraint on 
participation within an emerging system of states and political authorities operating 
across a number of levels.
In some respects, we can identity a theoretical and methodological framework 
emerging out of the domestic politics approach for addressing these institutional 
constraints on British participation in the integration process. Bulmer, for instance,
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makes the important point that British ‘semi-detachment’ does not represent ‘some 
(mistaken or correct) policy dreamt up in Whitehall’:
‘It is, rather, the product of a strong institutional logic permeating the political 
system, economic markets, and public administration.’ (1992: 29)
This approach has been crucial in challenging the artificial separation between a 
member-state’s European policy and its other domestic behaviour (Bulmer 1983:
354). Such an artificial separation is seen to be characteristic of neo-functionalist and 
intergovemmentalist approaches to the EC/EU which treats European policy making 
as having its own independent logic. It is within the domestic politics approach that 
Stephen George locates his now classic study of Britain and the EC/EU, An Awkward 
Partner (1990). From such a perspective, George claims that his narrative discussion 
of contextualised and constrained governing elite behaviour in relation to the EC/EU 
is not ‘undertheorised’ (1990: v). However, there is a tension in the domestic politics 
literature between George’s account of historically unfolding events and elite actions 
and Bulmer’s more explicit suggestion that there is an institutional logic permeating 
the political system. This tension is also evident in Gowland and Turner’s (2000a) 
implicit updating of the ‘awkward partner’ thesis, The Reluctant Europeans, with its 
intertwining of historical unfoldings and historical repetitions:
‘It was in response to British objections that the phrase ‘federal goal’ was 
struck from the proposed opening article of the Treaty of Maastricht. None of 
the other EU states expressed similar anxieities. Furthermore, none was 
surprised by this episode in view of the tortuous saga of Britain’s 
problematical adjustment to the process of European integration since 1945.
As will be seen in this study, the singular features of this British experience 
can be traced back in the first instance to the impact of the Second World War 
on Britain and to the main aims and assumptions of British policy makers in 
dealing with the problems of peacetime.' (Gowland and Turner 2000a: 8 
emphasis mine)
From this perspective the ‘tortuous saga’ of the recent governing elites in their
dealings with the EC/EU are traced back to the ‘aims and assumptions’ of earlier
elites, but the methodological and theoretical status of these evidently structural
dimensions of Britain’s historical relationship with the project of European integration
is uncertain. How do we address the complex reproduction of these continuities in
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attitudes and beliefs? The otherwise interesting and invaluable contributions of the 
domestic politics approach point to a deeper level of political reality without 
clarifying what this is. It is, therefore, prone to realist criticisms of positivism that it is 
based on observational regularities and a conjunction of conditions without any 
reference to the causal mechanisms and underlying structures which are involved in 
these processes (Keat and Urry 1975; Bhasker 1978; Outhwaite 1987). I would 
suggest that this stems from a failure to develop a theory of the British state within the 
global system. Instead there is a tendency to adopt a pluralist approach that 
disaggregates the state into a diversity of institutions, interest groups and political 
parties (see Bulmer 1983: 351). This thesis therefore extends the domestic politics 
approach in such a way that these methodological and theoretical lacunae are 
confronted through the application of political sociological concepts and theories that 
uncover a deeper layer of social reality.
The question arises as to whether these different features represent structural and 
chronic constraints in Britain’s relationship with European integration; or, whether 
they are merely part of a process of adaptation to Britain’s European reality? Kaiser 
(1996), for instance, has argued that Britain’s awkward partner status has been 
exaggerated and that elements of the British political system have not been as 
constraining as has been assumed. Drawing on public records, he argues that British 
elites had accepted by the 1950s that compromises in British sovereignty would have 
to be made. This reflects the underlying reorientation of British foreign policy towards 
the EC/EU (W. Wallace 1974; Bulmer 1992). The divergences in economic policy 
that have been central to recent conflicts between Britain and the EU may also have 
been exaggerated. Gowan points out that it was Chancellor Geoffrey Howe’s drive for 
ending the controls on the free movement of capital that Jacques Delors took up and 
‘which formed the basis for the entire single market programme’ (1997:100). To 
what extent, therefore, have British governments been exceptional in being ‘reluctant 
Europeans’? Indeed, it might be said that all states are in some respects exceptional6. 
Nevertheless, this leaves us with the problem of identifying what is exceptional about 
British exceptionalism and deciding whether this is comparatively and historically 
significant.
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Clearly, the British regime has had to adapt to European integration but the 
identification of empirical features of this process does not disprove the possibility of 
an underlying disjuncture. The domestic politics approach, however, has been open to 
empirical refutations because of its failure to engage with the deeper reality of the 
British political order and because it prioritises specific observational features of this 
relationship. It appears to stand or fall on whether one or other institutional factor is 
considered to be historically or comparatively significant7. In contrast I claim that the 
real significance of British exceptionalism is not uncovered unless the domestic 
institutions of the British politico-economic order are considered within the context of 
their global formation and evolution (Arrghi 1994). From the viewpoint of this 
thesis, domestic institutions cannot simply be studied from an internalist perspective, 
as they are determined by the developments within the inter-state system, and by the 
global configuration of capitalist social relations. Indeed, as will be shown, British 
exceptionalism may reflect historical and global trends that are not atypical of 
political and economic development but are not necessarily fully compatible with 
European modernity. It is only when the British politico-economic order is explored 
within a wider theoretical framework that we can begin to appreciate the structural 
dimensions of the exceptional relationship of the British state to the project of 
European integration. The British state and the EC/EU have to be viewed from a 
historical perspective that can locate their particular trajectories within a broader set 
of global determinants. From such a perspective, we can begin to fully appreciate the 
structural nature of the British state’s difficult relationship to the project of European 
integration. In particular, when these wider factors are taken into consideration, it may 
be possible to hypothesise that the partial Europeanisation of the British political 
order is in fact an extremely crisis-ridden, elite driven process that may not reflect 
deeper processes of political modernisation.
13 The research agenda: structural analysis and historical research
In this section, I want to deal more specifically with what I mean by a structural
analysis of the relationship between the British state and European integration. As is
evident from the above discussion, I am developing a structural analysis that is
concerned with historically embedded social relations that frame and contextualise
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elite action. Furthermore, the institutions I am interested in are structures of 
domination that consist of struggles to reproduce asymmetric relations within and 
across societies. It is important to emphasise that actors are not completely determined 
by structures but rather that structures represent limiting frameworks within which 
action takes place. As we shall see in this section, I draw on critical realism (Keat and 
Urry 1975; Bhasker 1978,1979,1989; Outhwaite 1987; Sayer 1992; Archer 1995, 
1996) to explicate the methodological and theoretical distinctiveness of the kind of 
structural analysis that informs this study. Inevitably, this raises a large number of 
issues concerning the philosophy of the social sciences and the nature of sociological 
enquiry that cannot practically be addressed in depth in the context of the present 
study. My aim here is simply to raise some important theoretical issues concerning a 
structural analysis and to propose a rationale for the approach taken.
I examine the history of Britain’s relationship with European integration from an 
analysis of the British state as essentially anti-European political modernisation. By 
this I mean that its historically embedded institutions and political relations are in a 
profound sense antithetical to the process of European integration. In a number of 
important respects the study is underpinned by a critical realist meta-theory. I am 
interested in the structural mechanisms that underpin the conflicts and events that 
make up the content of the relationship between the British state and European 
integration. Following the tenets of critical realism, I claim that the social world 
exhibits ontological depth. From this perspective, social reality can be seen as 
stratified i.e. consisting of multiple layers that are hierarchically ordered. This deep 
reality consists of structures that may or may not be actualised in reality but are 
defined by their causal potential. Theoretical reasoning is essential because the 
structural mechanisms that realists wish to uncover have a reality beyond 
observational language. Thus a genuinely scientific sociology cannot be restricted to 
replicating the closed systems of natural science in order to identify causal 
mechanisms, but has to engage with the complexity of social reality.
From such a position, the examination of broad patterns and trends in social and
political development, is essential for the coherent description and explanation of
structures that are being reproduced over large tracts of time. Institutions are therefore
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conceived in sociological terms as social wholes that are also parts of interdependent 
social systems. The aim is to explore the British state and European integration from 
the perspective of system integration (Lockwoodl964). However, this raises 
methodological problems. It may be argued that it results in prioritising theoretical 
reasoning and chains of historical inferences over a more rigorous empirical analysis. 
The approach of much macro-sociological analysis may be derided as ‘story-telling’:
‘the method of what historians call colligation, the binding together of facts, 
low level generalisations, high-level theories, and value-judgements in a 
coherent narrative, held together by a glue of an implicit set of beliefs and 
attitudes that an author shares within all his readers. In able hands it can be 
extremely persuasive, and yet it is never easy to explain afterwards why it has
persuaded because storytelling lacks rigour, lacks a definite logical
structure, it is all too easy to verify and virtually impossible to falsify.’ (Blaug 
cited in Sayer 1992: 251)
The problem with this argument is that it misses the point about the relationship 
between theoretical analysis and empirical evidence. Specifically, social scientists are 
concerned with complex social relations stretching across time and space in which 
causal relations cannot be examined in isolation from extraneous influences (Sayer 
1992: 250-251; Outhwaite 1987: 22). In examining the open systems that concern 
social scientists, there are always likely to be new causal mechanisms emerging that 
have not initially been considered and may only become explicit through different 
interpretations of the same conditions. Furthermore, human beings characteristically 
transform systems and structures and, thus, they lack the stability that is often present 
in other non-human phenomenon.
This raises important issues about the relationship between theory and research. In 
particular, the search for clear causal groups in the context of complex and chaotic 
open systems may not be appropriate. Indeed, we may go further and add that the 
acknowledgement of open systems is integral to social scientific analysis because they 
are the medium and content of human experience. Thus:
‘ ... a realist analysis of causality can account for the interaction of various 
causal tendencies within the complex and open systems among which we live, 
and which we ourselves are.’ (Outhwaite 1987: 22)
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From the perspective of critical realism, the identification of observable regularities is 
subordinate to explanations of the mechanisms that generate events. The key point 
here is that causal mechanisms are activated by human action, which is never entirely 
predictable and has its own causal properties. In this respect, structures that concern 
sociologists cannot be the same as structures in the natural world and sociologists 
require a variety of methodological strategies in order to understand social reality:
‘So causal analysis is usually closely tied to abstraction and structural analysis 
and hence explanation to description. There is also interdependence between 
all of these and the interpretation of meaning. As reasons can be causes and 
structures can be concept-dependent, causal, structural and interpretive 
analysis are interdependent.’ (Sayer 1992:114)
Outhwaite argues that once we have accepted the ontological properties of structure 
and agency as understood by critical realism then we should conceive of social 
processes in terms of Gidden’s ‘duality of structure’ or Bhasker’s transformational 
model of social activity’ (1987:117). In relation to this debate I refer to the work of 
Margaret Archer which represents one of the most significant attempts to refine the 
structure/action conception distinction in line with a realist ontology. Contra 
structuration theory (Giddens 1984), Archer has emphasised the ontological 
distinction between the properties of agents and structures and that these should not be 
conflated:
‘Structures (as emergent properties) are not only irreducible to people, they 
pre-exist them, and people are not puppets of structures because they have 
their own emergent properties which mean they either reproduce or transform 
social structure rather than creating it. To explain which occurs, the realist 
examines the interplay between the two (endorsing and utilising separability) 
and in both cases, reproduction and transformation necessarily refer to 
maintaining or changing something which is temporally prior to these 
activities, and whose change itself is posterior to them (thus entailing 
temporality).’ (Archer 1996:695)
From this perspective, fundamental temporal differences underpin the distinctiveness 
of system and social integration. These differences relate to the varying properties and 
powers of structures compared to agents. Archer wants us to make a clear distinction 
between the parts and the people. It is, therefore, the interplay between these different
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‘emergent properties’8 of structures and agency that determines outcomes (Archer 
1995:190). Structures pre- and post date action while action in turn intervenes and 
has practical consequences for structural elaboration; ‘it follows from this that the two 
cannot be co-variate in time’ and that one cannot be seen as the epiphenomenon of the 
other (Archer 1996: 694, 697). Structures then exhibit causal powers as generative 
mechanisms, while people are viewed as having their own powers of self and social 
reflection which determines the ways in which structures are received, reproduced and 
transformed (Archer 1995:174-175; 1996: 699-698).
The danger with a sharply dualistic approach to structure and agency is that the 
underlying ontological unity within particular historical lifeworlds may be 
overlooked. In the case of class exploitation and class conflict, there is a direct 
relationship between structural necessity and reactive agency that may best be 
understood from the perspective of the totality of capitalist social relations. The 
danger is that critical realists approach structure and agency as discrete features of 
social reality and, thereby, ignore the historical and dialectical nature of structure and 
agency. The consequence may be structural reification or even, conversely, 
voluntarism. Indeed, Roberts argues that the ontological claims made by realists for 
social phenomena collapse when considered from the perspective of historical totality 
(1999: 41). According to Roberts, critical realism potentially ‘loses contact with the 
sensuous nature of history’ and conceives of capitalism in terms of its technical 
qualities (ibid: 44). This is certainly the case when we consider Archer’s conception 
of structure that is unequivocally materialist and conceptually severed from a concern 
with meanings and legitimation (1995: 62). The operationalisation of such a 
conception of structure would be mechanical and ahistorical.
A key feature of critical realism is that it need not be as prescriptive as its critics
suppose. It is not committed ‘to the adulatory reification of particular existing
sciences, as intellectual and social forms, any more than to that of particular theories
and methods within them’ (Outhwaite 1987:118). It certainly allows for a conception
of structure that is concerned with recurrent historical contingencies and struggles that
are intrinsic to structural processes. In many respects, it can be argued that critical
realism transcends dualisms by taking the ontological properties of different
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dimensions of social reality seriously whether this reality is ultimately conceived as a 
complex whole or not.
I propose, therefore, that we can maintain the ontological distinctiveness of structures 
without engaging in reification and/or presenting them as mechanically deterministic. 
In particular, a structural analysis must proceed from the assumption that outcomes 
are first and foremost the product of definite and specifiable conditions and cannot be 
conceived as the simple effect of a structure (Hindess 1982: 334-335). Clearly, such a 
position is essential in order to maintain the possibility of structural transformation in 
the contexts of structures of domination (Stewart 2001). For Hindess, such structures 
are always contingent in the sense that they are sites of practices (ibid: 339). More 
specifically they can be conceived as arenas of struggles because they consist of 
opposing practices (ibid). Nevertheless, objectives and outcomes are clearly 
constrained and structured by these arenas even if their precise outcome is not 
dictated. In the case of formalised state power struggles, the patterns of interests and 
identities are often highly institutionalised to the point where a high degree of 
structural reproduction through struggle is likely to occur. In such contexts a range of 
practices may be evident, but real transformatory agency may not. The point, 
however, is that we can only come to such conclusions once we have begun to address 
specific contexts. In this case structures are identified ‘as a long chain of linked and 
contingent antecedents, a “trajectory” or “path” ’ (Bryant 1994:11 emphasis mine) 
and are explicated through theoretically informed historical reconstructions. This is 
the approach taken to structural analysis in the present study and underpins the use of 
historical narrative to set out the core arguments and interpretations. Specifically, the 
focus is on the practices and projects that reconstitute and reassert British 
exceptionalism in relation to European integration. Thus, while this is a study of 
macro-sociological processes, reification is avoided by connecting macro structures to 
the actions of macro-actors (Mouzelis 1995). It is the extent of historical continuity 
identified in these types of political agency that leads us to conceptualise the problem 
of Britain and European integration as structural.
If, as I have claimed, structural reproduction is identified through the explication of
historically contextualised agency then we enter the difficult arena of the relationship
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between history and sociology. Here, the particular danger facing sociologists 
undertaking historical research is that they potentially adopt a positivist conception of 
history and, as Goldthorpe notes,
‘treat the facts, or concatenations of facts or entire accounts, that they find in 
secondary sources as it if they were relatively discrete and stable entities that 
can be excerpted and then brought together in order that some larger design 
may be realised.’ (1991: 221)
Goldthorpe claims that the tendency of some historical sociologists to assume the 
stability of historical evidence means that the links they wish to make between 
evidence and argument are often tenuous and arbitrary (ibid: 222). This represents a 
significant criticism and highlights the problems of conflating sociological and 
historical enterprises. Notably, those sociologists who are concerned with establishing 
large-scale social and political trends are in danger of failing to acknowledge two 
significant problems with their work. Firstly, they rely on second order historical 
accounts and therefore produce what are essentially ‘interpretations of interpretations 
of, perhaps, interpretations’ (ibid: 223). Secondly, grand historical sociology is often 
faced with conflicting interpretations of historical evidence that they have to choose 
between (ibid). However, Goldthorpe, claims that they provide us with no 
methodological criteria for making such a choice (ibid). The dilemma, as Goldthorpe 
acknowledges, is that sociological analysis cannot do without a historical dimension 
because the analysis of social change is central to the discipline (ibid: 216). We may 
add that this is not simply a consequence of having to establish ‘the time-space 
coordinates’ of a social investigation but is a result of the centrality of history to the 
ontology of social phenomena (Bryant 1994:10-11). Indeed, despite the 
methodological traps Goldthorpe identifies, historically informed social analysis is 
fundamental to sociology because it identifies social processes that have often proved 
elusive to other kinds of sociological research. These arguments do not invalidate 
Goldthorpe’s methodological qualms about such work, indeed they make them even 
more pertinent, but they certainly raise the stakes in terms of the relationship between 
theory, methodology and research. The point here is that a methodological awareness 
of these issues should not lead to a fetishisation of primary evidence or an empiricist 
mistrust of all theory (Outhwaite 1987).
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In order to address some of the issues raised by the above discussion it may be useful 
to refer to some of the problems of evidence raised by the present study. Commenting 
on the historiography of Britain and European integration, Gowland and Turner point 
out that,
‘The historian of this as of any other period faces the task of forming a 
judgement on the basis of incomplete information and in the sure knowledge 
that no source offers either incontrovertible meaning or a ‘definitive’ picture.’ 
(2000b: xv)
Despite this the number of authoritative accounts that have now emerged on the 
subject do provide a wealth of historical data that forms the basis for sociological 
analysis (Deighton 1995; Kaiser 1996; Gowland and Turner 2000a). Furthermore, 
because we are dealing with the recent past much of this evidence consists of first 
hand accounts and an extensive range of authenticated documents. This may explain 
why government papers recently made available, such as those concerning the first 
application for membership, have confirmed rather than contradicted what was 
previously known from contemporary accounts (Gowland and Turner 2000b: xv).
This study then draws on a range of authoritative texts that are concerned with 
general overviews of British relationship with Europe as well as more specific texts 
covering particular periods and events. These texts tend to draw on other secondary 
work as well as primary material. The purpose of the current work is not to provide a 
new account of the events that make up the historiography of Britain and European 
integration but involves a reinterpretation of the existing accounts of this relationship. 
Therefore, I have selected from the literature, strategic examples and the main ‘facts’ 
surrounding significant events. I have often synthesised and extended existing 
interpretations of the established historiography in order to support my analysis. 
Where I have considered it necessary to support the discussion with primary 
materials, I have introduced relevant documents and personal accounts to support and 
emphasise interpretations. I have made particular use of political autobiography in 
order to gain first hand accounts as well as evidence of political attitudes and beliefs.
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parliamentary debates, party political documents and media material have also been 
included.
There are of course limitations to the procedures outlined above. The broad scope of 
the study means that some facts may be taken as given, when from the point of view 
of more detailed work they may be questionable. In this respect, I have to 
acknowledge my reliance on the existing historiography and its core interpretations in 
order to develop my arguments. In general, the approach taken can be referred to as a 
form of documentary research that relies on the establishment of chains of inferences. 
The limitations of such an approach potentially lies in its ‘openness’ in relation to 
what may count as good evidence and its claims of proof of conclusions (Platt 1981: 
64-65). I have suggested that we can defend such an approach because of the 
historical ontology of social phenomena and its advantages in establishing causal 
mechanisms. In this section, I have also argued that the evidential base of such 
research and the interpretations reached can be accounted for and approached 
systematically.
1.4 Conclusion
The relationship between the British state and the project of European integration has 
been inextricably linked to a politics of post-imperial modernisation. Despite 
membership of the European Union, Britain has continued to be at odds with a deeper 
project of European integration. The implication is that the politics of domestic 
modernisation have not resolved the question of Britain’s post imperial role in a 
fundamentally European direction. The domestic politics approach is suggestive of the 
reasons for this but does not fully explain the structural nature of these constraints 
and tensions. To do so we must begin to relate domestic politics and institutions to 
the historical and global dynamics of economic and political modernisation.
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Chapter Two 
The Global Dynamics of Modernisation and British 
Exceptionalism
The examination of social phenomena from the perspective of societal trajectories and 
the broad parameters of social and political change sets sociology apart from other 
disciplines. In particular in recent years, the idea that social relations and institutions 
under modernity are globalised has become a fundamental feature of sociological 
explanation (Harvey 1989; Giddens 1990; Albrow 1996; Castells 1996; Bauman 
1998; Beck 1999; Held et al 1999). The starting point in this chapter is economic and 
political modernisation as contrasting forms of political rule. This analytical 
framework is then used to understand and explain changes in the global order. From 
such a perspective, we are able to explore the processes of European integration as 
pent of the global dynamics of economic and political modernisation. Towards the end 
of the Chapter, I turn to the specifics of the British case. Here we find the historical 
subordination of national political modernisation to the pursuit of a global free market 
and the prioritising of capitalism as a mode of rule. This underpinned the 
establishment of Britain as a hegemonic global power and resulted in a distinctive 
relationship to European political modernity. This provides the framework from 
which to understand the structural tensions in the relationship between the British 
state and European integration.
2.1 Economic and political modernisation: contrasting forms of political rule
The general theoretical framework concerns two contrasting forms of political rule 
that are typical of modernity. The first is economic modernisation and is concerned 
with the transformation of political relations into private economic relations. This is 
particularly associated with the transition from feudalism and the abstract separation 
of the state from civil society. Following Marx we should note that this separation 
between the economic and the political is not substantive but abstract and ideological 
(1975:165-6). It is in fact a separation within the political sphere that gives rise to two
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political spheres; a public sphere of the state and communal relations and the private 
political sphere of the family, property and economic activity (Wood 1981;
Rosenburg 1994). This does not mean that politics is reduced to civil society but that 
modernity is characterised by conflicting arenas of legality and legitimacy. As Rose 
notes, ‘their [state and civil society] dirempted relation is a question of configuration 
which is always precarious’ (Rose 1992: 244). Thus, political strategies of economic 
modernisation are directed towards the establishment and restoration of private 
political power in production (Rosenburg 1994:128). It implies maintaining and 
enforcing the boundaries betweeen private and public spheres ‘which is the form of 
both class power and state power under capitalism’ (ibid: 129). The objective is the 
maximisation of the flexibility within the economy in order to secure capitalist 
accumulation9.
In comparison, a strategy of political modernisation involves a direct political 
intervention into civil society. It is associated with the extensive forms of 
administrative power exerted by a centralising political authority. A commanding 
feature of this process was the extent to which the state was able to pacify civil 
society and systematically control and employ the means of force in a society. This 
gave the modem state considerable capacity to dominate and structure social and 
political relations across a particular territory. Thus, as Ruggie notes, ‘the distinctive 
feature of the modem system of rule is that it has differentiated its subject collectivity 
into territorially defined, fixed mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion’ 
(1993:151). A significant consequence of this was that the solutions to the problems 
of modem societies have been conceived in terms of new and more extensive forms of 
state intervention. Crook et al summarise these developments as follows:
‘A modem political idiom of “ power politics” arose, based on systematic and 
rational interst representation and mediation. Its advanced or late modem form 
was founded on an alignment between major societal forces and organized 
political groups and on systematic, instrumental, pragmatic, elite-controlled 
interest mediation. Finally political modernization involved a concentration of 
the means of administration in the centralized state machines, a process which 
was subsequently accelerated by centralization and concentration in the 
economy and the mass media, and the extension of control over social 
processes. Thus, on the differentiation of political functions, bureaucratization 
of organization, and rationality of political action.’ (1992: 81)
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The extensive forms of political modernisation found within the modem European 
nation-state have been associated with the struggle to bring about the symbiotic 
development of capitalism and formal democracy within a particular territory. This 
has not been without significant problems. Offe, in particular, has drawn attention to 
‘the internal complexity and potential inconsistensies of functions which have been 
assigned to the modem state’ (1985: 5). Large- scale administration of society by the 
state has not necessarily been either effective or legitimate. Furthermore, interventions 
by the state into the economy have risked undermining the private organisation of the 
means of production. Current developments suggest that the state has been devolving 
and decentralising its powers and responsibilities in a bid to relieve tensions and offset 
potential crises (Crook et al 1992: 65; Offe 1996: 65). This has involved new 
territorial redistributions of political authority, shifting power downwards to regions 
and sub-nations and upwards to supranational bodies such as the European Union. It 
also involves a dispersal of state power to a range of quasi-govemmental and non- 
govervemmental actors, and to the private sector. These developments suggest a 
reversal in the centralising and monopolising processes that characterised modem 
state development. They also imply unique forms of late modem political 
modernisation. Such processes must, however, be placed in the context of the global 
dynamics of modernisation.
2.2 Analysing changes in the global order
The approach taken here is that the process of European integration represents a 
significant transformation of state power and the emergence of a relatively 
autonomous form of regional governance. However, European integration has been 
shaped by a range of economic and political factors associated with global 
transformations (Held 1999:10; Giddens 2001: 58-61). The purpose of this section is 
to provide an account of the global dynamics of political and economic 
modernisation. From this perspective, we can begin to understand how the history of 
the British state and European integration is a particular dimension of a broader set of 
set of global formations.
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A useful starting point is Giddens’ definition of globalisation ‘as the intensification of 
worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local 
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.’ (1990: 
61). He goes on to claim that the principal actors within the global political order are 
nation-states, while corporations are the dominant agents within the world economy 
(ibid: 71). Here Giddens is connecting two dominant conceptions of the global order, 
world systems theory and international relations, each of which draw our attention to 
the core institutions of the global order. The significant insight of world systems 
theory was that it located capitalist class relations within a global context that was 
independent of the nation-state (Wallerstein 1980). Wallerstein demonstrated that 
capitalism brought about a genuine world economy through commercial and 
manufacturing interconnectedness. This economy was, however, geographically 
segmented as total profit moved from periphery to core zones. Yet, world systems 
theory failed to demonstrate the extent to which class power was crystallized at the 
national level (Overbeek 1990:13; Giddens 1991: 69). The implications of this for 
our understanding of the actual historical development of capitalism are profound. 
Overbeek argues that Wallerstein works with a ‘very superficial concept of 
capitalism’ that does not consider the extent to which capitalism is a real social 
formation articulated by processes of nation-building and state formation (1990:14). 
Indeed, capitalism as an economic system is predicated on the political separation of 
state from civil society.
If the problem of the nation-state was not adequately addressed by world systems
theory, the opposite problem arises when we consider international relations. The
latter was founded on a realist conception of the nation-state as an autonomous
domain, which can be treated as an independent actor engaging with others in the
international arena (Morganthau 1978; Waltz 1979). More recently the emphasis has
shifted to an understanding of the complex interdependence of states that has emerged
as a consequence of the intensification of international transactions (Keohane and Nye
1977). Consequently, networks of reciprocal relations are seen to characterise the
mature state system. However, the extent to which the autonomy of nation-states has
been undermined remains questionable (Held 1995: 92, 96; Sassen 1996, 2000). The
broader issue that interdependence theory raises, but fails to resolve, is the
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significance of processes that ‘are not between states or outside states, but crosscut 
state divides’ (Giddens 1990: 67). In this sense, interdependence theory does not 
break free from classical realism because it is established on the principle of the 
distinction between domestic and external affairs (Bonefield et al 1995:19). This is 
particularly evident when we conceptualise capitalism as a system that is never 
entirely contained by nation-states. As Arrighi points out, capitalism escapes the 
spaces-of-places:
‘In the space of flows, in contrast, it triumphed by not becoming identified 
with any particular state but by constructing world-encompassing, non- 
territorial business organisations.’ (1994: 84)
Nation-states therefore compete with one another in order to direct the flow of capital 
to a particular territory, but they also operate as regulators of these flows in 
cooperation within other states (Bonefield et al 1995:18). In effect, states may 
control capital as part of their power over territory and populations, or the control over 
populations and territory may be a means or by-product of the control over capital 
(Arrighi 1994: 30; Giddens 1985:13-14). Arrighi refers to the former as a territorialist 
logic of state formation and the latter as a capitalist logic of state formation. States 
thus employ strategies of both political and economic modernisation in varying 
degrees and at different times. This brings into sharp focus the complex and 
indeterminate relationship between nation-state reproduction and global capital 
accumulation which is not addressed by world systems theory or international 
relations. From such a perspective the global system can only ever be contingently 
stabilised and this occurs under the hegemony of a leading capitalist state. According 
to Arrighi, successful and concerted capitalist expansions only occurred when inter­
state competition is contained by dominant blocs of world power that could bring this 
competition under control and ensure minimal state cooperation (ibid: 12). He 
identifies four states -  Venice, the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the 
United States -  as successive global leaders in processes of state formation and 
capitalist accumulation (ibid: 14). The sequence of development is crucial here as 
each political order ‘encompasses a larger territory and a greater variety of resources 
than those of its predecessor’ (ibid). In other words, each stage involves more
extensive and complex forms of political and economic modernisation. Thus, the long
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duree of societal rationalisation that is considered to be characteristic of modernity 
consists of shorter historical periods of modernisation. This is central to the present 
thesis as the politico-economic situation of any particular state or political order can 
only be understood once it is located within the stage of development of the global 
order as a whole.
23  Global Fordism and European integration
For the purposes of this thesis we are particularly interested in the more recent stages 
of global development that can be conceptualised in terms of the consolidation and 
crisis of global Fordism (Gramsci 1971: 312; Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1985; Hall and 
Jacques 1989; Harvey 1989; Rustin 1989; Overbeek 1990; Amin 1994). Global 
Fordism is characterised by ‘Fordism when considered at the level of the organisation 
of production, as the era of the Keynesian welfare state when looked at from the level 
of society and state, and as Pax Americana when looked at from the perspective of the 
overall organisation of the capitalist world system* (Overbeek 1990: 87). The 
changes in the organisation of production involved the reorganisation of the labour 
process and included the introduction of mass production techniques, increased 
discipline of workforces and relatively high wages in order to secure cooperation. In 
terms of the wider regulation of society it involved such factors as the extension of 
social welfare, collective wage bargaining and the incorporation of organised labour 
into economic planning. Pax Americana implied the reinvention of a liberal trade 
system amongst capitalist nations, the establishment of the dollar as a global currency 
and America as a global banker, and the aggressive extension of American militarism. 
Of course, these developments were framed by the parameters of the Cold War and 
Pax Americana has to be seen as an emergent global project. A key feature of 
American imperialism was the ‘globalizing of the sovereign state-system’ (Rosenburg 
1994:169).
Globed Fordism under Pax Americana, and its European articulation, forms the
context for much of the discussion in Chapter 3. The project of European integration
is viewed as a distinctive European dimension of global Fordism that is intertwined
with the development of the global system in the post-war period. In particular, the
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process of European integration is linked to the crisis of the nation-state form in post­
war Europe and the need to re-establish stable regimes of accumulation and 
legitimation. In Europe, these problems found a distinctive solution in the 
consolidation of European Fordist nation-states and an emergent transnational 
European economy. Political modernisation was mainly pursued at the national level 
but was also expressed in the emerging political and economic organisation of 
Western Europe. In particular, the latter was to involve a process of functional and 
technical integration that would form the basis for the construction of a European 
political community. This functionalist approach to integration envisaged that groups 
with particular interests and values would undergo change once they began to co­
operate within transnational contexts (Haas 1966:13-14). Ultimately, ‘the erstwhile 
set of separate national group values will gradually be superseded by a new and 
geographically larger set of beliefs’ (ibid). The focus was not, therefore, on building a 
European state, but on facilitating the construction of a European civil society initially 
organised around economic and technical cooperation. The processes of informal 
integration were, therefore, intrinsically linked to processes of formal integration in 
the emerging conceptions of a European political community outlined by writers such 
as Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch:
‘Common to all these approaches was a concern for a relationship between the 
establishment of political structures and their legitimation through the 
development of a shared sense of shared interests and values, which Deutsch 
designated a political community. All assumed a close interaction between 
economic integration, creating new patterns of economic interest as well as of 
trade, the social communication which accompanied this -  and which in part 
resulted from it -  and the creation of new levels of political institutions. None 
was entirely clear as to which was the independent variable and the dependent 
ones.’ (Wallace 1990a: 61-62)
What these authors envisaged was the construction of a European political community 
through the incremental, and largely technocratic, development of a European civil 
society. It was this idea that was considered to be over-optimistic by 
intergovemmentalists in the 1960s and 1970s (Hoffman 1966). It was argued that neo­
functionalists had completely underestimated the continued centrality of the nation­
state to political organisation and political identity. In the context of a stalling of
formal integration, neo-realists claimed that the European Community was essentially
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continuous with the nation-state system. This argument was predicated on an over­
extended concept of the sovereign state that underestimated its economic 
vulnerability.
2.4 Flexible accumulation and European integration
The limits of state-centric approaches to European integration became increasingly 
clear when the second wave of integration began to take off with the single market 
project in the 1980s (Schmitter 1996a: 10). The context for this was the emerging 
crisis of global Fordism. A key feature of the post-war European Fordist nation-state 
had been the attempt to accommodate the inherent class conflict of modem capitalist 
societies within a set of complex institutional arrangements. It systematically 
institutionalised the power of organised labour via corporatist arrangements and 
secured mass loyalty via the extension of social citizenship. The consequence of this 
attempt to constrain and regulate capitalism and secure national power containers was 
the introduction of rigidities into social organisation that eventually proved 
detrimental to capitalist accumulation, as Harvey notes:
‘There were problems of rigidities in the labour markets, labour allocation, and 
in labour contracts (especially in the so-called ‘monopoly sector’). And any 
attempt to overcome these rigidities ran into the seemingly immovable force of 
deeply entrenched working class power -  hence the strike waves and labour 
dismptions of the period 1968-72. The rigidities of state commitments also 
became more serious as entitlement programmes (social security, pension 
rights, etc.) grew under pressure to keep legitimacy at a time when rigidities in 
production restricted any expansion in the fiscal basis for state expenditure.’ 
(1989:142)
Harvey points here to the key argument of regulationists that the post-war crisis was a
consequence of increased working class power and rigidities this imposed on capital
accumulation (Sachs 1979; Aglietta 1979; Boyer 1988; Armstrong et al 1991). Yet
according to Brenner this is an insufficient explanation for the extent of the crisis and
he argues that the economic downturn was a consequence of over production and over
capacity in the international economy (1998; 2001; 2002). A similar point is made by
Harvey when he argues that the regulationists fail to address the underlying logic of
capitalism and its mechanisms and transitions (1989:179). Drawing directly on Marx,
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Brenner argues that capitalism is prone to periodic crisis because it is an inherently 
anarchic system in which,
‘individual capitalists have no interest in and are in any case incapable of, 
taking account of the aggregate effects of their actions... specifically the 
destructive impact of their cost cutting on already-existing capitals and on the 
ability of those capitals to yield profits.’ (2001: 9)
Brenner points to a breakdown in the global economic arrangements that had 
sustained the post-war boom, namely the hegemonic relationship between the United 
States and other economies. The post-war US economy expanded through supporting 
the growth of Europe and Japan in a symbiotic relationship that came to an end once 
these rival economies started exporting the same products at lower prices to the 
United States (ibid: 13). Fordism was marked by intensified international competition 
between companies that were exporting products that had initially been produced for 
the home market. There was therefore, international trade in the same products that 
resulted in over capacity and over production. We can note that Brenner’s arguments 
points to the rigidities within a Fordist system of mass production and mass 
consumption but these are understood in terms of the logic of capitalism as a global 
system. Clearly Harvey’s aim is to locate modes of accumulation and regulation 
theory within this powerful capitalist logic:
‘The crisis of Fordism was, therefore, as much a geographical and geopolitical 
crisis as it was a crisis of indebtedness, class struggle, or corporate stagnation 
within any particular nation-state. It was simply that the mechanisms evolved 
for controlling crisis tendencies were finally overwhelmed by the power of the 
underlying contradictions of capitalism.’ (1989:186)
The crisis of Fordism was eventually exhausted once the existing strategies for
dealing with over accumulation had reached their limits. Fordist strategies of crisis
management including increased international competition, rising government debt,
devaluation and the break down of fixed currency systems, essentially created and
reinforced existing crisis tendencies to the point where the only solution was a
fundamental shift in the organisation of production (ibid: 184-186). It implied a
strategy of economic modernisation designed to recommodify social relations and
reassert the boundaries between the political and the economic. The overcoming of
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the rigidities of Fordism and the reorganisation of economic structures along the lines 
of flexible accumulation became the dominant capitalist strategy:
‘Flexible accummulation as I shall call it, is marked by a direct confrontation 
with the rigidities of Fordism. It rests on flexibility with respect to labour 
processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption. It is 
characterised by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new 
ways of providing financial services, new markets, and above all greatly 
intensified rates of commercial, technological and organizational innovation.’ 
(Harvey 1989:147)
To a large extent, the move to flexible accumulation was accomplished by employers’ 
and governments’ persistent attacks on worker’s organisations, working conditions 
and living standards which culminated in significantly reduced wage growth and 
social spending, and increased unemployment. From the perspective of the social 
organistion of time and space, the crisis of the Fordist nation-state was fundamentally 
an attack on its spatial organisation by the temporal revolutionising of capitalist 
production and was consistent with capital’s capacity to perpetually deconstruct social 
power by re-shaping its geographical bases (ibid: 238). Specifically, it was the 
autonomy and empowerment of financial capital vis a vis the nation-state that became 
central to the realisation of this new flexibility (ibid: 165,194-195). This was 
particularly evident with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods financial system as the 
crisis in the dollar as an international currency became apparent from the late 1960s 
onwards. Financial capitalists disembedded themselves from national regimes of 
accumulation in the flexible pursuit of global profits (Strange 1986; Castells 1996; 
Greider 1997). A process that has gone hand in hand with multinationals shifting 
productive activity and assets between locations in order to capitalize on the volatility 
in demand, price, currency and value. In this globalizing economy, financial markets 
take on the role of ultimate arbiter over government economic policies, to a large 
extent replacing national legislatures, electorates and corporatist arrangements. What 
they have demanded have been policies of macro-economic discipline in order to 
protect investors. In this context, international institutions such as the IMF, OECD 
and World Bank have increasingly pressurised the developing and developed world 
into accepting austerity measures and deregulation and countries which ignore this
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pressure risk a flight of capital and currency crisis. Their key role has been therefore 
to preserve the international financial system.
Underpinning these processes has been the crisis and renewal of American hegemony. 
The globalisation of capitalist relations has been the response to the crisis in 
profitability and hegemony of the US that has been contingently resolved through a 
financial expanstion (Arrighi 1994,2003; Panitch 2000). From this perspective, 
globalisation does not simply represent an ideological mis-representation of the inter­
national political economy (Hirst and Thompson 1999). Rather, as preceding financial 
expansions have shown, globalisation implies a breakdown of policial, social and 
economic system integration in such a way that it transcends inter-national 
organisation (Arrighi 2003: 68-69). It is indicative of the capacity of capitalism to 
thwart political modernisation through disrupting time/space relations.
Global capitalism requires the pursuit of strategies of economic modernisation by 
powerful political and economic elites. They are dependent on human action and 
therefore disordered and uncertain. More specifically at the level of the political, 
globalisation is articulated as globalised power struggles over the reproduction and 
transformation of interests and identities. Thus, ‘local transformation is as much a part 
of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space’ 
(Giddens 1990: 64). The implication is that as economic modernisation proceeds we 
also witness re-organisations in political space. The central claims of this thesis 
concerning the British state and European integration are examined within this 
context.
2.5 European integration, globalisation and political modernisation
In recent times, the consequence of this structuring and restructuring of social and
economic relations in post-war Europe has been the globalisation of initially Western
Europe and more recently of Eastern Europe. By this I mean that there has been a
regionalised compression of time-space relations within Europe that is part of a range
of complex global processes of spatial and temporal transformation (Harvey 1989). If
the world has shrunk over the last twenty years or so, Europe has been shrinking at a
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particularly rapid rate and this is most clearly evidenced by the collapse of state 
socialism. As we have seen, these developments should be associated with the global 
spread of capitalist relations and, in particular, with a dramatic deterritorialisation of 
financial capitalism that has undermined the very concept of the nation-state (ibid: 
194; Castells 1996; Greider 1997). A primary outcome of these developments has 
been the intensification of inter and intra regionalised patterns of trade and 
investments (Hirst and Thompson 1999:121). Notably, the countries of the EU have 
their strongest trading and investment links with other EU countries then with Eastern 
Europe, and then with North America (ibid).
Such developments reflect extended processes of rationalisation that, also, includes 
the continued pluralisation of value spheres. In this sense people may be contingently 
integrated into Europe as a cultural or social space through work, tourism, 
consumption or social movement activity without necessarily developing a strong 
European identity. The constitution of this ‘European space’,
‘does not depend on the collective emotions and predisposed identities. It 
includes multiple spheres and subjects and is created through the activities of 
growing contingent of social and political actors who engage in the discourse 
of Europe and deploy strategic action.’ (Soysal 2002: 281)
As a consequence of both its economic liberalism, and social and cultural pluralism, 
we can conclude that ‘Europe’ materialises as part of the highly differentiated and 
fragmented experience of people’s contemporary lives. There has been a 
disembedding of social relations within the nation-state and their partial re-embedding 
at the European level. These developments have been enabled through policies 
implemented at the European level and designed to bring about the free movement of 
goods, services and people i.e. a strategy of economic modernisation.
It is pertinent to consider the British nature of this new European reality can be 
captured in a number of ways. For example, UK trade with Europe increased from 22 
% to 53 % between 1958 and 1992 (Northcott 1995: 200). Alongside this are the 
social, cultural and political networks that incorporate British associations and 
institutions within the web of a pluralist European civil society. Overall, these
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processes of informal integration (Wallace 1990a: 54) have been part of the European 
trajectory that has characterised the post-imperial transformation and fragmentation of 
British society. Questions arise, however, over the nature of the relationship between 
this British ‘market and cultural openness’ and the political framework of the 
European Union that has emerged to foster and regulate these developments 
(McCrone and Kiely 2000: 32). Evidently, the process of integration becomes 
particularly problematic in the British context once we consider the relationship 
between formal political integration and British political structures and identities.
Wallace has usefully defined formal integration as follows:
‘Formal integration consists of deliberate actions by authoritative policy­
makers to create and adjust rules, to establish common institutions and to work 
with and through those institutions; to regulate, channel, redirect, encourage 
social and economic flows, as well as to pursue common policies’ (1990: 54).
This definition could just as equally be applied to the nation-state, however, a number 
of commentators have noted that the European Union does not fit into this modernist 
political form (Schmitter and Streeck 1991; Meehan 1993; Ruggie 1993; 
Schmitterl996; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank 1996). The European Union is increasingly 
recognised not as a recreation of the nation-state at a new level but as a unique 
political entity that represents a break with the concept of the nation-state. Thus the 
European Union has been characterised as a form of multi-level governance in which 
decision making criss-crosses political institutions at sub-national, national and 
supranational levels (Marks and Macadam 1996). While elite structures and opaque 
decision making processes mean that it is far from democratic, it is not however 
concerned with accumulating monopolistic and exclusive territorial power in the 
classic mould of nation-state building. In this sense, it is neither a form of 
intergovernmental governance nor a federation although these ‘models’ are helpful in 
understanding elements of its political crystallisation. There can be little doubt that the 
European Union is increasingly part of a new geography of power that has emerged in 
the late modem context as a consequence of processes of economic liberalisation and 
societal pluralisation. In particular, it represents a new form of regulatory governance 
tailored to the needs of the global economy (Sassen 2000: 381). With the latest
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ascendancy of capital, its regulatory power is geared around trade liberalisation and as 
national welfare states are undermined it does not replace them with comprehensive 
European social rights (Schmitter and Streeck 1991).
European integration can be seen as continuous with political modernisation as it 
represents an attempt to reorganise political space and contain the shift to flexible 
accumulation within a European society. In the context of the functional crises of the 
European welfare states it has provided a new level of governance with which to 
address the increasingly complex and atomised interests of groups and individuals 
(Anderson and Eliasson 1996: 69). Indeed, it potentially represents a new opportunity 
structure for social movement and interest group activity that had outstripped the 
competencies of European corporatism (Marks and Macadam 1996:119). While 
European monetary union is often associated with the extension of economic 
globalisation, it can also be seen to represent an attempt to organise Europe as a 
politico-economic space and provide a stable monetary policy within which to resist 
the domination of autonomous financial markets under late modernity. It is my 
contention that while European integration has to be placed within the context of a 
global shift to flexible accumulation, at present10 it also represents a partial re­
organisation of political space that means it cannot be reduced to being a mere 
epiphenomena of economic globalisation. In Europe, economic globalisation has to be 
viewed through the prism of political Europeanisation. It is this overtly political 
process that has been so contested in Britain
To a large extent these processes of formal integration have been driven by European
leaders who have become the ‘entrepreneurs of alternative political identities’ (Ruggie
1993:172). Within the arenas of the European Union, governing elites (sub-national,
national and supranational) attempt to engage with the differentiation of late modem
collective existence through the pursuit of collective projects of integration. For
example we may compare the more technocratic and ‘social’ emphasis of the French
projects to the federalist and institutionalist approaches of German and Italian
governments. These were successfully brought together by the political acumen of the
Delor’s Commission during the 1980s and early 1990s and culminated in the 1992
Maastricht Treaty (Ross 1992). Nevertheless, formal integration is a profoundly
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decentred process, within which there is no one distinct hegemonic project or actor 
orchestrating the process. The exclusive territoriality of the nation-state, whether 
realised or not, was the single fixed viewpoint from which the processes and projects 
of political modernisation were conceived (Ruggie 1993). In contrast, formal 
European integration takes place in the context of an unbundling of territoriality and 
the reconstruction of what Ruggie refers to as a ‘multiperspectival polity’ (1993:
172). From such a position, there can be no overarching European national project but 
this does not mean that political projects and actions are not Europeanised. It is 
unsurprising that the focus of analysis has shifted from European integration to the 
complexities and uncertainties of Europeanisation (Bartolini 2002; Olsen 2002). 
Currently, European political modernisation represents a struggle to achieve and 
legitimate a complex polity and a functioning civil society in a context of uncertainty 
and fragmentation. It is therefore a response to the breakdown of the symbiotic 
development of capitalism and formal democracy within the nation-state as a 
consequence of the impact of flexible accumulation.
It is apparent that the engagement with the political process of European integration 
has emerged out of the distinct European encounter with the traditions of political 
modernity and the dilemmas of political modernisation. The modernising impact of 
European membership has been central to member states. It is seen to provide a stable 
arena within which legitimate political rule and capitalism can co-exist. The chronic 
incapacity of large sections of the British political class to positively engage with the 
process of European integration is a problem of translating ‘Europe’, as a modernising 
project, into the domestic arena. The argument of the next section is that the British 
approach to formal political European integration and the problems that have been 
encountered are the consequence of the British state’s highly exceptional relationship 
to this history.
2 .6  British exceptionalism in perspective
It is in relation to processes of extended political modernisation that we have to
understand the position of British governments towards European integration. In
particular, the capacities and capabilities to fully engage in such processes have been
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historically under-developed in the British context. This situation stems from the 
achievements of a British liberal imperial state that was characterised by 
unprecedented political and economic success and was based on the principles of a 
global market society. This concept was not typical of European modernity and its 
entrenchment within British state and political culture underpins my claim that there 
has been a systemic incompatibility between the British state and the EC/EU. In this 
section, I turn in more detail to the long history of British politico-economic 
development.
My argument, here, relies on a conception of British history as exceptional, a 
perspective that was initially developed by Naim (1964a, 1964b, 1970,1976,1977, 
1979) and Anderson (1964,1968,1976 [see 1992] ). The ‘exceptionalism thesis’ was 
theoretically pioneering and opened up a range of questions concerning the 
interpretation of British history. In particular, it attempted to understand the British 
state systematically and in so doing broke with Marxist orthodoxy. The fundamental 
tenets of Anderson’s and Naim’s original thesis emphasised the continued importance 
of the seventeenth century English revolutionary settlement to English history. This 
revolution had not resulted in the rise to power of the industrial bourgeoisie but 
agrarian capital and mercantile imperialism11 (Anderson 1992:18). The land owning 
aristocracy transformed itself from feudal landlords to capitalist farmers without 
weakening many of the principles of hereditary and hierarchy (ibid: 19). Anderson 
argued that while the English revolution removed the constitutional and juridical 
barriers to capitalist development, it left almost the entire social structure intact (ibid). 
It is apparent that Anderson endorsed a perspective on seventeenth century English 
history that emphasised the continuity of an ancien regime dominated by an oligarchy 
of landowners. It was this feature of the exceptionalism thesis that E.P. Thompson 
took particular exception to:
‘These English bourgeois were not, all of them, the bloody fools Naim and 
Anderson take them to be. It is not an argument between them and those of 
other countries. It happened one way in France and another way here.’ (1978: 
59)
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In an updating of this original argument (1987 [1992]), however, Anderson 
acknowledged the similarities between the development of the English ruling class 
and other developed countries. He specifically noted the universal ascendancy of the 
landed and nobility strata across the West (ibid: 123). Nevertheless, he continued to 
subscribe to the exceptionalness of the English ruling class in comparison to their 
peers, however instead of their archaism it was their peculiar economic modernity that 
Anderson chose to emphasise. In particular, it proved to be richer and more 
productive than other ruling elites and ‘had the longest consecutive history as a 
capitalist stratum proper’ (ibid: 132). It secured its ascendancy over its nearest rivals, 
the industrial bourgeoisie, by the sheer size of its income and wealth. Furthermore, it 
was a distinctly metropolitan elite with its seasonal residences in the capital.
The exceptionalism framework developed by Anderson and Naim was primarily 
theoretical, but it has found substantive endorsement in subsequent research (Leys 
1983; Ingham 1984; Gowan 1987; Overbeek 1990). An interesting but more implicit 
endorsement of British exceptionalism has come from Cain and Hopkins’ study of 
British imperialism (1993a 1993b). They chart the establishment of an English 
imperial ‘gentlemanly order’ that combined tradition with commercial and political 
innovation (1993a: 54). It was the assimilation of financial capital into the state as a 
consequence of its role in financing the national debt after 1688 that proved decisive 
for British political development (ibid: 72). This was consolidated with the move 
towards free trade after 1815 and the establishment of sterling as an international 
currency (ibid: 83). Significantly, they see developments in English financial 
capitalism as forming the basis for the establishment of both the formal and informal 
empire.
From such a perspective, it was the very evident success of the gentlemanly elite that
hindered the political modernisation of the British state and the ‘gentlemanly order’
was not overtaken by the forms of politico-economic rationalisation that became
apparent in other countries. Consequently, what was notable about domestic British
institutions were their lack of political modernisation in the sense that it has come to
be sociologically conceptualised. It is this perspective on British development that is
central to my argument in this thesis. Crucially, the impersonal, abstract constitutional
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state identified by Hobbes, Marx and Hegel as characteristic of modernity was 
missing and in its place, what had emerged during the course of ‘modem’ British 
history was the ‘quasi-personal domination’ of a gentlemanly patrician elite:
‘In relation to the body of civil society, this ruling class established a tradition 
of informality (as opposed to the formality of the ‘normal’ State-form); 
personal or quasi-personal domination (as opposed to the impersonality 
inseparable from later States); non-bureaucratic and relatively de-centralized 
control with a weak military dimension (as distinct from ‘rationalized’, rigid 
and militarized control.’ (Naim 1977:16)
In effect, it was unnecessary to engineer capitalist relations as the social and cultural 
domination of a market-oriented society had existed since the seventeenth century. 
The exceptionalism of the British political order lies in the fact that the formal 
freedom of civil society was not concomitant with the establishment of formal 
political structures. The state as a distinct modernising force did not come into being. 
Instead, the British political order that co-existed with a market society reflected the 
personal domination of a patrician elite. As Naim notes,
‘This class framed representative rules for its members, in the most limited 
version of property-owning pariiamentarianism; less the foundation of 
“ democracy” (in the Enlightenment meaning) than a new version of 
constitutional aristocracy, like a medieval republic on a grand scale.’ (1977a: 
16)
According to Marxist commentators, the exceptionalism thesis is seen to rise or fall 
on the extent to which Britain developed a proper ruling bourgeoisie (Thompson 
1978; Barratt Brown 1988). They have questioned the emphasis on the dominance of 
an imperialist commercial capitalism over national industrial development. Barratt 
Brown claims that this is a misconception that understates the extent to which Britain 
was an agro-industrial complex, one which was integral to the development of British 
imperialism (Barratt Brown 1988: 31). Furthermore, in the establishment of laissez- 
faire capitalism the development of the state was essential in order to secure the 
freedom of capital:
‘What sort of a nightwatchman was this who prepared the ground for every 
single activity of the buildings occupants and not only watched against
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unfriendly acts from outside but effectively ruled the seven seas and 
established colonial outposts in every continent?’ (ibid: 35)
Yet Barratt Brown’s account of the crisis in British society as a consequence of the 
absence of a powerful meritocratic technocracy within industry and government 
appears unconvincing because it lacks the underlying theoretical explanation that 
could account for the specifics of British development (1988: 40-42). The point of the 
exceptionalism thesis was not to deny British industrialisation or the emergence of the 
bourgeoisie. Instead it emphasised the domination of British capitalism by a powerful 
non-industrial sector that consolidated its dominance through commercial imperial 
expansion (both formal and informal) and through cultural and state hegemony. As 
Ingham (1984) has demonstrated, the evidence for this lies in the establishment and 
consolidation of the City of London as the commercial and financial centre of the 
world system. This dominance was concomitant with a regime of accumulation that 
was characterised by productive flexibility:
‘By becoming the main commercial and financial entropot of the world, the 
British state created unique opportunities for businesses established in its 
metropolitan domains to specialize in high value-added activities, to obtain 
inputs from anywhere in the world they happened to cheapest, and to dispose 
of outputs anywhere in the world they happened to fetch the highest price. The 
full exploitation of these opportunities required that specialization of British 
business be highly flexible... ’ (Arrighi 1994: 284)
This growing dominance of financial capitalism meant that it is was not a mere 
fraction of British capitalism but became the essence of the British state and the entire 
regime of accumulation. The dominance of the core institutional nexus of the City- 
Bank-Treasury provides evidence for this (Ingham 1984; Anderson 1992; Cain and 
Hopkins 1993a). The state reflected the dominant social and cultural institutions of 
liberal imperialism:
‘Imperial and imperialist policies did not issue from a conspiracy by a covert 
minority but from the open exercise of authority by a respected elite who 
enjoyed the deference of those they governed.’ (Cain and Hopkins 1993:471)
The downside of this state of affairs was that it lacked the kind of capacity that
enabled other European countries to engineer national industrial development, which
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were in many respects a reaction to British imperial success (ibid: 472). In 
comparison, the raison d'etre of the British state was primarily global economic 
modernisation.
It is evident therefore, that in the case of the development of the British state, the 
establishment of territorial control and the pacification of civil society were not co­
existent with the establishment of a capitalist society. The implication was that British 
capitalism was peculiarly unbounded and the state followed this logic. Its capitalist 
and territorialist logic were not contained within the structure of bounded and 
sovereign nation-states which were anchored in the inter-state system established by 
the Westphalia Settlement of 1648 (Arrighi 1994:55). What distinguished the British 
state was its world leadership. A system of economic and political rule was 
established on the principles of free trade imperialism:
‘The Westphalia system was based on the principle that there was no authority 
operating above the inter-state system. Free trade imperialism, in contrast, 
established the principle that the laws operating within and between states 
were subject to the higher authority of a new metaphysical entity -  a world 
market ruled by its Taws’ -  allegedly endowed with supernatural powers 
greater than anything Pope and Emperor had ever mastered in the medieval 
system of rule. By presenting its world supremacy as the embodiment of this 
metaphysical entity, the United Kingdom succeeded in expanding its power in 
the inter-state system well beyond what was warranted by the extent and 
effectiveness of its coercive apparatus.’ (ibid: 55)
This imperial mission united the external financial economic interests of the British 
elite with a particular liberal vision of the international order (Cain and Hopkins 
1993b: 303). The global domination of British financial capitalism was combined 
with an ideology that presented British rule as the ‘motor force of a general expansion 
of the wealth of nations’ (Arrighi 1994: 56). Thus, British free trade imperialism 
combined capitalist and territorialist domination in such a way that it was able to 
achieve global hegemony. It was secured across the globe by the control of world 
money and global elite networks. In this sense, the British system of imperial rule 
was primarily economic and strategic12. It did necessarily not involve a progression 
towards more complex and modem political structures 13. It was surpassed by the 
global hegemony of the US that was more firmly based on the idea of a formal system 
of sovereign jurisdictions.
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The British state relied on the flexibility of parliament and loyalty to the Crown to 
secure allegiance rather than constitutionalism and bureaucratisation14. It was an 
archaic mode of regulation that legitimated a global capitalist accumulation strategy 
characterised by free-trade imperialism (Arrighi 1994: 54). In this respect the 
establishment in Britain of a particular form of free market capitalism was neither 
typical of national capitalist development nor was it politically modem. In Britain, 
capitalism and society had become merged and given rise to a market society that was 
consolidated by the hegemony of liberal imperialism. In contrast,4 the countries of 
continental Europe were market economies but not market societies' (Gray 1998; 12). 
The primary spatial context of Empire within which British elites operated contrasted 
markedly with continental Europe. Here defensive forms of nationalistic 
modernisation became increasingly evident as opportunities for territorial expansion 
receded and capitalist competition intensified (Schmitter 1979: 34). In an attempt to 
maintain or improve their place in the unstable system of capitalist nation-states, these 
states consciously engaged in projects of political modernisation designed to construct 
stable national orders. In Britain, such processes were chronically compromised by 
the state’s position as a hegemonic global power throughout much of the nineteenth 
century and the continuation of the imperial mission well into the twentieth century.
In fact British political society had been constituted contra the forms of nation-state 
formation that had been typical of political modernisation. Indeed, we have to 
question the efficacy of the concept of the ‘state’ when used in connection with 
British political development and it is used throughout this thesis in the conditional 
sense that has been outlined above. It was not until the late 1950s and the possible 
relegation of Britain to the periphery of a world characterised by global Fordism that 
the chronic absence of modernisation became a major concern for both elites and the 
public.
2.7 Britain and European integration
This thesis explores the relationship of the British state to the European integration
from the perspective of the British state’s struggle for modernisation. The key
argument is that engagement with the integration project as part of programmes of
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domestic modernisation have been chronically compromised by contemporary 
articulations of deep seated structural features of the British politico-economic order. 
In particular, these include the central role of the state in servicing mobile 
international capital and the assertion of national political identities that are 
antithetical to political modernisation. These structural features remain central to 
understanding the relationship between Britain and the European Union. In particular, 
the failure to construct a Europeanised project of national modernisation is accounted 
for in terms of a post-imperial crisis that reinforces and re-orientates rather than 
restructures British institutions, interests and identities. The failure to realise an 
inclusive British modernisation project and resolve the post-imperial crisis culminates 
in a backlash against the integrationist project and the exclusion of ‘Europe* within 
the national political discourse. This leaves the British state at odds with the second 
wave of European integration.
The British state encounters the project of European integration against a background
of liberal imperialism, failed Fordism and a neo-liberal renaissance. A number of key
propositions that inform the present study follow on from this. Firstly, that the British
state initially engaged with the project of integration as a distinct liberal imperial
regime. Secondly, an understanding of the movement of the British state towards
joining the EC should be located within the emerging crisis of accumulation and
regulation strategies underpinning this imperial state regime that occurred in the
context of global Fordism. Thirdly, the difficult relationship between Britain and the
EC/EU can be identified in the post-imperial crisis of projects of modernisation to
reform the economy and revive the state. What emerged was a flawed Europeanism
marked by ‘imperial* continuities in the emerging ‘post-imperial* order. Fourthly, the
failure of projects of modernisation created distinct crises of political authority and
legitimation. These were expressed as an intensification of political conflict over
British involvement in the EC/EU and a growing anti-Europeanism. We have seen a
persistent mobilisation against European integration and it has been constructed
within the national political discourse as the ‘other* of British national interest and
identity. Euroscepticism has been a populist defence and reconfiguration of the
ideology of British exceptionalism. Thus the British problem with Europe has to be
contextualised within a set of reactive and defensive post-imperial struggles over the
53
meaning of British interests and identities. Finally, European policy was subordinated 
to the broader parameters of a nationally legitimated, neo-liberal Anglo-Atlanticism 
under the Callaghan and Thatcher regimes. The crisis over British post-imperial state 
formation has therefore resolved itself in the form of a mixture of exclusive and 
populist nationalism and economic globalism. This has created a distinct European 
crisis for the British state over the parameters of EU membership.
We can only fully understand the problematic relationship of the British state to the 
EC/EU from the perspective of the development of both these politico-economic 
orders within the global system. The ‘history’ of Britain’s relationship to the project 
of European integration is a composite of several different histories that are in turn 
related to the stage of global development. Specifically, the British state is not only a 
post-imperial order but is a post global hegemonic political order that had been a 
vehicle for a particular form of liberal capitalist modernisation. The legacy of this 
was a particular conception of modernisation that subsumed the political within the 
economic. The distinct role of the state in bringing about modernisation remained 
underdeveloped and ill conceived. The British struggles over European integration not 
only reflect the limitations on reversing this institutional logic but also the capacity of 
British elites to revive earlier conceptions of modernisation. Thus, this examination of 
the relationship between Britain and the EC/EU is a case study in the conflicts 
surrounding the domestic politics of modernisation, viewed as part of the historical 
substance of the global dynamics of economic and political modernisation.
54
Chapter Three 
The British State and European Integration 1950- 
1963: Imperial Opposition and Flawed Europeanism
In this Chapter I propose that the difficult relationship of the British state to the 
project of European integration between 1950 and 1963 can be located in the 
structural resistance of the British state to political modernisation. I show that 
European integration should be conceptualised in two ways: as an extension of Fordist 
processes of political-economic modernisation; and as a significant transformation of 
state relations and the beginnings of a regional government and a post-national 
political community. I go onto argue that the post-war British state was an imperial 
state that had been constructed without undergoing the forms of state rationalisation 
that were more typical of European state building. This lack of political modernisation 
is used to analyse and explain the content of the relationship between the British state 
and processes of European integration. It is also shown to be continuous once Britain 
enters a post-imperial trajectory and is forced to reconstruct itself as a nation-state. I 
argue that the decision to apply for membership of the European Community was a 
conservative strategy o f contained modernisation that was designed to secure the core 
elements of the British politico-economic order and avoid a more profound 
reconstruction of state and society. What emerges in Britain is a flawed Europeanism. 
The opposition that arose to this governing strategy only reinforced this conservatism 
by politically mobilising against European integration in defence of the spurious 
superiority of British institutions. This chapter is central to the overall argument of the 
thesis because it locates the relationship between the British state and European 
integration in the tension between the historical structure of the British state and the 
transformation of state power that the project of European integration represents.
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3.1 European integration, Fordism and the rise of regional governance
In this section drawing on Milward’s (1992) discussion of The European Rescue of 
the Nation, I argue that European integration was part of a Fordist mode of 
regulation15. As we saw in Chapter 2, Fordism16 has been characterised as a form of 
social organisation typical of the twentieth century. It involves the economic 
dominance of mass production and semi-skilled labour, the centralized organisation of 
both large-scale labour and a more economically and socially interventionist state 
(Aglietta 1979; lipietz 1985; Hall and Jacques 1989; Harvey 1989; Rustin 1989; 
Overbeek 1990). After the Second World War in Western Europe, Fordism was also 
more likely to be characterised by formal democratic structures, and included features 
such as constitutionalism. I also claim in this section that the project of European 
integration was an expression of the intensification of international relations between 
European states. This occurred to the extent that integration is usefully conceptualised 
independently of nation-state power as an emergent system of regional governance. 
This is important to the present study because it is this profound transformation and 
modernisation of European state relations that has been persistently problematic for 
the British state.
Milward (1992) has identified the formation of the European Community with the
emergence of a common state model across Western Europe after the war. He argues
that European integration was a core dimension of the post-war establishment of a
new state form: the Keynesian welfare state. This model of the nation-state was
predicated on the securing of legitimacy by responding to a greater set of demands
from citizens than ever before (Milward 1992: 26). It was organised in terms of a
wider social consensus than had been seen in the past, including ‘labour, agricultural
producers, and a diffuse alliance of lower and middle income beneficiaries of the
welfare state’ (ibid: 27). There was a virtual guarantee of full employment via
Keynesian demand management, and political parties competed with one another for
electoral support on the basis of their commitment to welfare programmes (ibid: 31).
The success of this post-war welfare state has been identified in its twin settlements
(Offe 1984:147). Firstly, the productivist or redistributive settlement, which formally
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incorporated organised labour into collective bargaining and recognised its role in 
public policy formation. With varying degrees of success, this reconfiguration of the 
power relationship between labour and capital was the mechanism by which the 
capitalist welfare state attempted to overcome the disruptive struggles and 
contradictions of liberal capitalism, and enable Fordist economic modernisation to 
take place (ibid). Secondly, the state secured legitimation by a redistributive 
settlement institutionalised in the extension of welfare provision and the establishment 
of the ‘social wage’ (Rhodes 2000). The implication of Milward’s analysis is, 
however, that for a number of Western European states the construction of the welfare 
state involved a third settlement, one that redefined the relations between these states 
and secured future growth and stability. The welfare state was dependent on economic 
growth and the European Community was a key mechanism that secured and 
stimulated the burgeoning European market (Milward 1992: 223). National 
protectionism had been seen as one of the main causes of economic instability in the 
pre-war period, thus it was in the interests of these European states to avoid it. There 
was a need for a system which allowed governments to subsidise, protect and 
modernise industries without using tariffs and quotas which closed national borders to 
trade. This was achieved by the limited surrenders of national sovereignty within the 
framework of the European Community (ibid: esp. Chapter 4; Milward and Sorenson 
1993:15). For Milward, the key political goal behind the integrationist project was to 
secure the allegiance of citizens to the nation-state, which had been weakened by the 
catastrophe of the Second World War. This went hand in hand with the need to 
incorporate Western Germany into a European commercial and political framework 
(ibd: 134).
In placing Milward’s classic account of integration within a broader sociological 
framework, it is therefore useful to identify the European Community with the post- 
1945 Fordist solution to the problem of maintaining capitalist growth and stabilising 
state boundaries. Integration put in place an organised European economic space that 
allowed capitalism to expand in the interests of the nation-state. In this sense, it was 
part of a mode of regulation that involved,
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‘highly diversified attempts within different nation-states to arrive at political, 
institutional and social arrangements that could accommodate the chronic 
incapacities of capitalism to regulate the essential conditions of its own 
reproduction.’ (Harvey 1989:129)
From the perspective of this model of post-war political economy, European 
integration provided a regional solution to regulation. A solution that was between the 
nation-state and the broader set of international institutional arrangements that came 
into place after the War under American hegemony. The elitist and technocratic 
features of the integrationist project were part of the international spread of Fordist 
political economic structures. These structures established national societies of 
citizens whose lifestyles were geared to consumption and who had expectations of 
rising standards of living. It was in this respect that Milward can legitimately argue 
that integration was, and remains, primarily ‘a response of national governments to 
popular demand’ (1996: 65).
However, Milward understates the role of post-national political developments in the 
process of European integration and, in particular, Federalist forces17 (1992:16-17; 
Anderson 1997: 59). The post-war problem of allegiance led to the extension of the 
formally rational structures of political authority of which the European Communities 
were a part. In the nation-state, these structures organised and neutralised political 
conflict by the extension of bureaucratic institutions that processed the claims of 
citizens (these included corporative arrangements, welfare organisations, mass 
political parties, interest groups and parliaments) (Habermas 1976: 37; Offe 1984:
163; 1996:14). Underpinning these developments were modem principles of political 
legitimacy; legal constitutionalism and popular sovereignty (Anderson 1992: 340). In 
Germany and Italy, new forms of regional and federal government were imposed in 
the wake of fascism. While France remained a unitary state, the solution to its post­
war imperial crisis involved the rewriting of the constitution and the establishment of 
the Fifth Republic. The formal implementation of European integration, the Treaties 
of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957), were an extension of processes of political 
modernisation and were part of broader processes of constitution making that 
underpinned post-war reconstruction. The Treaties linked together elites (national 
Ministers, officials and interest group representatives) within a formal framework of
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institutionalised rules and rule making, which enabled the pursuit of defined economic 
and political objectives (Wallace 1990a: 79). Within this elite context, the principles 
of Federalism and the possibilities of European unity had real political meaning (see 
Lipgens 1982). The central argument of the chapter is that the project of European 
integration cannot be reduced to mere intergovemmentalism, because it involved an 
effective transformation of state power and the emergence of a distinctively post­
national form of public governance. While this was occurring in the context of post­
war American hegemony of the Western world, it represented a distinctive 
reorganisation of European economic and political relations that could not be reduced 
to American domination. It was against this background of state reorganisation and 
post-national modernisation that British opposition to European integration must be 
understood.
3.2  The missing European rescue of the British state
Let us now consider the relationship of the British political order to these processes of
modernisation and state reconfiguration. Here Milward’s historical account is highly
suggestive about the difficult relationship between Britain and the EC. At first sight
the social and economic consensus that brought the EC into being was also evident in
Britain (Milward 1992: 436). The ‘ambitions and functions’ of the British state were
extended in a variety of ways including: a commitment to full employment;
agricultural protection; demand management and state control over industry; and the
extension of welfare (ibid: 345). A key difference, however, was that on the continent
these goals were underpinned by an industrial and commercial policy explicitly
designed to support the modernisation of industry and to encourage an export led
recovery of national industry primarily within a European trading bloc. Milward
argues that British commercial policy was fundamentally at odds with this regional
solution to the economic problems of the post-war era (1992: 433). In contrast, British
post-war economic policies were based rather on the Bretton Woods agreements and
related Anglo-American agreements for a worldwide economic system (ibid: 347).
British politicians in general believed that this was the basis for the reconstruction of
an international economy in which Britain would take second place only to the United
States (ibid: 347). A key feature of the relevant agreements was the re-establishment
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of sterling as an international currency in exchange for a substantial dollar loan. The 
resultant problem, however, was that it put into place a system of fixed exchange rates 
that could only secure sterling as an international currency against a strong dollar. The 
1947 experiment with conversion led to a sterling crisis and had to be abandoned in a 
matter of weeks (ibid: 348). In 1949, sterling had to be devalued because of a balance 
of payments crisis and by 1950 the solution of the incoming Conservative government 
was to pursue plans for the floating of sterling on the exchanges (ibid: 351). Milward 
claims that the aim was to restore Britain’s national prestige by securing its role in an 
international financial system (ibid: 354). As part of this strategy, there were 
persistent British attempts to dissolve the European Payments Union (EPU). The EPU 
was a soft-currency zone that supported European trade and allowed European 
countries to obtain credit on easy terms (ibid: 350). British elites, however, believed it 
diverted trade away from hard currency markets and between 1950 and 1957 they 
attempted to lead Europe into a ‘one world system’ (ibid: 352,387). In general 
British governments were fundamentally opposed to the programme of economic 
modernisation that was underpinning institution building at a European level in the 
post-war period18.
Milward identifies this failure of British governments to take seriously European
integration as a failure of British economic modernisation (ibid: 395). He argues that
the continued pursuit by political elites of currency convertibility and the ‘one world
system’ was a consequence of the primacy of the interests of the City in economic
policy (ibid: 395). The City was in no position to facilitate the introduction of
policies of economic modernisation as it was a ‘closed social circle protected by its
own restrictionist politics’ (ibid: 395). Its dominance over economic policy continued
because of the weakness of industry with the British state lacking the deep association
between commercial and industrial policies that had been developed elsewhere.
Industry had a far more limited role in government compared to the Bank of England
and the Treasury (ibid: 394). Industry itself did not challenge government policy but
rather pursued economic strategies that were defensive, retreating into what were
perceived to be ‘safe’ world markets and failing to take advantage of European
opportunities (ibid: 403-424). According to Milward, the new political consensus that
was typical of the reconstructed European state was absent in Britain (ibid: 433). The
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core political institutions of the British state, the Foreign Office and Treasury were 
dominated by an amateurish and socially prejudiced monied upper class (ibid: 431). 
Milward argues that the developments underway in Europe were to a large extent an 
anathema to the British political class:
‘The startling absence of genuine comparison with any other European 
country in the many memoranda and analysis of Britain’s economic position 
gives the impression of a hermetically sealed system with so little outward 
vision that no understanding of European developments could be possible.’ 
(ibid)
At this point it is necessary to question whether Milward has accurately pinpointed the 
problem of the British state and European integration. He places considerable 
emphasis on the limitations of the British post-war consensus and argues that it is this 
weakness that explains why British governments were later to lead the attack on the 
post-war welfare state (ibid: 433). It is possible to see Milward’s analysis of the 
current problems of the British state with European integration as rooted in this 
fundamental opposition to European social capitalism (ibid: 444). Nevertheless, it is 
clear that there was a strong commitment to the welfare state in post-war Britain and 
Milward is noticeably tentative about this explanation (Anderson 1997: 64-65). As 
Anderson points out, ‘consensus is an evasive term, notoriously close to euphemism, 
which parades rather than defines the democratic will’ (ibid: 65). The key question 
here concerns whether we are talking about the particular nature of the consensus in 
Britain or rather the weakness of that consensus. Is it a problem of actors failing to 
achieve a consensus or of a structural context which only allows a certain form of 
consensus to arise? I would argue that it is the latter that is significant. Milward 
importantly fails to explicate this structural context because of his focus on elite 
motivations. Ultimately, Milward fails to fully identify the structures underpinning 
British elite actions and determining their relationship to the process of European 
integration. If the problem of the British state and European integration is a problem 
of British modernisation, and the argument of this thesis is that it is, then it is 
necessary to consider the problem of national political modernisation in the context of 
the post-war Britain. It is within this context that the differences of economic interest 
have to be seen.
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33  The British post-war consensus: the imperial state and the problem of 
political modernisation
The extent to which we can apply the idea of a post-war consensus to Britain requires 
clarification. Hay points out that ‘consensus is perhaps the most disputed term in the 
academic vernacular of post-war British political history’ (1999:21). The concept is 
used to describe a degree of bipartisan convergence that existed in the post-war period 
(Beer 1965,1982; Miliband 1973; Gamble 1974; Barnett 1986; Lowe 1990; Addison 
1994). The clearest demonstration of this convergence was when the 1951 
Conservative government took office and retained the commitment to full 
employment and the welfare state (Jessop 1980: 29). However, the extent to which a 
consensus existed amongst British elites, let alone across society as a whole, remains 
highly debatable (Pimlott 1988; Addison 1994: 279-292; Hay, 1996: 44-48). 
Consensus can be used to refer to agreements on policy objectives across the main 
parties. However, it becomes more analytically significant when it is used to illustrate 
a broader political settlement characterised by the structured acceptance and 
reproduction of the broad parameters of the state (Hay 1996: 44-45)19. Such a usage 
helps to clarify the problem with Milward’s analysis which fails to relate the British 
consensus to the British state regime, a failure that contrasts with his discussion of the 
European nation-state. In Britain, the post-war consensus was shaped by existing 
structures of spatial, political and economic organisation that substantially set it apart 
from Western Europe. Up until the late 1950s, the British state was primarily an 
imperial state and, as a consequence, its post-war consensus was only superficially 
similar to those states who went on to form the EC. The British political culture was 
imbued with a model of political development that set it apart from the continent and 
from Fordist modernisation.
Cain and Hopkins (1993b: 266) have argued that the fruits of the victory in 1945
included the survival of Britain’s cultural and institutional heritage. Hay points out
that the post-war politico-economic settlement was largely inherited from before the
war (1994: 45). This inheritance consisted of the dominant institutions of the British
imperial order that had been gradually adapted to the development of mass democracy
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in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Initially, when the political order 
had been threatened by working and middle class radicalism in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the solution was the formation of a cadre of intellectuals and 
administrators imbued with the elite ethos by the institutions of the public schools, 
Oxford and Cambridge who were able to actively constitute a hegemonic order (Naim 
1977: 22; Gowan 1987). In her analysis of the 1867 Reform Act, Catherine Hall 
characterises the formation of this imperial political status order as follows:
‘Property was no longer the basis of the suffrage, but ‘race’, gender, labour 
and level of civilisation now determined who was included in and excluded 
from the political nation.’ (1994: 27)
These developments were indicative of piecemeal and conservative forms of state 
rationalisation that took place in the nineteenth century in reaction to domestic 
pressures and included the extension of the franchise and the establishment of 
elementary state education. However, it was in the context of a combination of 
internal and external threats at the beginning of the twentieth century that the British 
state went through a more intense period of rationalisation. This was a response to a 
crisis of the British state that stemmed from German and U.S. threats to its global 
hegemony and the rejection of the authority of the state by Irish nationalists, 
suffragettes and a growing minority of anarcho-syndicalists in the labour movement 
(Leys 1983: 39). Significantly, these threats gave rise to a strategy of social 
imperialism that was centrally dependent on a programme of social reform and 
attempted to institutionalise conflicts over class, gender and nation (Naim 1979: 54; 
Leys 1983: 50; Williams 1989:156). This strategy saw the Labour party fully 
incorporated into the state and accepting the ‘soundness of Constitution and 
Parliament’ (Naim 1979: 54). It culminated in what Middlemas (1979) has described 
as a system of corporate bias:
‘Under the double system of government’s needs and the changing economic 
and social conditions of their membership what had once been interest groups 
outside of the formal constitution -  what Hobbes called the ‘lesser Common­
wealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrayles of a naturale 
man’ -  became governing institutions, existing thereafter as estates of the 
realm, even if they retained the customary habit of opposition to the specific 
Party governments.’ (1979: 371)
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These developments represented a particular form of British state rationalisation that 
was firmly established as a necessary condition of state survival around the time of 
the First World War . Due to both internal and external threats, British political elites 
committed to the construction of a national political order and established the 
hegemony of a more revisionist liberal ideology. During the 1920s, this involved the 
establishment of a system of imperial preferences that allowed newly emerging 
Fordist industries, such as the car industry, to flourish (Overbeek 1990: 76). However, 
these developments co-existed with the continuation of a liberal orthodoxy and a 
commitment to the central principles of laissez faire. The British post-Second World 
War consensus was, therefore, largely a modification of this social imperial 
consensus, which had been intellectually fashioned towards the end of the nineteenth 
century and established at the beginning of the twentieth century. The British state 
did not construct a national Fordist mode of regulation and to do so would have been 
at odds with the international accumulation strategy of the dominant economic elite.
The post-war Labour government was, therefore, entrenched within an existing 
conservative liberal imperialist political order that largely remained the basis for 
social cohesion (Halsey 1986: 63; Naim 1979: 60). Naim points out the Second 
World War provided the Labour party with a ‘real opportunity’ to move forward but 
was ‘circumscribed’ as the war also validated the existing ethos and class structure 
(Naim 1979: 60). Labour’s incorporation into an existing conservative national 
consensus was evident on taking office, when the Labour government ended its 
hostility to imperialism and ‘hoisted the burdens of Empire with all the enthusiasm of 
the converted’ (Cain and Hopkins 1993a 277; also Fieldhouse 1984). Initially, Britain 
was to be the third force in global politics in-between America and USSR, although 
this ambition was later modified to being the junior partner of America (Curtis 
1995:14). Crucial to securing this world power status was both the extension and 
reinforcement of the concept of empire (Cain and Hopkins 1993: 276-277). The 
Colonial Office was reinvigorated and set about coordinating a post-war renewal of 
the imperial project (Lee 1977). This strategy could not be dismissed as either inept or 
based on a nostalgia for the past but rather:
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‘ ... the renewed commitment to Empire was as much a matter of calculation as 
it was of sentiment. Quite simply, the imperial option appeared to be far more 
promising than the alternatives, especially in war tom Europe.’ (Cain and 
Hopkins 1993b: 276)
While Britain ended the war financially dependent on the United States, it was 
believed that economic recovery would follow from an eventual revival of free trade 
imperialism. The economic strategy to enable this to take place initially involved a 
form of imperial preferential trading and the establishment of the sterling bloc and 
later by a return to multilateralism and convertibility. The implications of this for the 
economy were profound as it meant a commitment to shrinking imperial markets, 
external investment and the pursuit of a high and stable exchange rate. The 
commitments to full employment, stimulating domestic demand and domestic capital 
investment were fundamentally compromised (Hay 1994:45; Anderson 1992:166).
The popular ‘radicalism’ that emerged during the war in support for social reform did 
not, therefore, threaten the imperial order. The social reformist project was 
encapsulated in the reports produced by William Beveridge, Master of University 
College, Oxford and a senior civil servant. The tremendous support for the Beveridge 
proposals represented a Gramscian passive revolution controlled from above, 
encapsulating the principles of a revisionary imperialist liberalism (Hay 1996: 30). 
Social imperialism was not only renewed by Beveridge but also by the Keynesian 
economic strategy that promised full employment and material prosperity. 
Importantly, it seemed to promise that there would be no return to the economic crises 
of the inter-war period.
This strategy did not however threaten City and Treasury dominance and this was 
illustrated by Keynes’ commitment to the international role of sterling:
‘Sterling must itself, in due course, become once again convertible. For, 
without this, London must necessarily lose its international position, and the 
arrangements of the Sterling area would fall to pieces... ‘(Keynes 23rd May 
1944 cited in Naim 1979: 66)
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This renewed commitment to a one-world system did not merely represent a weaker 
version of the European post-war consensus. In Britain, it was a fundamental feature 
of a wholly different consensus involving a renewal of social imperialism under the 
intellectual guidance of Keynes and Beveridge. Specifically, the agreement to move 
towards the liberalisation of British foreign economic policy in exchange for 
American financial support was crucial to this renewal of traditional institutions of the 
imperial state. The belief in the symbiotic relationship between the international 
interests of financial capitalism and the national interest was instinctively accepted by 
British governing elites. This was particularly reflected in the Labour government’s 
attitude to the City and the role of sterling. The Atlee government ‘was active in 
Commonwealth conferences in promoting the solidarity of the sterling area and the 
use of sterling as a reserve currency. It also took the first tentative steps towards 
reopening the doors of the London market-place’ (Strange 1967: 232). It reinforced 
the international outlook of the British economy however this was fundamentally 
dependent on American support. While the aim was to reinvigorate Britain’s position 
as the centre of a global market society, the reality was of inexorable and terminal 
decline. The continuation of sterling’s role as a reserve currency, that provided some 
basis for the economic and political coherence Commonwealth idea, was underpinned 
by American financial support which had been agreed during the Anglo-American 
Loan negotiations of 1945 (ibid: 60-61). It meant, however, that the so called ‘special 
relationship’ developed on the basis of ‘an instinctive conjunction of financial 
interests, so that it seemed impossible, on either side, to imagine life without it’ (ibid: 
72). This had significant implications for the post-imperial restructuring of the British 
economy, as Overbeek comments:
‘Increasingly, however, the role of the City in the world economy changed and 
its place was now clearly defined by the contours of the Atlantic economy and 
Pax Americana, and by the dominance of those fractions of capital associated 
with that of American hegemony -  the internationalizing ‘Fordist’ industries 
such as automobiles, chemicals, and consumer electronics.’ (1990:107)
In effect, the renewal of the imperial state became chronically dependent on the 
United States, a position that proved to be extremely constraining on the reassertion of 
British power.
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The British consensus was inherently hostile to forms of corporatism that were the 
product of Catholic social theory and the dominant continental model of state building 
through economic integration (Skidelsky 1993: 354). Indeed much of the British 
economy was characterised by businesses that lacked the Fordist managerial 
professionalism that was becoming typical on the continent (Barnett 1986; Pollard 
1980). British industry continued to have the hallmarks of the first industrial 
revolution and was characterised by small capital, coal and cheap unskilled and 
intensive labour (Overbeek 1990; Hay 1994: 47). Thus the domestic economy was 
characterised by chronic weaknesses.
The social reforms that were embodied in the post-war welfare state lacked the 
politico-economic foundations that were evident in continental Europe. The 
nationalisation of industry and the establishment of corporatist structures did not lay 
the basis of an industrial citizenship and management continued to operate along 
similar lines to the past. In effect, corporatist structures became a fagade designed to 
achieve the acquiescence of labour after decisions had been agreed (Panitch 1976; 
Leys 1983; Coates 1989). In the context of an unreformed polity, the idea that the 
post-war welfare state implied the establishment and extension of social citizenship 
was highly dubious (Marshall 1950). Marshall’s analysis of the development of 
citizenship in Britain ignored British imperial history and its archaic political 
structure. The depoliticization inherent in state-centered conceptions of citizenship 
has been particularly acute in Britain because of the continuation of monarchical 
sovereignty and shadow of empire. As Roche notes,
‘Each of these factors has promoted images of dutiful service and ‘loyal 
subject’ status, the latter status often requiring the reactive, military and 
administrative attitudes of obedience rather than the proactive and autonomous 
political attitude appropriate to citizenhood.’ (1987: 386)
The post-war British welfare state can be seen as the extension of a form of state 
sponsored philanthropy, primarily concerned with securing the status of the 
‘respectable’ male white working class and ‘his’ family. However, this commitment 
was compromised by the emerging weaknesses in the British internationalised
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economy and the failure to secure union support for the concept of the social wage 
(Rhodes 2000:165-166)20.
The consequence of domestic conflicts and two world wars had irrevocably put the 
British state on a path to becoming a nation-state. As Taylor argues, ‘the history of the 
English people and of the English state merged for the first time’ (cited in Gray 1986: 
35-36). This development however was characterised by contradictions and tensions 
evident in Taylor’s use of the phrase ‘the English people’. The post-Second World 
War British state remained primarily a world state because of its immense colonial 
possessions, the position of its institutions in the global economy, the continued 
political currency of free trade imperialism and the role of British elites in global 
governance. Most strikingly it gave rise to fundamental conflicts at the heart of British 
economic policy that arose as a consequence of its increasingly contradictory 
commitments to the global and national orders:
‘Policy lurched between contracting the economy when a failure to achieve 
balances, above all in foreign payments, threatened sterling, and expanding it 
when unemployment started to rise. The excessive use of monetary and fiscal 
instruments to engineer deflation was highly damaging to investment -  both 
public and private. The manipulation of current and capital social expenditure, 
had damaging effects on social provision.’ (Rhodes 2000:166)
Underlying this failure to sustain a coherent project of post-war modemisaton was the 
dominance of regressive imperial institutions that prioritised the imperial state’s role 
in servicing internationally mobile capital. The construction of Britain as a national 
order is, therefore, best viewed as a domestic strategy employed by elites to secure 
Britain as a world state. In this respect it represents a compromised form of state 
management rather than proactive state modernisation.
So far this account has been suggestive of the structural tensions and contradictions
that underpin the relations between the British state and European integration.
However, it tells us little about the specific content of this relationship and how the
problem of British political modernisation expressed itself in specific events and elite
practices. My main concern in the remainder of the chapter, therefore, is to
demonstrate the ways in which this took place by exploring the historical relationship
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between the British state and European integration between 1950-1963.1 aim to show 
that when faced with the radical reconfiguration of state power that the project of 
European integration represented, the particular features of the British state discussed 
so far began to vividly express themselves. Thus, we can begin to see that British 
opposition to domestic political modernisation had regional and global dimensions.
3.4 The Labour government and the Schuman Plan 1950: an imperial approach 
to European integration
A number of commentators have documented the British response to the post-war 
proposals for a European Coal and Steel Community (Greenwood 1992; Deighton 
1993; Young 1993; Dell 1995; Gowland and Turner 2000a). This was conditioned by 
the desire of governing elites to re-establish and maintain the British state’s role as a 
significant global power despite its evident economic and military weakness. In this 
respect the key objective of policy was to secure a wider Atlantic community 
consisting of the United States, British Empire and Commonwealth and Western 
Europe. Without doubt this policy contributed towards the wider geopolitical 
framework within which European integration could happen (Deighton 1993). 
However, British priorities also reflected the inherent features of the British state and 
imposed limits on British participation in the European project. This was encapsulated 
in the British opposition to the principles of supranationalism and Federalism that 
were enshrined in the Schuman Declaration (1950).
The formal beginnings of European integration21 can be traced to the Schuman 
Declaration of May 1950 when the French Foreign Minister put forward the idea of a 
supranational European authority to govern coal and steel industries:
‘ ...the French government proposes to take action immediately on one limited
but decisive point to place Franco-German production of coal and steel
under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation 
open to the participation of the other countries in Europe..’ (cited in Pinder 
1991:1)
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The European Coal and Steel Community was the brainchild of Jean Monnet, the 
head of the French Commissariat du Plan that formed the basis of post-war French 
reconstruction. Monnet persuaded Schuman of the idea because it was seen at the time 
as a solution to containing a reconstructed Germany. By placing the German steel 
industry under a supranational authority, the backbone of the German economy was 
secured within a European framework (Pinder 1991; Anderson 1997). European 
control over the German steel industry eventually meant any future German 
rearmament could be monitored and contained. It also resolved the problem of the 
Ruhr Authority that had been set up in 1948 to watch over Germany’s main steel 
making region.
The question that arises is why did the solution to the control of the Ruhr 
encompassed the wider ambition of European Federalism? Anderson (1997: 58) 
raises this issue in his discussion of Milward’s intergovemmentalist analysis of the 
origins of the European Community and argues that Milward understates the role of 
Federalist forces. In particular, Anderson points out that it was the role of Monnet that 
led to the proposal of a supranational solution to post-war European cooperation. 
Monnet was an exceptional historical figure who was capable of turning a vision of a 
new post-national political order into a practical reality. Anderson identifies his 
ability to think beyond national differences as stemming from his career as an 
international banker22. This gave him a very different outlook on world affairs to other 
members of the French political class:
‘The small, dapper Charentais was an international adventurer on a grand 
scale, juggling finance and politics in a series of spectacular gambles that 
started with operations in war procurements and bank mergers, and ended with 
schemes for continental unity and dreams of a global directorate.’ (ibid: 59)
Anderson points out that Monnet consistently worked for supranational goals in 
Europe. He wanted to see a united Europe that would rival the power of the United 
States. These ideas found favour during the 1950s notably because of the support for a 
Federal Europe amongst the smaller nations of Europe (ibid: 63), but also because of 
the influence of Monnet in the United States and the support he received for the goal 
of a United Europe. For example as Grosser argues:
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‘In practice, the collaboration of Monnet’s American Friends led all the way to 
the drafting of entire Treaty articles....’ (1980:104).
When the Schuman Declaration was published, under Monnet’s influence, it made 
explicit reference to the goal of political union. This position was restated by the 
German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who made it clear that the project ‘was above 
all political not economic’ (Nugent 1994: 39). While the immediate concerns were 
economic growth and the position of Germany within Europe, the technocratic 
solution envisaged by Monnet had the wider ambition of binding the relations 
between European States within a legal constitutional order. Monnet and his 
supporters who set about constructing the ECSC were part of a European federalist 
movement that had been bom out of resistance to fascism and then to Stalinism. They 
believed they had found a practical method for achieving integration that would 
involve the gradual transfer of national sovereignty to a supranational community as 
national governments came to recognise that this was the most effective way of 
achieving specific policy goals. Its legitimacy stemmed not from direct support 
amongst electorates for the European ideal but from an acceptance of the social and 
economic benefits that accrued from integration. The task of the ECSC was to 
provide ‘economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living 
in the Member States’ (The Treaty of Paris [1951] 1987: 23). A Federal Europe was 
to be founded on a form of civic supranationalism that mirrored the civic nationalism 
that formed the basis for post-war reconstruction. Citizenship was partially delinked 
from traditional ideas of national assertion and relinked to economic growth and 
welfare. A nascent European civic supranationalism was initiated with the Treaty of 
Paris and the setting up of the ECSC and reflected the Federalist principle that the 
peoples and states of the Six members were, at least notionally, equal. The ECSC was 
therefore an attempt to construct Europe as an organised economic and political space. 
As I have argued, it was part of Fordist processes of modernisation that supported and 
mirrored developments at the national level as well as establishing a post-national 
form of European governance.
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The reaction of the British Labour government to the Treaty of Paris indicated the 
extent to which there was a fundamentally different consensus at work in Britain. The 
initial plans for a supranational Europe surprised the British. Bevin23, Foreign 
Minister at the time, was shocked and annoyed by the French proposals and, in 
particular, at the lack of prior consultation. Both the Germans and the Americans 
were aware of the impending declaration while the British were taken unawares 
because they were not consulted on the proposal (Lord 1996: 6; Young 1984:150). 
British annoyance with the French proposal was unsurprising as it represented a 
significant shift in French foreign policy. The British were keen to promote European 
cooperation through the framework of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), an approach the French appeared to 
support. The British policy was to support gradual moves towards European unity 
based on intergovernmental cooperation24, a policy that was designed to secure a 
particular form of British leadership of Western Europe. In fact, Bevin had gone so 
far as to propose the idea of a European ‘Third Force’ based on Anglo-French 
cooperation and, in particular, using French and British colonial possessions in Africa 
as a basis for European recovery (Greenwood 1992: 66). Yet it appears that Bevin, as 
Foreign Secretary, was unable to change the fundamental direction of an Atlanticist 
policy that was being pursued by the Treasury:
‘On every occasion when Bevin actively tried to get the customs union rolling, 
the economic departments kicked it into touch, the Americans who opposed 
regional economic arrangements would be offended, that trade with the 
Commonwealth might be injured and that, anyway, economic integration with 
the dislocated French economy held no advantage.’ (ibid: 65)
In general, British financial and military weakness and the emerging Soviet threat 
meant that the Special Relationship was to be the basis for any post-war re­
establishment of Britain as a global power (Deighton 1993:13).
This was the post-war consensus on foreign policy that Churchill encapsulated in his 
‘three circles’ speech in 1950 that was made to the Conservative party conference in 
October 1948. The three circles were the British Commonwealth, the United States
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and Europe. Churchill had stated that there was an order of priority to these three 
circles,
‘the first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and
Empire then there is the English speaking world and finally there is
Europe.’ (Churchill cited in Lord 1996: 62)
The British position was to participate in increased European cooperation but this was 
to occur alongside the construction of a wider Atlantic community (Deighton 1993: 
13). It was believed that this would allow Britain to support European co-operation 
and maintain its independence and sovereignty as a global power. Inevitably, the 
Federalist vision of the ECSC was unacceptable and viewed as a threat to the pursuit 
of a global role.
The French were sceptical, however, of the British commitment to Europe, both 
because of the Empire/Commonwealth and because of its special relationship with the 
United States. The supranationalism of the Schuman Declaration therefore 
represented a new direction in French European policy that broke with the strategy 
being pursued by the British. As we have seen, this change of direction by the French 
was given added impetus by American support who increasingly viewed Western 
Europe as a separate unit (Grosser 1980:119). This represented a fundamental 
challenge to the historical British claim to rule over the inter-state system and, 
therefore, a clear challenge to the British state as an imperial state. As Lord notes:
‘The preservation of British leadership and an intergovernmental approach to 
European cooperation were inseparably linked in the minds of British decision 
makers. Any supranational authority would act as a substitute for British 
expertise in devising initiatives and brokering between states.’ (ibid: 33)
From a broader perspective, the success of the Schuman Plan can be seen as 
consistent with the breakdown of British hegemony over world governance that had 
been occurring since the beginning of the twentieth century (Kennedy 1989: 298).
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The Labour government’s official rejection of a closer economic union was laid down
in a paper presented by Bevin and the Chancellor, Stafford Cripps. It outlined the
following implications:
‘i. Loss of Her Majesty’s Government’s responsibility for the budgetary and 
credit policy and the management of reserves;
ii. Hindrance to our efforts to reach and maintain equlibrium between the 
dollar area and the sterling area: we cannot sacrifice opportunities for dollar 
earning (or dollar saving) in order to make it easier for other European 
countries to earn or save dollars;
iii. Opening to European decision making the size of strategic dollar earning 
and dollar saving of United Kingdom industries;
iv. Materially affecting the system of imperial preference.’(cited in Moon 
1985: 71)
Moon points out these implications which ‘effectively distanced the Cabinet from 
European aspirations of economic unification, was accepted by the Cabinet and 
became its official policy’25 (ibid: 71). It reflected the traditional economic priority of 
the British state which was with securing sterling as an international currency and 
highlighted continued Treasury dominance over policy making. It was part of a 
strategy that placed multilateral world trade and establishment of a global liberal 
economic system over intra-European trade or a national accumulation strategy. This 
was evident in the use of Marshall Plan funds which went towards supporting the 
international financial position of Britain rather than supporting the modernisation of 
the domestic industrial sector (Overbeek 1990: 91)26.
The British government did not, however, reject the Schuman Declaration out of hand 
and recognised its contribution to Franco-German reconciliation. A Foreign Office 
report argued that the plan would be a pragmatic solution to the German problem and 
that therefore Britain should join it or at least be positive about it, while 
acknowledging that supranationalism remained a major problem (Moon 1985: 153). 
However, the Cabinet position was that they were not prepared to enter into talks 
unless the supranational principle was negotiable. What is clear from these events is 
that the British government was not prepared to accept a proposal that might imply 
unlimited loss of sovereignty and movement towards federation. The formal decision 
not to participate in the ECSC was taken on 2nd June 1950 and emphasised the prior
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commitment to submit resources to the jurisdiction of the High Authority as the 
fundamental reason for non-participation,
‘The main issues are really political. The exchanges with the French 
Government have brought out that their proposals, which started in a Franco- 
German context, have not been given a wider application. It is not merely 
pooling of resources, but also, in the first place, the conception of fusion or 
surrender of sovereignty in a European system which the French are asking us 
to accept in principle. M. Schuman’s original memorandum said in terms that 
his plan would be a step towards the federation of Europe. It has been our 
settled policy hitherto that in view of our world position and interests, we 
should not commit ourselves irrevocably to Europe either in the political or the 
economic sphere unless we could measure the extent and effects of the 
commitment.’ (PRO, CAB 129/40, C.P. (50) 120,2 June 1950)
The Labour party response to the issue was the publication of a pamphlet by the NEC 
entitled European Unity (1950). This rejected the Schuman Plan because it appeared 
to threaten the Labour party’s economic policies. In particular, the coal and steel 
industries were regarded as part of the commanding heights of the economy and 
needed to be nationalised in order to maintain full employment. Other European 
governments reluctance to nationalise their industries meant that the British 
nationalised coal and steel industries would be combined with private industries in an 
‘unstable market’ (ibid: 50). The High Authority was seen as too weak to regulate 
these industries in comparison to national governments. There was also the fear that 
the Authority would be dominated by a non-socialist majority. European Unity argued 
that it was better to go with the ‘winner takes all’ British political system (cited in 
Lord 1996: 51). The threat to the Labour government’s national governing strategy 
was summed up by Herbert Morrison when, in the absence of Bevin, Atlee and 
Cripps, he was asked to give a final decision on whether Britain would participate:
‘It’s no good. We can’t do it. The Durham miners will never wear it.’ (cited in 
Young 1998: 64)
European Unity went on to refer to how closer involvement in Europe could
jeopardise relations with the Commonwealth. It stated that ‘Britain has to remember
that it is the nerve centre of a Commonwealth that extends over every continent... .not
just an island off Western Europe’; the Commonwealth, it argued, was the ‘nucleus of
a potential world society’ (National Executive of the British Labour Party,1950
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European Unity 1950). The document went on to express fears over the implications 
of the plan for domestic control of defence matters and on relations with the United 
States. This document reflected the dominant view within the Labour party towards 
Europe and alternative views ‘ achieved no prominence at all within the anatomy of 
the issue derived from the Parliamentary debate’ (Moon 1985: 81).
For the Labour government, involvement in the Schuman plan would have meant 
challenging some of the core elements of the British state. The priority of the Labour 
government was to maintain strong single party rule. Indeed, membership of the 
ECSC was perceived as a weakening of a strategy designed to secure the 
representation of the organised working class within the British state. This can be 
seen as paradoxical since the opposition was part of a national class project that was 
already chronically weakened by its support for the structures of the imperial state. 
Nowhere was this more evident than in the failure of Labour’s nationalisation policy 
to restructure the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy and to secure the 
representations of labour that were found in industry on the continent (Cronin 1991; 
Hay 1996).
These economic, political and geopolitical constraints on British participation within 
the Schuman Plan reflected the underlying social imperial consensus within the 
British political order. The ECSC implied a territorial and capitalist reorganisation of 
the British state that was profoundly unacceptable at the time. This opposition was 
most succintly summarised in a Foreign Office memorandum of 12 December 1951 
which outlined a commitment to Atlanticism and Empire/Commonwealth that was to 
remain unchallenged until the late 1950s:
‘The United Kingdom cannot seriously contemplate joining in European 
integration. Apart from geographical and strategic considerations, 
Commonwealth ties and the special position of the United Kingdom as the 
centre of the sterling area, we cannot consider submitting our political and 
economic system to supranational institutions. Moreover, if these institutions 
did not prove workable, which their dissolution would not be serious for the 
individual countries which would go their separate ways again; it would be 
another matter for the United Kingdom which would have had to break its 
Commonwealth and sterling area connexions to join them. Nor is there, in fact, 
any evidence that there is real support in this country for any institutional
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connexion with the continent. Moreover, although the fact may not be 
universally recognised, it is not in the true interests of the continent that we 
should sacrifice our present unattached position which enables us, together 
with the United States, to give a lead to the free world/ (DBPO [1986], series 
II, vol. I no. 414)
The dismay and anger at the Schuman proposals indicated the extent to which the 
British conception of the European order was being challenged. However, its rejection 
by British elites also indicated a continued confidence in the principles of British 
liberal imperialism. The latter was not based on formal legal constitutional 
arrangements and Fordist economic organisation but on a more informal political 
domination from London (which in the aftermath of World War II meant in 
partnership with Washington). The British position was to support looser, more 
intergovemmentalist arrangements, such as the OEEC that limited its obligations to 
Europe and enabled it to concentrate on orchestrating the global political arena. It 
was informal global political domination that mattered and in this respect Britain 
treated Europe, the third of Churchill’s three circles, in the same way as the colonies 
of white settlement. In 1863, Disraeli had remarked in the House of Commons that 
‘colonies do not cease to be colonies because they are independent’ (cited in Cain and 
Hopkins 1993a: 469). The trappings of formal political independence were often 
necessary to secure informal political domination:
‘As they [former colonies] increased their formal political independence, so 
they became reliant on flows of British capital to an extent that limited their 
freedom of action in crucial respects and tied export interests and their 
political representatives to policy norms, the mles of the game, set by London’ 
(ibid).
The point here is that real power remained in London; in the case of Europe the 
attitude was similar. Ultimately, power within Europe was not considered to lie in its 
sovereign nation-states or in the pooled sovereignty of a unified Europe and its 
supranational institutions but in the partnership between Washington and London and 
the establishment of the one world system. While it caused some disturbance for the 
Labour government, the importance of the ECSC for the government should not be 
overemphasised. There was a general belief that the ECSC was unlikely to succeed, to 
the extent that it was perceived as a challenge to existing forms of global governance,
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it was not considered to be a particularly strong one. Its importance as a fundamental 
reorganisation of global power relations was therefore underestimated.
3.5 The failure of the European Defence Community 1951-1954: a British victory
We may characterise the emerging British position as one of tolerating the moves 
towards formal integration so as not to jeopardise the ideal of an Atlantic community. 
European integration was therefore to be viewed as a peripheral element of a form of 
association that had been enshrined in N.A.T.0 27 and the Bretton Woods agreements. 
This policy of ‘toleration’ hid a more deeply structured British opposition towards 
European integration that emerged in response to the setting up of the ECSC. This 
opposition continued with attempts to form a European Defence Community (EDC).
The background to the EDC was the intensification of the Cold War as a consequence 
of the outbreak of the Korean war (George 1990: 24; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 56). 
There was a growing fear of a Soviet threat to Europe, which was compounded by the 
overwhelming superiority of Soviet forces compared to NATO (ibid). As a solution 
to this, the Americans promised extra troops for Europe but in return wanted to see 
German rearmament (ibid). The response of the French was the Pleven Plan which 
advocated a European army, an independent European Defence Minister and 
eventually a European fpreign policy (Northedge 1974:160). It was also agreed that 
Federal institutions would be required to control such a structure and that the newly 
formed Assembly of the ECSC was to be given the task of drafting a treaty for a 
European political community. The Labour government’s reaction to these 
developments was critical, in the House of Commons Bevin stated that:
‘Europe is not enough; it is not big enough, it is not strong enough, and it is 
not able to stand by itself. It is this great conception of an Atlantic Community 
that we want to build up.’ (cited in Evans 1975:15)
The Plan however had strong American support and the British government agreed
not to stand in the way of the French if it was decided to go ahead with the EDC. In
September 1951, a joint declaration was signed by France, America and Britain
supporting the EDC but without any Commitment to British participation. Herbert
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Morrison, who had replaced Bevin at the Foreign Office, stated that Britain wanted to 
see ‘the closest possible association with the European continental community’ (cited 
in Gowland and Turner 2000a: 58). However, Morrison failed to outline what this 
closest possible association actually meant.
The election of a Conservative government in October 1951 under Churchill did not 
change the official policy and the events seemed to strengthen this position. On the 
28th November, Eden as Foreign Secretary informed a NATO meeting that British 
troops would not be part of a European defence force. This was seen by many as a 
reversal in Conservative thinking as Churchill had been a strong supporter of 
European unity during the war and while in opposition. In August 1950, he had 
spoken out in favour of a European army. Eden himself had criticised Labour's 
isolationism and their refusal to join the Schuman negotiations. However, once in 
power the Conservative government’s support for European unity appeared to be 
more a matter of rhetoric than reality. Membership of a European Defence 
Community was seen as potentially undermining the unique relationship that Britain 
had with the United States, a development which would have allowed a 
disengagement of American forces from the continent (Young 1998: 75). Although 
Churchill was viewed as one of the main supporters of European unity, his position 
was in fact exceptionally ambiguous and he never embraced the idea of any 
curtailment of British sovereignty. A Cabinet note of October 1951 illustrated 
Churchill’s position,
‘Our first object is the unity and the consolidation of the British 
Commonwealths and what is left of the former British Empire. Our second 
‘fraternal association’ of the English speaking world; and third, United 
Europe, to which we are a separate closely and specially-related ally and 
friend.’ (PRO, CAB 129/48 C. 51, 29 November 1951)
Eden was primarily an internationalist and, after 1951, an upholder of imperial 
preference, who saw British national identity as antithetical to European unity (Young 
1998: 74)28. The position of both Churchill and Eden was therefore that Britain would 
remain a ‘benevolent spectator of the progress of the EDC’ (Northedge 1974:162).
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The consequence of this cold British attitude was to leave the French feeling isolated 
and concerned over German domination of Europe (ibid). British refusal to join the 
EDC was a main factor in its failure and led directly to the refusal of the French 
Assembly to ratify the Treaty29 (ibid: 166).
The failure of the EDC opened the space for a British initiative for extending the 
Treaty of Brussels to include Italy and Germany. This new organisation, the Western 
European Union (WEU), was a loose consultative organisation which put in place 
procedures for checking German remilitarisation. Its primary objective was therefore 
to incorporate Italy and Germany back into the Western defence system. For the 
British government, NATO remained the most important international defence 
organisation and the WEU was viewed as the best way of maintaining Anglo- 
American leadership of the West European bloc. However, damage had been done, 
Maxwell Fyfe, Home Secretary at the time, stated that the refusal to commit British 
troops to the EDC ‘destroyed Britain’s name on the continent’ (cited in Turner 2000: 
50).
The Conservatives under Churchill appeared more supportive than the Labour 
government of the idea of European unity. However, the general attitude in the 
Conservative party reflected a confidence in the ‘solidity and superiority of British 
institutions and this made the European vision of transcending existing political 
structures unacceptable’ (Morris 1996:125). On the issue of supranationalism, there 
was no similarity between the European Christian democratic parties and the British 
Conservatives (ibid). Yet some sort of leadership role within Western Europe was a 
fundamental feature of British foreign policy at the time and the failure of the EDC 
and the formation of the WEU was viewed as a success by the Conservative 
government. However, this did not prevent the widening of the gap between Britain 
and her West European allies30.
In general it can be argued that for both the Labour and Conservative government the
relationship of Britain to Western Europe was framed within the broader parameters
of global strategic objectives of an Atlantic community. As we shall see this is a
recurring theme in determining the parameters of Britain’s relationship with the
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EC/EU. Governing elites were at times prepared to be supportive of proposals for 
greater European unity but without giving any indication of British involvement. They 
remained imperious and aloof. In many respects, such a policy was realistic 
considering the devastation of post-war Europe and the continued authority of the 
British state across the globe. However, it also reflected a structured opposition to the 
form of political modernisation that was evident in Europe and was finding its most 
radical expression in the supranationalism of the project of European integration. This 
was highlighted by the refusal of British governing elites to open up to serious public 
debate the possible gains and losses of different forms of membership and association 
with Western Europe (Northedge 1974:171)31. This was a distinct failure of political 
imagination on the part of political elites that can only be explained in terms of their 
institutionalisation within an historically regressive state regime.
3.6 Sabotaging Messina and the free trade proposals
The failure of the European Defence Community did not however end the drive for 
more Western European integration. Proposals for an economic union were put 
forward in a memorandum from the Benelux countries presented to the ECSC in 
1955. It contained measures for the establishment of a Common Market as well as for 
joint action in the areas of transport and energy and, in particular, for atomic energy. 
The Benelux proposals, plus Monnet’s proposals for an atomic energy community, 
were examined at the Messina Conference in 1955 and the outcome of this was the 
Messina Resolution. This committed the member-states of the ECSC to
‘continue the creation of a united Europe through an expansion of joint 
institutions, the gradual fusion of national economies, the creation of a 
common market, and the gradual coordination of social policies.’ (Nugent 
1994: 44)
The result of the Messina Conference was the setting up of the Spaak Committee 
(named after the Belgian Foreign Minister) to put together specific proposals in line 
with the resolution. The position of the British government was that it was not in 
Britain’s interests to join the negotiations and anyway it was believed that the 
proposals were likely to come to nothing. The British position reflected the dominant
81
view of the Treasury and the Foreign Office that had been evident in the British 
response to the ECSC and EDC. Butler, at the Treasury considered membership of a 
Customs Union to be incompatible with Britain’s role at the centre of the Sterling 
Area and Commonwealth, while Macmillan, at the Foreign Office, prioritised 
Britain’s historic world role (Kaiser 1996: 40-41). However, between 1955 and 56 
this stance was challenged on two fronts. Firstly, there was growing concern amongst 
economic ministries over Britain’s declining economic position and, secondly, the 
success of the Customs Union proposals added to the growing fears over British 
marginalisation from European developments. Divisions were beginning to open up in 
Britain’s position towards European integration that reflected the concerns over 
Britain’s declining global position.
The British were invited to participate on the Spaak Committee and agreed to do so on 
the understanding that they had ‘special difficulties’ with any proposal for a European 
common market (Camps 1964: 30). This was in line with the official position of 
appearing to be a benevolent supporter of moves towards integration. It was hoped 
that Britain would be able to steer the talks ‘along the most sensible lines’
(PRO: CAB 134/1026 MAC (55) 20th, 16 June 1955 cited in Young 1993: 95). The 
British representative at the negotiations was not a Minister but rather a civil servant, 
Russell Bretherton, an Under Secretary in the Board of Trade. This demonstrated the 
low priority awarded to participation. Bretherton reported to the Spaak Committee 
that Britain was apprehensive about the moves towards economic integration because 
of its commitments to the Commonwealth and Empire (Moon 1985:144). In 
particular, there was the issue of whether the Treaty of Rome would cover the 
overseas territories of the member states. The response of the other states was that 
they were prepared to negotiate on British conditions for entry and wanted to see its 
participation in a customs union. Bretherton informed his superiors that they were in a 
position to shape the negotiations to suit British interests (Young 1998: 91). It was 
therefore clear by August 1955 that Britain had to decide whether or not to take an 
active part in the negotiations and, as Bretherton informed his superiors, to do so 
would have meant a commitment to the final results (Young 1995: 96 Kaiser 1996:
47). The British government decided to withdraw its representation from the Spaak
Committee in November 1955, arguing that it was a replication of the OEEC.
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However, there was a growing concern in government circles over potential success 
of the Spaak committee (ibid: 48). There had already been some recognition within 
both the Board of Trade and the Treasury over the economic consequences of British 
exclusion from European developments (Young 1995: 94; Kaiser 1996: 34-36)32. 
These fears were reflected in Peter Thomeycroft's33 (President of the Board of Trade) 
letter to Macmillan in January 1956 in which he stated:
‘I am convinced that the Americans are living in a fools’ paradise about 
Messina, and I strongly recommend that you and the Foreign Secretary should 
seek to bring home to President Eisenhower the gravity of the dangerous 
situation which is rapidly developing against the interests of both our countries 
and all our joint work since the war to build up a ‘one-world’ trading system’ 
(cited in Milward 1992: 428).
Thomeycroft went on to charge the integrationist project with ‘undermining our 
security and economy’ and stated that it would inevitably lead to German domination 
of Europe (ibid: 429). It was evidence of a more aggressive opposition to European 
developments underlying diplomatic manoeuvring. By the beginning of 1956 it had 
been agreed that Britain should attempt to sabotage the proposals for a Customs 
Union by having the Brussel’s proposals redirected through the OEEC (Kaiser 1996:
48). The aim was, as Gladwyn Jebb described it, to ‘embrace destructively’ the 
proposals for an economic community (cited in Kaiser 1996: 48). The objectives of 
the British government were to attempt to politically isolate those governments who 
favoured further European integration and convince the Americans that the Messina 
initiative would split Europe. Neither of these objectives proved to be successful and 
the OEEC strategy was reformulated in 1956 into a more constructive set of counter­
proposals to the customs union. Plan G, as it was known, proposed a European 
industrial free trade area (FTA) that would preserve British Commonwealth trade and 
protect British agriculture while opening up the markets of the Six to British industry. 
Kaiser claims that the FTA proposals were indicative of different positions within the 
British government (1996: 73-74). For Thomeycroft and the Board of Trade the 
proposals represented a radical reorientation of British trade policy which involved 
removing Britain’s protectionist trade legacy. It was conceived as a vital modernising
strategy formulated in the context of an emerging understanding of the realities of
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British decline. However, this has to seen in the context of a post-imperial 
internationalisation of the British economy that was characterised by two significant 
features. Firstly, the American penetration of the British economy as American 
investment into the UK increased by 151% between 1950 and 1958 (Overeek 1990: 
105). Secondly, the EEC’s share of British overseas investment began to increase 
dramatically (Overbeek 1990:106). Membership of the EC particularly suited large 
British capital that was traditionally outward looking as well as American 
multinationals that were increasingly basing themselves in Britain. The growing 
significance attached to EC trade can be seen as part of an emerging post-imperial 
accumulation strategy that had a distinctly international focus. What was missing was 
the internalisation of Fordism without which a lot of British industry remained ill- 
equipped to face the demands of the increasingly competitive European and world 
economy (Gamble 1994:115).
For Macmillan, EC membership was increasingly being viewed as part of a 
revision of the three circles policy designed to secure Britain’s position as the 
mediator between the United States, the Commonwealth and Western Europe (ibid: 
74). While there was support amongst economic interest groups for Plan G, there was 
however continued Cabinet opposition against a proposal that might weaken 
Commonwealth ties and weaken Britain’s world role (ibid: 79-82). As we shall see, 
Cabinet opposition to the proposals only collapsed after the Suez debacle (ibid: 83).
The free trade negotiations went ahead but were viewed by the member states as not
in their interests. Britain would be able to import relatively cheaply from outside of
Europe because of its system of Commonwealth preferences, and still take advantage
of the free trade area for exporting within Europe. A free trade area lacked the
systems of bargains and sacrifices that characterised the EEC and ensured that
everyone benefited. In short, it implied ‘commercial advantage with fewer
obligations’ (Camps 1964:167; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 108) and lacked the
commitment to wider European unity that such obligations implied. Negotiations
became polarised between the British and the French; the former being concerned
with international free trade, the latter with European unity. Although it was de Gaulle
who actually vetoed the free trade proposals, in the end the ‘free trade area was
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defeated by loyalty to the Treaty of Rome’ (Camps 1964:172). It appears that the 
negotiations never were likely to succeed even before since the Six had become 
suspicious of British motivations after the earlier attempts to sabotage the Mesina 
initiatives (Kaiser 1996: 91-92; Young 1993:104). Despite the relaxation of domestic 
constraints, these suspicions of British motives were justified considering the 
continued ideological opposition that remained entrenched within the British state to 
the integrationist project. Ultimately, what divided the British from the rest was the 
level of regional integration that was being proposed. When FTA negotiations finally 
failed in 1958, Macmillan told a small meeting of colleagues that ‘there were three 
groups who wanted supranationalism and who were playing no small part on the 
Commission... .the Jews, the Planners and the old cosmopolitan elite’ (cited in Young 
1998:118). What had emerged amongst the British governing elite was an 
‘increasingly desperate antagonism to the Six’ (Young 1998:116). It was viewed as 
an inward looking protectionist bloc that was antithetical to the kind of world order 
envisaged by the British governing elites.
3.6 Establishing a European civil society
While the European Economic Community was given the utilitarian label ‘The
Common Market’, the Treaty of Rome in fact represented the constitution of the
Community that provided the basis for Community rights and citizenship (Meehan
1993:11-12, 30). Meehan argues that sociological arguments about nation-building
and the universalisation of rights are applicable to the development of the Community
and the Treaty of Rome (ibid: 31). She also points out that the decision of relatively
autonomous powers to enter into the agreement with one another and the
disagreements about the distribution of powers are analogous to the controversies over
the establishment of the United States (ibid). This American model is arguably
applicable to the process of integration because the founders of the European Union
did not see power as rooted in an abstract conception of the ‘nation’ but on the
‘reciprocity and mutuality’ of consenting governments and peoples (Arendt 1963:
181). Rather than a Hobbesian conception of the international order in which states
strive against one another for dominance, the bargains, compromises and package
deals that characterised governmental negotiations on integration have been indicative
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of a form of public power in which governments were prepared to make sacrifices of 
state autonomy for the greater goal of a closer union. However, while the Treaty of 
Rome was a clear break with the Westhphalian model of state sovereignty, it 
represented a confederal organisation of political authority rather than a true 
federation (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 233). This confederal system signified
‘the operation of a complex of public bodies at the European level, subject to 
various forms of accountability and quasi-democratic control but lacking full 
constitutionalized establishment and rights, or full citizenship legitimation.’ 
(ibid)
Initially, it was believed that full political integration would be achieved via the 
‘Monnet method’ of technical and economic integration in specific areas that would 
ultimately ‘spillover’ and culminate in a distinct European political community (see 
Haas 1966,1968). This functionalist approach to political integration heralded a form 
of European citizenship that avoided prioritising political citizenship in favour of a 
segmented citizenship that related to different parts of an individual’s existence as 
consumer, worker, welfare claimant etc:
‘The various possible items of functional citizenship have nothing more in 
common than commodities you put in your purchasing trolley in a 
supermarket.’ (Neunreither 1995:11)
In this respect, the Community reflected the problems of a post-war reconstruction 
that established citizenship on the technocratic grounds of economic planning and the 
extension of welfare bureaucracy. A further dilemma was that the political citizenship 
of the Community was largely indirect, via membership of a member-state. In this 
respect, it was defined in an even more passive way than in bureaucratised national 
welfare states. In effect, the Community established a highly truncated and elitist form 
of political community. Yet, despite these considerable limitations, it can be argued 
that the Treaty of Rome significantly extended the emergent civic supranationalism 
that had been established under the Treaty of Paris. It implied the construction of a 
European civil society as the mechanism to regulate transnational social and economic 
relations. This consolidated a novel form of organising public power at a European 
level that attempted to turn states into corporate citizens and established a set of
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enforceable rights for citizens at the European level. It was this highly formalised 
political and economic reorganisation of Western Europe that the British objected to. 
This deeper project of integration was increasingly becoming the focus of the British 
governing elite’s hostility, and their discourses and practices began to reflect the 
growing belief that integration was a serious threat to the British conception of the 
international order.
Significantly, the wider political debate appeared to be largely immune to these 
growing concerns and displayed the kind of imperious distance that had characterised 
much of the British attitude to European integration since the end of the war. During 
the formation of the EC, Moon (1995) concludes from the sequence of events in 
Britain that British political classes viewed the process as being of little importance.
In 1957, the year in which the Treaty of Rome was signed, the Conservative party 
conference debated the issue but did not discuss the possibility of membership of the 
EEC. The emphasis at the conference was placed on how to stimulate 
Commonwealth trade and on the relationship with the United States and the 
Commonwealth in opposing the Soviet Union (ibid: 147). Moon points out that
‘the depiction of the issue by the Cabinet, that British participation in 
European economic integration was really irrelevant to Britain’s needs and 
commitments, also prevailed in Parliament and within the Conservative Party.’ 
(ibid)
The European issue barely entered the British political agenda at this time. It was 
largely absent from parliamentary debate and the issue of membership was not taken 
up by the Labour party, business or the trade unions. It was, largely, ignored by the 
press who considered neither the possibility of British membership nor what was 
occurring on the continent (ibid: 154).
The failure of the FTA proposals therefore represented the defeat of British attempts 
to shift the continent towards association and cooperation and away from integration 
(Camps 1964: 505; George 1990: 28; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 109). The 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) went ahead but without the Six members of 
the EEC. It consisted of Britain, the Nordic countries and Austria and Switzerland, the
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‘outer seven’. Yet, rather ominously, in trade terms the EEC continued to be of more 
significance to Britain. Indeed, it was increasingly recognised that EFTA would be a 
bridge to the EEC (Kaiser 1996:102).
3.7 The post-imperial context: towards nation-statehood
The decision to apply for membership of the EC, as revealed by Foreign Office and 
Cabinet papers, can be viewed as a tactical shift in British policy. The decision was 
designed to secure fundamental geopolitical objectives in the context of imperial 
decline (Dobson 1991; George 1990,1991; Warner and Deighton 1993; Young 1993). 
Indeed Lords argues that ‘the 1961 application was in many ways grounded in 
traditionalist categories of foreign policy thought* (1996:13). Largely without 
exception the analytic focus has been on the actions of elites intended to maintain 
Britain’s strategic position by the pursuit of EC membership (Milward 1997: 7). 
However, the argument presented here is that to view the first application as a matter 
of geopolitical decision making is problematic unless this is located in the context of 
the pressures for a profound restructuring of the British state regime. In fact, Britain’s 
decision to join the EC represented a move towards a peculiar kind of nation-state 
building in the context of the disintegration of Britain as an imperial state and not 
simply a readjustment to shifts in global strategic alliances.
The non-involvement in the process of European integration for both Labour and
Conservative governments can be explained by the continued attempts by elites to
secure the British state as an imperial state. To a large extent decisions were being
made on the basis of an assessment of the short term disadvantages of membership to
Britain’s status as a world power and therefore not on any critical assessment of the
chronic nature of British decline. However, it can be argued that even while the FTA
negotiations were occurring it was becoming increasingly clear that imperial renewal
was impossible and that the British political order was under threat. This is in line
with many contemporary commentators of British decline who now consider the
period between 1957 and 1960 to be central to understanding the sequence of British
decline (Gallagher 1982; Tomlinson 1982; Holland 1984; Cain and Hopkins 1993b)
The key event in this respect was the 1956 Suez crisis (Louis and Owen 1989; Cain
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and Hopkins 1993b), which led directly to the first British application for 
membership of the Community (Young 1998: 99; Turner 2000: 51).
The decision by the British Conservative government, backed by France and Israel, to 
invade Egypt was in reaction to Colonel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez canal. 
The grounds for this action were that Nasser wanted to block oil reaching Europe and 
was intent on invading Israel. The invasion of Egypt by the combined forces of the 
three powers was met with universal condemnation and, most importantly, was not 
supported by the USA. The failure of the attack led to an immediate sterling crisis in 
Britain, and American support for economic stabilisation was only agreed if Britain 
removed her troops. The impact of Suez on the Conservative party was dramatic and 
led to the resignation of Eden. The tensions in the party at the time were between the 
progressive One Nation Tories, who were increasingly anti-Empire and pro-Europe; 
and Empire Tories, such as the backbench Suez group, who pressurised Eden to take 
action over the Suez canal to restore ‘Britain’s imperial mission and destiny’ (Amery 
cited in Turner 2000: 50). Harold Macmillan was successful in succeeding Eden as 
Prime Minister because he was seen to be a compromise candidate, able to unite the 
Conservative party. Yet, it was Macmillan who recognised that the Empire was 
largely over and that Britain’s post-imperial future must include membership of the 
EC. In fact this was consistent with Macmillan’s position as one of the leading 
corporate liberals within the Conservative party (Overbeek 1990: 64). These corporate 
Conservatives supported state intervention into the economy and emphasised science 
and technology as a national priority. Macmillan came to link EC membership with 
this modernisation project.
In the course of 1957, Macmillan became increasingly alarmed by developments on 
the continent and concerned that British plans for the FTA should succeed. There was 
no immediate change of policy regarding joining the EEC in the immediate aftermath 
of Suez, yet it undoubtedly resulted in a radical shift in thinking amongst the party 
elite; as Edward Heath, Chief Whip at the time, concludes in his account of the Suez 
crisis:
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4 ...perhaps the greatest legacy of Suez was that it forced many of the British 
establishment to accept that the sun was setting on the British Empire and that 
America was the new superpower. This in turn forced many who had hitherto 
been sceptical about European unity to realise that our future lay in our own 
continent and not in distant lands which our forbears had coloured pink on the 
map. Even Eden, who had crucially kept our seat empty at Messina in 1955, 
acknowledged this fact in one of the last memos he circulated as Prime 
Minister. On 28 December 1956, he wrote that ‘the consequences of this 
examination may be to determine us to work more closely with Europe/ ’ 
(Heath 1998:177-178)
The consequence of Suez was also to seriously tarnish Britain’s reputation amongst 
members of the Commonwealth (Sanders 1990:148). Many members began to 
support the movement amongst prominent third world leaders towards a position of 
non-alignment with either East or West (ibid). This reflected the growing anti­
imperialism of both colonies and former colonies and the growing importance of 
nationalism. As the Empire came to an end, Britain’s status as a global power 
declined. In the relationship between the superpowers, British diplomacy was proving 
limited. Britain had not established a tripolar world and, if any power was to emerge 
as a third force, it was more likely to be the EEC. It was becoming clear that America 
was taking the EEC very seriously and by the early 1960s viewed a United Europe as 
a potential junior partner (Grosser 1980: 200-201).
The economic benefits of Commonwealth and Empire were also becoming far less 
certain. With the decline in the prices of raw materials after the Korean war and their 
reduced import purchasing power, the export potential of these countries grew more 
slowly (Cain and Hopkins 1993b: 286). Commonwealth markets were also being 
penetrated by Japan, America and the EEC (Jessop 1980: 70). Furthermore, problems 
in the British economy were being made worse by money going out of the country 
into the Empire and this was combined with the high cost of defence to maintain a 
global role (Cain and Hopkins 1993b: 282-283). The new economic opportunities 
that began to open up were in Europe and Japan and, as a result, British trading and 
investment patterns began to shift towards the former (ibid: 287; Jessop 1980: 70; 
Sanders 1990:151). The integrationist project had not proven to be the failure as had 
been predicted by the British. In fact tariff reductions were occurring earlier than had 
been envisaged and the Community was generally thriving (Gowland and Turner
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2000a: 115). In comparison, the economic and political significance of EFTA was 
proving to be of ‘marginal utility’ (Wallace 1990a: 79). Yet, rather ironically, the 
British economy was actually performing better than at any time since before the 
1880s, the problem, however, was the extent that it was being out performed by its 
rivals (Gamble 1994: 20). As Cain and Hopkins point out, Britain’s decline as an 
imperial power became effective only when these relativities changed (1993b: 312). 
The real problem was that the economy was not growing sufficiently enough to 
sustain extensive external and domestic commitment. The consequence of this was 
recurring current account deficits that provoked currency speculation. This was 
exacerbated by colonies and other countries holding sterling assets that exceeded the 
value of foreign reserves and resulted in the so-called ‘sterling balances problem’ 
(Schenk 2002: 347). The only real solution was to prioritise the construction of a 
national Fordist economy.
The British crisis was therefore a crisis of a world state that was being forced into 
being a nation-state by external forces. It was being organised within a set of Western 
institutional arrangements, under American hegemony, that considered the nation­
state to be the organising principle: ,
‘these states were so united in their global interests, so similar in their 
capitalist and nation-state structures, and their trade and investment with each 
so dominated the world economy that a broad consensus underlay their 
negotiations over international arrangements.’ (Mann 1995:116)
The institutionalisation of the British state within these arrangements and the 
corresponding decline of Empire helped secure the end of the British state as a world 
state. The immediate problem for the political classes was how to adapt to the reality 
of global Fordism. Britain seemed unable to take advantage of these structural 
changes in the global situation in the way that countries such as Germany and Japan 
were successfully doing. By the end of the 1950s, the reality of decline was clearly 
apparent (Jessop 1980; Gamble 1994). The growing concern with ‘what is wrong with 
Britain’ focused on the lack of modernisation of the major institutions of the British 
political order, from the economy to the civil service and universities (Jessop 1980:
79; Gamble 1994: 24). The structural boundaries and parameters of the British state
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appeared uncertain and the contestation over British nation-statehood became the 
organising principle of political strategies from the 1960s onwards.
These structural developments and shifts in the politico-economic order resulted in a 
range of policy developments and institutional reforms. In the aftermath of Suez a 
range of defence cuts were introduced and decolonisation was speeded up34. There 
was also a strong recognition that British policy had to be more firmly linked to that 
of the US, as Macmillan noted when reflecting on Suez:
Tt was the action of the United States which really defeated us in attaining our 
object ...This situation with the United States must at all costs be prevented 
from arising again.’ (PRO, AIR 8/1940, COS (57) 220,11 October 1957 cited 
in Hennessy 2000: 258)
This was eventually to give rise to Macmillan’s ‘grand design’ which would see 
Britain as a bridge between the EC and America. By 1960 the newly elected 
Conservative government had committed itself to modernisation of which the grand 
design was a part (Hennessy 2000: 257). Meanwhile, the domestic response to the 
problems of relative economic decline included expansionist economic politics and a 
more interventionist approach that aspired to French economic planning as a model 
(Pollard 1980: 398; Jessop 1980: 39-40; Overbeek 1990:131-132). This included the 
revival of a corporatist strategy with the setting up of the National Economic 
Development Council in 1962 as a common forum involving management, 
government and labour and some independents in an attempt to consider ways of 
encouraging economic growth (ibid). It also implied a new settlement between the 
classes in the form of a National Incomes Commission (Hennessey 2000: 260). Yet 
these attempts at economic modernisation were weak; overall economic control 
remained with a Treasury that avoided direct state intervention into production and 
continued to prioritise the international role of sterling. Thus, while the City and large 
multinationals were successfully adapting to global Fordism, much of British industry 
remained weak and uncompetitive. Neither did the Macmillan government tackle the 
problems of British industrial relations and establish effective corporatist structures.
Another plank of modernisation was the concern with defining a national citizenship
as Empire was deconstructed. This was particularly evident with the increased
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immigration from the New Commonwealth (occurring by the late 1950s) and the 
problems of ‘assimilation’ that this was perceived to imply. These developments 
culminated in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act that attempted to control 
immigration and begin to determine criteria for nationality and residence35. It aimed to 
restrict non-white immigration and broke with Labour’s earlier British Nationality Act 
(1948) that had conferred in law the status of British citizen on subjects of any 
Commonwealth country. Thus began a more concerted effort to define the boundaries 
of the national collectivity that has proved to be chronically contentious and complex 
(see Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992: chapter 2). As we shall see, the decision to join 
the EC became irretrievably caught up in these struggles to redefine the nation.
Alongside imperial decline and national restructuring, the move towards membership 
of the EC might be seen as part of a significant strategy of modernisation by 
repositioning Britain within the most significant economic and political reorganisation 
of nation-states that had emerged in post-war Europe. Undoubtedly, membership 
became associated with domestic modernisation for political elites but it remained a 
compromised strategy and, as we shall see, this was to be typical of its role in 
domestic politics. What emerged was a profoundly conservative strategy of truncated 
modernisation through membership of the EC. In effect, it became the dominant plank 
of the Conservative government’s modernisation programme and an alternative 
strategy for an administration unable to carry out a more profound national Fordist 
reconstruction.
3.8 Modernisation without modernising
An effective analysis of the Britain’s decision to join the EC must recognise that this
was a conservative strategy desinged to secure core elements of the British state
through selective modernisation. The aim was turn a declining imperial state into the
leading capitalist state within an association of nation-states in order to renew the
global authority of Britain and reinvigorate the domestic economy36. I propose here
that the force of British membership of the EEC as a strategy of modernisation was
inherently compromised in its initial conception. In effect, it confirmed British
dependence on the US and the internationalisation of the British economy. This poses
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particular problems for associating British membership of the EC with transformation 
and modernisation of the British politico-economic structure. Indeed, the European 
strategy seemed to offer the best of both worlds by implying continuity through 
change. In retrospect, this flawed Europeanism was evidence of a peculiar form of 
compromised, post-imperial nation-state building that was eventually to culminate in 
Thatcherism. As we shall see the dilemma was that the coherence of such a strategy 
was inherently fragile given the ambitious political objectives and structures that were 
inherent to the project of European integration.
The conservative nature of the British decision to apply for membership of the EC can 
be illustrated by the geopolitical objectives of the governing elite at the time. In 
particular, EC membership was viewed as necessary to maintain Britain’s key 
strategic relationship with the United States; indeed, it was partly a consequence of 
pressure from the United State. The continuation of this key external relationship was 
viewed as fundamental to British security. In particular the continuation of the British 
power in the world became associated with maintaining an independent nuclear 
deterrent. However, by the late 1950s it was clear that Britain lacked both the 
resources and technological know-how to develop its own system. Any continuation 
of Britain as a nuclear power and thereby its world role, depended on American 
support for an independent national deterrent (Kaiser 1996:129). In return, the United 
States wanted to see British membership because it was believed the British would be 
more favourable to American interests and keep the Community from becoming an 
‘inward looking club’ (George 1990: 31; Kaiser 1996:130). Indeed, it was believed 
that Britain could help undermine de Gaulle’s attempts to assume leadership of 
Western Europe and to make it more independent of American control (Grosser 1980: 
183-190).
In 1961, Macmillan met President Kennedy in Washington and became convinced that
America was even more strongly in favour of British membership than it had been in
the past and that the continuation of the ‘special relationship was dependent on
membership’ (ibid). The architect of this policy was George Ball appointed by
Kennedy to Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. Belli was a European specialist,
having been legal adviser to the West European unification movement. He was
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committed to the EC and convinced Kennedy that British membership of this 
organisation was vital for Western unity. In a meeting with Edward Heath, he argued 
that outside of Europe, Britain would be a ‘force for division rather than cohesion 
since she is a giant lodestar drawing with unequal degrees of force on each member 
state’ (cited in Evans 1975:144). The position of the US put British governing elites 
under pressure to join but it also seemed to reinforce an idea that Britain could be the 
leading nation-state in Europe. In these terms Britain’s role within Europe was clearly 
to be that of a constraining force, controlling and directing European integration in 
ways that were in line with American interests. From such a point of view, 
membership of the EC was not seen as threatening to Anglo-American relations but in 
fact was a way of consolidating the ‘special relationship’ (Kaiser 1996:130). This was 
not a British illusion but continued to reflect shared interests in relation to monetary 
policy.
From the end of the 1950s, the US joined the UK in persistent balance of payments 
deficits while the Six member-states accrued surpluses (Schenk 2002: 350). This was 
only possible because both countries had reserve currency status and their deficits 
were financed by trading partners holding their currencies as reserves (ibid: 351). It 
was a policy objected to by the Six because of its inflationary pressures. While the Six 
wanted to see a reduction in US and UK balance of payments, the Americans and the 
British sought ways to finance their deficits through changes in the international 
monetary policy (ibid: 353). The consequence of this was a ‘series of secret meetings 
at official and ministerial level between the United States and the United Kingdom 
designed to develop joint positions on international monetary issues’ (ibid). It was 
once again evidence of what Strange had referred to as the instinctive conjunction of 
financial interests that underpinned the ‘special relationship’ and reinforced the 
differences between Britain and mainland Europe (1971: 72-73).
In many respects, the Foreign Office and the Treasury were largely responsible for
refining the European strategy (Young 1993:102). By the end of the 1950s, the
Foreign Office began to view Europe as a new arena for establishing British influence
in the context of imperial decline and as a way of strengthening Anglo-American
relations post-Suez (Beloff 1963: 89-90; Young 1998:176; Gowland and Turner
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2000a: 121). The European conversion of the Treasury was also occurring with 
appointment of Sir Frank Lee as Joint Permanent Under Secretary in January 1960. 
Lee believed that British economic success now depended on participation within the 
European Community. He chaired the influential Economic Steering Committee 
which recommended British entry37. The combined impact of Lee and the Economic 
Steering Committee was illustrated by the reaction of one Treasury official in which 
he stated:
‘in 1959 the very idea caused him (as an advocate of EEC membership) to be 
written off as a long haired eccentric, in 1960 it was getting to be all right, and 
by 1961, you were a stick in the mud if you thought otherwise.’ (cited in Moon 
1985:171)
The belief was that entry into the EC would reinvigorate the British economy by 
giving it ‘a much needed dose of stiff competition’ and end its excessive reliance on 
the Commonwealth and sterling area (Young 1998:120; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 
121). However, the concern with domestic modernisation has to be placed within the 
context of the multinationalisation of the British economy and, in particular, the 
penetration by American capital into Britain and its imperial backyard (Overbeek 
1990:105). This penetration of American capital had been reinforced in 1958 by the 
relaxation of foreign exchange controls and the consequent growth of the Eurodollar 
market (ibid: 109). In July 1961, the Federation of British Industry (FBI) dominated 
by big multi-national corporations came out in favour EEC membership (ibid: 101). 
The growing support within the Treasury for membership therefore reflected the 
continued trend of British investment to go abroad, a trend reinforced by American 
multinationals operating in Britain (ibid: 106).
With the declining economic importance of the Commonwealth, Britain was well 
placed to become a gateway to European markets. The outlook of an intensification 
of European competition for the less advanced sections of the British economy were, 
however, likely to be negative. The modernising implications of this European policy 
therefore had much in common with traditional approaches to the domestic economy 
that enforced greater domestic competition through the external sanction of free trade 
(Gamble 1994:115). In addition, the Treasury believed that membership would
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reinvigorate sterling’s international role and that the City of London would become 
Europe’s financial centre (Schenk 2002: 355). Evidently, they believed that this would 
be secured once the benefits of EC trade resolved Britain’s balance of trade deficit. In 
effect, domestic economic modernisation and EC membership was imagined within a 
wider international post-imperial accumulation strategy. This was particularly 
noticeable in the continued commitment to sterling as a reserve currency which it 
believed was essential for the continuation of the City as a financial centre. After a 
return to convertibility in 1958, the City was once again provided with a medium of 
exchange that enabled a rapid revival (Strange 1971: 233). Government monetary 
policy until the late 1960s was then determined by the need uphold the value of 
sterling through international loans and high interest rates. The underlying 
weaknesses of the British economy and a comparatively de-regulated City meant this 
was difficult to sustain and there was intense speculation against sterling. Attempts to 
intervene only seemed to confirm that there were problems with the pound, and failed 
to quell market speculation (ibid: 238). Thus during the very period that governments 
were looking to modernise Britain through joining the EEC, there was the continued 
belief that the pound could be as strong as the dollar and this was essential to sustain 
the role of the City. Nowhere was the complete absence of a coherent project of 
political modernisation more evident:
‘The truth was that most Britain policy towards the operations of the City in 
the crucial ten years between 1958 and 1968 had been based on instinctive 
reflexes inherited from the past or on pragmatic, unprepared and unthought- 
out response to the looming threat of the next sterling crisis. If there was any 
coherent strategy, it was based on a complete misconception of the parameters 
of feasibility.’ (ibid: 242-243)
Nevertheless, what was occurring by the early years of the 1960s was a re­
examination of relations with Europe and a questioning of the assumptions that had 
been governing European policy since the end of the war (Camps 1964: 280; Gowland 
and Turner 2000a: 120-123). For the Macmillan government, membership of the EEC 
was perceived to be a vital strategy of modernisation at a time of terminal decline. It 
implied the necessary modernisation of Britain’s economy and external relations. 
Furthermore the adoption of a modernising European discourse was essential for
revitalising the Conservative party and creating a new modem image (Kaiser 1996:
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146). Evidently, it was a way of uniting both party and national interests. During 
1960 Macmillan became increasingly convinced of the necessity of British 
membership and in July he made the significant appointment of two ‘Europeans’ in 
key positions in his government. Christopher Soames became Minister of Agriculture 
and Duncan Sandys was moved to the Ministry of Commonwealth Relations in order 
to deal with any potential opposition. Another key appointment was that of Edward 
Heath who was made Foreign Office Minister with responsibility for European affairs. 
In the domestic arena, the press were increasingly supportive of membership and there 
was also a strong European movement in the country which encouraged the 
government that a shift in policy would be conducive to public opinion (Camps 1964: 
294; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 122).
In the negotiations over membership the international orientations of British policy 
making resurfaced in the concern to secure commitments to both the Commonwealth 
and to EFTA. Initially the government pushed ahead with the idea of a modified 
customs union that would link together the EEC and EFTA. Yet the Six were explicit 
that the only option open was full membership. It became clearer to the British 
government that the EEC was more than an economic arrangement and that any 
political influence Britain was to have could only be secured by full membership. The 
climate inside the EEC was seen to becoming more favourable to Britain. On the 31st 
July 1961 made the announcement to the House of Commons of British intention to 
seek membership of the European Community. In so doing, however, Macmillan 
emphasised the conservative elements of this strategy and played up its role in 
securing British world power status. Macmillan made it clear that the ‘dominant 
considerations in his mind were political ones’ ‘our right place is in the vanguard of 
the movement of greater unity o f the free world, and that we can lead better from 
within than outside’(cited in Camps 1964:359 emphasis mine). Inherent within the 
statement was also a degree of caution, emphasising the. continued importance of the 
Commonwealth he noted that,
‘If a close relationship between the United Kingdom and the countries of the 
EEC was to disrupt the long-standing and historic ties between the United 
Kingdom and the other nations of the Commonwealth the loss would be 
greater than the gain.’ (cited in Evans 1975: 28)
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In general, Macmillan and Cabinet Ministers presented the issue as a non-contentious 
one denying the Federal intentions of the Community and emphasising that 
membership would not undermine existing commitments and that national 
sovereignty would not be infringed (Young 1998:129; Turner 2000:56). Examining 
the political debates on the issue and the way it was presented by government 
spokesmen, Moon argues that a disproportionate amount of attention was given to 
dealing with subjects associated with criticism of entry (1985:167). The tone of the 
debate was reflected in a Guardian editorial:
‘The plunge is taken but, on yesterday’s evidence, by a shivering
Government.’ (cited in George 1990: 33)
It is argued that Macmillan remained ‘reticent about the full implications of 
membership of the Community’ (Camps 1964: 513; also see Gowland and Turner 
2000a: 123-124). A letter by the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, outlining the 
significant losses of sovereignty that would result from signing the Treaty of Rome 
received little attention from the Cabinet (Young 1998:126-127,129). In the debate in 
the House of Commons on the 2nd August 1961, Macmillan told MPs that moves 
towards a Federal Europe would be resisted (ibid: 129). Young argues that Macmillan 
chose to ignore the political nature of this venture; specifically that it would make 
Britain part of a European political order and would reduce the independence of both 
parliament and the courts (ibid: 129). The policy was therefore presented as a 
continuation rather than a reversal or change in direction from the past. What lay 
behind these ways of thinking was the belief that formal supranationalism could be 
undermined and that Britain could assume leadership role of the Community with the 
support of the smaller European countries and the backing of the United States. The 
formal supranationality of the Community had already been opposed by de Gaulle and 
this was reassuring to British politicians and officials (W. Wallace 1997: 27). The 
belief was that Britain could be transformed from being an imperial state into the 
leading European nation-state within an association of nation-states. By a sleight of 
hand, Empire was to be replaced by Europe (Turner 2000: 52). However, if there was 
a consensus emerging on membership it was a fragile one, particularly as the
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government’s own authority was in decline. Nevertheless, even this conservative 
European strategy met with strong opposition and the anomalies in the government’s 
position gave them lots of ammunition.
Significant opposition was clearly evident during the negotiations over British 
membership which took place amid much publicity. In contrast to Messina and the 
Spaak Committee, Europe became a major public issue (Gowland and Tuner 2000: 
134). A key feature of the negotiations became the protection of Commnowealth trade 
and the securing of Commonwealth links, particularly as the leaders of the 
Commonwealth had expressed their disapproval of British membership38. However, it 
can be argued that this was also necessary in order to diffuse opposition to what was 
increasingly being viewed as a threat to British institutions and identity 39. On the 
right, there was an outburst of ‘Empire loyalism', fuelled by the Beaverbrook press, 
which accused Macmillan of putting ‘Europe ahead of the Commonwealth’ (Young 
1998:141; George 1990: 34). The dissenters within the Conservative party were the 
imperialist right wing of the party who numbered between thirty and forty MPs and, 
although they did not threaten a government with a majority of one hundred, they 
proved themselves to be particularly vocal. The Conservative MP, Walker Smith, the 
first back-bencher to be called in a debate on pursuing membership, put into words the 
problem that, in due time, would tear the Conservative party apart (ibid: 154-155). 
Walker Smith’s essential point concerned the distinctiveness of Britain compared to 
Europe, he noted that,
‘their evolution has been continental and collective, ours has been insular and
imperial.’ (ibid)
The question of entry went beyond mere economics, he cautioned, it went to the heart 
of the British state’s post-imperial future and the extent to which this implied a 
continuation with its past. As far as Walker Smith was concerned, membership 
implied an undesirable break with that past. This early Eurosceptic speech reflected 
the underlying unease within Conservative ranks about the decision to pursue 
membership and this was not restricted to the back benches but was also evident in the 
Cabinet40 (Gowland and Turner 2000a: 124).
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The government also faced the growing opposition of the Labour party; its leader, 
Hugh Gaitskell, issued a statement in September 1962 against entry on the current 
terms. The Labour party was divided over Europe between those who were strongly in 
favour as a matter of principle, including many on the right such as George Thomas, 
the Deputy Leader. The majority of Trade Unions were also firmly in support of 
membership by the early 1960s on pragmatic grounds (Kaiser 1996:173). In contrast, 
opponents of membership viewed the EEC was as a ‘capitalist club\ For the latter, 
membership would be a threat to the independent economic policy of a future Labour 
government. The opponents were mainly, although not exclusively, positioned on the 
left of the party. Gaitskell, however, was part of a section of the party that could be 
said to be agnostic on the issue. When faced with a divided party, his position proved 
to be extraordinarily erratic in attempting to oppose the Conservative government's 
position without fully objecting to British membership (ibid: 162). By the time 
Gaitskell came to deliver his speech to the Labour party conference in October 1962, 
he had chosen the course of opposition to the European project:
‘After all, if we could carry the Commonwealth with us, safeguarded, 
flourishing prosperous; if we could safeguard our agriculture, and our EFTA 
friends were all in it, if we were secure in our employment policy, and if we 
were able to maintain our independent foreign policy and yet have this wider, 
looser association with Europe, it would be a great ideal. But if this should not 
prove to be possible; if the Six will not give it to us; if the British Government 
will not even ask for it, then we must stand firm by what we believe, for the 
sake of Britain, and the Commonwealth and the World; and we shall not flinch 
from our duty if that moment comes/ (Gaitskell 1962: 37)
To become a member of a Federal Europe would, he argued, mean ‘the end of Britain 
as an independent European State’ and ‘the end of a thousand years of history’ (ibid: 
23). The speech was well received. In particular, it reflected the continued 
significance of the Commonwealth for many on the left and the right of the party as 
the main alternative to the Empire both as a source of renewed political identity and as 
a viable economic partner (Young 1998:156-15). The Commonwealth, therefore, 
was a significant factor in the opposition to a European trajectory within both parties 
and, despite its limitations for the British economy, it seemed to offer a form of 
national renewal that was continuous with its imperial past. It was the Commonwealth
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option that Dean Acheson, the former US Secretary for State, ridiculed for its lack of 
unity, political structure or strength when in 1962 he famously described Britain as 
having ‘lost an Empire’ without yet ‘having found a role’ (cited ibid: 171). By 
evoking the Commonwealth, the opponents of the government’s European strategy 
demonstrated their inherent conservatism. The implication was that the British state 
was above the narrow nationalism of Europe because of its imperial history (Naim 
1973).
The opposition to membership gathered pace and began to influence the opinion polls; 
by 1962 they showed a decline in support for entry (Gowland and Turner 2000a: 131). 
National political projects continued to be attached to institutions and ideologies of 
the imperial state. The significant form of European political modernisation that the 
project of European integration represented was rejected. European integration was, 
therefore, becoming symbolically constituted across sections of the political class as a 
threat to British identity and interests and was proving to have potential as a political 
discourse around which electorates could be mobilised. It was represented as a threat 
to the reconstruction of the boundaries of the British state around the post-colonial 
Commonwealth. The government’s response to these developments was a pamphlet 
defending the policy. It addressed more directly the political implications of 
membership, yet it remained ‘cryptic’ about political unity (Young 1998:141). The 
emphasis was placed on the capacity of Britain to determine the nature of political 
unity once inside the Community and that ‘in renouncing some of our own 
sovereignty, we would receive a share of sovereignty renounced by other members’ 
(ibid: 142). Membership would neither alter the position of the Crown ‘nor rob our 
Parliament of its essential powers, nor deprive our Law Courts of their authority in 
our domestic life’ (ibid). This represented a defence of the government position and 
stated that membership of the Community was essential for Britain’s post-imperial 
future which threatened neither British identity nor the political order on which it was 
founded. In effect, both anti-European and pro-European forces defended their 
position in terms of a belief in Britain as a global politico-economic order. This 
reinforced the extent to which the realities of European integration could not be 
incorporated into the British debate. Evidently, the Macmillan government reflected
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the emerging tensions and contradictions in Britain’s post-imperial transition to 
nation-statehood:
‘Nowhere did the push and pull of past and the needs of the future exert their 
conflicting force during the Macmillan premierships more powerfully than 
along the ever widening fault line of Europe.’ (Hennessy, 2000: 267)
The Conservative government was attempting to adapt to the realities of global 
Fordism by reproducing certain core elements of the British politico-economic system 
within a contemporary form and within the parameters of Pax Americana. Underlying 
this was the continued problem of political modernisation in the Britain. As, 
Hennessey argues, these problems were personified in the figure of Macmillan who 
despite an acute awareness of the problems facing Britain, retained a Whiggish 
attachment to traditional institutions (2000: 270-271).
Three years after Macmillan made his statement that Britain intended to seek 
membership of the Community, the European Court of Justice declared in a historic 
ruling that European law took precedence over national law (Meehan 1993: 57). This 
radical assertion of the Community as an independent legal order reinforced the 
constitutional nature of the Treaties, the formal supranationalism on which European 
integration was founded, and, thereby, further distanced this political order from the 
position of British political elites.
By applying for membership of the EEC, the Macmillan government recognised the 
need for modernisation. However, it was a strategy of flawed Europeanism that was 
not underpinned by a broader strategy of political and economic modernisation. 
Instead, Europe was to replace Empire and enable Britain to become a leading 
capitalist nation-state operating as ‘junior partner’ within a US dominated Western 
bloc. This possibility was abruptly ended by de Gualle’s veto of the British 
application in January 1963 when he concluded that Britain had failed to prove its 
European credentials in the negotiations on membership. In particular, the strategic 
alliance with the United States and differences on agriculture and trade were cited as 
the main stumbling block (Kaiser 1996; Wilkes 1997).
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3.9 Conclusion
In this Chapter I have argued that European integration was part of a range of Fordist 
processes of economic and political modernisation that occurred after the Second 
World War. It is against state led processes of political modernisation that the British 
opposition to European integration should be viewed. British opposition to domestic 
political modernisation had powerful regional and global dimensions. This was 
evident when considering the British post-war consensus that I proposed was 
primarily a social imperial consensus. This gave rise to an opposition to the formal 
and extensive institution building that was typical of post-war Europe and is 
associated with the Fordist mode of regulation in general.
The British governing elite developed an imperial strategy towards European 
integration that was continuous with the ideology of free trade imperialism that had 
been the basis of the British global hegemony for much of the modem period. It is 
clear that the governing elite’s strategy towards European integration was part of a 
broader strategy that was concerned to re-establish the British state as a global power 
in alliance with the United States.
The shifts in global economic and political relations that were occurring in the 1950s 
left Britain relatively weak. From the late 1950s onwards, membership of the EC 
became viewed as a strategy of national renewal. As such, however, it was a 
conservative strategy of truncated modernisation that was pursued by a defensive 
government and took place as an alternative to more extensive internal reconstruction. 
Modernisation was typically associated with geopolitical adjustments. Yet, these 
adjustments occurred within an already established set of parameters; specifically, the 
continued British dependence on U.S. political and economic capital. This was not 
just a substantive fact but a normative position held by large sections of the political 
class.
What we see is that membership of the EC, as part of the solution to Britain’s post­
imperial trajectory, became implicated in the chronic tensions over the transition of
the British state from an imperial to a nation-state. Ultimately, both as an imperial
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and as an emergent nation-state, the relationship to the project of European integration 
was indicative of the structural constraints on political modernisation that have been 
persistently reasserted in Britain. The next chapter explores this further and views 
the relationship of the British state to European integration in the context of the 
chronic post-imperial crisis that afflicted the British state during the 1960s and 1970s.
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Chapter Four 
The British State and European Integration 1964- 
1979: The Post-Imperial Crisis and the Exclusion of 
Europe
In this Chapter I propose that we introduce the idea of a British post-imperial crisis 
in order to explain the problem of the British state and European integration. In 
Chapter 3, it was shown that the decision to apply for membership of the EC was part 
of a limited strategy of conservative modernisation that was primarily concerned with 
post-imperial reconstruction. Here, I examine the failure of this strategy to achieve 
legitimacy or retain its coherence in the context of a post-imperial crisis. The 
implication of this crisis was that fundamentally regressive features of the British 
political order were reasserted and reconfigured. The consequence of this for British 
European policies was profound. In particular, the exclusion of Europe becomes 
entrenched within the national political discourse and European integration is 
constructed as the ‘other’ of British identity. While European states begin to consider 
a revival of the integrationist project as a solution to the crisis of global Fordism, the 
consequence of the British post-imperial crisis is that governing elites increasingly 
distanced themselves from the political implications of membership. By the end of the 
1970s, a British European trajectory becomes firmly subordinated to the idea of a 
strong British state enmeshed within an Atlantic dominated global economy. Thus, 
despite the achievement of membership in 1973, constraints and limitations on the 
British state’s involvement in the integrationist project, reflecting the underlying 
structure and crisis of the state regime, become increasingly evident. What we see, 
therefore, is the shaping of the contours of Britain’s relationship with the EC by a 
combination of domestic and international forces as a post-imperial British state 
attempts to reposition itself within the global order.
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4.1 The crisis of Fordism and sustaining the project of European integration
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the formation and development of the European 
Community was part of the rise of the post-war Fordist nation-state (Milward 1992). 
This state regime was the basis for the reorganisation of state relations across Western 
Europe and formed the bedrock of an emergent post-nationalisation of European 
political authority. The starting point for this Chapter will be to demonstrate the 
continued importance of locating the trajectory of the EC within the wider processes 
of post-war European Fordist modernisation, albeit with different implications for the 
integrationist project. This analysis of the state/integration relationship provides a 
vital framework against which to continue to assess the uniqueness of the relationship 
of the British state to the EC. In particular, it will become evident that during the 
1960s and 1970s the British state remained structurally at odds with the complex 
political modernisation that continued to underpin the increasingly critical project of 
European integration. Despite the crisis conditions of the 1970s, European member- 
states continued to articulate a vision of European integration that was actualised in 
the projects and practices of elites. The fact that the project was sustained during this 
difficult period illustrated its continued currency amongst European elites, in contrast 
what stands out about the British case is the weakness of its European ‘vision’.
From 1958 until 1968, the countries of the EC went through a period of sustained 
economic growth that began to rival the United States (Wallace 1990a: 42-43). The 
total GNP of the Six went from 37% of that of the United States in 1960 to 42% in 
1965 (ibid). The significance of the establishment of a European customs union to 
this growth cannot be underestimated:
‘Once the great importance to national economic resurgence in western 
Europe of three things -  trade with Western Germany, trade expansion in 
general and protection in specific areas - is understood, the common market 
can be seen as the best possible arrangement to combine these three elements 
in a new form of international commercial regime.’ (Milward 1992:120)
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As Milward (1992) has shown, the rapid growth of the economies of the Six was 
centrally dependent on the increase of intra-West-European trade and, in particular, on 
the institutionalised expansion of the West German economy. The EC modernised 
international commercial policy and created a completely unique model of formalised 
state relations on which the new political economy could be founded (ibid: 223).
These developments were encased within an emergent European political community 
that included the supranationalisation of political authority. However, despite its early 
successes, it is generally recognised that the drive for further integration was 
exhausted by 1965 (Marquand 1989:18; Wallace 1990a: 76; 1997: 26-27; Ross 1992: 
52-53; Anderson 1997: 57). A crucial figure here was the French President, Charles 
de Gaulle, and his reassertion of the concept of the nation-state:
‘ there can be no Europe other than a Europe of the States -  except of course
for myths, fictions and pageants’ (cited in Pinder 1991:11).
De Gaulle undermined the authority of the Community in such a way that it 
culminated in a crisis during 1966. The background to this was the package of 
proposals put forward by the Commission president of the time, Walter Hallstein, 
which were seen to represent a direct challenge to the authority of the member-states. 
The Commission proposed greater supranational control over the revenues and 
expenditure of the Community related to the completion of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. There were also proposals on extending majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers and on increasing the powers of the European parliament. De Gaulle 
directly challenged this expansion of powers when he withdrew French ministers from 
the Community in 1963. He only agreed that France should return to the Community 
when member-states were given a right of veto over matters where important national 
interests were seen to be at stake. Such a move seemed to limit the development of the 
Community as it meant all decisions effectively required unanimity thus undermining 
the efficacy of qualified majority voting, a more ‘federal’ component of the 
Community decision making process.
To focus solely on the actions of de Gaulle to explain why the integration project 
stalled during the 1960s is, however, to understate the structural factors involved
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during this time. The causes of the institutional crisis of the 1960s had deeper roots 
and can be found in the nationally configured capitalist systems that dominated post­
war Europe and which had achieved considerable economic success (Ross 1992: 52). 
The complex post-war reorganisation of patterns of interest within corporatist and 
formal democratic political structures had its basis in the monopoly of fiscal and 
monetary policy pursued by national governments (ibid). The member-states were less 
interested in transferring regulatory powers to a supranational authority than in 
ensuring that a set of arrangements were in place that allowed for international trading 
agreements and supported successful national arrangements (ibid). Wallace argues 
that the 1965 institutional crisis was a product of integrationists overselling the 
European idea to reinvigorated national governments (1990: 76). Ironically, the 
integrationist project that had supported and complemented the post-war 
establishment of Fordist nation-states appeared to be a victim of the success of this 
political and economic reconstruction.
(
The initiation of the so-called ‘Luxembourg Compromise * certainly restricted the
competency of the EC. However, French opposition to the expanded powers of the
Community did not necessarily imply a reversal of the process of integration. In fact,
it represented a wish to secure national control over further developments, not to
reverse what was already in place (Milward and Sorenson 1995:15). By the late
1960s this began to change and there was a revival of the integrationist projert that
was particularly evident in the decision to pursue the goal of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU)41. The decision was based on the growing inability of the Fordist
nation-state to contain capitalism as the international economy headed towards a crisis
of over accumulation and over capacity (Harvey 1989:141-142; 185-186). Thus, the
decision to expand the Community and move towards economic and monetary union
was driven by the need to re-regulate markets as well as to expand markets. Alongside
growing economic instability, the Fordist nation-state was facing an explosion of
powerful interest group lobbies and increased problems of state legitimation (Harvey
1989:139; O’Connor 1987: 41-45). Therefore, a shift towards European social and
economic regulation42 provided a way out of the problems of traditional forms of state
intervention and the struggles over redistribution (Majone 1996: 56). It offered the
possibility of responding to the diffuse interests of consumers, interest groups and
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multinational companies while avoiding the chronic politicisation of policy making 
and implementation that was beginning to dog the Fordist nation-state43. Within the 
increasingly complex conditions of late modernity, the integrationist project was once 
again proving to be part of an emerging regional political response to state problems.
An extensive relaunch of the Community, however, was effectively stopped in its 
tracks by the economic crisis of the 1970s. The problems of over capacity and over 
accumulation were exacerbated by OPECs decision to raise oil prices five fold in 
1973 and the Arab embargo on oil to the West during the Arab-Israeli war. By 1974 
the annual growth rate of OECD countries was 2 % which compared to an average 
rate of 5 % between 1965 and 1973 (Pierson 1991:145). There was also another oil 
increase in 1979 and growth between 1974 and 1984 remained at around two % (ibid). 
By 1975 unemployment had reached 15 million and OECD countries were running 
balance of trade deficits (ibid). Fordist strategies of crisis management -  increased 
public spending, devaluations, government debt and the US decision to end the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates -  essentially reinforced existing crisis 
tendencies. By the mid 1970s, governments were failing to achieve the four goals of 
the post-war order: growth, low inflation, full employment and balance of trade and 
the Fordist compromise was being seriously undermined (Harvey 1989:145).
During this period there was a resort to protectionism within the Common Market by 
the use of non-tariff barriers that led to a rapid decline in intra-EC trade (Ross 1992: 
53), This was accompanied by a revival of national corporatism and the chronic 
failure to constitute European wide forms of concertation (Schmitter and Streeck 
1991). The integrationist project appeared to be characterised by a lack of coherence 
and direction and this was reflected in the growing dominance of state-centric 
approaches to the Community (Hoffman 1966; Aron 1976; Waltz 1979). Aron 
captured this mood when he referred to The Crisis in the European Idea, noting tthat:
‘Old nations, national states, do not sacrifice part of their sovereignty, the 
object of so much jealous care, for love of Europe. As yet no one loves Europe 
as he loves his village or his country or his Party’ (1976:12).
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Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to view European integration as ending with 
de Gaulle in 1963 and only beginning again with the adoption of the Single European 
Act by the Council of Ministers in 1986. In many respects the conditions and 
developments during the late 1960s and 1970s laid the basis for the second wave of 
integration that began in the mid 1980s. Significantly, during this period there were 
moves towards enlargement of the Community in 1973 initially to include Ireland, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, and talks were opened with three further potential 
members (Greece, Spain, Portugal). The proposals put forward for economic and 
monetary union did result in modest attempts to establish specifically European 
exchange rate controls in the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 
There were also institutional developments including the establishment of European 
political co-operation on foreign affairs and the formalisation of the European Council 
(regular meetings of heads of government). Many of these developments were outside 
of the structures set up by the Treaties, but they reinforced the continued 
institutionalisation of nation-state power and provided opportunities to revive the idea 
of EMU in 1978. From this broader perspective of the integrationist project, the 
intensification of intergovemmentalism cannot simply be seen as end in itself.
Furthermore, the continuation of the integration process was evident in the increasing 
regulatory power of the Community that was producing fifty directives and one 
thousand regulations by 1975 compared to twenty five and six hundred in 1970 
respectively (Majone 1996: 57). Reflecting on these developments in the Community, 
Coombes commented that,
‘there is a continuing and elaborate process involving thousands of 
representatives from Community institutions and from Member-states, 
sometimes preparing, sometimes actually making, decisions in implementation 
of common measures already agreed. The Commission itself is at the centre of 
a vast network of consultative bodies consisting of representatives from 
interest groups and national governments’ (1974: 488).
This description of the Commission is more typical of that found in the literature on 
the European Commission during the 1980s and 1990s, and it indicated the extent to 
which the processes of integration were continuing despite, and in response to, the 
crisis of Fordism. In those areas where the Commission had not been successful it
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had, however, accumulated ‘a veritable parts bin of good ideas for European change 
which would turn out to be very useful in the 1980s’(Ross 1992: 54).
In broader terms, these developments were part of an emergent reorganisation and 
restructuring of European political space in the context of the crisis of the Fordist 
nation-state. From this viewpoint, realist and intergovemmentalist perspectives fail to 
capture the extent to which a new European political reality was beginning to take 
shape as part of a late modem reorganisation of political power. The conflicts over 
further European integration that were occurring from the 1960s onwards represented 
an intensification of struggles to re-regulate and re-organise political space in the 
context of the extended processes of social and economic rationalisation that were 
beginning to characterise advanced societies. These processes, generally associated 
with economic globalisation, were by the late 1960s and early 1970s materialising in 
Europe and destabilised the exclusive territoriality of the nation-state. The European 
Community then represented a key forum for a renegotiation of the institutional 
arrangements of those states and their post-war European settlement. It was an attempt 
to establish new political forms of regulation to accommodate capitalist restructuring 
via the extension of a European political community.
4.2 British exceptionalism continued: the post-imperial crisis
Of particular concern here is the relationship of these developments to the British 
state.. It is important to remind ourselves that this relationship cannot be 
straightforwardly viewed from the perspective of the European Fordist nation-state or 
the crisis of Fordism. The world economic problems of the early 1970s only 
exacerbated existing problems within the British state. As Leys notes,
‘What distinguishes the British experience, however, and underlies more 
clearly than anything else its ‘endogenous’ nature, is that in Britain the new 
crisis had already begun in the 1960s -  a decade of unparalleled prosperity for 
the rest of the industrialized world. The worldwide accumulation of the 1970s 
did not cause the British crisis, it only made it worse’ (Leys, 1983: 66).
The exogenous causes of Britain’s problems had already materialised during the
1950s in the retreat from Empire and the relative decline of the British economy in the
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face of international Fordism. Thus, during the 1960s and 1970s, the relationship of 
Britain to the Community is more accurately understood in terms of the British state's 
post-imperial crisis. This crisis was pushing the British state in a direction that was 
not convergent with its European partners and was in many respects diametrically 
opposed.
Crisis is generally associated with a disintegration of existing social and political 
structures (O'Connor 1987:146). Yet, it is clearly not simply a systemic process but 
also a lived experience that implies struggle and conflict (ibid; Hay 1996). 
Furthermore, crisis implies transformation as new centres of power emerge and 
displace existing structures of domination. Yet, the post-imperial crisis in Britain 
does not follow this usual pattern. Indeed, those authors who have discussed the 
British crisis have emphasised both the dissolution of ruling ideas and the coming 
apart of the historic bloc that had dominated Britain since the nineteenth century, as 
well as the continuation of core elements of the British state and political culture 
(Naim 1977; 1979; Jessop 1980; Leys 1983; Anderson 1992; Gamble 1994; Naim 
2001). In this Chapter I am interested in this distinctive British post-imperial crisis 
which combines intense forms of political struggle and the decay of existing 
structures but without their transformation. What we are concerned with is the ability 
of this regime to continue to reimpose itself through crisis.
This post-imperial crisis most clearly expressed itself in the failure of successive
governments to carry out comprehensive economic and political modernisation44. As
we have seen in Chapter 3, this was in many respects the legacy of the Macmillan
government that had responded to the end of British imperialism by changing the
orientation rather than the structure of British politico-economic institutions. The
implication was that attempts to modernise the politico-economic settlement were
systematically compromised. In particular, the essence of the crisis of British political
modernisation during the period in question was demonstrated by two chronic failures
of state-building45. Firstly, the failure to construct a national accumulation strategy
and, secondly, by the failure to reconfigure national political identities. These two
elements are the cornerstone of state building and their absence proved critical in the
development of the post-imperial crisis. The consequence of these failures was the
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continued internationalisation of the British economy at the expense of the national 
economy, and the centralisation and concentration of existing political structures46 in 
an attempt to contain the intensification of political conflict. Political elites attempted 
to pursue projects of national renewal yet without political modernisation and 
alongside the reassertion of core elements of the politico-economic structure. This 
was a regressive response to crisis conditions and the implications for the construction 
of a coherent and transformatory European policy were profound.
The failure of national accumulation strategies during the 1960s and 1970s has been 
explored in considerable depth (Bacon and Eltis 1978; Glyn and Harrison 1980; 
Pollard 1980,1992; Fine and Harris 1985; Coates and Hillard 1986; Overbeek 1990; 
Gamble 1994). Jessop has usefully termed the crisis of the British economy that had 
become chronic by the 1970s as a crisis of flawed Fordism. He notes:
Tt involved a limited expansion of mass production, relatively poor 
productivity growth, union strength producing wage increases from 1960s 
onwards not justified by productivity growth, a precocious commitment to 
social welfare and jobs for all, growing import penetration from the 1960s to 
satisfy the mass consumer market, and from the mid-1970s, to meet demand 
for capital goods.’ (1991:138)
Jessop argues that liberal, corporatist and dirigiste strategies all failed to work in the 
Britain and resulted in a chronically flawed Fordist economy and state (ibid: 140- 
141). Liberal strategies were constrained by the lack of modernisation and poor 
management within British industry. Corporatist strategies failed because both capital 
and labour were fragmented and disorganised. Dirigiste solutions were limited 
because of the state’s incapacity to influence the economy at a micro level. A major 
cause of these failures was the range of powerful and particularized producers groups 
and organizations in Britain (Marquand 1981: 27). These groups acted in terms of 
their own interests and lacked a conception of the wider general interest, thus they 
behaved conservatively and inhibited change (ibid). Ultimately the state relied on the 
blunt instruments of legal restraints (e.g. prices and incomes) and money (e.g. 
subsidies) to coerce organizations to behave in the way they wanted (Jessop 1980). In 
particular, a powerful and voluntarist labour movement, conditioned by a history of 
operating inside an imperial regime, compounded the problem of constructing a class
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compromise organised around a stable corporatist settlement. The implication of this 
was that ‘conflict around the issue of the social wage remained central to problems of 
economic management and renewal’ (Rhodes 2000:168). Governments failed to 
appreciate the importance of securing the social wage and/or they were faced with a 
comparatively dysfunctional, and often militant, labour movement that asserted its 
independence in relation to the state.
From the perspective developed here, this flawed Fordism can also be seen as an
expression of the extent to which the British politico-economic order continued to be
rooted in a conception of the global market society. This is particularly evident when
we consider the failure of the British state to address the international orientation of
British multinational and financial capital. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the post-war
politico-economic settlement reinforced the external outlook of British capital at the
expense of the internalisation of Fordism. This was confirmed by the large proportion
of the City’s activity that was devoted to the Eurodollar and Eurobond business by the
1960s and which became central to the trade and investment needs of multi-national
companies (Ingam 1984; Cain and Hopkins 1993b: 293). This helped to secure the
City-Bank of England-Treasury nexus as a distinct source of power within the post-
imperial conjuncture and the value of sterling continued to be the marker of British
economic competency (Ingham 1984; Cain 1997). The various strategies to modernise
the British economy were constrained by the continued influence of this nexus over
economic policy. There was no consensus around Fordist modernisation and the state
did not develop the necessary capacities that would allow it to engage in effective
planning of the economy. In effect, successful Keynesian policies depended on a
strong national economy and expansion of productive investment in order to avoid
balance of trade deficits. This proved impossible to achieve in Britain because the
state was incapable of reorganising industry or curtailing British commitments abroad.
Therefore, expansion of the economy fuelled wage demands, sucked in imports and
created balance of payments crises. The consequence of this was a loss of confidence
in sterling, the threat of currency devaluation and the acceleration of the trend of large
British capital to invest abroad. Governments therefore resorted to policies of
retrenchment in order to restore the confidence of the financial markets which they
believed depended on the continued status of sterling as a reserve currency. In effect,
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governments continued to shore up the value of sterling through austerity measures 
and international loans in order to secure confidence in the City as a world financial 
centre and avoid a continued flight of capital. This was futile considering the 
inexorable decline of sterling and the globalised role of the City whose interests had 
increasingly become divorced from those of sterling. The sustained speculation on the 
pound culminated in the devaluation of crisis of 1967 which exhausted the official 
defences and in effect led to the acceptance that sterling was never going to rival the 
dollar. The adoption of floating exchange rates during the 1970s did not however 
prevent the intensification of speculation against the pound from financial markets 
that had little faith in the British economy. Inevitably, the politics of sterling had 
disastrous effects on programmes of reform designed to construct a national political 
order. They led to high interest rates, investment crises and inflationary pressures that 
proved disastrous for the domestic economy and persistent attacks on the welfare state 
that undermined wider social relations.
How far governments of the 1970s would have been able to reverse these trends 
remains debatable. However, they appeared naive in their attitudes to the impact of 
financial markets on Britain and this was evident in their failure to actively advance a 
European solution. Any reform of the economy would therefore have required the 
state to ensure that the interests of financial and multinational capital were 
subordinated to the national interest, instead governments persisted in the illusion that 
the international priorities of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus were those of the nation. 
The financial markets were, therefore, effectively able to exercise a veto over key 
aspects of economic policy. This was exacerbated by the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods agreements on regulated exchange rates and the increase in speculative attacks 
on currencies. In this context, the Labour government opted for an international 
solution to Britain’s economic crisis in the form of a package of austerity measures 
imposed by the IMF in alliance with the Treasury-Bank axis (Jessop 1980: 80-82). It 
was a crisis measure that prioritised the interests of multinational companies and 
global financial interests and rejected a more fundamental programme of 
modernisation. It was instinctive support for a global market strategy and was 
indicative of the incapacity of British governing elites to fundamentally reorganise
capitalist interests, nationally or internationally, and avoid dependence on the U.S.
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In relation to the national political economy, the pursuit of membership of the EC was 
critical. It was a liberal strategy of economic modernisation aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of the British economy by exposing it to the market forces of a 
European common market. It appeared to provide the necessary stimulus to Britain’s 
international Fordist companies that could be the basis to reinvigorate the British 
economy (Overbeek 1990:100-101). However, it was a strategy that potentially 
replaced rather than complemented modernisation of the British economy. Crucially, 
it was a significant change that the state could bring with some autonomy from 
domestic constraints because it was within the realms of foreign policy decision 
making. Yet, without economic modernisation, it was a blunt economic strategy that 
proposed the revival of British economy by exposing it to European competition and 
giving the economy a ‘short, sharp shock’. In this sense, it was a traditional free trade 
approach to British economic problems. It was already clear by the mid 1960s that 
this strategy would have a negative impact on British balance of payments because 
the inadequacies of British industry would be exposed by the intensification of foreign 
competition (Crossman 1979: 259-260;Young 1998:195-196,). By the early 1970s, 
the European strategy became at best a short-term instrument of crisis management, 
aimed at shoring up dominant fractions of British capital in the context of the crisis in 
American hegemony and a global economic downturn. From a longer-term 
perspective, an economic relationship between Britain and the EC was being 
established in which the main rationale for British membership was in order to act as a 
gateway for international capital. In effect, Britain was potentially undermining the 
EC’s capacity to defend itself against the growing competitive pressures within the 
world economy.
A predominantly political economy approach to understanding the British post-
imperial crisis and problems of political modernisation does not, however, detail the
extent to which this crisis is also a crisis of national political identities. This has
specific implications for understanding the relationship between the British state and
the project of European integration. This particular element of the post-imperial crisis
suggests that Britain can only be considered to be a highly contested or emergent
‘nation-state’. Two features of this standout. Firstly, there have been persistent
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struggles over ethnicity,, citizenship and the position within British society of 
minorities from former colonies and other Third World countries (Halsey 1986: 67- 
76; Gilroy 1987; Anthias and Yuval Davies 1992: 40-60). The general trend of 
immigration policies was to restrict and control the entry of non-whites into Britain 
and this can be seen as part of an attempt to construct a national citizenry. However, 
the formal construction of a distinctive British national citizenship was not created 
until the British Nationality Act of 1981 and, reflecting the legacy of Empire, British 
citizenship policy was extremely ambiguous and complex (Hansen 2000). Secondly, 
there have been conflicts over the internal boundaries of the United Kingdom and, in 
particular, over the status of the ‘subordinate nations’ of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland within the Union (Naim 1977, 2000, Cochrane and Anderson 1989: 
54-62, Anthias and Yuval Davies 1992: 42-45). Clearly, the most visibly violent of 
these struggles have occurred in Northern Ireland as a consequence of the historical 
subordination and subjugation of the sizeable Catholic minority (O’Dowd 1985). The 
various attempts to resolve the problems of a multi-national British state remained 
within the Westminster system and did not include full federation. This contrasted 
with other European states where power increasingly shifted to regional authorities47. 
In general, the post-imperial period was marked by a continued struggle to 
reconfigure British imperial subjects as citizens, and this indicated the extent to which 
Britain remained at a distinct variance from other modes state building and their 
particular but established routes to citizenship and nationality (Brubaker 1989,1992).
This stmggle to reconfigure' political identities was especially evident in relation to
British membership of the EC, which was consistently presented by governing elites
as a continuation, rather than a transformation, of the political order. As I argued in
Chapter 3, this was central to the conservative strategy put together by the Macmillan
government and it will be demonstrated in this chapter that ‘Europe’ continued to be
presented as a way of stabilising and strengthening pre-existing conceptions of British
interests and identities. What also occurred during the 1960s and 1970s was the
intensification of the exclusion of Europe as it became something to mobilise against
in order to construct and assert conceptions of British national identity and alternative
projects for national renewal. In reality what the debate about the EC offered was a
false resolution of the post-imperial crisis by resurrecting and recreating British
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imagined communities48 (Anderson 1991) in the face of the project of European 
integration. In effect, a British anti-state nationalism re-asserted itself at a time of 
crisis over modernisation. Here it is evident that while the opportunity to reconstruct 
the British state as a European nation-state through membership of the EC arose, the 
realisation of this was fundamentally constrained by existing traditions and identities 
reasserted within the post-imperial crisis. Indeed, ‘new’ or modified forms of 
legitimation were emerging in this post-imperial situation that foresaw only a limited 
role for European initiatives and centred around populist conceptions of British 
exceptionalism. The national ‘community’ was increasingly constructed through the 
exclusionary practices of the coercive state and the free market (Hall 1979 [1983]: 
30). Evidently, the British nation was being reimagined and the contestation over the 
relationship to the European Community was a fundamental part of that process.
The key feature of this crisis was the failure of various attempts to carry out 
modernisation and that attempts to transform national-political identities were 
characterised by contradictions and failure. This crisis was expressed in the 
intensification of political conflict and, in particular, the breaking out of virulent 
forms of factionalism within the main political parties. The 1960s and 1970s were 
characterised by the fierce contestation over projects of national renewal. The 
problem was that these struggles were often reactive and defensive rather than 
transformative, in the sense that they remained as concerned with the reproduction of 
old structures of domination as they did with bringing about change. At the heart of 
this failure to construct a consensus around a programme of real social and economic 
change, was the institutionalisation of the political class within a political structure 
that increasingly worked against change. Governments and parties then continued to 
support the semi-rational structures of imperial rule. However, as these structures 
declined in legitimacy and new forms of representation, such as corporatism, failed to 
replace them, the state resorted to forms of coercion and populism49 (Jessop 1980: 54- 
65). The continued conservative belief in the established institutions and outlook of 
the British state, underpinned and held together both the Labour party and the 
Conservative party, despite the growing divisions that emerged during the 1960s and 
1970s (Naim 1977; Marquand 1988; Anderson 1992). Significantly, Naim identified
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the continuation during this post-imperial period of a moribund nationalist ideology 
that was incapable of enacting significant change:
‘This is the country where a deep-laid strategy of class alliance achieved the 
highest degree of popular integration into the affairs of the
state.......................The result was a particularly powerful inter-class
nationalism -  a sense of underlying insular identity and common fate, which 
both recognised and yet easily transcended marked class and regional 
divisions. However, far from being a model of politically effective nationalist 
ideology, this complex was to become useless outside imperial conditions.’ 
(1977: 43)
Thus despite the unique historical conjuncture that the post-imperial crisis 
represented, British political forces responded in a traditional form. In particular, they 
liberated international economic interests and asserted the power of the state in order 
to secure a renewal of accumulation. The personalised visions of a European British 
trajectory that were articulated by pro-European politicians, were often compromised 
and confused and did not form the basis for a coherent reconstruction of either the 
economy or national-political identities. The deep institutionalised visions of the 
relationship between politics and the economy, that were identifiable in other 
European member states and drove integration forward, were absent in the British 
case. This became particularly evident once the EC was constituted negatively by 
sections of the political class in order to reassert the legitimacy of the British state. 
The British state’s relationship to the European project unfolds towards an uncertain 
and crisis prone accommodation with the EC.
From this inherently weak and divided domestic position, we can begin to fully 
appreciate the emerging ‘awkward partner’ status (George 1990) of Britain within the 
EC and how governing elites floundered in their attempts to engage with the re- 
articulations of the integrationist project. That this was the case became immediately 
apparent once Britain had entered the Community. In 1974, only a year after entry, 
Coombes commented that,
‘In Britain the Community is still widely seen as a threat, while in the rest of 
the Community the British role increasingly appears as the final straw for an 
already ailing camel’ (1974: 487)
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In 1977, reporting on the first British Presidency of the Council of Ministers,
Edwards and Helen Wallace pointed to the ‘low profile approach of the government’ 
and noted that,
‘..the first six months of 1977 have seen the government retreating before a 
resurgence of anti-Community feeling within its own Party, and have left the 
future of Britain’s relations with her European partners as troubled as ever.’ 
(1977: 286)
As was shown in Chapter 3, the Macmillan government attempted to articulate a 
vision of post-imperial renewal through the establishment of a British hegemonic role 
within Europe. This seemed to offer a post-imperial alternative to Empire through 
British domination of the EC. However, profound structural constraints on the 
realisation of this project emerged in the context of the post-imperial crisis. As I have 
indicated, the economic rationale for membership was questionable considering the 
structure and problems of British capitalism. In addition, there emerged fierce 
opposition to membership which prevented Europeanism becoming fully 
institutionalised in the British state and the wider society. It was evident by the 1970s 
that the possibilities of Britain becoming a hegemonic European power were 
impossible considering the intensification of the crisis of the social and political order. 
While the external barriers to membership weakened, its realisation was not the basis 
for the post-imperial renewal that those of the Macmillan era had hoped for. Core 
elements of British exceptionalism were being reasserted and reconfigured through 
post-imperial social and political struggles that constrained a British European 
trajectory. The idea that the national political order could be constituted within the 
boundaries of an economic and political Europe remained fundamentally at odds with 
British developments.
My intention in the remainder of this Chapter is to look more directly at the European 
policies and strategies of British governments between 1964 and 1979 and to explore 
the contexts and conflicts within which elite actions on Europe took place. The aim, 
therefore, is to continue to establish a sociological analysis of the British state’s 
European trajectory which is concerned with structural reproduction through political 
struggle.
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43 Failed modernisation and the European remedy: the second application to 
join the EC
The processes outlined above are evidenced by the shifting position of the Labour 
government towards membership during the period from 1964-70. A key event during 
this period was the shift in party policy away from the Gaitskell line on membership 
and towards the decision to apply for membership in 1967. Here we can begin to 
understand how European strategies are conceived as a solution to crisis tendencies 
and as a reaction to the failure of national projects. In 1966, the Labour government 
adopted the conservative European strategy of the previous Macmillan administration 
to regain the political initiative ‘as a last ditch way out for Britain’ (Frey 1968:197). 
What is clearly identifiable is the fragility and lack of coherence of a strategy that fails 
to command authority as a vision for national renewal. It was therefore a 
fundamentally constrained and flawed Europeanism.
In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that the position of the Labour party under Hugh 
Gaitskell to membership of the Community had been one of hostility. It was highly 
critical of the terms of entry negotiated by the Conservatives and only considered the 
possibility of membership on terms that were never likely to be accepted by the Six50. 
The unifying impact of the position was illustrated by the general lack of opposition 
within the party to Gaitskell’s speech to the 1961 conference. This speech, described 
by Naim as ‘tear jerking patriotism and invocation of the imperial relics’ (1973: 46), 
was clearly concerned with using the prospect of British membership of the 
Community as a basis for party and public mobilisation. The death of Gaitskell and 
the election of Wilson did not seem to imply any change in policy, especially as 
Wilson had defeated the longstanding pro-European George Brown in the leadership 
contest. The 1964 election manifesto followed the Gaitskell line and stated that 
Britain’s first priority was the Commonwealth (Frey 1968; Young 1998). This 
remained the official line when Wilson called an election in 1966 to improve Labour’s 
slender 1964 majority.
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The Gaitskell approach to Europe had been based on its secondary importance to the 
Commonwealth. It was a belief that Wilson shared (Gowland and Turner 2000a: 160). 
During the 1964 election he committed a Labour government to increasing the 
Commonwealth’s share of British trade, which had been falling under the 
Conservatives. For the Labour party, the Commonwealth was part of national renewal 
and would help restore Britain to its historical role at the centre of world affairs. 
However, trade with the Commonwealth only grew at a slow rate and the Labour 
government became disillusioned with the possibilities of these economic relations. 
The European Community became an issue during the 1966 campaign as a 
consequence of the pro-European position of Edward Heath, Leader of the 
Opposition. In a significant election speech in Bristol, Wilson restated the Gaitskell 
conditions for membership and accused Heath of giving in to the French:
‘One encouraging gesture from the French government and the Conservative 
leader rolls on his back like a spaniel.’ (cited in Gowland and Turner 2000a: 
157)
However, by this stage it could be argued that Wilson was already beginning to move 
away from the Gaitskell position. On entering office he was increasingly influenced 
by a pro-European Foreign Office (George 1990: 37). During 1965, those on the left 
were becoming increasingly concerned about a drift into the Common Market (ibid: 
36, Castle 1984: 33). Early in 1966 Wilson approved the formation of a top-level 
committee to examine the implications of membership, a committee which only the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were to know about (Young 1998:186). After 
the election victory of 1966 secured a Labour majority of 97, the shift in policy 
became more pronounced with the appointment of George Brown, who was in charge 
of economic relations with Europe and who went on to become Foreign Secretary 
(Frey 1968:199-200). What was occurring was a shift in the Labour leadership 
towards what the Macmillan government had attempted to make the established 
position of the British state.
In October 1966 a meeting was held at Chequers on membership of the Community.
Crossman reflected in his Diaries that after reading papers distributed by George
Brown and Michael Stewart, who took over at the Department of Economic Affairs
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from Brown, it was clear that they ‘now wanted full backing from the Cabinet for a 
new European initiative and it was also clear that ideally they would have liked a 
declaration of intent to sign the treaty (of Rome)’ (1979: 259). At this meeting,
Wilson announced that he and George Brown would tour the European capitals to 
clarify the issues and sound out opinion; this initiative became known as the ‘probe’. 
The Cabinet was split and Crossman recounts a discussion in which he spoke up for a 
position that placed domestic considerations first:
‘I regard little England as the precondition for any successful socialist 
planning whether inside or outside the Common Market. Whatever happens, 
we need to cut back our overseas commitments and withdraw our troops from 
the Far East and the Middle East.’ (ibid: 261)
Crossman went onto argue for devaluation, suggesting that his colleagues should not 
view going into Europe as a way of retaining world power status (ibid). He also 
regretted that a paper on joining the North Atlantic Free Trade Area was not taken 
seriously (ibid: 262). These views reflected the position of the opponents of 
integration on the left51 of the party who primarily wanted to see Britain as a strong 
socialist nation-state that maintained its internationalist and Atlanticist outlook. 
Labour’s internationalism was in fact a hangover from imperialism that fitted in with 
the national sentiment (Naim 1973: 70). It legitimated the continuation of the pursuit 
of the British state’s world power status and the state’s ‘outward-looking’ orientation. 
In contrast, Europe was viewed as ‘narrow’ and nationalistic. At this time, however, 
the extent to which membership of the EC was a threat to this vision did vary across 
the left52. The same could be said for those in the centre and right of the party 
53(Bilski 1977: 310). In general, however, the core of the anti-Europeans was on the 
left, while the core pro-Europeans were on the right 54(ibid).
It is essential that the change in policy that occurred in October 1966 is viewed in 
relation to the crisis of the Labour administration. The Wilson government of 1964 
was elected on a platform of domestic modernisation. Warde describes the project as a 
form of technocratic collectivism that redefined socialism in terms of ‘purposeful 
administration by a meritocratic elite’ (1982: 97). The economic proposals included 
state directed industrial investment and state economic planning in order to address
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the incompetence of private sector management. The Wilson government put in place 
a set of reforms that included a Department of Economic Affairs overseen by George 
Brown that was to produce a five year plan and promote long term growth. It was 
inspired by the post-war French planning system and was intended to be a 
counterweight to the powers of the Treasury (Leys 1983:71). The dilemma was that in 
order for this economic policy to succeed it required an expansion of the economy, 
but this in turn threatened the value of the pound. Leading members of the 
government, including Wilson, seemed oblivious to the economic realities of the 
British economy and the implications of the proposals for economic expansion 
contained within the National Plan (Hennessy 2000: 303-304). Only months after 
taking office in July 1966, a run on the pound led to pressure to deflate the economy 
and the extensive and expensive policy commitments that had been promised in the 
Labour manifesto had to be curtailed55. The overriding goal of the government then 
became the traditional one of restoring international confidence in the pound through 
deflationary policies. This occurred alongside inflationary wage rises negotiated by a 
fragmented labour movement. After 1966, there was a return to stop-go, compulsory 
wage restraint and legislation was proposed to restrict strikes (Warde 1982:108). The 
government had failed to use demand management to secure the cooperation of the 
trade unions to long term incomes policy commitments (Rhodes 2000:167).
This effectively meant the end of the government’s National Plan and, as Crossman 
reflected, ‘the destruction of the Wilson myth’ (1979: 232). The rest of the Labour 
government’s period in office was dominated by the sterling crisis. Despite a 
devaluation in 1967, by 1968 the pound was in the words of Roy Jenkins, the 
Chancellor at the time, ‘staring over the precipice into* the abyss’ (cited in Hennessy 
2000: 316). The weakness of sterling and fragility of the Bretton Woods system of 
exchange controls meant that the pound came under intense speculation and was only 
shored up by a 4 billion dollar line of credit (Jenkins 1989: 230). Neither was the 
government able to bring about wage restraint and wages exploded alongside a 
dramatic increase in strike activity during 1969-1970. Clearly, the Labour 
governments of the sixties were unable to challenge orthodox economic priorities and 
were overwhelmed by the problems of sterling and the balance of payments (Jessop
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1980: 40; Warde 1982:107). Membership of the EC came to fill the void in economic 
policy.
A shift in the orientation of foreign policy also became particularly urgent as political 
relations with the Commonwealth deteriorated. This was most clearly evident over the 
issue of Rhodesia. When the white Rhodesian government declared unilateral 
independence, Wilson announced economic sanctions that he predicted would bring 
down the regime, but they failed to do so. The failure to solve this problem affected 
the unity of the Commonwealth nations and British prestige amongst them. Further 
problems concerning Britain’s world role emerged in its continued military 
commitments East of Suez, including patrolling the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf 
and maintaining a presence in Malaysia. The Labour government committed Britain 
to maintaining these costly symbols of world power status in order to secure 
American support for oil sanctions on Rhodesia (Crossman 1979:165; Gowland and 
Turner 2000a: 155). These defence commitments, however, were to prove too 
expensive to sustain and by the beginning of 1968 the decision had been made to 
withdraw all forces East of Suez, apart from those in the Persian Gulf and Hong 
Kong, by the of 1971. These developments intensified the need for alternative 
international arenas within which the British state could continue to be a significant 
. global power.
What we begin to see at this time is a worsening of the post-imperial crisis. Even 
before the economic crisis of 1966, and pre-empting the second application for 
membership, Benn was commenting in his Diaries that,
4 This country is so decrepit and hidebound that only activities in a wider
sphere can help us to escape from the myths that surround our politics.’ (14th
January 1965, Benn 1996:121)
In more general terms, there was ‘a steady deterioration in the authority of the state
and the dominant ideas of the political order’ (Leys 1983:63). This was precipitated
by the deteriorating economic position of Britain relative to the rest of the
industrialised world56. A diverse range of challenges to the social order were
emerging, including a rise in the number of strikes, ethnic and racial tension, civil
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rights movements and urban guerilla warfare in Northern Ireland. As Halsey points, 
out these ‘domestic discontents fanned by economic stagnation, class and status 
inequalities were less and less easily contained by the traditional remedies of political 
liberalism, gentlemanly culture and civic incorporation’ (1986:151). The breakdown 
of the old imperial order had reached a critical point by the mid sixties, a position that 
was exacerbated by the Labour government’s failed programme of modernisation.
It is within this context that the second application for membership of the EC took 
place. For the Labour government, a primary feature of this policy was that it would 
secure the position of Britain as a great power. At the October 1966 meeting, it was 
presented by Brown and Stewart as the ‘only way to make sure that Britain kept her 
place at the top table’ (Crossman 1979: 259). Membership of the EC seemed to offer 
the possibility of a return to great power status combined with opportunities for 
economic renewal through a revised external policy. In this sense, it appeared to 
enable the Labour government to recapture its place as the party of post-imperial 
national reconstruction without having to engage with the chronic problems of the 
domestic politico-economic structure.
Crossman identified the European policy as the new project of significant members of 
the Labour leadership being pursued as a way out of crisis by deflecting from political 
realities as well as helping to outflank the left of the party (ibid: 349). However, he 
was also aware of its potency as a solution to this national crisis. Shortly after the 
announcement of the Probe, he referred to his decision to tell Wilson that if he 
intended to take the country into Europe to make it clear in order to give the 
government some ‘strategic direction’ (1979: 270-271). He went on to say that ‘at 
present we’re falling apart because we haven’t got any central purpose in life’ (ibid). 
Despite reservations, clearly Europe was seen as capable of providing this purpose for 
much of the party. By 1967, Tony Benn was commenting in his Diaries that the 
government was now looking for a solution to its problems from the outside and was 
persuaded that the Common Market was the solution (Benn 1996:171). Pimlott 
argues that it was a ‘gigantic attempt’ to distract attention from domestic and foreign 
policy problems and to revive the government’s ‘fighting spirit’ (1992: 435).
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The key element in persuading the Labour government of the viability of reviving 
British membership of the Community as a solution to crisis was the Civil Service 
(Young 1998:177-190). By 1963, a European ‘elite regiment’ had emerged and 
established itself within key administrative offices of government (1998:177). A 
‘new orthodoxy’ was identifiable in the Foreign Office amongst the diplomatic corps 
who saw both their own and their countries future as being inside Europe (ibid: 177- 
178). Young, in particular, refers to the role of John Robinson and Sir Con O’Neill 
and argues that their appointment to Brussels marked the point at which the Foreign 
Office European policy became dominated by men who believed Britain belonged in 
the Community (ibid: 179-180). In the preparatory documents for the October 
meeting of the Labour Cabinet, O’Neill referred to a country adrift and in decline for 
twenty years and that entry into Europe would provide ‘a new goal and a new 
commitment’ which would ‘crystallise its hopes and energies’ (ibid: 190). The 
European political vision was presented to the Labour government at a time when its 
own project was in ruin. Wilson attempted to reignite Labour’s idea of the 
‘technological revolution’ by linking it to entry to the Community in the form of a 
European Technological Community (ibid: 193). After what Wilson believed was an 
extremely successful meeting with de Gaulle, he returned from the tour of the capitals 
convinced of the necessity of membership57. While the Cabinet was split on the issue, 
when it came to endorsing the statement of intent to seek membership it was 
supported by all except Douglas Jay and Dennis Healey and there were no major 
battles or resignations (ibid: 194-195; Crossman 1979: 348; Gowland and Turner 
2000a: 165-166). Furthermore, opposition within the party and the trade unions was 
effectively neutralised by the time of the annual conference in 1967 when the NEC 
statement favouring entry was accepted by a heavy majority (Bilski: 1977: 311), an 
outcome indicative of the control the leadership and the Centre-Right pro-marketeers 
had at the time (ibid: 309,313).
The decision by the Labour party to support membership of the Community was a
reaction to a crisis of government coming out of the ruins of the National Plan. As this
failure to transform British economy and society became clear, the leadership
embraced the Conservative idea of membership of the Community as a strategy of
contained modernisation and attached the Wilsonian theme of a technological
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revolution to it. The underlying tenets of this approach remained the same as they 
were under Macmillan (George 1990:40; Frey 1968: 205-206). There was no 
conversion to the project of European integration, the aims of membership were to 
stop British economic decline and guarantee world power status. The policy was 
firmly couched within the language of British high politics. In Wilson’s speeches on 
the issue he underplayed the integrationist project and emphasised the Anglo- 
American partnership and Britain’s more global ambitions for the Community (see 
Frey 1968: 203-204). The issue can be seen as part of the Wilson government’s, and 
in particular Wilson’s, attempt to recreate itself, after the failure of its modernisation 
programme, as the party of national responsibility and of a more traditional 
paternalistic rule (Naim 1973: 50).
The distinct limitations of EC membership as a strategy of economic revival and 
modernisation, considering the weakness of the British economy, at the time were 
overshadowed by the need for political momentum and a continued belief in an 
external free trade solution to Britain’s economic problems. Crossman’s reflections on 
the deliberations about whether to apply for membership at the October 1966 meeting 
are pertinent in this respect:
‘To my great surprise he [Sir William Armstrong, Joint Permanent Secretary 
at the Treasury] admitted under questioning that entry in 1968 (which all the 
papers took as a working assumption) was now a bit too early in view of the 
time it would take to restore the economy to state healthy enough for entry. 
This remarkable discussion stimulated a long discussion of the timetable.
Some officials suggested it would take two years of the slow growth we must 
now expect before we got the economy right and then another two years to 
prove that when growth started we wouldn’t have inflation. I could see George 
Brown getting angrier and angrier at this point. The trouble about the morning 
session was that the Ministers present were determined to use the officials 
mainly to supply information confirming their own personal point of view.’ 
(Crossman 1979: 260-261)
Any doubts about a shift in economic strategy towards the EC had disappeared by
spring 1967 when British industry in the shape of the CBI overwhelmingly came out
in support of British membership despite the immediate effect it might have on the
balance of payments (Frey 1968: 218). Many large multi-national companies came
out in support of membership as did the City (ibid: 219). This support cannot be
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separated from the intensification of capitalist internationalisation and, in particular, 
the continued penetration of American dominated international capital into the 
European market (Miliband 1973:14-15). A trend that was noticeably extreme in the 
British case where by 1970 all the top 100 manufacturing companies were 
multinationals (Gamble 1994:110). As a result Gamble notes that ‘Britain’s 
relationship to the world economy was more like that of the United States’ (ibid). This 
was further reinforced by the continued interpenetration of British and American 
capital.
In the event, the second application for membership was once again vetoed by de 
Gaulle. The French continued to view Britain’s interests as too close to those of the 
United States. In addition, Schenk argues that the continued international role of 
sterling, combined with its weakness on the foreign exchanges was a particular cause 
for concern amongst the Six, and in particular, the French (2002: 366). There was a 
genuine fear that the Community would be called on to bale out the British economy 
when it faced another Sterling crisis (ibid). Even if this was not the case, the volatility 
of sterling as an international currency left Britain extremely dependent on the United 
States (ibid). These concerns were significant barriers to British membership in 
196758.
Nevertheless, there was support for membership across many of the member-states
and when de Gualle was replaced by Pompidou in 1969 membership became a real
possibility. Early in 1970 the Cabinet endorsed a paper favouring membership of the
Community. However the Labour government were defeated in an election twelve
days before negotiations were about to start. By this stage there was growth in anti-
Community feeling within the country59 and the divisions within the Labour party
were beginning to show in aftermath of a crisis ridden period in office. In March
1970, Peter Shore, a Minister without Portfolio in the Wilson government, made a
speech critical of entry, arguing that the decision should not simply be made by
politicians but should become a matter of public debate (Crossman 1979: 699).
Crossman describes it as a ‘remarkable’ speech particularly in the sense that Shore
gave no prior warning to the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary of what he
intended to say (ibid: 700). This was indicative of the continued undercurrents of
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opposition to what was a right of centre leadership and a conservative European 
policy (Bilski 1977: 309). The growing opposition to membership pre-empted the 
shift to the left that was occurring within the party and was to become fully manifest 
once Labour entered opposition (ibid). This growing mobilisation of the Labour left 
around an anti-EC stance was a significant unintended consequence of the shift in 
policy of the leadership towards the European strategy of the British state, put in place 
by the Macmillan government.
Despite this emerging opposition, a number of factors combined to make it possible 
for the Labour government to pursue a European strategy. Crucially, what had 
occurred by the end of sixties was the establishment of considerable support across 
the political class for membership. It was the stated policy objective of both major 
parties and had strong support within business circles and across powerful sections of 
Whitehall. Frey argued that the move towards Europe seemed to reflect a real 
transformation in the consciousness of the political class (1968: 230). Entry into the 
EC was now held up as a long-term economic panacea and as a new arena for British 
leadership that would restore world power status. However, as with the Macmillan 
regime, the Labour government emphasised continuity through national renewal 
inside the EC, but failed to grasp ‘the significance of the new international 
experiment’, as had been the case during the first application (Beloff 1963:177). This 
was a conservative strategy of flawed Europeanism that reflected the continuation of 
an imperial liberal ethos within the British state. The fragility of this strategy was 
evidenced by the opportunistic manner it was taken up by the Labour government, the 
divisions within the party and the volatility of public opinion (Durant 1968: 234). It 
therefore lacked a wider and deeper legitimacy. In short, it was a constrained and 
limited strategy that was not underpinned by a coherent vision of British renewal 
along the lines of a Fordist European nation-state. It was unsurprising that the left of 
the Labour party objected to what was in essence a reassertion of a British free trade 
strategy albeit one that particularly benefited multi-national companies and 
international financial capital.
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4.4 Entry into the Community: the Heath government and flawed Europeanism
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, superficially, the economic and political climate 
appeared ripe for the Europeanisation of the British state and society. These factors 
included, firstly, the internationalisation of the European economy and the continued 
direction of British overseas trade towards Europe (Northcott 1995: 200). Secondly, 
with de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, a relaunch of the Community took place towards 
the end of the sixties and British entry was seen to play a significant part in that. 
Finally, in 1970 the Conservative party was back in power under the fiercely pro- 
European leadership of Edward Heath, who viewed membership of the Community as 
a defining plank of the government’s programme (George 1990: 49; Morris 1996:
129; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 168-169; Turner 2000: 64). Indeed, it appeared that 
the Heath government was finally able to implement the Macmillan strategy of 
modernisation through membership of the EC. Heath articulated a British-European 
vision that was clearly influenced by the Macmillan government within which he had 
served and his leadership appeared to lay the basis for the renewal of a strong British 
European policy. The fundamental aim was the same; membership would finally 
secure Britain’s place as a leading European capitalist nation-state. The argument 
here, however, is that the Heath government failed to articulate or institutionalise a 
coherent British European project. Alongside its failed domestic political agenda, its 
European strategy was characterised by crisis management and legitimation problems.
Edward Heath then took office as Prime Minister at a key moment in Britain’s
relations with the Community. Heath had led the negotiations on entry under
Macmillan and came to power when it was clear that the member-states were looking
favourably on British membership. In addition, much of the preparatory work had
already been undertaken by the previous administration. What distinguished the
Conservative administration from the previous Labour one was the apparent depth of
its commitment to European entry and this counted for much in achieving a positive
outcome. For Heath, British membership of the EC appeared to be a goal to be
achieved at almost any political price (Campbell 1993: 336; Morris 1996:129;). This
reflected the fact that Heath’s life story was that of a committed European (George
1990: 49; Young 1998: 216-222). He had been strongly influenced by Churchill’s
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powerful proclamations for a United States of Europe made in the aftermath of the 
war and, in his maiden speech in June 1950, he criticised the government’s failure to 
become involved in the Schuman plan (Heath 1998:145-146). When the first bid for 
entry came to end with de Gaulle’s veto, Heath’s concluding speech restated in the 
clearest terms Britain’s commitment to Europe:
‘The end of the negotiations is a blow to the cause of the wider European unity 
for which we have been striving. We are a part of Europe, by geography, 
history, culture, tradition and civilisation ’ (Heath 1998: 235)
In his Godkin lectures of 1967, Heath outlined his European vision (Heath 1970). He 
argued that the forms of international cooperation that took place in organisations 
such as the OECD was insufficient and argued for an active European Commission 
(Lord 1993:38). He put forward the possibility of a European defence system and 
suggested the pooling of French and British nuclear weapons (Youngl998: 221;
Heath 1998: 361). He evidently wanted to place Europe at the centre of British foreign 
policy, above either the Commonwealth or the United States (Heath 1998:361). It was 
a strategy that distinguished committed European politicians not only from the 
traditionalists, but also from the opportunists. However, it was a paradoxical vision of 
transformation in that it was also a vision of continuity. Heath argued that the 
Community was structured in a similar fashion to the British state. It had institutions 
that were pragmatic and open and in which there was no need to ‘specify end states or 
theological principles of arrangement’ (Lord 1993:39). On sovereignty, he said that 
effective state sovereignty would be increased as the membership of the Community 
increased the range of choices open to the British state (ibid: 37). This comment 
seemed to suggest that the British state could opt into what it liked and out of what it 
did not. What Heath was effectively doing was fashioning a vision of the Community 
that fitted with a British national ideology, the aim being to clear the ground for 
Britain to become a dominant power inside the Community once membership was 
achieved.
In order to secure Britain’s leadership role inside the EC, modernisation and
expansion of the economy was necessary. A second major feature of the Heathite
strategy on Europe was the belief in its contribution to economic renewal. The
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exposure of the British economy to European competition would, it was believed, 
keep down inflation, producing an influx of foreign capital which would help to 
finance new investment and eventually reduce the balance of payments deficits (Lord 
1993:23). This was part of an overall economic strategy designed to increase the 
competitiveness of the British economy by removing some of the constraints on 
economic management and allowing industry to resolve its own problems60 (Gamble 
1994:123). Turner thus refers to membership of the EC ‘as the external arm of the 
Party’s domestic Selsdon strategy’ (2000: 64). In general the aim was to end 
economic decline by increasing the exposure of British society to the discipline of 
market forces and providing new opportunities for revitalised British international 
companies. It was to lay the basis for a sustained expansion of the economy. In 
particular, the urgency of this new economic strategy was reinforced by the crisis in 
the American economy. By 1968 the American economy was running a running an 
overall deficit on its balance of payments. By 1971 there was a renewed dollar crisis 
and a shift towards more protectionist policies (George 1990:43). These 
developments unleashed an international economic crisis as the United States 
appeared to withdrawing from its role as the world banker. For British large-scale 
capital dependent on the Eurodollar market and on overseas investment, the collapse 
of the international economy under American hegemony was particularly difficult 
(Naim 1973: 25-26; Overbeek 1990:127). In the context of the continued chronic 
problems of the domestic economy and the crisis of the American-led international 
order, outward-looking British capitalists opted for Europe (Naim 1973: 26). While 
pro-European politicians saw in Europe the opportunity for a market led strategy of 
national economic modernisation, powerful elements of British transnationalised 
capital supported entry into the EC in order to secure their foothold within the 
international economy. These economic pre-conditions therefore reinforced the 
urgency of implementing the government’s European policy.
Despite the force of economic conditions, the government’s European policy was
facing an intensification of legitimation problems. In March 1970, only 22 % of the
electorate favoured entry compared to 64 % against (Butler 1979:151). Clearly, this
has to be seen in the context of the growing divisiveness of the policy, both within and
across the main parties. Against the background of public scepticism, the European
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policy of the Conservative party under Heath was in fact played down during the 
election campaign. The party only committed to negotiate with the Community, ‘no 
more, no less’ (The Conservative Manifesto 1970 in Craig 1990:130). Yet it became 
clear that the main priority of the government was to secure entry first and then to sort 
out any difficulties once inside the Community (ibid: 226, George 1990:56). It was 
believed that this would deny the Six the weapon of refusing entry to Britain as a way 
of dictating terms in any negotiations (Young 1973: 211). Furthermore, there was a 
fear that another veto would reopen divisions within the party (Turner 2000: 65).
The negotiations on British membership lasted for eighteen months and concerned
the position of sterling as an international reserve currency, Commonwealth trade,
agriculture and the British budgetary contribution (George 1990:50). The issue of
sterling was of particular concern for the French who wanted to see it brought into
line with other currencies. However, it was agreed that this would not form part of the
official negotiations for entry (ibid: 51). The British accepted the Common
Agricultural Policy and negotiated special arrangements for Caribbean sugar and New
Zealand dairy produce. In order to reach a successful deal on the latter, the British
were forced to make concessions on their budgetary contribution (Young 1998: 231-
232). When the negotiations reached a particularly difficult stage in spring 1971, it
was unclear to the British whether the French were looking for a way of preventing
British entry (George 1990:54). The situation was resolved by a summit between
Pompidou and Heath, in which the British Prime Minister successfully reassured the
President of Britain’s commitment to a European future. What Pompidou wanted to
see was a clear historic shift in the British attitude. Heath convinced him of this by
claiming that the ‘special relationship’ with the United States was over and that
Britain, like France, could only continue its ‘world vocation’ in partnership with its
European partners (Heath 1998: 370). This prioritisation of Europe represented a
decisive break with the position of previous governments and it secured Britain’s
entry into the Community. In particular, the government committed itself to running
down the sterling balances with the implication that the world role of sterling would
be ended (Gowland and Turner 2000a: 176). It was, however, made against a
background of a general loss of confidence in the international hegemonic rule of the
United States and, thus, a loss of confidence in the ‘special relationship’ (George
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1990: 45). Nevertheless, considering the continued economic and military dependency 
of Britain on the United States, it could not be seen as anything more than a temporary 
readjustment, rather than a profound structural reorientation. In fact, membership 
secured an important strategic role for Britain vis a vis the US and the EC, as a 
gateway for American multi-national companies to enter the European market61. In 
addition it secured the City’s position in the Eurodollar market, which itself had seen a 
dramatic invasion of American banks during the 1960s (Strange 1971: 234). This 
interdependence of American and British economic interests both necessitated and 
problematised Britain’s role as an intermediary between America and the continent. 
Evidently, the formal breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1973 and the end of the sterling 
area lessened the importance of the pound as an international currency, so that it was 
no longer a significant barrier to British membership. However, it did not necessarily 
alter the underlying structural inter-relationship between the British and American 
economies and, in particular, financial capital. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
Britain’s position as a chronic international debtor nation particularly dependent for 
credit directly from the US, as well as the US dominated IMF (Strange 1971).
The Heath government appeared to pursue entry into the European Community on the 
understanding that it represented a historical shift in the identity of the British political 
order. In fact it was a compromised and constrained position that reflected the 
tensions that had been evident in the earlier strategy of the Macmillan government, as 
well as a deepening of the problems of legitimation. The negotiations avoided the 
‘deep, existential meaning' of Britain’s relationship to Europe, the relationship of 
Britain to the future of the integrationist project or the question of sovereignty (Young 
1998: 238). They were effectively a technocratic exercise interrupted by some high 
politics designed to reassure the French. While still in opposition, Heath had made 
the claim that any enlargement of the Community could not occur without ‘the full 
consent of the peoples and parliaments’ (Heath 1998: 362). The issue, however, was 
not presented to the public in terms of fundamental shift in British political identity, 
but over ‘whether it is in the interests of the country to go into the Common Market or 
not’ (ibid). As Young points out, ‘Heath was talking cost of living, not cost of 
nationhood’ (1998: 240 emphasis mine). The debate over membership had a
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particular role to play and it was not to prepare the country for a radical 
transformation of the political order, as Naim notes:
‘No ideal debate really ‘stands apart’ from basic social antagonisms -  least of 
all, surely, in an over-organic national unity like Great Britain. If it fails to 
give voice to them, the chances are it is functioning in some way to stifle 
them. In that case, the deadly inertia of the ‘Great Debate’ must have come 
from its role as obstacle, or diversion, in the play of social forces. Paraded as a 
noble expression of national dispute, it must have worked in reality as 
repression -  as reaffirmation of the national consensus, the sacramental unity. 
The aim of the national breast-heaving was only, in the end, to pull the 
national corsets tighter still ’ (1973: 8 emphasis mine)
This was a very conservative vision of national renewal through membership of the 
EC that emphasised continuity through change. This was evident in the Heath White 
Paper on membership. It claimed that sovereignty would not be eroded and what was 
being proposed was an ‘enlargement and sharing’ of sovereignty (ibid: 246). Young 
argues that in the Commons debate on the European Communities Bill to ratify 
membership, the political implications were disguised (ibid: 247-251). In bringing the 
debate to a close, he claims that Heath was ‘as soporific as could be’ referring to a 
commitment which ‘involves our sovereignty’ but from which ‘we are also gaining an 
opportunity’ (ibid: 247). The focus was thus on the economic benefits and not on 
what would change but on what would stay the same (ibid: 250-251). The government 
failed to articulate its vision of the future of Europe (ibid: 254). Heath’s view is 
predictably different. He argues that the ‘public information campaign on the outcome 
of negotiations was the most comprehensive ever by a post-war government’ and that 
this campaign focused on both the political and economic issues (Heath 1998: 378). In 
defence of the comprehensiveness of the political debate, he cites Lord Douglas 
Home’s (Foreign Secretary) speech in 1971 to the Conservative Group for Europe 
which emphasised that the application for entry was of ‘the utmost political 
significance’ (ibid: 378). Heath claims this was ‘perfectly clear’ in his closing 
statement on the Commons debate:
‘I want Britain as a member of a Europe which is united politically, and which 
will enjoy lasting peace and the greater security which will ensue.’ (ibid:380 
emphasis mine)
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This was, however, a secondary discourse that was subordinated to a more 
depoliticised emphasis on economic benefits and on continuity and stability through 
membership. In fact, Heath’s position on integration was not entirely coherent. 
Although he viewed the Community as a unique political entity, he had little time for 
supranationalism or Federalism, as is evident from his comments on the 1972 Paris 
summit commitment to the formation of a European Union:
‘I had argued that European Union was an admirable objective which could 
only be achieved by pragmatic steps. The European Union has always
developed sui-generis When the European Union reaches the end of its
development, it will remain sui generis. I believed, therefore, that there was 
little point in debating theoretical arguments about federalism. What we are 
concerned with was making a success of the European Community, and the 
word ‘Union’ allowed us to do just that.’ (1998: 391-392)
What exactly ‘sui-generis’ meant in this context can only be assumed to be some 
notion of pooled sovereignty of states which Heath had referred to in his Godkin 
lectures and in other speeches and statements. If it is possible to identify the position 
of the Heath government, it saw the Community primarily as an intergovemmentalist 
arena for the pursuit of British interests (Morris 1996:129). In the negotiations on 
entry the government defended the veto and was identifiably ‘Gaullist’ in its approach 
to the Community (Butler 1986:118,159). In general, entry into the Community was 
not part of a profound rearticulation of national interests and identities within a 
broader project of constituting a European political order, but was driven by the need 
to sustain some deeper conception of an existing national unity. In this sense, Heath’s 
comment that the word ‘Union’ was ‘useful’ can be seen as a failure to appreciate the 
worldview that was rooted in the process of European integration. In short, for the 
Heath government membership of the EC was about replacing Empire with Europe, as 
it had been for Macmillan; a strategy that looked increasingly unrealistic against the 
political and economic problems of the early 1970s.
This conservatism became evident in the reluctance of the government to 
constructively engage with the attempts to renew the project of European integration 
that were occurring from 1969 onwards. The Conservative government was viewed as 
resistant to progress towards economic and monetary union when they refused to
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allow sterling to re-enter the ‘snake’62 unless the German government was prepared to 
underwrite its value (George 1991: 52; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 179). This was 
not acceptable to the Germans without wider policy coordination (ibid). It was also 
evident that in a number of other areas, including technology and social policy, the 
Heath government was resistant to joint policies (ibid: 51 George 1990: 58). The 
exception was on the European development fund, although George claims that this 
was a ‘pragmatic response’ in order to offset the losses that would result from 
participation in the CAP (1991:51). In general, the Conservative government’s 
position represented ‘less a change of direction than a change of tactics’ which could 
be attributed to America’s abdication from the responsibility for managing the 
international economic system (ibid: 50-51). The government ‘attempted to fill that 
gap by organising the EC as a strong actor in world affairs under British leadership, 
much as de Gaulle had tried to organise it under French leadership’ (ibid: 53). In this 
sense, the Heath government failed to understand that in the process of integration, 
national interests were not so much antecedents but outcomes of European 
negotiations. Underlying this was the lack of any real conviction to resolve Britain’s 
post-imperial crisis within a wider European framework. After membership, 
therefore, tensions inevitably emerged between Britain and its partners. In effect, the 
British government seemed unable to articulate a coherent and constructive approach 
to EC membership.
4.5 Contexts and constraints: evaluating the British accession to the EC under 
Heath
In a clear irony, membership of the Community under the Heath government was a
monumental event, but one deeply rooted in notions of the historical continuity of the
British state, and not in its reconstitution as a leading state within an emergent
European politico-economic order. It continued to be a strategy designed to rescue the
British state from decline and crisis, without engaging in any substantial restructuring
of the state regime. The Conservative government’s commitment to EC membership
was a consequence of Heath’s own biography, the changing international
circumstances and its continued usefulness as a political strategy at a time of crisis.
Significantly, the Heathite ‘vision’ of the relationship between Britain and the
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Community gained ascendancy in the context of the failure and exhaustion of 
alternative bases for renewal, including the special relationship with the United States. 
At a time of international economic crisis, class conflict and civil strife in Northern 
Ireland it became the ‘essential instrument’ for achieving a degree of unity across the 
political class (Naim 1973:36). Naim points out that ‘it, and it alone, offered the way 
out from the pitfalls which seemed to dominate the political landscape of 1970’ (ibid). 
In particular, it reflected the immediate interests of British internationalised capital. 
After 1972, it was the only element of the Selsdon strategy still in place and the only 
way the government could reassure British capital63. Membership was eventually 
achieved against the background of an unsustainable expansion of the economy, that 
resulted in a balance of payments crisis for the incoming Labour government, and 
growing trade union militancy due to the failure of the government to secure trade 
union reform and wage restraint. The latter was most clearly evident with a large 
miner’s strike and pay claim that eventually led to the fall of the government. In 
effect, a European strategy of long-term modernisation became a contingent 
instrument of crisis management, associated with the reassertion of powerful 
economic interests and the failure of the government’s reform programme. We can 
conclude that the Heath government failed to institutionalise a legitimate British- 
European project. While the European situation may not have been conducive to such 
a fundamental reorientation, it was clear that membership of the EC did not imply a 
serious confrontation with the problems of British exceptionalism. The basis for 
establishing Britain as a leading European nation-state within the EC had not been 
achieved and membership was contested and compromised.
The weakness of the Heath government’s position was evident in the significant
European splits emerging within the Conservative party. The passage of the European
Communities Bill was only secured for the Heath government by support of the
Jenkinsite faction within the Labour party64. Heath was faced with the extreme
opposition to membership by a faction of Conservatives under the leadership of
Enoch Powell. For Powell, membership of the Community was seen as the end of
British independence and as a fundamental threat to the British way of life and
national sovereignty (Powell 1971; 1975). From the late sixties the opposition within
the Conservative party, influenced by Powellism, had entered a new phase and was
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less concerned with empire and commonwealth than with Franco-German domination 
and its anti-free market policies (Turner 2000:62-63). These arguments were to be 
echoed during the right wing mobilisation against the EC/EU during the 1980s and 
1990s (ibid). In his opposition to membership, Powell was supported by forty 
Conservative MPs and this obliterated the government’s majority during the passage 
of the Bill on accession. Although Heath allowed a free vote on the passage of the 
Bill, the belief in Toyalty to the leader’ continued to dominate the party and the anti- 
marketeers were marginalised in the party65 (Morris 1996:128). Nevertheless, the 
seeds were sown for a right wing backlash against the European policy of the 
Conservative party. In general there was growing scepticism about Heath’s 
enthusiasm for Europe once he retreated on his Selsdon strategy after 1972 (Turner: 
2000: 65). This did not mean the Conservative party was to stop being the ‘Party of 
Europe’ and by 1975 this was the orthodox position (Grimmond and Neve 1975: 94, 
Morris 1996:129), yet this position was unequivocally subordinated to a particular 
conception of a strong British nation-state.
Even as membership was being achieved, the link between British post-imperial 
renewal and modernisation and participation in the European Community, that had 
been central to the Macmillan, Wilson and Heath governments, was being 
fundamentally challenged. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the European 
modernisation strategy had become a strategy of last resort, a ‘substitute’ policy that 
lacked real depth and was played up during the various crises of projects of national 
renewal. The danger was that European policy became part of a ‘crisis of crisis 
management’ (Offe 1984) that only exacerbated the lack of a wider and deeper 
legitimacy across the public and the political class. The more these legitimation 
problems arose the more governing elites unsuccessfully attempted to depoliticise the 
European issue by re-emphasising its conservative role as a policy of stability and 
continuity. As we shall see this became particularly evident during the Labour 
administrations of 1974-1979.
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4.6 The exclusion of Europe and the ascendancy of pragmatic nationalism
By the time entry into the European Community had been secured, cross party support 
for membership had fractured. The opposition to the EC on the Tory right was 
paralleled on the Labour left. This reflected the polarisation of the main political 
parties as more extreme political forces grew in significance (Leys 1983: 41). 
Increasingly, membership of the European Community became a battleground around 
which national political projects were contested (George 1990: 76-77). Clearly this 
was an unintended consequence of the decision to join the Community that governing 
elites had not forseen. As crisis conditions intensifed and were exacerbated by the 
growing divisions within the party, the Labour governments’ approach to Europe was 
subordinated to the needs of party and national unity. Increasingly, the EC was being 
evoked by significant sections of the political class not as the saviour but as the 
‘other’ of the British nation. Such a perception was to have significant implications 
for Britain’s role as a member of the Community and on the construction of a British 
European vision. The objective of those members of the governing elite who 
continued to support membership was to pragmatise Britain’s relationship with the 
EC and to establish it as a depoliticised feature of domestic statecraft. We may, 
therefore, characterise the emerging position of the British governments towards the 
EC in the early years of membership as pragmatic nationalism, i.e. to continue to 
engage with the EC but to do so in terms of exclusive conceptions of national interest 
and identity. In effect, this meant the assertion of policy objectives within which the 
EC had little importance. Thus the European Community had no place in the attempt 
and failure by the Wilson government to construct a stable corporatist regime under 
the aegis of a ‘Social Contract’66. Furthermore when the international economic crisis 
deepened, the solution to the fiscal crisis of the Callaghan government was to be 
found in the form of the IMF and to emphasise an Atlanticist approach to the global 
downturn.
During the Labour party’s time out of office, between 1970 and 1974, it became
increasingly split on the issue of Europe as the party shifted to the left (Bilski 1977;
Benn 1996: 249-250; Young 1998: 270-271). The debate on membership ‘played a
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decisive role in the reconstruction of power and ideological balance inside the Labour 
Party’ (Bilski 1977: 316). The left opposed membership increasingly viewing it as a 
form of ‘narrow regional integration’ dominated by French nationalism and as a threat 
to British socialism and to the British nation (Naim 1973: 63-67)67. On the other side, 
the Jenkinsite faction of pro-Europeans remained firmly committed to a brand of 
European social democracy. They were the strongest supporters of a European future 
for Britain to be found across political spectrum. In July 1971, a special conference 
was held on membership of the Community at which the irreconcilable divisions 
within the party were clearly visible (Bilski 1977: 319). The left then used the issue in 
a highly effective manner to mobilise support and increase their power in the party. 
Naim argued that the issue became seen as a way out of the crisis of the Labour party 
after a disappointing period in office:
‘In 1970-71 Labourism was suffering from defeat and deep disorientation, and 
coping very badly with the situation. And its ominous incapacity to find 
renewal ideologically was demonstrated against the background of rapidly 
falling membership and militancy, and the marked trend towards
embourgeoisement This was the state in which the Party confronted the
great debate [on EC membership]: a declining empire of national socialism, 
lifeless at the top and increasingly unsure of its old social basis.’ (1973: 81)
In an attempt to contain the splits within the party, in 1972 the Labour shadow 
Cabinet decided to support a proposed amendment to the European Communities Bill 
by Enoch Powell calling for a referendum, a proposal that Tony Benn had originally 
put forward in 1970 (Benn 1996: 255). It was an opportunistic stance taken to try and 
undermine the government in the context of domestic problems, but was also a way of 
uniting a party that had become fundamentally split on the European issue. Wilson 
dealt with this split by siding with the left and supporting the referendum but he was 
unable to do this without committing the party to a more oppositional stance. This led 
to the resignation of Roy Jenkins in April 1972 and was indicative of the strength of 
the left at the time. During 1972 and 1973, the party was just held together by a 
commitment to opposing the terms of entry negotiated by Heath and supporting a 
referendum on the issue. This then was the position of the party when it took office in 
1974.
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The re-negotiations the British government entered into have been characterised as a 
‘sham’ with no suggestion of revising the Treaty of Rome or the Treaty of Accession 
(Greenwood 1992:100)68. The German Chancellor Schmidt described them later as a 
face saving, cosmetic operation undertaken for the British government (Young 1998: 
283). A number of concessions were made to the British on issues such as 
Commonwealth trade and the CAP. By the time of the Dublin Council in March 1975 
the two outstanding issues were British budgetary contributions and New Zealand 
butter. Wilson approached the meeting as ‘a St. George figure who knew how to stand 
up to foreign dragons and would never sell his country short’ (George 1990:86). His 
defence of the interests of the white Commonwealth was popular with the British 
public and large sections of the Labour party. Wilson also rejected calls for increased 
harmonisation, falsely implying that the Commission was about to impose on the 
British people a ‘Euro-loaf ’ and ‘Euro-beer’ (ibid: 87). Wilson was, therefore, able to 
sell the renegotiations, which only added up to a number of minor and qualified 
concessions by the Community, as a victory for the Labour government and the 
British people. Such tactics were designed to enable Wilson to move both his Cabinet 
and party in favour of continuing support for British membership. Wilson effectively 
used a strongly nationalist position to legitimise the continued membership of the 
Community on pragmatic grounds. Inevitably, it meant ditching any attempt to link 
membership of the Community with a broader project of British renewal and 
modernisation.
Even this position, however, was difficult to sustain. When Wilson publicly stated his
continued support for a referendum in January 1975, he attracted considerable
criticism from within a deeply divided party. He nevertheless succeeded in producing
a Cabinet majority of 16-7 in favour of membership based on the renegotiated terms
and a majority in parliament (Young 1998: 284, Benn 1996: 313). Divisions within
the Labour party by this stage were particularly deep and so intense that a
parliamentary victory was a only achieved with the support of the Conservatives. Six
members of the Cabinet dissented from the Cabinet line, including Tony Benn,
Barbara Castle, Michael Foot, Peter Shore, Willie Ross and Eric Varley. During the
Cabinet debate on the impact of membership on national sovereignty, both the pro and
anti-marketeers defended their positions as consistent with the continuation of British
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parliamentary sovereignty (ibid: 343-345). Wilson at one point claimed that the 
British parliament had the power to come out at any time (ibid: 344). Both sides 
presented themselves as the guardians of the British constitution. These persistent 
divisions within the party were further exposed when the dissenters in the Cabinet 
began to mobilise the party against continued membership (Benn 1996: 313-315). By 
the time of a special Labour party conference in April 1975, a large majority voted 
against membership.
During the referendum campaign, it was the Yes campaign that galvanised the British 
political classes. The leading establishment figures from business, politics, the media 
and, even the church, lined up in support of Britain in Europe (George 1990: 94-95). 
Its endorsement by the Labour leadership was a key factor in the increased support for 
continued membership (Butler 1979:154). The Yes campaign emphasised the 
economic case for membership69 and considerable attention was given to the effects 
on the cost of withdrawal (George 1990: 94; Young 1998: 291). They presented their 
case for continued membership as a pragmatic economic necessity and emphasised 
the control of national governments over European decision making. (Young 1998: 
293; Gowland and Turner 2000a: 211). It was fundamentally a conservative case for 
British membership that made no mention of any restrictions on British sovereignty as 
a consequence of membership. There was no engagement with the project of 
European integration as representing a fundamental transformation of the British state. 
As Young points out the Yes campaign,
‘..conformed to the old familiar rule, the golden thread of deceptive 
reassurance that runs through the history of Britain’s relationship with the 
European Union up to the present day: our entry was essential, our 
membership is vital, our assistance in the consolidation is imperative -  but 
nothing you really care about will change. ’ (1998: 293 emphasis mine)
All the confusions of the British European strategy that had been evident at the time 
of the Macmillan government, and reflected a fundamentally reoriented rather than 
restructured political order, were therefore being restated. Yet, the emphasis was more 
focused on the pragmatic economic necessity of membership rather than the revival of 
world power status that had been so central to the Macmillan approach.
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The No campaign focused more directly on the issues of sovereignty and nationhood. 
This was the position of Powell and those Conservatives who opposed membership. 
They were joined in their concern over the nation with those on the Labour left such 
as Shore, Benn and Foot. Shore proclaimed that membership of the EC meant that 
the Tong and famous history of the British nation and people has ended’ (cited in 
Young 1998:292). In a letter in to his constituents in December 1974, Benn outlined 
what was to be his fundamental reason for opposing Britain’s membership in the 
referendum campaign:
‘Britain’s continuing membership of the Community would mean the end of 
Britain as a completely self-governing nation and the end of our 
democratically elected Parliament as the supreme law-making body in the 
United Kingdom.’ (Benn 1974: 38 emphasis mine)
Benn,therefore, aligned himself with a simple and populist left wing nationalism and 
against the realities of an advanced international capitalism and its political 
reorganisation. Naim points out that the left viewed the Common Market as a 
‘disease’ of capitalism, like high imperialism or fascism, and not as a new post­
national stage in bourgeois society, within which there was also the opportunity to 
strengthen the position of the working class and European socialism (1973:145-146). 
Ignoring the realities of international capitalism70, and the possibility of crafting a 
distinctive national-European accumulation strategy, those on the British left 
continued to perpetuate a socialist utopia of national economic autonomy. They 
envisaged a dilution of the possibilities for socialism in Britain as a consequence of 
membership of an entity that was seen as capitalist and driven by consensus politics 
(Castle 1980:404). In the Cabinet debate, reflecting the view of the left, Benn argued 
that membership meant ‘Britain will be governed by a European coalition government 
that we cannot change, dedicated to a capitalist or market economy theology’ (1989: 
346). The left’s defence of the nation meant they found themselves in an unlikely 
alliance with Powell and his supporters. Powell proclaimed that membership of the 
Community meant the end of the British parliament and with it national independence 
(Powell 1978: 35). During the battle over the passage of the European Communities 
Bill he had argued that membership of the EC would be bitterly opposed by the 
British people:
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‘If Brussels. Luxembourg and Paris are imagining that the ‘English gentleman’ 
will now ‘play the game’, they will be mdely undeceived. These resentments 
will intertwine with all the raw issues of British politics: inflation, 
unemployment, balance of payments, the regions, even immigration, even 
Northern Ireland: and every one of these issues will be sharpened to the 
discomfiture of the European Party.’ (Powell in Ritchie 1978: 43-44)
Thus on both the left and right ‘Europe’ was evoked as the ‘other’ of British freedom 
and national identity in order to revive the old Westminster system and construct the 
‘imagined community’ of the United Kingdom. These populist projects of national 
renewal drew on a distinct British state nationalism that was realised in opposition to 
a political ‘Europe.’
In the event the final referendum vote was strongly in favour with 67.2% Yes vote on 
a turnout of 64.6%. This was not, however, the endorsement of the British people for 
the European project, but a vote for the status quo in support of the position outlined 
by their leaders (Butler and Kitzinger 1976: 280, George 1990: 95, Greenwood 1992: 
102). The public effectively endorsed the conservativism of the European strategy of 
the British state. Membership of the Community came to represent a sense of 
continuity and security at a time of British decline and crisis. However, the authority 
of the vote was questionable and this was indicated by the fact that by 1978 there was 
a majority telling Mori that they would vote against continued membership (Butler 
1979:151). One noticeable feature of the Britain In Europe campaign was the 
distance kept by Wilson71, Callaghan and Thatcher, who was newly elected as leader 
of the Conservative party (Young 1998:298). Young judges that they ‘recoiled from 
the political implications of an issue which party could not accommodate’ (ibid: 298- 
299). Political leaders were attempting to neutralise the issue and in doing so they 
moved away from fully endorsing the importance that the Heath-Macmillan 
governments had attached to British participation in the EC for post-imperial renewal.
The domestic conflicts over Europe during the 1970s were particularly important in 
establishing Britain as the ‘awkward partner’ in the EC (George 1994). The instability 
of the legitimacy of British membership meant that there were fundamental 
constraints on British governments adopting a more assertive European strategy and
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fully engaging with the process of integration as a leading member-state. Evidently, in 
the context of a post-imperial crisis that now included an intensification of domestic 
Euroscepticism, to try and turn Britian into a hegemonic European state was 
unrealistic. That this was so became immediately evident after the referendum when 
the Wilson government blocked and disrupted a range of Community policies on 
energy, pollution controls, transport and the European Regional Development Fund72. 
It was, however, under the Callaghan administration that this shift away from the 
British-European modernisation ‘vision’ of Macmillan and Heath was finally 
confirmed. In order to contextualise this important development it is necessary to 
consider what was happening to the British economy at the time.
4.7 The shifting balance of domestic forces and the further decline of 
Europeanism
The referendum campaign had taken place against the end of the government’s ‘Social
Contract’ as a strategy of national renewal and modernisation. There was a rise in
inflation to 30% by the summer of 1974, a balance of trade deficit of £3,323 million
by the end of 1974 and widespread structural unemployment that had reached over 1
million by October 1975 (Coates 1980:12; George 1990: 75). The government could
only handle the deficit by raising huge international loans that in turn added to the
burden of public spending (Coates 1980:19). The dilemma was that the ‘Social
Contract’ that was designed to stimulate economic growth could only do so by
shifting resources away from the greater social wage on which the contract had been
constructed (ibid: 23). After 1975, therefore the government was forced to try and win
trade union support for wage cuts and ending industrial disputes (ibid: 25). The
capacity of the government to achieve a cooperative relationship with a hostile and
fragmented labour movement was limited. In effect, the social contract became a
mechanism for achieving wage controls and any consensus on the social wage that
had been achieved began to break down. In March 1976, Wilson resigned and was
replaced by Callaghan. The latter took office in the at a time of worsening economic
conditions with continued high inflation, unemployment and a large balance of
payments deficit. The record levels of public sector borrowing finally gave rise to a
sterling crisis that consumed the Callaghan government for its first nine months73. A
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run on the pound was ended by an IMF loan of £3.5 billion74. The main consequence 
of this loan was that the government’s economic policy was subordinated by the 
deflationary goals demanded by the IMF. This resulted in the largest cut in public 
spending since 1945 (ibid: 39-41). However, by 1977 Britain’s financial position had 
improved as a consequence of an increase in the value of sterling and there was a fall 
in the rate of inflation. During 1977, the government was able to reflate the economy. 
Economic conditions improved with unemployment levels stabilising and the 
economy growing by 3 % in 1978 (ibid: 48). However, the weaknesses in the British 
manufacturing base meant that imports began to rise and there was growing 
speculation on sterling (ibid: 48-49). The British economy remained trapped in a stop- 
go cycle which during anarchic nature of international capital of the 1970s was that 
much harder to escape from. Furthermore, the government had failed to achieve a 
productive relationship with the trade unions based on a social wage consensus and on 
which a more coordinated response to economic problems could have been based 
(Rhodes 2000:170).
Whether these problems could have been eased in the short term by pursuing a
European course of action remains debatable75. However, the government’s approach
to the global economic crisis was to move in the direction of an Atlanticist solution.
As we have seen, such a position was entirely consistent with the direction of British
international economic policy since the end of war. However, during the period
1975/1976 the implications of this position were particularly profound, due to the
rejection of Keynesianism76 by the Labour government and the subordination of fiscal
and monetary policy to the rules imposed by the IMF. In effect, the British
government had concluded that the only solution to Britain’s problems was to allow
the economy to be dictated by international market forces77 and that domestic
conditions had to be favourable to international capital accumulation78. Panitch
emphasises the significance of the British case in the shift to flexible accumulation
brought about under U.S. hegemony:
‘The conditionality attached by the IMF to the British loan of 1976 was a 
momentous break with Bretton Woods protocol. For it amounted to nothing 
less than the imposition of financial capital’s long-standing preferences for 
price stability and priviate investment as the pre-eminent goals of economic
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policy, upon a major Western state whose people had just voted for public 
expenditure and full employment.’ (2000:12)
The Callaghan government rejected a European monetary policy in the form of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in favour of solutions to be carried out under the 
surveillance of the IMF. The EMS was proposed by a German government that 
believed Washington’s approach to international monetary policy, emphasising the 
role of stronger economies leading the world out of recession, resulted in increased 
speculation against the Deutschmark (Greenwood 1992:105). Helmut Schmidt, 
German Chancellor of the time, stated that ‘the whole management of the dollar by 
the American Administration was absolutely intolerable’ (cited in Jenkins 1989: 247). 
The EMS proposed a system of exchange rates fixed to a common European parity, 
based on the Deutschmark, but with room for movement up and down. There would 
be substantial short and medium credit facilities available to governments who faced 
speculative attack. The British government’s position in the negotiations on 
membership was extremely cautious and in some cases hostile to the whole idea 
(Jenkins 1991: 441-446). In the face of party opposition and American doubts about 
the system, the position of the government was to adopt informal membership. 
Greenwood comments that this approach to the EMS indicated ‘Callaghan’s 
standoffishness towards Europe and the old hankering for a more global approach to 
economic management’ (1992:106). It can be seen as another reassertion of a post­
imperial British conception of a global market society within an Atlanticist framework 
and, in opposition, to the pursuit of a more substantial European policy. Panitch 
argues that the Labour government was not only ‘managing the British crisis’ but 
‘explicitly saw themselves as junior partners with the US in managing the 
international crisis, through policies to accelerate the free flow of capital’ (2000:13). 
This traditional response to another British financial crisis was out of step with a 
country that was a recent member of the Community and whose partners clearly had 
considerably more interest in British national economic regeneration than the US. It 
would have been unlikely that a more coordinated European response to Britain’s 
crisis would have expected the shift towards a neo-liberal policy agenda.
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The importance that had been attached to the EC membership for post-imperial 
renewal by previous administrations was being questioned during the second half of 
the 1970s. The emerging assault, not only on welfare spending, but also on the 
principles of collective social welfare (Hall 1979: 29) implied a recomposition of the 
balance of forces within the British politico-economic order (Jessop 1980: 82). The 
change was in favour of a new Anglo-American neo-liberal model of economic 
development that re-asserted the private political power of capital79. In a reversal of 
the principles on which the Keynesian-welfare state ideal had been based, an attack on 
social and industrial rights was viewed as a legitimate way to increase 
competitiveness and restore capitalist accumulation.
In this context, the Labour government was ill-prepared to pursue a more constructive 
European policy that would have exacerbated party divisions and undermined its 
ideological appeals for national unity80. What was notable about the 1974-1979 
Labour government was the importance it attached to the concept of the nation in 
order to maintain public and party support81. By the late 1970s, Warde notes that all 
that was left to the Labour government was ‘patriotic symbolism’ (1982:156). In 
effect, the move towards a more globalised domestic economy and a more coercive 
state was given legitimacy under the guise of national unity.
Ultimately, the entrenchment of Britain’s ‘awkward partner status’ under the
Callaghan regime has to be seen as part of the move towards a distinctly British
conception of a strong state that was necessary to support the reorganisation by the
forces of international capitalism. The dilemma was that the British government still
had to engage with the business of the EC and this proved to be increasingly difficult.
In January 1977 the British assumed Presidency of the Council of Ministers for the
first time. By this time the government was embroiled in a number of difficulties with
the EC over the common fisheries policies as well as the CAP. The approach of the
British Presidency was outlined by Crosland, Foreign Secretary, at the European
parliament. It was notably ‘low-profile’ and emphasised ‘ a cool and realistic appraisal
of what was feasible, rather than by over-ambitious and misleading commitments to
rapid integration’ (Edwards and H. Wallace 1977: 284). The Presidency, therefore,
was not used as an opportunity to pursue a more active and constructive approach to
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the Community (ibid: 286; George 1990:124). Nevertheless, an area the British 
government were more enthusiastic was the enlargement of the Community82.
Further problems arose with the EC over the agreement to implement direct elections 
to the European parliament by May 1978. The proposal was inevitably met with 
considerable opposition within the Labour party. The Green Paper on this issue was 
initially debated in March 1976, but the eventual Bill was not passed until the 
government was forced to introduce a guillotine order in January 1978 (Broomhead 
and Shell 1977:152; 1979:127). This motion was passed by 314 votes to 147 with 
considerable cross voting, with nearly half of those voting against emanating from the 
backbenches (Broomhead and Shell 1979:17). In the committee stage Dr David 
Owen, the Foreign Secretary, proposed that any further increase in the power of the 
European parliament would require a British Act of Parliament (ibid). The 
government’s approach to the EC was constrained by the shift towards the left that 
had occurred within the party yet this only reinforced a more general scepticism 
across the political class. This was particularly evident in the attitude towards direct 
elections, which were considered to be ‘at best irrelevant and at worst a threat to 
British democracy in the eyes of all but a minority’ (H. Wallace 1981:122). A 
compromise had been reached in the Labour party by 1977 on membership yet this 
was achieved because of the willingness of the leadership to take a more belligerent 
line within the Community (The Economist October 8th 1977:18). Membership was 
to be tolerated as long as it was firmly subordinated to national interests. This was the 
clear intention of the position outlined by Callaghan in a letter to the Labour party 
Secretary, Ron Hayward (ibid: 60-62). He wrote that withdrawal was out of the 
question because of its impact on relations with the United States and he called for the 
maintenance of the authority of national governments and parliaments (ibid: 60). He 
also warned of the dangers of an ‘over-bureaucratised, over-centralised and over- 
harmonised Community’ (George 1990:126). In effect, Callaghan was setting out the 
parameters of Britain’s involvement within the Community and establishing a 
European strategy that emphasised the containment of membership and its 
subordination to the Washington Consensus83.
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4.8 Towards the strong state and the global economy
In their dealing with the EC post-referendum, the Wilson-Callaghan regimes did not 
demonstrate any serious commitment to the European project. They were not 
committed to membership on anything more than pragmatic grounds. They pursued a 
highly truncated European strategy and a belligerent approach to the Community that 
lacked even the limited vision of the Heath government. The pursuit of anything more 
than this was ruled out by the continued hostility of the large numbers of anti- 
Europeans within the party and the government’s reliance on the unifying appeal of 
the concept of the nation. In this context, even the conservative strategy of Macmillan 
and Heath became suspect. There was, therefore, no coherent European strategy being 
pursued that was linked to a broader British project of integration. The pragmatic 
nationalist approach of the Labour governing elite implied the pursuit of exclusive 
and rigid conceptions of the national interest. It could be said that while other 
member-states were responding to crisis by beginning to contemplate further 
European integration, British governments were engaged in limiting the impact of 
membership. Particularly significant was the recomposition of the shift in the balance 
forces in favour of international capital that was achieved through the intervention of 
the American dominated IMF. Ironically, such a policy fitted with the anti-European 
sentiments within the Labour party at the time. From this perspective the attitude of 
the Labour governments to the EC can be viewed as opposition to the establishment 
of a European mode of regulation to re-introduce some sort of governance into the 
global economy. In effect, the crisis of global Fordism and the particularities of its 
British expression saw the Callaghan government resort to a neo-liberal Atlanticist 
strategy that had the objective of ensuring international accumulation despite its 
impact on the domestic social order. Thus, any European strategy was now firmly 
contained within the newly established parameters of the British politico-economic 
regime. If the possibility of establishing domestic Fordism within a European arena 
had been pursued in a contradictory and flawed manner since Macmillan, it was now 
being rejected as a possible basis for post-imperial reconstruction.
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While the Conservatives were more united and viewed as the ‘Party of Europe’, the 
appeal of Powell had sensitised the party to the electoral possibilities of linking 
together economic liberalism and a populist nationalism. Powell was a consistent 
opponent of the Heath government and laid the ground for the rise of the New Right 
within the party with its emphasis on the free market and the strong state (Gamble 
1994:141). For Powell, there was clear logic in his opposition to British membership 
of the EC and his political agenda. For him, joining Europe was a direct threat to the 
British state and a betrayal of the nation by the Conservative party. Powell persistently 
evoked the nation by his opposition to the Community. However, the Conservative 
party remained fiercely loyal to the leadership and Powell increasingly alienated 
himself from the wider party. He eventually refused to fight on a Conservative 
platform in 1974. In contrast, the election of Thatcher to the leadership of the party in 
1975 was a victory for a nationalist neo-liberalism from inside of the party. Notably, 
when Thatcher won the leadership of the Conservative party in 1975, she reversed the 
European priority that Heath had imposed on the party (Young 1993:143). She 
championed the moves towards a strong state and the relentless exposure to market 
forces that had already begun to occur under the Callaghan administration (Gamble 
1994).
4.10 Conclusion
Despite the Heath government’s actions in finally achieving British membership in 
1973, the general direction of political forces during the 1970s was a downgrading of 
the significance of a European strategy for national renewal. This reflected the fact 
that membership of the EC had not become part of a new state directed capitalist 
accumulation strategy which was underpinned by the introduction of new regulatory 
political forms into the British state. It was not about restructuring but salvaging 
existing political and economic interests.
In the context of crisis and decline, the legitimacy of a European strategy remained
suspect. The move towards the exclusion of Europe within the national political
discourse became particularly apparent with the shift in the Labour party towards the
left and the rise of a more populist nationalism in the Conservative party. Its
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immediate impact was to reinforce an attitude to the Community that was already 
centred around traditional ideas of the national interest and national identity. But it 
went further than that, and even those politicians who accepted membership of the 
Community as an essential part of Britain’s future, distanced themselves from the 
more contentious and ambiguous elements of the Macmillan-Heath strategy that 
emphasised national renewal through Europe. This reflected the extent to which the 
British state’s post-imperial trajectory was being constructed in terms of an aggressive 
(and regressive) reassertion of British exceptionalism. This peculiar ‘nationalism’ was 
divorced from modernist associations with state building and constituted itself in 
opposition to political modernisation. By the late 1970s, it was only possible for 
British governments to engage with the Community on highly pragmatic grounds. 
They were resistant to moves towards further integration and negotiated with the EC 
on the basis of exclusive notions of British identity and interests. The idea that a post­
imperial Britain was to be constructed as a leading European nation-state inside the 
EC proved less and less likely. The Callaghan government confirmed the 
subordination of Europeanism within British politico-economic thinking to that of 
Atlanticism and an emerging Anglo-American neo-liberal project.
With the crisis of global Fordism, the flawed attempts to internalise and Europeanise 
Fordism within the British politico-economic order came to an end. Instead there was 
an unequivocal move in the direction of international flexible accumulation that was 
concomitant with rearticulations of British exceptionalism. In liberating international 
economic forces and facilitating this through the assertion of state power, the British 
state was responding to crisis in its traditional form. By so doing, Britain was taking 
up a particular position in the context of globalisation that was not to prove entirely 
compatible with further moves towards European integration. As we shall see in 
Chapter 6, this trajectory was fully realised under the Thatcher administrations 
between 1979-1990 in a form that intensified the already difficult relationship 
between the British state and European integration.
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Chapter Five
The Second Wave of European Integration: A Process 
of Political Modernisation?
The discussion so far has examined the problem of the British state and European 
integration from the perspective of global Fordism and its emerging crisis. The 
problems of the British state’s European policy have been shown to be a consequence 
of the failure of a post-imperial regime to establish a Europeanised project of 
domestic political modernisation. In this chapter, I suggest that the parameters for 
action by European political elites were fundamentally changed by the shift from 
Fordism to flexible accumulation (Harvey 1989). I explore the responses to these 
changes in the form of the second wave of European integration. The project of 
European integration as it was pursued between the mid 1980s and thel990s, can be 
seen as a form of political modernisation (Held 1995; Habermas 1994,1999; Walby 
1999; Hutton 2002). From such a viewpoint, the European Union is best understood 
as a progressive, yet uncertain and contested, political response to the recent processes 
of globalisation encapsulated in the move to flexible accumulation. In particular, I 
want to emphasise how national and supranational elites came to make certain choices 
in favour of furthering European integration as a potential response to contemporary 
political and economic conditions. In doing so the Chapter will focus on the Single 
European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992).
Within this context, the continual problems of British political modernisation and its 
relationship to European integration are reconfigured. While the second wave of 
European integration was seen as the basis for the reform and modification of 
European regulated capitalism in the context of globalisation, in Britain an aggressive 
nationalist neo-liberal regime questioned many of its core assumptions. This forms the 
essential background to the rest of the thesis which explores the relationship between 
the contradictory Thatcherite restructuring of the British state and European 
integration between 1979-1994.
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5.1 The second wave of European integration
The second wave of European integration may be considered to be initiated by the 
Single European Act (1986) and culminated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992)84. These 
two agreements represented the most significant steps taken towards an integrated 
Europe since the Treaty of Rome (1957). This revival of European integration has to 
be placed within the intensification of economic globalisation and the ending of the 
Cold War. These developments were part of the acceleration of processes of flexible 
accumulation and the emergence of risk societies while old assumptions about social 
organisation were increasingly undermined85 (Beck 1992,1999). The re-launch of the 
integrationist project was therefore a distinct political response to these new realities 
and uncertainties. However, it also reflected the specific problems of political action 
and, in particular, the struggle to legitimate political programmes at a time of political 
disenchantment. The problem that British governments had with the direction of 
European integration during the 1980s and 1990s has to be seen as a significant 
struggle within the broader parameters of the contestation, if not crisis, over an 
emerging European model of global governance. Given the importance of 
developments in the process of European integration, I want to begin by exploring the 
major agreements that formed the substance of the integration process during the 
period in question and then go on to examine how different theoretical frameworks 
can help us understand these events.
Although the global economic slowdown of 1970s effected the whole of the Western
world, the European economy suffered particularly badly relative to its major
competitors (Wise and Gibb 1993: 52). The EC’s share of world manufactured goods
fell from 45% in 1973 to 36% in 1985 (ibid). In particular, the Community was
showing lack of competitiveness in the high technology sector and other areas of
growing demand. This left them vulnerable to import penetration from Japan and the
USA (ibid: 55-56). Furthermore, the response of many European countries to the
economic recession had been to erect non-tariff barriers and subsidise loss making
firms in order to protect national economies (ibid: 60). The negative effect on intra-
Community trade was increasingly evident as the Community failed to provide the
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underpinning for economic growth that was the basis for the European welfare state 
settlement86. The widespread perception was that the national Fordist welfare state 
was no longer the engine of European economic integration but had become the major 
barrier to its success. The problems with the European economy were confirmed by 
the Albert and Ball Report (1983), commissioned by the European parliament, which 
catalogued the demise of the European economy between 1973-1980. By the early 
1980s it was clear to all member-states that the European economy was only going to 
regain its competitiveness by the completion of a single market and an increased 
coordination of economic and monetary policy (ibid: 61). A key factor in the eventual 
success of this policy was the commitment of the French government to a European 
economic policy.
In the early 1980s, a socialist government under Francois Mitterrand had to end an 
attempt to expand the French economy in the face of a financial crisis brought about 
by intense international speculation against the Franc. The French experiment proved 
that it was no longer possible for national governing elites to produce desired macro- 
economic outcomes, the pursuit of which could in fact undermine economic stability 
(Schmitter 1996b: 10). In France, the consequence was the politique de rigeur 
introduced by Jacques Delors87. The intensification of international competition and 
growing autonomy of financial markets indicated that by the early 1980s the 
European economy was becoming the victim of powerful forces of economic 
globalisation. In particular, the US was actively destabalising the international 
economy by implementing a tight monetary policy and increased government deficit 
spending, this raised interest rates and pulled investment away from Western Europe 
(Geyer 2000: 41). Ross notes that,
‘The international financial blackmail tactics of the Reagan administration, 
coming after a decade of confusion caused by the collapse of the US-run 
Bretton Woods system, argued for a specifically European response in trade 
and monetary areas.' (1992: 56)
In 1983, the French government report explicitly put forward a European solution for 
the French economy, emphasising the growing inability of national governments to 
find national solutions to Europe’s relative economic decline (Ziltener 1997:18). The
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report put forward proposals for a single market, social legislation and qualified 
majority voting (ibid: 18-19). It emphasised the importance of the French-German 
axis in pushing forward integration and raised the possibility of a two speed Europe if 
some countries were reluctant to proceed. This report was, therefore, central to the 
formulation of the objectives for the French Presidency of the European Council in 
the first half of 1984. At the European Council in Fontainebleau in June 1984, it was 
agreed to follow the Mitterrand line and an Ad Hoc Committee for Institutional 
Affairs (the so called Dooge Committee) was establish with a mandate to examine 
possibilities for political unity (Ziltener 1997: 22). The Dooge Committee Report was 
presented in 1985 and made a number of recommendations, foremost of which was 
the completion of a genuine internal market by the end of the decade (ibid: 29-30). It 
also called for the strengthening of the European monetary system and economic 
convergence. There were additional recommendations for a European social area that 
would include a dialogue between employers and employees over the harmonisation 
of social policy. Furthermore, it emphasised the need to promote common cultural 
values and the establishment of a unified approach to external affairs. The majority on 
the Committee concluded that institutional reform was necessary to achieve these 
goals (George 1990:178).
The possibilities opened up by the European Council meetings were grasped by Lord
Cockfield, vice-president of the Commission, who produced a White Paper on
Completing the internal market (Commission 1985a). This highly technical document
oudined a practical programme for the completion of a European single market and
was approved by the member states at the Milan EC Council in 1985. The Dooge
Report and Cockfield’s paper formed the basis for the negotiations that took place at
the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in December 1985. The terms of the
Single European Act were agreed and came into force in July 1987 after ratification
by each of the member states. It is evident that the SEA was a ‘package solution based
on barter’ and inevitably consisted of a number of compromises between the various
member-states (Ziltener 1997: 40). Despite this, it achieved its overriding objective,
the liberalisation of European markets. The economic benefits of a single market were
loudly trumpeted by the Commission which, under the powerful leadership of Delors,
saw the single market programme as a basis on which to relaunch the Community
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(Grant 1994: 66-67). However, the case for the single market was not fully outlined 
until the Cecchini Report 1988 which attempted to provide a ‘solid body of 
scientifically-assembled evidence as a means of judging the extent of the market 
fragmentation confronting European business and Community policy makers alike* 
(1988: xviii). This outlined a free market solution to European economic problems 
arguing that the intensification of competition brought about by market integration 
would result in a lowering of costs, greater efficiencies and the consequent 
restructuring of European industry (Cecchini 1988). However, there was more to the 
SEA than simple market liberalisation; the Delors Commission successfully linked 
completion of the internal market to institutional change and an increase in the 
competencies of the Community (Ross 1992: 57; Ziltener 1997: 57). These other 
measures appealed in particular to those member-states who wanted to see an 
extension of the political and social dimensions of the Community. There was a range 
of political initiatives that extended the role of the Community in relation to areas 
such as cohesion, environmental and social policy. At the institutional level, the SEA 
extended qualified majority voting for most areas of the internal market programme 
and the power of the parliament was increased by the Cooperation Procedure that 
allowed it to amend proposals. Significantly, the SEA eroded the ‘veto culture* that 
had been initiated by the Luxembourg Compromise (Ziltener 1997: 42; Howe 1994: 
458). In general, the implication was that European re-regulation was to accompany 
national de-regulation.
The Delor’s Commission considered the SEA to be the beginning of a new
expansionist trajectory for the Community. At the centre of this was the Delorsian
view that Europe had to construct itself as an organised space that had sufficient
common identity to enable it to avoid becoming ‘Japanified, Americanised or
globalised* (Delors 1992, cited in Grant 1994:163) The SEA was therefore part of a
more ambitious project of transnational regulated capitalism that was designed to
transform Western Europe and revive the ‘European Social Model’ in the context of
the moves towards flexible accumulation (Delors 1992; Ross 1992; Hooghe and
Marks 1997). Thus the principles of social solidarity, social protection and social
partnership were to be pursued at the European level alongside the necessary
liberalisation of the European economy. The aim was to construct a distinct European
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political space that would be legitimised by the deepening of European formal 
democratic structures and would eventually lead to the establishment of a federated 
Citizen’s Europe (Grant 1994: Chapter 7; Hooghe and Marks 1997:11). Crucially, 
the Delor’s Commission used the SEA as a basis for further spillover initiatives. It 
was indicative of the extent to which the Commission had become a policy 
entrepreneur, able to exert its bureaucratic pressure and “‘soften up” the opposition of 
member-states, while waiting for a window of opportunity to open’ (Majone 1996:
74). In the wake of the SEA, Ross describes the unfolding of this strategy:
‘Delors was certain that the completion of the single market would place the 
Community on a new expansionist trajectory. The Commission’s new political 
capital was thus quickly reinvested in what he and his staff called a ‘Russian 
doll’ strategy. Commission leaders and their member-state allies had carefully 
included vague but potentially expansionist commitments -  the ‘new 
competences’ -  in the Single European Act, many of which were originally 
canvassed in the European Parliament’s earlier ‘ Draft Treaty on Political 
Union’, While various communiques from the European Council pointed in 
similar directions. EC heads of state and government were thus on public 
record as committed to moving ahead. President Delors was eager to remind 
them of their commitments. Hardly had the ink dried on the Single Act when 
the Commission and its leaders were prodding Europe towards newer and 
wider aspirations.’ (Ross 1992: 58-59 emphasis mine)
Thus, the Commission had become the key player in the integration game, brokering 
deals that pushed the member states closer together and expanding the Community’s 
supranational potential. Over six years the various ‘Russian dolls’ were uncovered 
and by the Maastricht European Council of 1991 it was evident that the construction 
of ‘a new integrated and federalizing Europe had reached the point of no return’ (ibid: 
65).
The most ambitious proposals on the agenda were the plans for economic and 
monetary union (EMU). The proposals for EMU were put together by a committee of 
Central Bank Governors under the Chairmanship of Delors. As Chairman, Delors was 
able to move the governors towards a consensus on what he wanted (Ross 1995: 81). 
Indeed, a member of his team reflected that ‘there wasn’t a phrase in the final paper 
which he didn’t author’ (ibid: 82). The Delors Report was published in 1989 and 
supported the three stage architecture for EMU that had been outlined in the 1970
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Werner Report. It was expected that the member-states would move from completion 
of the internal market and membership of the European exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) to economic convergence based on agreed criteria. The conditions would then 
be in place for the implementation of the final stage that would involve the 
establishment of a European central bank (ECB) and a single currency.
There was, however, to be more to the Community’s new trajectory than the EMU. 
Delors continued to emphasise the necessity of expanding the social dimension of the 
Community in order to complement economic integration. A key objective here was 
to deter the practice of social dumping whereby companies and countries would 
attempt to gain competitive advantage within the internal market on the basis of low 
social costs. The possibility of social dumping appeared to be increasingly likely as 
multinational companies developed a range of business strategies that cut across 
national boundaries (Wise and Gibb 1993:153). In response to these fears, the 
Commission put forward the ‘Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers’ 1989; a non-legally binding declaration on which a programme of social 
policies was to be put forward by the Commission (ibid: 160).
As the member-states negotiated the Social Charter, the integration process was 
overtaken by events as state socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Cold War 
came to an end. Delors and the Commission capitalised on these developments by 
supporting German unification and then outlining a programme of Community 
enlargement. This would firstly encompass the EFTA countries and subsequently 
reach out to the ex-socialist regimes. Crucially, in 1989 it was agreed with the US that 
the Community would co-ordinate aid, the bulk of which was European, to the East 
(Ross 1992: 60). The end of the Cold War and the expansion of its external policy had 
also confirmed the need for the Community to develop a more active and co-ordinated 
foreign policy.
At the Maastricht negotiations in December of 1991 the member-states, acting on a
range of proposals from the Commission, began to re-draw the political architecture
of the Community and rethink its range of responsibilities. Despite the limitations of
the various policy preferences imposed by national governments, the member-states
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went a long way to establishing Delors’ concept of Europe as an ‘organised space’ 
between the nation-state and the global market. Some of the most important 
agreements were as follows:
• A timetable was agreed for the establishment of EMU that followed the essence of 
the 1989 Delors Report. EU responsibility was extended into new areas such as 
public health policy, transport and (except Britain) social policy.
• New arrangements were put in place for formalised intergovernmental cooperation 
over foreign policy and justice and home affairs.
• A new Committee for the Regions was established and the financial support for 
poorer regions was increased, almost doubling the overall size of the structural 
funds (Geyer 2000:144-145).
• For the first time the concept of a distinct European citizenship was introduced 
and the citizens rights were formalised and extended.
• New powers were given to the European parliament including the right of veto 
over certain areas of legislation.
Schmitter notes that the Maastricht Treaty was the outcome of a ‘hastily assembled 
compromise’ and as such was ‘an intrinsically incoherent document’ (1996b: 131). In 
particular, it was rooted in the technocratic economism that had been characteristic of 
the Community since the 1950s (Marquand 1992). The main implication of this was 
that it failed to address the critical problems of legitimising the EU and the real 
political obstacles to further integration. Despite these limitations, it did point in the 
direction of a possible stable European political order that was neither 
straightforwardly intergovernmental nor supranational in character. Schmitter argues 
that we can only get to grips with the new political structure that Maastricht 
inaugurated if we imagine a polity that does not have the monopolising and 
centralising characteristics of a nation-state but does have,
‘the capability to take decisions, resolve conflicts, produce public goods, 
coordinate private behaviour, regulate markets, hold elections, respond to 
interest group pressures, generate revenue, incorporate new members, allocate 
expenditures, send and receive diplomatic representation, conclude 
international agreements and even declare and wage war!’ (1996b: 132)
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Both theoretically and substantively, Maastricht seemed to confirm the development 
of the EC/EU as a unique form of multi-level governance ( Peterson 1995; Marks and 
Macadam 1996; Schmitter 1996b; Cram 1997). The implication was not only that 
day-to-day policies, but history making decisions within the EU were increasingly the 
product of complex political interactions between national governments and 
supranational institutions as well sub-national authorities, social movements and 
interest groups. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, it implied a revolution in the 
political architecture of modem governance.
The implicit implication of the multi-governance perspective is that, in the wake of 
the decline of the nation-state as an exclusive political organisation and without a 
European state, the dominant political category that defines European political society 
is that of civil society. There is an evident pluralisation and fragmentation of European 
societies and the emergent multi-level polity both reflects this process as much as it 
attempts to organise and regulate its progress. These developments are however 
uncertain and ambiguous as the integration process has yet to reach an end point88.
The question arises of what kind of European economy has been constituted by 
political elites clearly motivated by the need to reconstruct some kind of distinct 
European civil society in the face of international threats. This debate frames the 
further discussion of theoretical approaches to the EU discussed in the next section. It 
also provides the focus for the discussion of the role of the British state in relation to 
the development of the EC/EU during the 1980s and early 1990s.
5.2 Europeanisation: an effective response to globalisation?
In recent years a profound critique has emerged of those features of globalisation
associated with changes in work, consumption and technology (Bauman 1998, 2000;
Gray 1998,2000; Sennett 1998; Young 1998;). A global neo-liberalism has been seen
to have brought about the naturalisation of inequality, the subordination of politics to
‘uncontrollable’ economic forces, the rise of individualism and exclusive identities
and the intensification of the experience of insecurity and uncertainty. This has been
driven by a financialization of the global economic order that has imposed policies of
164
fiscal constraint and low inflation onto governments while amplifying financial 
wealth (Arrighi 1994, 2003; Greider 1997). The debates concerning processes of 
Europeanisation raise fundamental questions about the reconfiguration of power in the 
face of globalisation (Wallace 2000; McGrew 2002). In particular, to what extent is 
the European Union primarily a vehicle for a regressive economic globalisation, of 
deregulation and deflation? Or, does it imply a genuine form of political 
transformation and modernisation? In the remainder of this Chapter, I will address 
these questions. This forms the basis by which the recent articulations of British 
exceptionalism are compared in the next two chapters.
That the processes of integration outlined in the previous section imply a progressive 
reorganisation of political and economic power in the context of globalisation remains 
contested (Schmitter and Streeck 1991; Scharpf 1994; Streeck 1995,1996; Burham 
and Bonefield 1996a, 1996b; Mishra 1999). As we have seen, the SEA was 
concentrated on the liberalisation of European markets and reflected the renewed 
dominance of a market oriented policies. The Maastricht Treaty imposed strict 
monetary and fiscal constraints on those member-states participating in EMU, limiting 
public spending and forcing member-states to impose policies of welfare 
retrenchment (Mishra 2000: 40). In an important contribution to this debate Schmitter 
and Streeck argued that recent European developments favoured capitalist interests 
and that integration was fundamental to the deregulation of European corporatism 
(1991). The consequences represented a clear attempt to construct Europe as a 
coherent politico-economic space at the expense of social contracts89. The 
establishment of the single market, they argued, represented part of a shift from 
national corporatism to transnational pluralism:
‘European-level relations between capital and labour, instead of constituting 
the core of the European political economy, will for the foreseeable future 
remain compartmentalized in the private sphere of large multinational 
enterprises and will thus be essentially non-political and voluntaristic in 
character.’ (Streeck and Schmitter 1991:158)
The reformed EC/EU resembled a pre-New Deal liberal state which exhibited ‘a high 
level of civil rights... .a low level of political rights... .an even lower level of social
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rights... .[and] the almost complete absence of industrial citizenship’ (Streeck and 
Schmitter 1991:152). The key factor here was the decision by the member states to 
move towards ‘mutual recognition’ instead of harmonisation (ibid: 149). Streeck 
came to a similar conclusion regarding Maastricht which he argued failed to introduce 
meaningful market correcting measures or a system of European level neocorporatist 
governance (1995: 402). The implication was that states deregulated at the national 
level without re-regulating at the European level. In essence, the second wave of 
integration traded the break-up of the national Keynesian welfare state to maintain the 
integrity of a European economy in the face of the wider forces of globalisation 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1991). But the practical result represented a European variant 
of flexible accumulation that accepted the renewed ascendancy of market forces:
‘Deregulation thus spread from the United States to Britain, the country with 
the most open capital markets, and from there to the European continent, 
meeting with declining resistance in changing domestic political economies.’ 
(ibid: 148)
From this perspective, European integration is firmly located within the process of 
globalisation as part of the drive towards ‘flexible accumulation’90 (Harvey 1989). In 
essence, the EU can be placed alongside global institutions such as the IMF that have 
been the mechanisms for breaking up nationally regulated labour markets and 
undermining national welfare states. Burnham and Bonefield, for instance, have 
comprehensively argued, from the perspective of a Marxist class analysis that 
European monetary regimes and the establishment of a single currency have been 
driven by the need to impose fiscal discipline on the working class (1996a, 1996b).
As Bonefield notes,
‘EMU, then, inscribes the neo-liberal policy of market freedom associated 
with Hayek though the creation of European supranational institutional 
devices that check expansionary responses to labour conflict.’ (2002:132)
The clear limitations of the Maastricht Treaty in establishing political legitimacy and 
the wider problems of the democratic deficit reflect the underlying logic of 
contemporary European capitalist development (ibid: 132). The nation-state is 
incorporated within a ‘European republic of the market’ and monetary policy is
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effectively shielded from national class conflict. Thus, the lack of a broader political 
Europe is therefore essential if the EU is to facilitate the functioning of the market. 
European multi-level governance implies the restructuring of political institutions in 
line with an intensification of global capitalist domination and the maintenance of the 
system of European nation-states in order to contain class conflict. Europe becomes a 
bounded economic space while the nation-state retains a central role as the instrument 
for securing social order within particular territorial compartments.
As a project of political modernisation, the above analysis suggests that the Delors 
projectwas fundamentally flawed in its belief that European markets could be 
liberalised while simultaneously constructing a Citizens Europe of regulated 
capitalism. Instead, European integration appears as a process designed to 
depoliticise the intensification of capital accumulation by those hegemonic and 
globalised fractions of capital. States primarily function as coercive entities and 
national political communities are undermined by market forces. Nevertheless, even 
those who are pessimistic about the European project acknowledge that it cannot be 
reduced to economic factors alone. Walby (1999) has questioned the analysis 
developed by Streeck and others and, in particular, claims that the regulatory potential 
of the European Union has been underestimated. Drawing on Majone’s (1996) 
conception of the EU as a regulatory state with considerable juridical power, Walby 
concludes that,
'The European Union is a polity which has responded aggressively to the 
perceived threat of globalisation. It is no passive victim in the manner often 
postulated as the role for nation-states within globalisation theory. During this 
process the strength of this polity has grown considerably, becoming a fully 
fledged supra-state, developing new policy capabilities, sometimes at the 
expense of the capacity for action of its member states. The EU has 
demonstrated a response to globalisation in which a polity has been 
significantly reconfigured and aggrandized.’ (Walby 1999:134)
To substantiate this argument, Walby refers to the extensive regulatory role played by 
the EU in relation to gender relations which she argues represents a more progressive 
institutionalisation of gender equality than has been evident at the level of the nation­
state (ibid: 130-133). For Walby, those who question the role of the European Union
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as a progressive force have unduly focused on class relations. In support of her 
analysis, she cites other examples of this progressive policy regime including 
environmental regulation, health and safety, and consumer protection. In a similar 
vein, Falkner claims that the Delorsian social dimension has been partially 
institutionalised within the European Union (1998). In particular, it is evidenced by 
the construction of a corporatist policy community following the Maastricht social 
policy reforms and the agreements on a range of regulatory projects including works 
councils and rights for part-time workers (ibid). The main conclusions drawn from 
these assessments of the recent development of the European social dimension is that 
the European Union is not an inherently neo-liberal, deregulatory regime but that 
there are significant institutional developments re-organising and re-regulating 
political interests at the supranational level.
It is also possible to view EMU as a central part of the project to establish the 
European Union as an effective and extensive political order. EMU represented an 
attempt to contain the pressures imposed by the crisis of Fordism and enable a deeper 
and more coordinated response to the financial and monetary relations of the global 
economy (Grahl 1997: 244-245). As Grahl points out EMU was primarily a French 
project designed to make possible ‘a fundamental challenge to existing world 
monetary relations and a move towards greater symmetry between Europe and North 
America’ (ibid: 204). It was therefore conceived as an alternative to the limitations of 
the Washington consensus and European doubts concerning American management 
and mis-managementof the international monetary system91. As such, EMU is 
necessary for any progressive post-Fordist modernisation of European societies and 
represents a potential economic framework for constructing a European political 
community in opposition to the regressive strategies of economic globlalisation. As 
Hutton argues,
‘The arrival of the euro cements the establishment of a continental-scale 
economy that will not be fractured by different currency regimes. It allows 
interest rates to be set for the benefit of the Europe-wide economy rather than 
to protect a particular national exchange rate or reflect the monetary conditions 
in the anchor currency. It is the friend, in short, of production, investment and 
employment, and is Europe’s response to the currency regime established by 
the US in the early 1970s which has cost Europe so much. By marrying the
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benefits of continental scale and cheap money with the already proven merits 
of Europe’s economic and social model, over the medium to long term the 
growth of the EU with a single currency could not only be greater than without 
it -  it could be startlingly dynamic. The euro is a means of delivering to 
Europe’s citizens’ (2002: 331 italics mine)
Hutton suggests that monetary union can form the basis for a broader project of 
constructing a European civil society and a progressive process of political 
modernisation. If the major constraint on political action in the global society is the 
autonomy of financial capitalism then a successful and integrated European monetary 
system is a pre-requisite for the construction of a European political society.
From the broader perspective of political modernisation, the economic project of the 
European Union connects to the establishment of a European civil society. As 
Habermas notes with regards to the single market programme, ‘the extensive contacts 
between members of different nationalities within Europe creates the conditions for 
communication networks of European-wide public spheres’ (1994: 33). In respect to 
the latter, it is possible to identify a range of possibilities for the construction of an 
effective European civil society. As a number of authors have pointed out, the EU 
does provide the opportunities for delinking citizenship from nationality and to 
construct citizenship in terms of a conception of a European political community 
(Tassin 1992; Meehan 1993; linklater 1998; Bellamy and Warleigh 2001). From this 
perspective, the European Union enables people to constitute themselves as ‘European 
citizens’ and pursue diverse collective projects and identities beyond those of 
individualised workers and consumers. Evidently, a European political community 
offers the possibility of breaking free from the passive and uniform status of 
citizenship imposed by nation-states. A process that is demonstrated by transnational 
social movement, regional mobilisation and interest group activity that encounters the 
European Union as a new opportunity structure (Meehan 1993; Marks and McAdam 
1996). The implication of these developments is that the European Union combines 
various political projects and practices that together constitute a unique political 
society and challenge the depoliticisation of European integration. From this 
perspective, the integration process is characterised by a process of reflexive political 
modernisation, as Habermas notes:
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‘The politics that sets up markets is self-referential, to the extent that every 
step toward market deregulation entails a simultaneous disqualification or self­
restriction of political authority qua medium for enacting binding collective 
decisions. A 'catch-up' politics inverts this process; it is reflexive politics in its 
positive rather than negative version.’ (1999: 45-55 emphasis mine)
In considering the capacity of the European Union to re-regulate societies and to 
constitute a European civil society, we can conclude that it represents a distinct form 
of public power that represents an overtly political response to globalisation. It is a 
project of political modernisation designed to bring about new forms of social and 
political inclusion within a reconfigured set of territorial parameters. In the absence of 
any overt project of nation or state building at the European level, we can conclude 
that this is taking the form of a complex, network society organised in terms of 
circuits of knowledge and information and rooted in collective experiences of 
negotiating risk societies (Beck 1992; Castells 1996; Delanty 1995; 1998).
The extent to which these developments imply inclusive political communities
depends on historical contingences and political struggle. These are evident in the
tensions over monetary union. As we have seen, the process of monetary union did
not pro-actively seek to bring about economic convergence through harmonisation
and redistribution but through the imposition of fiscal discipline and deflationary
measures. Member-states were forced to introduce austerity measures in order to
qualify for EMU. The broader criticism is that states and regions are being forced to
compete within the single market via cuts in wages and social costs as they have lost
control over their exchange rates and were not supported by a more active European
economic policy. High levels of unemployment during the 1990s reflected the extent
to which the European economy was being rationalised and restructured without any
corresponding programme of social and economic investment. The danger here is that
without a strong move toward the convergence of European economies, the logic of
territorial capitalist competition between states, and increasingly regions, reasserts
itself in new and unpredictable ways. In relation to EMU, Grahl refers to ‘a
programme so blinkered and dogmatically conceived that it has already begun to
disorganise the economic and political life of the Union,(1997: 225). At the heart of
this problematic economic agenda, however, remains the fact that the European
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economic institutions have been unwilling or unable to take on the financial markets 
in their search for a stable and strong currency (Hutton 2002: 338-339). If they were 
to do so, it would imply a broader Europeanisation of economic policy than has been 
enacted since Maastricht and would require the kinds of fiscal and political risks92 
implied by the original Delors project (Grahl 1997: 244-245; Hirst and Thompson 
1999: 255; Hutton 2002: 339). The dilemma here is that the pursuit of economic 
policies centred on productive investment, employment and social cohesion go against 
the logic of contemporary global capitalism and the hegemony of financial capital.
In certain fundamental respects, the European Union has continued to defensively 
react to the wider forces of economic globalisation. This defensive economic agenda 
has been pursued alongside and been concomitant with the questioning by key 
sections of the European political elite of the capacity of the European Union to 
achieve a deeper political legitimation (Habermas 1999). These problems were 
evident in the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty as Europe entered 
recession and the legitimacy of the second wave of integration was increasingly 
questioned, most notably in the Danish and French referenda. In many respects, the 
commitment of national political elites to the European project has been tested by a 
range of problems increasingly facing advanced societies -  unemployment, 
immigration, crime and nationalism. In diverse ways, the problem of ‘otherness’ has 
become intrinsic to European societies resulting in a politics of exclusion that 
demands the reinvention of the powers of the nation-state, however illusory they may 
be. This fundamentally undermines the project of integration as it aims to constitute a 
post-Hobbesian geopolitical order with boundaries, both of geography and identity, 
that are more negotiable than traditional power politics. This has inevitably left the 
identity of the European political order uncertain and easily undermined. Reflecting 
on recent developments, Habermas claims that Market Europeans ‘have concluded a 
tacit alliance with Eurosceptics’ against European Federalists (ibid: 56). The 
implication has been that political elites have focused on market integration and 
expansion, most notably to the countries of Eastern Europe93, without a concomitant 
commitment to legitimising or extending a plural European political community94. 
Political modernisation is collapsed into economic modernisation removing, in the
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words of a spokesman for the Deutsche Bank, ‘any distinction between civic and 
economic activity’ (ibid).
The nature of the political struggles within the European Union became increasingly 
explicit and critical during the 1990s and as we entered the new century. European 
integration has unleashed new forms of political modernisation that are evidently in 
tension with both a deregulated global economy and continued domination of the 
nation-state. This does not imply a return to international Fordism but the 
politicisation of flexible accumulation through regulation and active civil societies.
In Europe, globalisation has to be viewed through the prism of political 
Europeanisation. The process of European integration suggests the development of a 
market economy embedded within a political society and not the construction of a 
market society. Clearly, this trajectory remains uncertain and a matter of intense 
political struggle and contestation. It is within this framework of globalised political 
struggles that we have to understand the relation of the British state to the project of 
European integration during the period in question. It is my contention that the 
constraints on British political modernisation reassert themselves within the context of 
flexible accumulation in the form of an aggressive Anglo-American neo-liberalism. 
This structures both the response of governing elites to globalisation and to the second 
wave of European integration. It reinforces the constraints on British engagement 
with integration as a distinct project of European political modernisation. In essence, 
the relationship between the British state and European integration during the period 
in question will now be explored in terms of the emergence, crisis and consolidation 
of the Thatcherite restructuring of the British state.
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Chapter Six
Thatcherism, European Integration and the Politics
of Modernisation
In this chapter, I examine the relationship of the Thatcher governments to the second 
wave of European integration between 1979-1990. My central claim is that the 
defining elements of Thatcherism as a political project were fundamentally in 
contradiction to deeper processes of European integration. This became evident in the 
British opposition to the broader project of European integration that unfolded during 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Further, British European policy was subordinated to a 
wider Anglo-American project of flexible economic modernisation that was opposed 
to the re-organisation of a specifically bounded European politico-economic space.
Underpinning the Thatcherite approach to European integration was a continued and 
continuing opposition to the possibility of a distinctly European solution to problems 
of British post-imperial political modernisation. During the period in question, the 
primary purpose of EC membership for the Thatcher governments lay in the 
opportunities it provided for extending free market policies. As a corollary, there was 
a consistent opposition to European institution building. This reflected the extent to 
which Thatcherism as a political project combined economic modernisation with 
opposition to political modernisation. Thatcherism reaasserted a form of British 
national identity that was historically constituted in opposition to European political 
modernisation. Nevertheless, this aggressively neo-liberal restructuring of British 
European policy could not contain an intense conflict within the Conservative party 
over the trajectory of the British state once its limitations became apparent. In 
essence, the British problem of political modernisation resurfaced in the shape of the 
European crisis of the Conservative party. It is my contention that these politics of 
modernisation were resolved in a distinctinctly Thatcherite direction. I focus on the 
unfolding of this European crisis in this chapter before exploring its full manifestation 
in Chapter 7.
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6.1 Thatcherism and British exceptionalism
There is now a considerable body of literature exploring the political project of the 
post-1979 Conservative governments, loosely organised around a conceptualisation 
and analysis of the phenomena of Thatcherism (Hall 1979; Hall and Jacques 1983, 
1989; Jessop 1984; Overbeek 1990; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Hay 1996a, 1996b). 
These debates explore the coherence of Thatcherism as a set of ideas and ideologies 
and the extent to which it represented a fundamental restructuring and transformation 
of the British state. Such debates are most usefully understood in terms of the extent 
to which they focus on Thatcherism as project or as process. Hall (1979) for example 
conceptualised Thatcherism as a political project characterised by an ‘authoritarian 
populism’ able to win over the hearts and minds of ordinary people. It recast an 
authoritarian moral conservatism, appealing to nationalism, traditional values and law 
and order. This approach was criticised by Jessop et al who argued that the concept of 
‘authoritarian populism’ ignored the complex and differential impact of Thatcherism 
and presented it as a monstrous monolith (1984: 73-74). From this perspective, 
Thatcherism should be located within wider complex political processes acting as 
constraints on its full realisation. While the concept of Thatcherism has become a 
shorthand for a range of developments and shifts in the post-imperial trajectory of the 
British state, we should not lose sight of the utility of the concept for capturing the re­
configuration of the British state around a set of hegemonic neo-liberal principles. It 
is my contention that we can usefully employ the concept in order to understand a 
number of features of contemporary British political transformation and reproduction.
Thatcherism represented a clear ideological, economic and political break with the 
Keynesian-Beveridge settlement that had placed the extension of the welfare state, 
full employment and state intervention at the centre of British politics. The post-war 
settlement had restructured the parameters of the state in such a way that projects of 
modernisation and renewal had not significantly challenged or reformed what was a 
set of comparatively flawed Fordist arrangements. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the 
resulting crisis was particularly evident once Britain entered an uncertain post­
imperial trajectory. Thatcherism was therefore able to capture the ideological terrain
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in the context of the post-imperial crisis of British failed Fordism, Despite political 
constraints, it was a successful political project able to redraw the parameters of the 
British state enacting what Heffeman refers to as a new political consensus that 
reflected a new dominant political paradigm:
‘The relative success of Thatcherism in helping to engineer a shift in the 
political landscape of the UK finds reflection in a reordered political agenda; 
one which lies at the heart of the political change from a social-democratic 
inspired political world view to one which owes more to neo-liberalism. This 
reordered political agenda provides almost a mock theory of governance, one 
which guides what governments (and, as importantly, respective governments) 
can and should do and what they consider themselves able to do. Political 
change, be it gradual or dramatic, is ultimately realised as the transition from 
one paradigm to another. A dominant political agenda is structured around a 
series of contestable political beliefs that have over time become translated 
into a set of assumptions, an implicit “ agreement”  on the role of public 
administration, one existing as a ‘framework’, which acknowledges a 
prevailing political orthodoxy.’ (Heffeman 1999:15)
We should be clear, however, that Thatcherism was an attack on Fordism from within 
the British state and not an attack on the state per se. Thus it is very important to 
conceive of Thatcherism as structurally continuous with some of the core principles 
of organisation that have underpinned the historical development of the British state 
(Leys 1990; Anderson 1992; Gamble 1993; Naim 1994). As a political project, 
Thatcherism ideologically repackaged and reasserted elements of the British political 
order within a favourable international environment. It represented a reaction against 
Fordist initiatives that had failed to resolve the post-imperial British crisis but did so 
by re-formulating an already embedded system of flexible accumulation into an 
extensive neo-liberal project of economic modernisation.
Thatcherism can therefore be viewed as an aggressive post-imperial reassertion of the 
liberal conception of Britain as a globalised free market society. The problems of 
modernisation were resolved by economic reductionism:
‘ the market was reconstituted as a major ideological force and crucial 
distinctions between the productive and unproductive, private and public, 
wealth creating and wealth consuming came to be the yardsticks forjudging 
policy’ (Gamble 1988:182).
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The guiding principle of Thatcherism was the unleashing of individualism and market 
forces throughout British society. The underlying aim was to restore the confidence 
and security of the capitalist class by removing the destructive interference of a state 
no longer trusted by business and commerce (Leys 1990). This was to be achieved by 
removing the barriers between the British economy and the global market place. In 
particular, this meant attacking an inadequately corporatised and unpredictable 
national labour movement. The attempt to construct a viable national accumulation 
strategy was abandoned and an economy that was already far more transnationalised 
than most opened up its capital markets still further. The upshot of this was to 
continue the trend whereby Britain’s stock of overseas investments was considerably 
higher than all Western economies, apart from the US, and at the same time Britain 
extended its role as a ‘host country’ for foreign investment and multinationals, 
particularly American and Japanese (Gamble 1988: 20). The full implications of this 
evident by the mid 1990s when it was clear that the British economy had become for 
more globalised than its competitors (Hirst and Thompson 2000: 343). An 
examination of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) shows that these flows had become 
far more important for the level of domestic investment and capital formation than in 
most other large economies (ibid. see Figure 1). In this respect, ‘it is more like a 
Malaysia or an Indonesia than it is an Italy or even a France’ (ibid: 344). An 
accumulation strategy was put in place that further privileged rentier incomes from 
foreign investments, internationally tradable services and inward investment from 
foreign multinationals (ibid: 226). This neo-liberal economic project went hand in 
hand with the assertion of a strong state in order to ensure the social stability that 
would underpin a successful free market economy. This was now given a stronger 
ideological justification in terms of the necessity of upholding and restoring 
traditional values and standards of individual and family responsibility that underpin 
the free economy and, thereby, a free society. There was a unity between the belief in 
the force of the market, the assertion of state domination and a conservative 
conception of the good society. In terms of statecraft, the emphasis on individual and
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Figure 1
T a b ic  5 M easures o f the internationalization  o f productive activity: the U K  com pared
USA Japan Germany France UK Italy Canada Netherlands Belgium1 Denmark Sweden
(A) FD I flows US$ billions: 
(1990-96)
Outflows 423.4 173.7 166.1 189.0 186.4 45.4 48.8 l l l . l 50.3 16.9 45.9
Inflows 336.3 7.6 21.7 126.4 139.9 26.6 45.6 62.1 72.7 15.8 37.9
(B) FD I stocks as %  of G NP 
(1997)
Outward 11.8 6.0 14.1 14.9 38.9 10.8 23.6 52.9 35.9 15.0 32.2
Inward 9.3 0.7 5.9 11.4 22.5 6.8 23.4 31.7 53.3 15.2 18.9
(C) Share of inward FDI flows 7.0 0 -0 .6 8.2 14.6 1.6 6.2 14.8* 28.3 2.7 14.8
in gross fixed capital 
formation (1996)
(D) (i) Average gross expenditure 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.2 1.5
on R&D as %  of G D P 
(1988-95)
(ii) Foreign source of R&D 
as %  o f total expenditure 
(1995)
0 0.1 1.8 8.3 14.3 3.9 10.5
Sourcer. compiled and derived from: (A) OECD (1998), UN (1996, 1997,1998); (B) UN (1998: Annex Tables B.3, B.4); (Q  U N  (1998: Annex, Table B.5); (D) (i) Harley 
and Owen (1998: 69, Table 16); (ii) Duffus and Gooding (1997:44, Table 17)
Notes
1 Belgium and Luxembourg.
1 1995 (1996 =  9.9%; 1995 was more typical of previous years).
Source: Hirst and Thompson 2000: 342
market freedom justified the removal of the constraints on governing autonomy and 
the maximisation of the coercive functions of a fundamentally unreformed state 
structure. It represented a shift towards a form of populist politics in which there was 
to be a more direct relationship between the core leadership and the electorate (Mair 
2002). There was a downplaying of the mediating role played by institutions such as 
parliament, Cabinet and party.
In a comprehensive sense, Thatcherism was a populist reassertion of a conception of 
the British state and society as a global market society that was profoundly rooted in a 
reactionary and authoritarian capitalist individualism.
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6.2 Thatcherism and the financialisation of the global order
As an economic strategy, Thatcherism depended on the favourable external 
environment that had been created by the collapse of international Fordism that was 
initiated by the crisis in US hegemony. Its real significance lay in its recognition that 
‘the prospects for the successful modernisation along the lines previously attempted 
have vanished’ (Gamble 1988: 230). Both in terms of outward and inward foreign 
investment, Britain benefited from the deregulation of capital markets initiated by the 
United States and the expansionist fiscal policy of the early Reagan era. Gamble 
argues that the recovery in the British economy between 1981-1987 was fuelled by 
the budget and trade deficits of the United States that followed from this policy shift 
(ibid: 98). In ideological terms, Thatcherism emerged as a particular British variant of 
an emerging US global project of neo-liberalism that was attempting to reconstitute 
the world order. During the 1970s, the American shift to the right and the growing 
hegemony of a free market philosophy helped provide the justification for a 
renaissance of a laissez-faire thinking in Britain and undermined those who continued 
to support projects of Fordist modernisation. Gray points out that this Utopia of the 
market was rooted in an Enlightenment thesis of Western superiority (1998: 2). From 
such a viewpoint, it was believed that the world would move inexorably towards a 
universal civilisation modelled on American free market capitalism (ibid: 3). The 
Thatcher governments signed up to this worldview and enthusiastically imported 
American policies on a range on issues including, labour market deregulation, health 
reforms and taxation. An Anglo-American nationalism was at the heart of the 
Thatcherite project, a doctrine which Thatcher articulated more fully in her writings 
once she left office (Thatcher 2002: 20-23). In essence, at the root of American 
success was a national character whose development was informed by English 
individualism.
‘America is unique -  in its power, its wealth, its outlook on the world. But its 
uniqueness has roots, and those roots are essentially English. Already at the 
time of their foundation, the settlements across the Atlantic were deeply 
affected by religious, moral and political beliefs.’ (Thatcher 2002: 20)
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These reactionary conceptions of individualism and national identity came to justify 
the rampant individualism that found its highest expressions in the autonomy of 
financial markets. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the key mechanism for the global 
shift to a system of flexible accumulation was the financialization of the global 
economy. Initially this had proved critical for a U.S. regime of accumulation that 
found its banks and corporations seeking out quick profits abroad in the face of 
domestic instability and over production (Arrighi 1994,2003; Greider 1997). By the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S. had turned the situation to its advantage by a 
monetarist counter-revolution that ended its role as a world banker and re-routed 
capital back to the Unted States (Arrighi 2003: 66). Arrighi argues that there was 
nothing new in this and parallels can be drawn between the current period and the 
crisis of British hegemony at the end of the nineteenth century which culminated in 
the ‘belle epoque’ of British financial capitalism between 1896-1914 (2003). Towards 
the end of the twentieth century, the British declining rentier regime was therefore 
offered an opportunity for partial renewal on the back of another wave of 
financialization initiated by the crisis of United States hegemony. An already 
structurally embedded system of flexible accumulation was able to take advantage of 
the growing autonomy of finance by attracting and servicing free floating capital that 
accompanied the crisis of the US. This had initially been evident in the emerging 
Eurodollar market. By the late 1980s and 1990s the already high levels of mutual 
investment between Britain and the United States had increased dramatically. The 
degree of aggregate investment in the US by British firms climbed from £43 billion in 
1988 to £122 billion in 1998 while the figures for the EU were £23 billion and £99 
billion (Aspinwall 2003:152; see figure 2). The evidence also suggests that American 
companies were larger and accounted for a larger proportion of UK employment 
(ibid: 152-153; see figure 3). This was driven by the deregulation of the City which 
opened the way for American investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley to penetrate the headquarters of British capital through their domination of 
integrated securities and corporate finance at the international level (Ingham 2002:
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Figure 7: (a) Book value o f inw ard direct in vestm en t by source, 1988-1998 (£bn); (b) bool- 
value o f outward direct investm ent b y  destination , 1988-1998 (£bn)
Source: Office for National Statistics.
Source Aspinall 2003: 153
Figure 3
(b) ^
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Figure 8: (a) Foreign-ow ned firms in the UK 
by region of ow n ersh ip , 1997 (%); (b) UK 
dom estic  em p loym en t in foreign-ow n ed  
firms, 1997 (%)
Source: Office for National Statistics
Source Aspinall 2003:153
From this perspective, Thatcherism did not so much drive through the reconstruction
of the British state and economy as adapt and revive elements of Britain’s inherently
flexible capitalist system to a new set of global economic realities. It was a
distinctively British form of economic modernisation, but one that was ideologically
compatibile with the ruling ethos in the struggling US Empire. A declining post-
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imperial regime that was struggling to find its place in the post-war world of global 
Fordism suddenly found that the world had come to it in the form of a renaissance of 
financially driven flexible accumulation.
63  A struggle for hegemony
The Thatcherite restructuring of the British political order has to be seen as both 
uncertain and as a profoundly political process. Heffeman points out that this process 
of enacting a Thatcherite political transformation of the British political order has 
come about over time and was variously constrained by:
1) the dictates of political statecraft,
2) the obligations arising from electoral imperatives,
3) the demands of administrative realities,
4) public policy agendas inherited from previous administrations (2000: 40).
These are important realities but it must equally be recognised that they did not
necessarily weaken the broader ideological agenda or purpose of Thatcherism as a
political project (ibid). Thatcherism emerged through a series of struggles and
conflicts not just against ideological opponents but also amongst believers. At its core
the Thatcherite settlement unleashed a form of market led economic modernisation
that had a number of problematic social and political consequences for which it had
no remedy. Despite its success in reshaping political agendas it did not resolve British
problems of political modernisation. The problem was that the commitment to low
inflation, privatisation and globalisation of the economy intensified social and
regional inequities and left the British economy particularly vulnerable to external
forces. Further, the broader complexities of the post-imperial crisis concerning the
constitution of the British national order and the politics of citizenship were largely
dealt with by their exclusion from the political agenda. It was illustrative of the extent
to which the state had relied on market mechanisms and coercion while the deeper
problems of governing a post-imperial, multi-national, pluralist political order
remained unresolved (Hirst 1989). This was indicative of the extent to which
Thatcherism was a utopian project prepared to resist pressures to accommodate and
adapt to the forces of social change in the pursuit of the higher ideal of a free market
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individualism. Thus, despite its compromises and confusions, both the strength and 
weakness of Thatcherism was an ideological certainty that was consistently and 
ruthlessly realised in policy.
6.4 Thatcherism, the crisis in the Conservative party and European integration
There is now a considerable literature exploring the splits and crisis of the 
Conservative party over European integration during the 1980s and 1990s (Baker, 
Ludlum and Gamble 1993,1994; Young 1998; Turner 2000). The aim of this chapter 
and the next is to analyse these conflicts from the perspective of the discussion of 
British exceptionalism and the politics of modernisation developed during the course 
of this thesis. A useful starting point for understanding these disputes within the 
Conservative party is the framework developed by Baker, Gamble and Ludlum 
(1993). Locating European splits and divisions within a broader historical context, 
they argue that they reflect continued tensions within the political class over Britain’s 
strategic relationship to the world political economy (ibid: 422). Parallels are drawn 
with the splits that emerged over the repeal of the Com Laws in 1846 and those over 
Tariff Reform in 1903. The advantage of such an approach, and of particular 
importance in the British case, is that it attempts to integrate external and domestic 
policy issues (ibid: 425). Baker et al map the divisions along two axes, of sovereignty 
and interdependence in terms of external policy and of limited and extended 
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Source: Baker, Gamble, Ludlum 1993: 426
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The European split can therefore be understood as follows:
‘Thatcher’s stance was hard to sustain both because her position was not 
central and because she separated herself from many of the of those who had 
been part of her coalition on other interests. It seems likely that the bulk of 
Conservative M.P’s would be placed in the two lower quadrants. But most of 
the Cabinet Ministers of both the Thatcher and Major governments belong in 
the two upper quadrants. This is the potential Peelite split.’ (ibid: 425).
The European split can be understood as the unfolding of these two splits. Firstly, the 
split within the governing elite between Thatcher, her supporters and other ministers 
and, secondly, as a wider split in the political class between the governing elite and 
the party during the Major premiership.
The Baker, Ludlum and Gamble ideological map should be developed and revised in 
a number of directions. To begin with the sovereignty/interdependence divide was 
more complicated than it seemed. The meaning of ‘sovereignty’ for a post-imperial 
state, which had become chronically dependent on its relationship to the United States 
both economically and politically, should be questioned. The real issue here is the 
nature of British post-imperial dependence. At one level the Thatcherite position can 
be veiwed as concerned with national-sovereignty, at another it was concerned with 
consolidating Britain’s Atlantic dependency. What distinguishes this from those who 
favour interdependence was the extent it was firmly located within an Anglo- 
American nationalism often at the expense of broader internationalism.
It is important to emphasise the divisions between those who have celebrated British
membership of the European Union from the perspective of interdependence and
extended government and those who have supported interdependence alongside
minimal government. The first group is committed to European integration as the
basis for a broader project of national modernisation and transformation. This project
was most clearly articulated by the likes of Heseltine and Chris Patten both of whom
have looked to move the Conservative party in a direction that is closer to European
Christian democracy. This group can be separated from the European pragmatists who
have primarily viewed further integration into Europe as a limited project that can
make a positive contribution to domestic statecraft. They have been primarily
reformist Thatcherites committed to the Thatcherite revolution but who also
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recognised the utility of international governance. For political figures such as Howe 
and Lawson state heritage of conservative modernisation remained important and the 
European project was viewed as making a significant contribution to this.
In relation to the European issue, Thatcherism became an attack on both these forces 
of modernisation within the Conservative party in favour of a populist English neo­
liberal idealism. Thatcherism in this sense was distinct in its opposition to a politics of 
accommodation and adaptation to modernity, i.e. conservative modernisation, and 
instead expressed ‘the more radical futurity of reaction’ and ‘the fervour of a 
historically purified neo-liberalism’ (Osbome 1996). From this perspective, splits in 
the Conservative party over European integration have been indicative of chronically 
divergent positions on the politics of modernisation. A further revision is that we 
have to take into consideration the broader context of these divisions and splits. If, as I 
have suggested, we take the hegemony of Thatcherism seriously its reactionary 
modernism and, concomittant Euroscepticism, keeps reasserting itself. In the 
European struggles within the governing elite Thatcher ultimately lost out, but 
Thatcherism was re-articulated. The implication was that the European power 
struggles within the Conservative party and the trajectory of this crisis were framed by 
the hegemony of Thatcherism.
This framework provides the basis on which to analyse the crisis of the Conservative 
party over European integration. The initial course of events established a Thatcherite 
approach to European policy at the expense of more committed Europeans. This was 
built on a coalition within the senior supporters of Thatcher, bringing together 
pragmatic Europeans, and more radical Thatcherites. It was this coalition that was 
destroyed by the second wave of integration, the shifts in geopolitical relations 
occurring during the 1980s and early 1990s and the emerging crisis in the Thatcherite 
project. There was a consequent opening up of strategic differences within the 
governing elite and a reaasertion within the British state of the politics of 
modemisaton. Most notably these conflicts over modernisation began to take shape 
around the issue of the European drive for EMU and the Maastricht agenda. As we
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shall in Chapter 7, these were ultimately resolved in a distinctly Thatcherite, anti- 
European direction.
6.5 A Thatcherite European policy: the budget dispute and the Westland affair
As we saw Chapter 4, under the Callaghan administration there was a clear move 
away from the priority that membership of the EC had achieved in British strategic 
thinking since the Macmillan government. This was particularly evident amongst 
those party leaders who recognised the problems of legitimating a more proactive 
European policy. It was however less evident amongst sections of Whitehall, notably 
the Foreign Office. The position of the first Thatcher administration towards the EC 
was therefore closer to that of the previous Labour government than that of the Heath 
era, in the sense that the EC did not play a fundamental role in-its policy proposals for 
British renewal. Europe was to be conceived as a flexible international arena for the 
vigorous pursuit of national interest. This strategy was nevertheless pursued alongside 
a continued commitment to the EC and to the Conservative party as formally the party 
of Europe. Undoubtedly, however, a key feature of the leader’s approach was to resist 
the constraints imposed by the EC as well as by Europeanists within the state and to 
begin to craft a distinctive Thatcherite approach to the Community and, to European 
cooperation in general, that represented a break with the past. This distinctive 
approach was evident in relation to two issues, the budget dispute and the Westland 
affair.
The issue of the Community budget came back onto the agenda because the initial 
renegotiation by Wilson had not actually produced any financial results. By 1979 the 
transitional period was coming to end so Britain would have to pay its full 
contributions (Butler 1986:94). In addition, Commission figures showed that Britain 
was likely to overtake Germany as the major net contributor (ibid). For a government 
committed to major cuts in public spending the idea of paying out to the Community 
an amount that was disproportionate to its economy was abhorrent. When the issue 
arose at the Dublin Conference in December 1979, Thatcher famously announced her
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intention ‘to get our money back.’ The issue was not resolved until the Fontainebleu 
meeting in June 1984 when Britain received an ad hoc refund on its contributions and 
an annual rebate. It also put in place a new budgetary mechanism. During the 
budgetary negotiations, the British government had invoked the Luxembourg 
compromise and Thatcher was quite prepared to use the witholding of British 
contributions as a negotiating weapon (Butler 1986:100; Heath 1998: 699). The 
impact of the British stance towards the budgetary issue on the other Community 
members should not be underestimated. In his examinations of the negotiations for the 
Single European Act, Ziltener points out:
‘Whether justified or not - the battle cry ‘I want my money back! ’ was 
traumatically imprinted on the memories of many persons who were active in 
the EC negotiation system at the time, as I could gather from practically all 
interviews.’ (1997:12)
The budgetary issue both inaugurated and signalled the Thatcherite way of dealing 
with the Community. The idea of calling to account an overspending bureaucracy 
fitted neatly into the Thatcherite ideology. Domestically the dispute also enabled the 
leader to demonstrate her national credentials in a period before the Falklands war 
when they seemed less certain. The ‘confrontational method’ adopted meant 
approaching the Community as an arena in which British interests were either won or 
lost and in which Thatcher was determined to win (Young 1998: 345). Significantly 
the issue also demonstrated an underlying scepticism about the European project. 
Skildelsky argues that the Prime Minister was in reality questioning the very 
legitimacy of the Community,
‘The quarrel was embittered by Mrs Thatcher’s view that the Community did 
not need a budget at all (apart from one to support its staff) because no 
continuous cross-border transfers were necessary. Therefore, she concluded, 
the main function of the budget was political -  to provide revenue for a 
European state.’ (1994: 358)
There was evidence that this approach was exacerbated by some of the divisions 
within the Conservative party and the wider political class. The issue outraged Heath 
and led him to write to the Prime Minister outlining his total opposition to any ‘act of
illegality by HM Government affecting the European Community’ (Heath 1998: 699).
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Thatcher was not only at odds with sections of the party during the early period of her 
premiership but also with the pro-European Foreign Office. Owen, Foreign Secretary 
during the Callaghan administration, had found the Foreign Office to be seething with 
Europeanists who considered Britain’s relationship to the Community as their number 
one priority (Owen 1991: 245-8). Lord Hunt of Tamworth expressed the view that 
Thatcher did not see the Foreign Office as ‘one of us’ and ‘tended to feel that the 
Foreign Office was so committed (to Europe) that it wasn’t on our side at all’ (cited 
in Young 1998: 31). Thatcher therefore was pitting herself against those who since 
Macmillan had seen the European Community as central to the modernisation of the 
post-imperial British state.
These tensions within the political elite also reflected differences emerging over 
foreign policy, particularly over the relationship with an increasingly unilateralist 
United States. The rise to power of Reagan in the US reinforced the growing 
hegemony of a New Right conservatism. The implications of this for foreign policy 
were profound as the new administration adopted a unilateralist approach in order to 
re-establish US hegemony that advocated a policy of confrontation (Overbeek 1986: 
20-21). The inclination of the Thatcher administration was to follow this lead was 
clearly demonstrated by the support Britain gave to America when it unilaterally 
decided to attack Libya. The strength of this support was particularly evident during 
the Westland Affair when the Prime Minister supported an American bid for the 
British Helicopter firm over a European consortium. Thatcher made a clear strategic 
choice to support those on the Westland Board whose primary orientations and 
connections were with American financial capital (ibid: 15). The struggles within the 
government over the support for the American bid led to the resignation of Michael 
Heseltine, the Defence Secretary, who later commented about the failed European bid,
‘it is impossible to think of any other country on earth where a defence 
contractor would be sold to a foreign purchaser with the government refusing 
even to allow a discussion about the merits of an alternative solution, led by 
two of its own leading national companies.’ (2000: 312)
The Westland decision was a further attack on those in the political elite who, since 
Macmillan, had believed in the possibility of an Atlantic partnership of equals
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between Europe and the US and saw this as fundamental to the economic 
modernisation and renewal of the post-imperial British state. Such a strategy had been 
outlined by Heseltine as early as 1973 in a speech to the World Affairs Council in 
America:
‘For many years I believed that for Britain and for Europe the arguments led 
overwhelmingly to the conclusion that such were the resources at the 
command of the world’s major powers that we find it increasingly to maintain 
an advanced industrial base unless we moulded together a partnership of 
nations that in total would be the equal of the competition which the world 
will increasingly expose us.’ (Heseltine 2000:149)
Heseltine’s position during the Westland affair reflected a longstanding commitment 
to a distinctive European accumulation strategy that would inevitably involve 
considerable political intervention by European states within the framework of the 
EC. In contrast, Thatcherism implied a profound rejection of such a strategy of overt 
political modernisation in favour of a global free market strategy in co-operation with 
the US. The aggressive pursuit of profit by international financial institutions and 
giant corporations was expressive of the new ascendancy of mobile capital and did not 
require a distinctly European political project. The relationship to the EC that the 
Thatcher governments sought to establish reflected the extent to which European 
policy was conceived as a subordinate part of the British state variant of the U.S. led 
global free market project. Such a position implied a rejection of any broader 
conception of European modernisation beyond economic liberalism. As will be shown 
below, this became particularly evident in the negotiations over the Single European 
Act.
6.6 The Single Market: Thatcherism in Europe?
The decision of the Prime Minister to sign the SEA in 1986 is often viewed as 
inconsistent with the virulence of her later Euroscepticism and opposition to the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Yet the extension and liberalisation of the internal 
European market should be seen as entirely in line with the government’s attempts to 
entrench neo-liberalism as a global hegemonic project. From the British perspective, 
the support for the SEA was part of an accumulation strategy that ended controls on
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the free movement of capital within Europe so that large multinationals could increase 
their flexibility and restore their profits. British European policy was therefore linked 
to the drive to rejuvenate the British economy through a strategy of flexible economic 
modernisation.
In the run up to the negotiations on establishing the single market, national 
governments began to outline their vision of the new Europe, George identifies the 
priority of the Thatcher government as follows:
‘The problem for Britain was to turn the direction of discussion towards the 
practical achievement of a free internal market and away from discussion of 
institutional reform... ’ (1990:177 emphasis mine).
In June 1984 at the Fontainebleau summit, Britain put forward a discussion document 
entitled ‘Europe-The Future’ which outlined a distinctively minimalist and free 
market approach to further integration (ibid: 175). It did call for closer political 
cooperation but made no concessions on the issue of institutional reform. It outlined a 
distinctively pragmatic British conception of Community development that 
emphasised flexibility and policy ‘exits’ (Europe -  the Future 1984).
This British discussion paper received a lukewarm reception and the summit chose to 
pursue the Mitterrand line that had been outlined at the European parliament. 
Following Fontainebleau, the Dooge Committee was set up with a mandate to look 
into the possibility of political unity. The majority on the Committee concluded that 
institutional reform was necessary to achieve these goals (George 1990:178).
The response of the British government was to vigorously oppose the momentum that
was growing for institutional reform. In particular, it sought to defend the veto and
resist the expansion of the powers of the European parliament. In June 1985, Sir
Geoffrey Howe put forward a paper outlining the British counter-position that
suggested the creation of a secretariat for improving foreign policy co-operation and
conceded the possibility of the introduction of majority voting (George 1990:179).
During this period the particular aim of the British government was to prevent an
intergovernmental conference being held. The possibility of an IGC raised the stakes
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of the game as it meant agreement had to be reached on the extent of political 
integration that in the normal running of the Community could be glided over (Ross 
1995: 32). However, the British were out-manoeuvred when the Italian Prime- 
Minister Bettino Craxi called for a vote on an intergovernmental conference which he 
won by a majority of seven to three (George 1990:181-182; Young 1998: 333).
Nevertheless, with the focus primarily on economic integration and with few 
concessions to those who had a more federalist agenda, the eventual outcome of the 
negotiations over the SEA was viewed as a British victory. In her memoirs Thatcher 
remarked that,
‘I was pleased with what had been achieved. We were on course for the Single 
Market by 1992.1 had to make relatively few compromises as regards 
wording; I had surrendered no important interest; I had to place a reservation 
on just one aspect of social policy in the Treaty.’ (1993:555)
To an extent, these claims made by Thatcher were justified in that it was the drive for 
the free movement of capital put forward by Sir Geoffrey Howe that formed the basis 
of the single market project (Gowan 1997:100). The British government went so far 
as to trumpet the SEA as ‘Thatcherism on a European scale’ (Young 1998: 333 Howe 
1995:456). In particular, ministers stressed the benefits that would accrue to the City 
and Britain’s financial service sector in general (Buller 2000a: 83-84). It was 
estimated that one third of GDP growth expected from the single market would be the 
consequence of the expansion of services and the liberalization of financial services 
was a key part of the case for the single market outlined in the Cecchini Report (ibid).
The Single European Act appeared to fit neatly into the Thatcherite free market 
ideology and its programme of flexible economic modernisation. Its was a further 
move in the direction of securing the internationalisation and mulinationalisation of 
the British economy. The limitations placed on political integration resonated with the 
pragmatic British approach to Europe. Moreover, there appeared to be an apparent 
convergence of economic policy across Europe with that of the British Conservative 
party, establishing the British government as a leading player in the 
Community .Wallace and Wallace commented that,
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‘By 1986 only a minority of the radicals of the new right retained their earlier 
suspicions of the European continent, still repeated with diminishing force in 
parliamentary debate after parliamentary debate. The Prime Minister herself 
had become the senior member of the European Council, inheriting the status 
and style of Helmut Schmidt and seeing herself as a central figure in European 
intergovernmental conversations. The confidence with which the British 
government approached these European conversations reflected not only its 
lost fears of the monsters of federalism and corporatism, but also its sense that 
it was carrying the ideological battle onto the European stage, its policies on 
privatization and deregulation being gradually emulated by its continental 
partners in France, in Spain, even in Germany.’ (1990: 98)
Nevertheless, the idea that British elites were drifting towards Europe and letting go 
of an‘instinctive Atlanticism’ remained questionable. Despite the impact of 
globalisation and the continuation of different national trajectories, the states of 
Western Europe continued to embed market mechanisms within a diversity of national 
institutional arrangements that can be traced back to earlier phases of political 
modernisation (Crouch 1993; Hollingsworth and Streeck 1994; Crouch and Streeck 
1997; Hasse and Leiulfsrud 2002). In particular, there was no drive to dismantle 
welfare state regimes or the underlying social contracts that underpinned them 
(Alber 1988: 463; Pierson 1991:173-176; W. Wallace 1997: 38). In contrast, the 
attacks on organised labour undertaken by the Thatcher government indicated the 
extent to which the British economy was becoming globalised in far more extreme 
ways than on the continent. At its core, the approach of the Thatcher government 
remained influenced by developments in the US and, as the Westland affair 
demonstrated, were prepared to align British interests in that direction. The budget 
dispute, the Westland Affair and the SEA indicated a distinctive Thatcherite approach 
to dealing with the Community that reflected a British neo-liberal agenda centred on 
economic globalisation and policy exit. The aim was to employ a European market 
strategy in order to facilitate deregulation while avoiding re-regulation through the 
organisation of Europe as a political space. Thus, while the other member-states were 
moving towards agreement with Delors over the content of the second wave of 
European integration, Britain remained fundamentally at odds with many of its 
underlying principles and emphasis on a European led project of political 
modernisation.
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In essence, the Delors strategy was to use the SEA to create the basis for future 
spillover initiatives and, by playing to Thatcherite neo-liberalism, the British guard 
was lowered sufficiently to enable suggestions of further integration to be put on the 
Community agenda. It is possible that Thatcher therefore underestimated the 
expansionist elements of the SEA because she so firmly believed that her free market 
agenda had been victorious. She says that ‘it was only in the last days of office and 
under my successor that the true scale of the challenge has become clear.?(ibid). Yet 
at the same time she claims to have been aware of the shifts in power that were 
occurring in Europe around the time of the SEA:
‘In the two years of European politicking that led up to the Single European 
Act, I had witnessed a profound shift in how European policy was conducted -  
and therefore in the kind of Europe that was taking shape. A Franco-German 
bloc with its own agenda had re-emerged to set the direction of the 
Community. The European Commission, which had always had a yen for 
centralized power, was now led by a tough, talented European federalist, 
whose philosophy justified centralism.’ (1993: 559)
The underestimation of the extensive nature of the second wave of integration is best 
explained by the fact that European policy remained couched within a broader set of 
global economic and political objectives that obscured the real impact of integration 
(Bulmer 1992: 21). Such an approach followed the post-war Churchillian strategy of 
different spheres of British influence (the USA, the Commonwealth and Europe). This 
was constructed on the continued belief that Britain was able to maintain some kind of 
autonomy in relation to these different spheres and that the West remained 
interdependent. While Thatcherism was expressive of Anglo-Americanism within the 
British state, the danger was that any withdrawal from European developments meant 
losing out on the political resources and economic opportunities that were available in 
the EC and were not forthcoming from other areas (Bulmer 1992:18-19). Not least of 
these was the continued attractiveness of Britain as a centre for international 
investment within the EC and its crucial role in the flexible economic modernisation 
of Britain. The British Europeans’ case for continued and active engagement with the 
processes of European integration remained strong. The mid 1980s therefore 
reflected a large degree of consensus on European policy that reflected long standing
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foreign policy commitments and an emerging neo-liberal hegemony. In this context 
the real tensions between the British state and the second wave of integration 
remained obscured.
These underlying conflicts of interest and identity began to open up as the full 
implications of the Delors project became explicit. In particular, for many hardline 
Thatcherites its emerging programme of political modernisation was viewed as 
fundamentally antithetical to its own programme of neo-liberal reform as well as 
representing a more fundamental attack on the British state and British political 
identity. This was exacerbated by the fracturing of the West as the U.S. began to 
pursue a more unilateralist and nationalist, foreign and economic policy agenda as the 
Cold War came to an end. The underlying and unresolved strategic dilemmas 
concerning the role of the post-imperial British state within the global order began to 
resurface in the form of acute divisions within the governing elite over the 
relationship to the European project. Thatcher herself was central to the emerging 
split in the Conservative party as she increasingly attacked Conservative Europeanism 
as complicit with the Delors project and fundamentally questioned Britain’s post­
imperial European trajectory. As Gamble notes,
‘The depth of the split in the Party was a direct result of Thatcher’s leadership. 
She legitimated opposition to Europe in a way which the leadership had 
hitherto successfully avoided. She suggested that there was an alternative -  
continuing to give priority to Britain’s Atlantic over its European links, 
pursuing an open-seas, open-trade policy, which cultivated Britain’s 
connections with all parts of the world economy, rather than being exclusively 
preoccupied with Europe. She pointed to the trade deficit Britain had with the 
EU and to the location of the bulk of Britain’s overseas investments in 
countries outside the EU. True internationalism, she argued, meant avoiding 
entanglement with a protectionist, inward looking, interventionist, high-cost 
continental economy.’ (Gamble 1995: 23)
Such a position may not have been fully worked out until Thatcher left office but it 
was being devised in collaboration with an inner circle of advisors and supporters 
during her time as Prime Minister. It was the logical extension of the Anglo variant of 
the New Right position that since the 1970s had developed in a symbiotic relationship 
with the conservatism of the Washington consensus. Her commitment to entrenching
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this project within the British state led her into a collision course with other members 
of her government and to a rejection of the European compromises that had been 
central to the Conservative party since Macmillan. It was an attack on the forces of 
conservative modernisation that had viewed accommodation to the European project 
as central to post-imperial restructuring. Initially, these conflicts arose over Britain’s 
participation within the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and the proposals 
for EMU.
6.7 ‘You can’t buck the markets’: Conservative conflicts over the ERM
As we have seen, since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, a major factor in 
economic instability had become fluctuating exchange rates and the considerable 
power that had accrued to the financial markets over monetary policy. The ERM had 
initially been established to counter these developments by locking European 
currencies into a system of exchange rates that were anchored to the Deutschmark. 
Chancellors, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson, were convinced by the merits of 
the system and were concerned about the impact of fluctuating exchange rates was 
having on the British economy (Lawsonl992: 647-657; Stephens 1996: 24-25; Howe 
1998: 111, 448). Bonefield and Burnham argue that the increasing support for ERM 
membership during the 1980s represented Thatcherism by another means. In 
particular, ‘membership of the ERM put pressure on employers to confront workers in 
order to achieve lower labour costs, while capping consumer spending through high 
interests rate’ (1996: 5). It was therefore a way of securing low inflation by 
disciplining the working class while at the same shifting political responsibility onto 
the international arena (ibid: 6). The growing support for ERM membership may not 
have implied an alternative to Thatcherism however it did represent a more reformist 
Thatcherism that supported forms of international economic governance. It was not 
however a position shared by Thatcher herself and these tensions over monetary 
policy evolved into significant splits within the governing elites over the relationship 
between Britain and the world economy.
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The significance of support for ERM membership by those of the governing elite 
within the Thatcher administrations was that it represented a clear break with 
monetarist doctrine. In the 1970s, Thatcher and her colleagues who were influenced 
by New Right ideas had become disciples of monetarism. They believed that the 
British disease of high inflation could be controlled by restricting the amount of 
money in circulation. This had an instinctive appeal to Thatcher who saw ‘no reason 
why the nation’s finances should not be managed on the same basis as those of a 
prudent household or comer shop’ (Stephens 1996: 8). As Bonefield and Burnham 
note:
‘Exchange rate problems and balance of payments deficits were seen as 
pseudo-problems, disguising the real problem of inefficient use of resources 
caused particularly be wage inflation and labour market inflexibility due to 
trade union distortion of labour market self-regulation.’ (1996: 9)
Monetarists therefore believed that if governments concentrated on controlling the 
public spending and removing distortions within the labour market then exchange 
rates would reach an equilibrium. This translated into Conservative government 
policy in 1980 in the form of the Medium Term Financial Strategy drafted by Nigel 
Lawson. This set growth rates for the amount of money circulating in the economy 
known as Sterling M3. The overall aim was to decrease inflationary pressures for pay 
demands within the economy (Stephens 1996:13). However, establishing a reliable 
relationship between the monetary supply and inflation proved unproductive (Buller 
2000b: 321). In particular, this policy was at odds with the liberalisation of the 
financial markets that occurred in 1979 when the government removed the controls on 
foreign exchange transactions and the abolition of internal credit controls (Hutton 
1995: 64-66, Stephens 1996:13-14; Buller 2000b: 321). The impact was to lead to a 
dramatic increase of private debt and a rise in City incomes that precipitated the 
housing boom of the 1980s. The government’s attempts to control public debt and to 
control the money supply made little sense alongside an economy that was being 
expanded by the contingent economic management of the financial sector. The value 
of sterling did not reflect the government’s monetarist targets but the decisions of the 
financial markets. The main instrument available to government to control the 
exchange rate and influence inflation was control of interest rates. When Geoffrey
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Howe raised interest rates in 1981 to counter the devaluation of the pound, it 
represented the beginning of the end for monetarism and a return to fiscal economic 
management (Stephens 1996:24). However, the government continued to set 
unsuccessful monetary targets. A change in direction only occurred in 1985 after 
sterling had been falling for four years. In September, at a meeting of the G5 there 
was an agreement to attempt to stabilise the financial markets. In October, Lawson 
dropped the M3 sterling target (ibid: 46). In a ministerial meeting on 13th November, 
Lawson made the case for membership of the ERM as now the best way of securing 
the government’s anti-inflationary strategy (ibid: 49). This was strongly supported by 
those who attended the meeting (ibid: 49-50). It was a clear move in the direction of 
support for international economic governance as a solution to the problems, of 
domestic economic management and was in line with historical preferences within the 
British state for strong and stable exchange rates (Gamble and Kelly 2000: 7). 
However, it was not supported by Thatcher who, with the advice of Alan Walters and 
Brian Griffiths (head of the No. 10 policy unit) listed a number of objections (ibid: 
50). Thatcher regarded the policy as an abandonment of monetarism as it was no 
longer the control of the money supply that was being made central to maintaining 
economic stability but the exchange rate (1993: 689-690). For her, fixing the 
exchange rate would allow other economic indicators to be ignored for the goal of 
exchange rate stability and the economy could get out of control:
‘The only effective way to control inflation is by using interest rates to control 
the money supply. If, on the contrary, you set interest rates in order to stick to 
a particular exchange rate you are steering by a different and potentially more 
wayward star.’ (1993: 690)
This approach was consistent with a free market philosophy. As she noted, the 
realignments within the ERM were a matter of ‘political horse rather than the 
workings of the market -  and the market does a better job’ (ibid: 693). This position 
not only reflected Thatcher’s opposition to fixed exchange rates, but also her 
reluctance to become embroiled in European forms of economic governance.
Despite Thatcher’s opposition, Lawson began to pursue informal membership of the 
ERM when he introduced a policy of shadowing the Deutschmark as a way out of the
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sterling crisis of 1986 when the value of pound fell by 12.5% (Lawson 1992: 647). 
This crisis occurred-as a consequence of the fall in the price of oil and the 
depreciation in the value of the pound because of the financial markets perception of 
it as a petrocurrency. Lawson’s policy of shadowing the DM and securing the 
Bundesbank’s support for sterling was therefore an attempt to find a European 
solution to this economic crisis. In effect, the underlying strength of the German 
economy and the Deutschmark were being used to stabilise sterling and a volatile 
British economy against the financial markets. The belief was that this could be 
sustained because of the improved competitiveness of the British economy that in turn 
would be helped by a stabilised exchange rate and low inflation. In effect, Lawson 
believed that the markets had got it wrong and exaggerated the continued dependency 
of the British economy on North Sea oil (Lawson 1992: 648-649). This policy of 
shadowing the DM worked and took some pressure off the pound. At this stage it was 
a short-term measure, however in March 1987, after the Louvre Accord when 
agreement was reached by finance ministers to stabilise international exchange rates it 
became policy. A policy shift that Thatcher claimed not to have known anything 
about (1993: 701).
Lawson was clearly pursuing an approach to monetary policy that favoured forms of 
international economic governance as part of the solution to domestic instability and 
can be viewed as a typical strategy of British conservative modernisation. His self 
styled approach to Europe was that of a pragmatist, T am neither a Europhobe, nor a 
Eurofanatic and no wish to ingratiate myself with either group’ (ibid: 912). Yet this 
masks the fact that Lawson was clearly far more influenced by European models of 
political economic development than his leader. Lawson evidently believed that a new 
industrial competitiveness could replace the reliance on North Sea oil revenues and 
this would be underpinned by a stable and competitive exchange rate anchored inside 
the ERM. Stephens notes that,
‘Lawson’s model was West Germany: the Deutschmark had been strong 
throughout the postwar period, but remained competitive because of the 
country’s strong inflation and productivity performance.’ (Stephens 1996: 55)
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It was a position that had been echoed in 1978 when the Conservative party in 
opposition had supported the setting up of the EMS. At the time, Shadow Chancellor, 
Geoffrey Howe told his leader that ‘fundamentally we do believe in the German 
principles of economic management’ (Howe 1998: 111). The dilemma, as we have 
seen in earlier chapters, is that the structure of the British economy was characterised 
by extensive international penetration and a weak domestic industrial base. Between 
1973-92, the rate of growth of capital stock in Britain was lower than in any other 
European country (Northcott 1995: 203). Yet, Britain was also receiving more inward 
investment than any of the others with around 45 % of the total and twice as many 
new plants from the United States and Japan that any other country in Europe (ibid). 
In the context of an increasingly globalised economy, within which capital was 
relatively easily moving in and out of the national economy, the use of the exchange 
rate as a tool of economic management was fundamentally constrained and could not 
prevent currency speculation. Sterling was characterised by short-term fluctuations 
reflecting the volatility of the British economy and long-term decline as a 
consequence of the ending of its role as a world currency. The belief that these 
structural shifts could be resolved by an exchange rate policy was a British delusion. 
The pursuit of a stable pound simply recreated all the problems that governments had 
faced in the post-war period of having to borrow heavily to maintain its value. By the 
1980s the extent of the autonomy of the financial markets made such a policy even 
more difficult95. The growing importance attached to ERM membership as a solution 
to exchange rate instability without a more fundamental restructuring of the British 
economy represented the continuation of a strategy of flawed Europeanism. In the 
wake of the failure of monetarism, it represented a short-term fix up for a rentier 
regime. The pursuit of ERM membership was therefore a return to more orthodox 
politics of economic management designed to accommodate Britain to changes in the 
global economy. It was in this sense a typical policy of conservative modernisation 
but one that could not be consolidated in the context of Thatcherism. For Thatcherites, 
ERM membership reprsented a return to a discredited politics of conservative 
accommodiation to forces that should be resisted in the pursuit of a purer form of neo- 
liberalism.
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6.8 The ERM and the leadership crisis
The period from 1987 to 1990 saw an intensification of economic and political 
problems for the third Conservative administration under Margaret Thatcher’s 
leadership. The expansion of demand that had occurred during 1987 was triggered by 
the deregulation of the financial markets that led to a massive reflation of the 
economy (Hutton 1995: 71). This was further fuelled by cuts in direct taxation. The 
economy quickly overheated and in 1989 it began to enter recession. There was a 
record balance of payments deficit, rising inflation and two million unemployed (ibid: 
218). A consequent rise of interest rates to counter inflation saw them reach 15 % by 
May 1989. In effect the globalisation of the British economy had been pursued 
without any broader strategy designed to support the domestic economy and maintain 
long term stability. In summary, the tensions over the ERM not only represented the 
confusion at the heart of government economic policy as the underlying vulnerability 
of the economy was exposed, but also the deeper tensions surrounding the politics of 
modernisation in Britain.
Hay refers to the re-emerging crisis of the British state during this period as a crisis of 
‘under-load -  of an under-extended, retrenched and debilitated state’ (1999: 71). In 
particular, the intensification of the European struggle was evidence of an emerging 
Thatcherite revisionism within both the Conservative and Labour parties that was 
responding to the weaknesses apparent in Thatcherism’s failure to address entrenched 
problems. Thus, the EC increasingly offered political opportunities, particularly as a 
new structure of economic governance, at a time when the weaknesses of Thatcherism 
as a strategy of political modernisation had been exposed. Even those sceptical about 
Europe found it hard to turn their back on the EU as Thatcher and her more ardent 
supporters were prepared to do.
Predictably, as the economic indicators worsened, Thatcher came under increasing
pressure to join the ERM. By this time the Labour party had also dropped its
opposition to the European Community and its European policy centred around
membership of the ERM and emerging support for the Delors Report. With ERM
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membership now linked to EMU, the conflict over European integration increasingly 
became the issue around which the parameters of the Thatcherite settlement were to 
be contested. Thatcher’s opposition to ERM membership was hardened by the Delors 
Report that saw entry into the ERM as stage one of EMU. Signficantly, Thatcher 
linked British ERM membership to a broader European project designed to bring 
about political integration:
‘The ERM was seen by the European Commission and others as a path to 
EMU -  and this subtly changed die former’s purpose. But EMU itself -  which 
involves the loss of the power to issue your own currency and acceptance of 
one European currency, one central bank and one set of interest rates -  means 
the end of a country’s economic independence thus the increasing irrelevance 
of its parliamentary democracy. Control of its economy is transferred from the 
elected government answerable to Parliament and the electorate, to 
unaccountable supra-national institutions.’ (1993: 691)
By linking ERM membership to participation in European political union, Thatcher 
set herself apart from the pragmatic Europeanism of Howe and Lawson and opened 
up a strategic split in the Thatcherite governing elite. Despite the fact that Lawson 
shared Thatcher’s opposition to EMU96 she believed that his policy of shadowing the 
DM had ‘so undermined confidence in my government that EMU was brought so 
much nearer’ (ibid). In May, Thatcher publicly blamed Lawson’s policy of shadowing 
the DM for the rising inflation seen during the late 1980s (ibid: 919, Thatcher 1993: 
710). After the June election in 1989, Lawson continued to press for membership of 
the ERM and responding to questions in a House of Commons Select Committee on 
the Delors Report responded that,
‘It would reduce rate fluctuation and we would be able to use it to assist us in 
our anti-inflationary policy.’ (Lawson 1992: 923)
The matter came to a head in the immediate run up to the Madrid Council in June 
1989. During the weeks beforehand, Lawson and Howe attempted to get Thatcher to 
commit to a policy that would see British entry into the ERM by the end of 1992.
They also wanted commitment on moves towards EMU while arguing that there 
would be no moves towards stage three ‘until further work was done on what it 
entailed, including notably its political implications’ (ibid: 929). Thatcher responded
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with a number of reasons for delaying even further Britain’s entry into the ERM for 
four years or more based on a number of conditions outlined to her by her economic 
advisor Alan Walters (Thatcher 1993:709). At their second meeting with Thatcher 
on 25th June, Thatcher again refused to adopt a specific date for entry to the ERM and 
instead said she would continue to pursue a policy of ‘when the time is right’ based on 
the Walter’s conditions. The meeting ended with both Howe and Lawson threatening 
to resign (Lawson 1992:933). Clearly, a profound split had emerged in the governing 
elite that forced the Prime Minister to take a more conciliatory tone at the Madrid 
Council. However, the consequence of the deterioration in the relations between 
Thatcher and Howe in the run up to the Madrid summit led to his dismissal from the 
foreign office and to him becoming a detached Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of 
the House. Nor were the relations between Lawson and Thatcher to improve. When 
the pound began to fall during 1989, Lawson found that his policy of trying to hold its 
value against the ‘psychologically important’ DM3 level was undermined by the 
increasingly public pronoucements of Thatcher and Walter’s that the pound ‘should 
find its own level’ (Lawson 1992: 949-950). Eventually, Lawson considered his 
position as being more and more undermined and eventually resigned when Thatcher 
refused to consider getting rid of Walters as her economic advisor.
Stephens points out that when Thatcher refused to consider entry into the ERM in
1985, it was the only time during her premiership when she stood alone against the
will of her most senior ministers on a crucial aspect of policy (1996:51). She not only
held out against the advice of her top ministers but undermined them by looking to
personal advisors. It was a radical assertion of the powers of the Prime Minister’s
office and the clique of supporters and advisors who constituted it. Her position
hardened further when the ERM became linked to EMU in the Delors Report. What
this resolute approach of the Prime Minister represented was a defence of a particular
model of the international economic order against those moves towards more
European regulation. Nevertheless, outside of the ERM did not mean a British
government could pursue an independent monetary policy but that its policy was to
continue to be dictated by international financial markets and the Washington
consensus. It was the global neo-liberalism of the latter that Thatcher was defending
against the emerging European alternative to global governance. It led her into a
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direct attack on the legitimacy of Europeanism within the Conservative party and the 
British state as a whole. It was powerful evidence of the continued fragility of the 
Europeanisation of the British state and further evidence of the failure to embed 
membership of the EC/EU as a project of post-imperial political modernisation.
6.9 Anti-Europeanism and renewing Thatcherism
For Thatcher, engagement with an increasingly organised European political order 
became diametrically opposed to a political project that was rooted in a neo-liberal 
Anglo-American nationalism. European integration was once again constituted as the 
‘other’ of a British political order. This split the coalition within the Conservative 
party between radical and reformist Thatcherites. In Thatcher’s critique of the second 
wave of integration during the period, lay the foundation for a revived Euroscepticism 
that became entrenched within the national political discourse. While it was criticised 
by the wider governing elite and led to Thatcher’s eventual downfall, it can be seen as 
a profound attack on Europeanism from within the state that contributed to the 
consolidation of a neo-Thatcherite approach to European integration within the British 
state. The underlying opposition to European integration, that had been evident since 
the 1950s and reflected British ‘exceptionalism’, was powerfully reasserted as a 
populist ideological discourse. The strategy was to try and secure enough popular 
support to enable the break to be made with Europeanism and its supporters to be 
sidelined. This was particularly expressed in the increasingly public conflict between 
Thatcher and Delors.
Thatcher’s concerns about the direction of the Community had been confirmed by the 
launching of proposals for a European social space to be formalised in a European 
Social Charter. This was rejected by Thatcher at the Madrid summit and the British 
government went on to obstruct any proposals coming out of the Community’s Social 
Action Programme that followed the signing of the Charter. Delors had chosen the 
British TUC conference of 1988 to outline a vision of a social Europe:
‘The internal market should be designed to benefit each and every citizen of
the Community. It is therefore necessary to improve worker’s living and
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working conditions, and to provide better protection for their health and safety 
at work.’ (cited in George 1990:193)
Before this speech he told the European parliament that within ten years 80 % of 
economic and possibly fiscal and social legislation would be coming from Brussels. In 
her memoirs, Thatcher describes her growing distrust of Delors and his 
‘expansionist’ aims and her belief that this would not be acceptable to the British 
people. In her memoirs she refers to her decision to oppose integration:
‘By the summer of 1988 he (Delors) had altogether slipped his leash as a 
functionnaire and become a fully fledged political spokesman for federalism. 
The blurring of the roles of civil servants and elected representatives was more 
in the continental tradition than in ours. It proceeded from the widespread 
distrust which their voters had for politicians in countries like France and Italy. 
That same distrust also fuelled the federalist express. If you have no real 
confidence in the political system or political leaders of your own country you 
are bound to be more tolerant of foreigners of manifest intelligence, ability and 
integrity like M.Delors telling you how to run your affairs. Or to put it more 
bluntly, if I were Italian I might prefer rule from Brussels too. But the mood in 
Britain was different. I sensed it. More than that, I shared it and I decided that 
the time had come to strike out against what I saw as the erosion democracy 
by centralisation and bureaucracy, and to set out an alternative view of 
Europe’s future’ (1993: 742)
Here we see Thatcher appealing directly to public opinion and her sense of its mood 
to legitimate her growing opposition to European integration. In the summer of 1988, 
she commissioned a paper from an official which spelt out to her how the 
Commission was ‘pushing forward the frontiers of its competence’ and had 
‘misemployed treaty articles’ in order to get directives past under qualified majority 
voting (1993:743). She went on to ask:
‘Were British democracy, parliamentary sovereignty, the common law, our 
traditional sense of fairness, our ability to run our own affairs in our own way 
to be subordinated to the demands of a remote European bureaucracy, resting 
on very different traditions? I had by now heard about as much of the 
European ‘ideal’ as I could take; I suspected that many others had too. In the 
name of this ideal, waste, corruption and abuse of power were reaching levels 
which no one who supported, as I had done, entry to the European Economic 
Community could have seen. Because Britain was the most stable and 
developed democracy in Europe we had perhaps the most to lose from these 
developments.’ (1993: 743-44)
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Thatcher rounded on Delors and his conception of the Community in a speech at 
Bruges delivered in September. This came only weeks after Delors had addressed the 
TUC and outlined an alternative vision of a Europe of nation-states:
‘Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, 
approaching each other more, doing more together, but relishing our national 
identity no less than our common European endeavour. Let us have a Europe 
which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward not inward, 
and which preserves that Atlantic Community-that Europe on both sides of the 
Atlantic -  which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength.’ (ibid: 
745)
This speech indicated that Thatcher believed that Europe was more than an economic 
area but she saw it as a defender of freedom within an ‘Atlantic Community’ (Young 
1998: 357). This speech was not the basis for a new strategy towards European 
integration that could find favour across the member-states but was designed as an 
attack on those ‘enemies of freedom’ she had identified in the Community:
‘We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only 
to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super-state 
exercising a new dominance from Brussels.’ (1993: 744-745)
This was a far from a veiled attack on the Commission and the centralising French 
socialist who headed it. But the Commission was not the only target. A draft of the 
speech, which the foreign office insisted was toned down, had also contained a 
reference to Britain having saved Europe from being united ‘under Prussian 
domination’ and Britain as the only successful European imperial power (Young 
1998: 348). A strong element of Thatcher’s growing Euro-scepticism and the basis 
for mobilising against the Community was to do with her distrust of Germany.
During the Sterling crisis of 1986 when the Bundesbank had refused to directly 
support Sterling, Lawson recollected Thatcher’s reaction as follows:
‘She was furious that the Germans were not being more helpful, and went into 
her gut anti-German mode, which was never far from below the surface.’ 
(Lawson 1992: 656)
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In particular, it was the Bruges speech that marked the clear break with Europeanists 
within the party and the beginning of the public mobilisation of the Eurosceptics 
within the Conservative party. It was a powerful and populist reassertion of the strong 
state/free economy position and of Atlanticism. This speech contained a number of 
themes that were to be replayed by Eurosceptics in their opposition to further British 
involvement in the integrationist project in the 1990s and beyond. It was constructed 
around a number of oppositions between Britain and the EC/EU. They included 
European bureaucracy and political formalism versus British pragmatism and 
democracy; British free trade liberalism versus European protectionism; British 
globalism versus narrow Europeanism; British political stability versus European 
instability. By presenting the project of European integration as fundamentally 
antithetical to British national interests and identities, Thatcher had taken on the 
mantle of Powell. It was however an attack on the Delors project to reorganise Europe 
as a politico- economic space and a defence of Britain’s own particular response to 
globalisation. It was a populist ideological expression of British exceptionalism 
directed against the forces of accommodation to European integration.
The combination of a Europe economically dominated by Germany and an 
expansionist Commission headed by a French Catholic socialist meant that for 
Thatcher and Eurosceptic forces the second wave of integration became seen as 
Fanco-German state building. These fears were exacerbated by proposals for German 
unification in the wake of the fall of the Berlin wall, a development that Thatcher 
opposed. The moves towards greater European integration were increasingly 
constituted as the most fundamental threat to the British state and British political 
identity. While the Heath government had seen Europe as the only way back to some 
sort of power in the world, Thatcher could claim to have achieved this by reasserting 
the Anglo-American alliance. She had put herself at the centre of super power 
relations and asserted a British commitment to a leadership role in the world system. 
George maintains that many of Thatcher’s fears concerning the 1992 project reflected 
her belief in the importance of US leadership (1996: 35).
This attempt to forge a populist anti-Europeanism became obvious in the run up to the 
1989 European elections:
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‘The overall strategy was simple. It was to bring Conservative voters -  so 
many of whom were thoroughly disillusioned with the Community -  out to 
vote.’ (Thatcher 1993: 749)
Lawson described the campaign, under Thatcher’s instructions, as a crude and 
embarrassing anti-Europeanism that was encapsulated in the poster ‘Do you want to 
live on a diet of Brussels?’ (Lawson 1992: 922). He records his growing awareness of 
Thatcher’s strategy:
‘I suddenly realised, with a shiver of apprehension, that she saw the Euro- 
campaign as a trial run for the next general election campaign; and that, with 
the short term economic outlook unpromising, she saw a crude populist anti- 
Europeanism as her winning strategy.’ (ibid)
The campaign further opened up the splits in the party, Thatcher complained of the 
‘Heathism’ of many Conservative MEP’s who were at odds with her anti-European 
line and undermined the campaign (Thatcher 1993: 749 Lawson 1992: 922). These 
splits were clearly evident with the formation of the Bruges Group and parliamentary 
‘Friends of Bruges’ formed in February 1989 to support the Thatcherite line. The 
Conservative press and the pro-Labour Daily Mirror also supported a revival of anti- 
Europeanism that culminated in a series of attacks on Jacques Delors in The Sun 
during 1990 (Wilkes and Wring 1998:197). Meanwhile, during the campaign Heath 
launched attacks on Thatcher in Brussels and in the media (George 1994: 215; Heath 
1998: 710). The message was that Britain would be left behind and become a second- 
class member of the Community. A similar warning came from Michael Heseltine in 
his book on Britain and Europe published in May 1989 (George 1994: 215). The 
result of the election was that the Conservative share of the vote dropped from 40.8% 
to 34.7%. In contrast to the Conservatives, the Labour party pursued its most unified 
pro-European campaign in its history. The possibility seemed to emerge of a 
revisionist Thatcherism centred around a renewed coalition of committed and 
pragmatic Europeans within the governing elite. This implied a return to the politics 
of conservative modernisation and opposition to the reactionary fervour of Thatcherite 
neo-liberalism.
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6.10 The end of Thatcher
As we have seen with the resignation of the Lawson and the demotion of Howe, 
Thatcher’s position had been severely weakened and the alliance of Hurd and Major 
brought about ERM membership. Hurd, was a classic Tory European, he was as 
Young says ‘a Foreign Office man to his roots: trained there as an embryonic 
mandarin, embraced there as Heath’s private secretary when the 1971 negotiation 
took place’ (1998:362). Major was ‘to all appearances a Thatcherite’ (ibid: 363) but 
his views on Europe took shape while Foreign Secretary and Chancellor. While at the 
Foreign Office he became more positive about the European Union and began to 
develop friendly relationships with European politicians (Seldon 1998:95). In a 
speech to the Conservative party conference in October 1989 he restated Britain’s 
commitment to membership of the Community and in private he expressed 
reservations about Thatcher’s oppositional line (ibid). As Chancellor, he was 
committed to membership of the ERM as the only way of countering inflation (Major 
1999:138). A more traditional conservative position on Europe was therefore being 
re-asserted within the governing elite contra the Thatcherite attack.
When, in summer of 1990, Thatcher lost Nicholas Ridley from the Cabinet because of 
his anti-German comments in the Spectator magazine97 she lost what she referred to 
as ‘almost my only ally in the Cabinet’ (Thatcher 1993: 722). When John Major 
replaced Lawson as Chancellor her position was so weakened that she was unable to 
hold out any longer against membership and Britain eventually joined on the 5th 
October 1990:
‘Although the terms that I had laid down had not been met, I had too few allies
to continue to resist and win the day.’ (Thatcher 1993:722)
However, Thatcher’s Euro-scepticism had not abated and was on display at the Rome 
summit in the same month. She attacked the plans for economic and monetary union 
as ‘cloud-cuckoo land’ and promised to block things that were not in British interest 
(Young 1998: 367). On her statement to the Commons she rouded on Delors and the
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Commission referring to it as trying to ‘extinguish democracy’ and create a federal 
Europe:
‘No...no...no,’ she bawled, her eye seemingly directed to the fields and seas, 
the hills and the landing grounds, where the island people would never 
surrender.’ (ibid: 368)
It was at this point that Geoffrey Howe made his decision to resign, and his 
resignation speech that followed secured Thatcher’s downfall. This speech was a 
powerful defence of the Tory Europeanism of Macmillan and Heath. He referred to 
the necessity of facing the ‘realities of power’ as Macmillan had done and not to 
‘retreat into a ghetto of sentimentality about our past.’ (House of Commons Debate 
[H.C.Deb.] Vol. 180. Col. 2,461-465 13th November 1990). It succintly defended this 
political project and portrayed Thatcher as its enemy:
‘The tragedy is -  as it is for me personally, for my party, for our whole people 
and for my right hon. Friend herself a very real tragedy -  that the Prime 
Minister’s perceived attitude towards Europe is running an increasingly 
serious risk for the future of our nation. It risks minimising our influence and 
maximising our chance of being once again shut out. We have paid heavily in 
the past for late starts and squandered opportunities in Europe. We dare not let 
it happen again. If we detach ourselves completely, as a party or a nation, from 
the middle ground of Europe, the effects will be incalculable and very hard to 
correct.’ (ibid)
Howe argued that the Community should be seen ‘as an active process which we can 
shape, often decisively, provided that we allow ourselves to be fully engaged in it 
with confidence, with enthusiasm and in good faith’ (ibid). In contrast he referred to 
Thatcher as viewing the continent as ‘teeming with ill-intentioned people, scheming, 
in her words to ‘extinguish democracy’ (ibid).
Howe’s speech was a powerful reassertion of Conservative Europeanism that 
emphasised the negative consequences of becoming marginalized from European 
developments. Howe defended the ‘middle way’ which was neither a Federal Europe 
nor a Europe of sovereign nation-states (ibid). Thatcher’s view that there were only 
these polar opposite positions, he termed ‘a false antithesis, a bogus dilemma’ (ibid).
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It was a characteristic expression of British pragmatic conservative modernisation 
through engagement with European integration. While it harked back to the past, it 
was also suggestive of the continuation of the Thatcherite policy developed in relation 
to the single market that Howe had played such a crucial part in negotiating. For 
Howe, the EC was arena in which Britain could pursue its neo-liberal agenda and 
‘maximise its sovereign power’ (Howe 1990: 687) within an increasingly 
interdependent world. It was an attack on Thatcher’s ideologically populist and 
aggressive assertion of British exceptionalism in relation to European integration. 
However, from the perspective of Thatcherite Euroscepticism it was clearly viewed as 
complicit with the Delors agenda.
Howe’s speech confirmed to many Tory MPs that Thatcher was now too out of step 
with the mainstream. While many publicly supported her nationalistic stance at time 
of economic and political uncertainty, they were not prepared to support her (Young 
1998: 369). The first challenge to her leadership came from Sir Anthony Meyer in 
1989 whose motivations were directly related to Thatcher’s anti-Europeanism (ibid: 
370). He received sixty votes indicating that her leadership was weakened. However, 
it was Michael Heseltine’s challenge that emerged after Howe’s resignation speech 
that finally brought her downfall. At this stage, as John Major recalls, ‘the backbench 
rats began to desert the Prime Minister’ and ‘malcontents stalked the parliamentary 
lobbies’ (1999:179). Heseltine succeeded in achieving 152 votes to Thatcher’s 204 
forcing a second ballot. This was to be the fatal wound that destroyed her political 
authority and led to her resignation.
The question arises of what were the implications of Thatcher’s defeat at the hands of 
Conservative Europeans? How far did it imply a fundamental shift in a post- 
Thatcherite direction?
6.11 What kind of a victory?
The splits in the leadership and the party over the ERM and EMU represented
fundamental strategic divisions within the Conservative party (Baker et al 1993).
Since the end of the 1970s, Britain had been on a particular trajectory that emphasised
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the defence of the traditional unitary state as well as a particular form of flexible 
economic modernisation that prioritised a global free market strategy. European 
policy had been subordinated within these wider objectives of a reactionary neo­
liberalism. In contrast, continuing to engage with the process of integration, as many 
pro-Europeans claimed was essential, potentially compromised this trajectory as the 
British political order became further integrated within a European regulatory regime.
The choices regarding the nature of post-imperial dependence determined the overall 
trajectory and structure of the British political order. The question arises as to whether 
the downfall of Thatcher represented a fundamental shift away from a neo-liberal 
Anglo-American trajectory in favour of a politically integrated Europe. Were these 
strategic choices clearly articulated within the factions of the Conservative party? It is 
my contention that to answer this question in the affirmative is to understate the 
significance of the Thatcherite settlement and the complexity of the divisions within 
the political class over European integration and politics of modernisation. The 
Thatcher years had entrenched British dependence on the United States and partially 
resolved the problems of economic modernisation through the assertion of a strategy 
of flexible globalisation. In so doing, ‘a rentier class was bom again through 
rebuilding very large portfolio investments in North America and in other parts of the 
non-European world’ (Gowan 1997:102). These economic arguments were becoming 
central to the emerging anti-European Thatcherite position and were articulated by 
Thatcher herself, once out of office:
4... .the European Community’s relative importance as regards both world 
trade and Britain’s global trading opportunities is diminishing and will 
continue to diminish. Our politicians should become less concerned with 
European markets, whose most dramatic expansion has probably been 
achieved and more interested in the new opportunities emerging in the Far 
East, Latin America and the North American Free Trade Area. The disposition 
of Britain’s massive portfolio of overseas assets -  over £1,300 billion in 1993 
-  provides an insight into the judegement of the private sector on this question: 
over 80% % are held in countries outside the EC, and the proportion in the 
merging markets is expanding vigorously. The share of our total trade with 
countries outside the EC, and particularly with the Pacific Rim, is increasing 
and will continue to do so.’ (Thatcher 1995: 498)
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The assertion of flexible accumulation in Britain provided the basis for a populist 
renewal of a reactionary British exceptionalism. Thatcherites therefore felt 
increasingly justified in defining and constituting the British politico-economic order 
as distinct from much of continental Europe. Further moves in the direction of an 
integrated Europe were therefore considered to have major domestic political costs. 
This was made explicit in the attempts to renew Thatcherism by an anti-European 
campaign of political mobilisation. The dilemma, as key sections of the political class 
recognised, was that for a post-imperial politico-economic order dependent on its 
wider regional and global relations and with a volatile economy, the opportunities 
opened up by European integration could not be ignored. The dilemma was that this 
implied a return to the politics of conservative modernisation that Thatcherism had 
rejected.
While the removal of Thatcher indicated that a new cross party consensus appeared
possible on European policy, the election of the right wing pragmatist, John Major, to
the leadership of the Conservative party instead of Michael Heseltine reflected the
support within the party for the Thatcherite settlement. Major was viewed as a party
manager whose role was clearly to unite the various factions and constitute a viable
European policy. A Heseltine victory would have brought the party ‘much nearer to a
fatal split on Europe’ (Turner 2000:136). However, with the support of a pro-
European Labour party and in the context of a less sceptical public opinion, it may
also have resulted in the most significant shift towards the EC and European
integration that had been seen since the Heath government. Indeed, in combination
with a radicalised regional and industrial policy, it may have been the basis for a more
profound British Europeanisation. In contrast, the election of Major was therefore
primarily about the consolidation of the Thatcherite settlement and with it the
reproduction of the contemporary form of British exceptionalism that this implied.
This was most clearly seen in Major’s strategic decision to try and keep the right of
the party on board in key policy decisions. As we will see in Chapter 7, the attempt to
square this with a viable European policy that could positively engage with the second
wave of European integration created a distinctive and unresolved European crisis for
the Conservative party and British state. The differences over Europe opened up
across the political class and became a source of political mobilisation, creating
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divisions and splits that could not be contained by the governing elite. This 
represented the full manifestation of the chronic divisions within the Conservative 
party over the politics of modernisation.
6.12 Conclusion: the emerging European crisis of the British state
We have seen that Thatcherism fundamentally challenged the idea of conservative 
modernisation that surrounded Britain’s relationship to the EC/EU. This represented 
a populist reassertion of a reactionary British exceptionalism that located British 
interests and identity in a purified conception of the global market society. 
Consequently, European policy was conceived in terms of economic liberalisation and 
the negotiation of policy exits became the defining feature of a British European 
strategy. Thatcherism, however, reduced political problems to those of the market 
and state domination. The chronic instability of such a project for establishing stable 
government in the complexity of late modernity suggested that European ‘options’ 
and ‘opportunities’ could not be erased completely from British political agendas. 
However, any constructive engagement with European integration was compromised 
by Thatcherism and the underlying British opposition to political modernisation. In 
Chapter 7 it is clear that the Major governments could only adopt contradictory and 
unstable positions on European integration that gave rise to attacks on the governing 
elite and resulted in a significant European crisis for the British state.
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Chapter Seven 
The European Crisis of the British State 1990-1994
John Major was elected to the leadership of the Conservative party to resolve the 
crisis of Thatcherism. This crisis was evidenced by an economic recession, growing 
electoral unpopularity for the Conservatives and the unease within the party over 
European integration. In forging a post-Thatcher agenda, the government set itself the 
task of rebuilding relationships on the continent and re-engaging with the second 
wave of integration. A new constructive European policy, including a commitment to 
ERM membership, was to be a central plank of the Major administration’s governing 
agenda. Nevertheless, this new approach remained distinctly Thatcherite in terms of 
its commitment to neo-liberal policies and a strong, centralised state. The attempt to 
incorporate Europeanism into what was primarily a neo-Thatcherite agenda proved 
fundamentally flawed and completely derailed the Major government. It soon became 
clear that such a course of action was disastrous for the government and triggered a 
distinct European crisis for the British state. This crisis emerged in the form of the 
humiliating ejection of sterling from the ERM. In addition there was an extraordinary 
attack on the governing elite by Eurosceptic forces during the attempts to ratify the 
Maastricht Treaty. In this chapter I explore the unfolding of this crisis, its aftermath 
and its implications for the arguments developed in the course of this thesis. I shall 
show that these events are central to understanding the problematic trajectory of the 
British state, demonstrating as they do the chronic continuation of the structural 
constraints on the development British European policy in the early 1990s.
7.1 Majorism: the missing political strategy
‘Majorism’ did not exist as a distinct political project but was primarily an attempt to
consolidate the Thatcher legacy (Marquand 1991: 41; Riddell 1992: 428-429; Hay
1996a: 163; Seldon 1998: 742-743). Nevertheless, a key reason for the electoral
success of the Conservative party in 1992 was that it presented itself as less
ideologically doctrinaire than it had been during the 1980s. It was more in line with
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the One Nation tradition that had served the party so well under mass democracy. 
Indeed, a key feature of the Major administration was a commitment to protecting and 
improving public service provision and this justified increases in public expenditure. 
The intellectual force behind this new focus was Chris Patten, Chairman of the 
Conservative party (1990-1992), who advocated a social market philosophy along the 
lines of the German Christian Democrats (Riddell 1992: 427). Alongside Patten, 
David Willetts attempted to articulate modem conservatism as a combination of 
Thatcherite free trade radicalism and a belief in community that was rooted in a long 
tradition of conservative nation building:
‘This preoccupation with linking communities and markets is part of a 
continuing Conservative concern with national integration. Disraeli’s two 
nations, Salisbury’s fears of national disintegration, the One Nation Group, 
John Major’s opportunity society -  all address the question of how to ensure 
that all British citizens feel that they participate in national life’ (1992: 420)
Initially, therefore the Major administration looked to a more inclusive conservatism 
in order to distinguish its policy agenda. Major’s apparently emollient and 
conciliatory nature seemed to fit with this mood and was important in securing his 
leadership bid. Nevertheless, this was clearly not a radical agenda for political 
modernisation but a pragmatic Thatcherism tempered by English social liberalism. 
Noting the underlying vacuity of this strategy, Marquand commented:
‘The end of Thatcherism has, however, left a vacuum which nobody had yet 
mshed in to fill. Majorism is not a project in the sense that Thatcherism was a 
project. It is a sort of ragout of old style Tory paternalism and new-style 
Thatcherite entrepreneurialism, laced with upward social mobility and 
palpable personal decency of its author. It may suffice to win the 
Conservatives the next election, though that looks less likely that it did a year 
ago. There is no evidence that it offers any solution whatever -  good, bad or 
indifferent -  to the long-drawn-out crisis of maladaptation which grips the 
British state.’ (1991: 41)
Thus, none of the modernisation deficits of the British state were being addressed by 
the emerging post-Thatcher political agenda. The ideological dominance of 
Thatcherism left little room for creative political agency. This became increasingly 
evident once the Major governments became preoccupied with party unity and
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abandoned attempts to construct an intellectually coherent project along the lines that 
Patten had envisaged.
In particular, the Major government remained strongly attached to a traditional 
conception of British parliamentary sovereignty and it did not consider redrawing the 
existing constitutional settlement. Apart from Northern Ireland, the sensitive and 
contentious position of the non-English nations were ignored. Crucially, the 
decentralisation of state functions that was evident in other European states, and the 
devolution of power to other political authorities remained problematic with a 
governing consensus that continued to support centralised state power. There was no 
resolution of what Hirst had referred to as the ‘constitutional crisis’ that continued to 
challenge Britain’s homogeneity as a nation-state (1989: 40).
While the organisation of political authority across European states became more 
decentralised and neo-corporatist (Crook et al 199: 97-104; Offe 1996: 65), what was 
notable about the British case was the extent to which this was primarily associated 
with privatisation and marketisation of state functions (Crook et al: 99). The emphasis 
the strong state remained but was combined with an extensive application of free 
market principles across a range of sectors. A programme of privatisation was 
continued in the areas of coal (1994) and rail (1996-7). There was a radical shake up 
of Whitehall with the extension of compulsory competitive tendering and contracting 
out to central government (Riddell 1992: 428). Thatcherite welfare reforms were 
continued such as the opting out of schools from local authority control and the 
extension of the quasi-market in the health sector. While the government began to 
grapple with the politics of the welfare state, it did so by reinforcing the status of the 
individual consumer in the shape of proposals such as the Citizens Charter. 
Increasingly, the power of centralised government combined with the language of 
consumerism was used to justify increased surveillance over public services and the 
intensification of the ‘audit culture’. The key focus here was on finding performance 
indicators for the producers of public goods and to maximise efficiency and 
competitiveness. The Major governments extended the strategy of economic 
modernisation to cover a range of state functions and agencies.
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This programme was underpinned after 1993 by economic policies designed to ensure 
British economic stability once ERM membership and EMU membership had been 
ruled out. Kenneth Clarke, as Chancellor, put in place a more transparent process of 
decision making which gave increased power to the Bank of England in the setting of 
interest rates (Stephens 1996: 292-293). This underlined a shift towards a more 
general focus on domestic economic stability, over any artificial focus on the 
exchange rates. As such, it represented a significant modernisation of the institutional 
infrastructure of domestic policy and laid the basis for the impressive macro- 
economic performance between 1993-199998 (Gamble and Kelly 2000:19). These 
were, however, national reforms occurring in the absence of participation in EMU.
In the wake of the crisis of Thatcherism at the beginning of the 1990s which was 
generated by the rapid processes of deregulation (or market based re-regulation) and 
the conflicts over European policy, the Major government began to look for primarily 
national ways of securing economic stability. These developments however continued 
to imply an exceptional trajectory for the British state during the 1990s. The losses of 
power faced by organised labour in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s meant that 
Britain was not going to engage in the kinds of modification of institutionalised class 
compromises that other European states began to embark on (Grote and Schmitter 
1999; Rhodes 2000:162-163). Despite the reform of the institutions of monetary 
policy, the emphasis on economic stability did not represent any commitment to a 
longer term industrial strategy. Indeed fixed investment per year in manufacturing in 
Britain in 1992-94 as lower than in 1961-73 while imports had reached 33 % by 1990 
compared to 21 % in 1970 (Northcott 1995: 202-203). In comparison, by 1994 
London accounted for 44 % of European equity markets which represented three 
times as much as Paris or Frankfurt (ibid: 202). The emphasis continued to be 
conceived in terms of the stability and attractiveness of Britain for mobile capital and 
largely at the expense of social cohesion and long term economic stability (Hirst and 
Thompson 2000: 354).
It was in the area of European policy that the Major government faced its severest test
when it attempted to move beyond the increasingly Eurosceptic agenda set out by the
former Prime Minister. Initially, the Major government saw its commitment to the
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ERM and to a more constructive European policy as the basis for distinguishing it 
from the later Thatcher governments and as part of a bid to revive electoral fortunes 
and outflank an increasingly pro-European Labour party. Yet, Major’s attempt to 
stake the national prestige of the government on a revived Europeanism proved to be 
an unmitigated disaster that split the Conservative party, possibly with fatal 
consequences, and destroyed the credibility of the government. While it might be 
argued that this was a product of a particular set of circumstances, it was the way in 
which these events reinforced and made manifest underlying structural contradictions 
between the British state and European integration that concerns us here. It was a 
continued manifestation of the post-imperial rearticulation of British exceptionalism, 
in terms of both political interests and identities.
The three key factors that emerged during the period of 1990-1993 which undermined 
the government’s policy, were indicative of the British state’s inability to engage with 
European political modernisation and, for that matter, political modernisation per se. 
Firstly, the government’s policy proved completely at odds with the extensive nature 
of the second wave of European integration. Bulpitt notes that froml988 the 
Community could no longer be confined to,
‘a common external tariff, the CAP, and internal tariff reductions -  EFTA with 
knobs on. On this level the Community threatened to become an ‘association’ 
possessing that capacity for continuous, comprehensive and public penetration 
of British governing, which, Conservative leaders had always tried to avoid.’ 
(1992: 266)
The government’s claim that the Maastricht negotiations were a British victory and
the extensiveness of integration could be contained, proved completely unsustainable.
Additionally, the emerging problems of legitimating Maastricht meant that the British
government was faced with publicly defending a project in which they were reluctant
participants. Secondly, the government’s attempt to craft a European monetary policy
based on membership of the ERM proved unsustainable in the context of a classic
British recession that demonstrated continued weaknesses in the domestic economy.
Furthermore, the government’s reaction after ERM withdrawal was to further
undermine the possibility of participation in EMU and to advocate national solutions
to monetary problems. Finally, and most significantly, these two developments
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exacerbated and provoked a comprehensive Eurosceptic mobilisation, particularly on 
the right of the Conservative party, that launched one of the most devastating attacks 
on a British government in the twentieth century. The combination of these three 
factors was to further distance the government from European developments and push 
it towards developing a more explicitly neo-Thatcherite approach to the European 
Union. Thus, the unfolding of events within a powerful structural logic led to a 
profound reassertion of the ideological, political and economic tensions in British 
state’s relationship to the European Union. It is to the history of this European crisis 
of the British state between 1990-1993 that I now turn.
12  ‘At the heart of Europe’
The conditions in the country in 1990-1991 appeared favourable to a more pro- 
European stance. The Eurosceptic forces in the Conservative parliamentary party had 
been temporarily muted by the downfall of Thatcher. There was growing public 
support for a pro-European position with a two to one majority believing Europe was 
good thing for Britain in 1991, the highest level of support since the 1975 referendum 
(Northcott 1995: 330-331). The continued membership of the ERM had become the 
central plank of the Major administration’s economic policy. Europe appeared to be 
fundamental to the government’s attempts to revise the Thatcher settlement and 
symbolised a modification of some of its less palatable elements. In this context, 
Major proposed to place Britain at the ‘heart of Europe’.
A key feature of the initial approach of the Major government to the European
Community was to rebuild relations and secure those alliances with European
politicians and governments that had been alienated by Mrs Thatcher. The main
figures behind this strategy were Chris Patten and, the Foreign Secretary, Douglas
Hurd (Forster 1999: 32-33). A central aim of the Hurd-Patten strategy was to place
British Conservatives in the mainstream of European politics. Patten already had
considerable contacts with European Christian Democratic parties from the time when
he was Head of the Conservative Research Department (ibid). When he became Party
Chairman, he aimed to have British Conservative MEPs join the Christian Democratic
centre-right group in the European parliament. He believed this would lead to Major
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attending Christian Democratic leaders’ meetings where many European bargains 
were struck (ibid). The main focus, however, was to improve relations with Germany 
and Major set about building a strong alliance with the Christian Democratic 
government in Bonn. Forster argues that behind this was the aim of exploiting 
German concerns over the Delors proposals for monetary union (ibid: 32). The close 
relationship built up between Major and Kohl was in marked contrast to Thatcher’s 
lukewarm meetings with the German Chancellor. In his memoirs Major emphasised 
his friendship with Kohl, as well as with other leaders, and claims that ‘he had no 
hang ups about Germany’ (1999: 265-267). Unsurprisingly, therefore, Bonn was 
chosen for a keynote speech by Major in March 1991 in which he emphasised the 
differences between his government and that of his predecessor to the European 
Community. In the speech Major stated that,
‘My aim for Britain in the Community can be simply stated. I want us to be 
where we belong. At the very heart of Europe. Working with our partners 
building the future.’ (cited in Major 1999: 269)
This new cooperative approach within the Community was concomitant with an 
economic policy that placed ERM membership at its centre. Nevertheless, despite 
being received by domestic Eurosceptic forces as a cryptic statement of Federalist 
intentions, Major’s speech was a classic example of British Conservative 
Europeanism, as the summary by his advisors at the time demonstrates:
‘Europe, John Major said, should develop by evolution, not some treaty-based 
revolution provoking disunity in the cause of unity. It must keep its Atlantic 
ties strong. Britain had not, by playing its part in the transformation of Europe, 
‘abandoned our history or our ties with the Commonwealth and the United 
States’. But there were limits to the notion of a common foreign and security 
policy for European countries; NATO must remain paramount. So far as 
monetary union was concerned, ‘we think it best to reserve judgement’, and 
‘we accept its imposition.’ Co-operation -  already a code word for a way of 
doing business outside of the Brussels institutions -  was the way forward for 
members of the Community.’ (Hogg and Hill 1995: 78)
Above all, Major emphasised that ‘Europe was made up of nation-states’ and that a 
right balance had to be found between ‘closer cooperation and a proper respect for 
national institutions and traditions’ (cited ibid). Moreover, this was to proceed
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alongside the overarching aim of advancing a free trade Europe. Major therefore re­
emphasised what he saw as the limitations of the European project.
From the outset the government’s position was unconvincing. It combined a clear 
statement of constructive engagement with the second wave of integration even 
reviving the idea of a leadership role for Britain in that process, yet re-affirming a 
fundamentally Thatcherite set of principles based around neo-liberalism and state 
power. The consequence of the latter was that the government increasingly looked for 
policy exits and appeared sceptical about the new multi-level institutional architecture 
that was taking shape. The Commission and many member-states were moving 
towards an overtly federal agenda, thus the idea that the Community could be reduced 
to a common market firmly under the control of states appeared out of date and out of 
step with the direction of the integrationist project. As the largely negative and 
obstructive goals of the British government for the Maastricht Council began to 
emerge, the ambition to put Britain at the heart of Europe looked increasingly devoid 
of content.
7.3 The Maastricht negotiations: a Roman triumph?
The position of the British government during the Maastricht negotiations has been
comprehensively documented (Blair 1999; Forster 1999). The government’s
objectives during the negotiations were to pursue selective opt outs in the areas of
monetary union and social policy and to put forward proposals designed to obstruct
the more ambitious objectives of the other member-states. Both Blair and Forster
emphasise that this negotiating strategy was largely determined by domestic
circumstances and, in particular, the need to maintain Conservative party unity (Blair
1999: 219; Forster 1999:177). Forster notes that by September 1991, ‘the problem of
Eurosceptic dissent was an increasing preoccupation for John Major’ and he was
forced ‘to abandon his Party Chairman’s attempt to chart a new intellectual path for
the party’ (Forster 1999: 88). Yet, at the same time, the government was committed
to continuing to engage with European developments and, as Major later protested,
‘engage in the argument’ and ‘argue the British case’ (cited in Seldon 1998:167). The
central argument here is that developments within domestic politics were in fact
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reinforcing the underlying structural trajectory of Britain’s relationship with the 
Community.
The bargaining position of the Major government during the Maastricht negotiations 
reflected ‘Britain’s European dilemma’ (Forster 1999:178). More specifically, it 
reflected the impossibility that a government operating within the paradigm of 
Thatcherism could engage with a process of European political modernisation. 
Therefore, it proved increasingly difficult for the government to defend its policy 
against the Eurosceptic right of the party.
The attacks on Major’s policy emerged immediately following his ‘heart of Europe’ 
speech. In an interview in the US, Thatcher railed against German domination of 
Europe and the idea of European unity. In June of 1991, the Daily Telegraph gave 
prominent coverage to a publication by the Bruges Group which effectively accused 
Major of supporting a federal Europe (Major 1999: 269). This right wing pressure 
group had become the ‘rallying point’ for sceptics and opponents of further 
integration across the party and by 1990 had 132 Tory backbenchers as members as 
well as prominent right wing academics such as Patrick Minford, Norman Stone and 
Kenneth Minogue (Seldon 1999:164). However, arguably more significant in shaping 
the direction of the government’s approach to Europe during the run up to the 
Maastricht negotiations was the influence of Eurosceptic ministers (Blair 1999: 203- 
204). Major’s consensual style of leadership, and Thatcherite sympathies, increased 
the power of these ministers who held portfolios directly relevant to the IGC (ibid).
As Blair notes,
‘The Eurosceptic quartet of Baker, Howard, Lamont and to a lesser extent 
Lilley, led government departments influential in the formation of British 
European policy.’ (ibid: 204)
In effect what Major did was to successfully buy off the support of these ministers 
while still putting together a realistic bargaining position. He did this by holding firm 
on the opt outs over EMU and the Social Chapter. This was evident in the Commons 
debate that took place before the IGC. Major recalls that,
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‘The debate worked well. I set out our negotiating aims with great care. No 
federalism. No commitment to a single currency. No social chapter. No 
Community competence on foreign and home affairs or defence/ (Major 
1999: 274)
By emphasising these negative goals and objectives, the Major government was able 
to resist Eurosceptic pressure for a British veto to be exercised over economic and 
monetary union and new Treaty agreements on political integration. In effect, the 
British government’s position at the Maastricht Council (December 1991) was to try 
and prevent moves towards further integration without having to veto the Treaty. It 
indicated the extent to which the structure of British politics prevented any British 
European strategy becoming part of a broader European Christian Democratic project, 
as politicians such as Patten and Hurd may have wanted. The overriding concerns at 
the Maastricht Council were increasingly those of domestic politics and Conservative 
party unity (Forster 1999; Blair 1999). Once Major had won oyer Eurosceptics to his 
negotiating position it became possible for the government to make concessions, such 
as strengthening the European parliament to include co-decision making powers. Such 
areas remained under the tight control of the foreign policy executive (Hurd and 
Major) and it was made difficult for more Eurosceptical ministers to challenge such 
decisions (Blair 1999: 204). On EMU the government’s negotiating position was to 
seek a general opt out for all governments and to continue to pursue the alternative of 
a hard European Currency Unit (ECU) as a parallel European currency. The latter was 
designed to halt the move towards monetary union. This was pursued alongside 
attempts to separate the French from the Germans by playing on differences over the 
speed towards monetary union (Forster 1999: 59). The British government failed to 
achieve these objectives and underestimated the momentum for EMU amongst the 
other member states:
‘London was left to determine the terms and conditions of its own self 
exclusion and negotiators concentrated on securing a UK opt out and the 
important right to reverse the initial position at a later date.’ (ibid: 72)
The opt out over the single currency was relatively easy to achieve as it allowed the 
other member states to negotiate the details of EMU without the risk of a British veto. 
In contrast, the British opt out of the Social Chapter was a matter of intense political
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bargaining during the final stages of the negotiations. A compromise agreement on 
social policy circulated by the Ruud Lubbers, President of the European Council, was 
rejected by Major when Michael Howard, Employment Secretary, threatened to resign 
(Forster 1999: 92; Blair 1999:113). The conclusion to this was the negotiation of a 
separate protocol by the other 11 member states that inevitably weakened the 
development of the social dimensions that had been so central to the Delors’ project.
The pursuit of selective opt outs and the negative negotiating position adopted by the 
Major government was the only viable position that the government could hold in the 
face of divided party and Cabinet. It enabled Major to avoid political ramifications of 
the moves towards EMU and the Social Chapter without having to veto the entire 
Treaty. However, the degree to which the government had been pressured into 
adopting a hardline and negative stance towards the Treaty, meant that the attempt to 
place Britain and the Conservative party at the ‘heart of Europe’ was shattered. In 
effect, the British government had contributed to the emergence of a two speed 
Europe in which Britain would be in the second lane, the very thing it had argued 
against. Clearly, at Maastricht the Major government was pragmatically reacting to 
domestic political events and was not actively engaged in crafting a strategy of 
European political modernisation that could be fully incorporated into the British 
political order. Underlying this pragmatism was an unwillingness and inability to 
challenge the core features of the political order. The Major government’s revival of a 
strategy of conservative Europeanism hardenned into a crisis prone neo-Thatcherite 
position as the extensiveness of the second wave of European integration unfolded.
An increasinlgy sceptical Europeanism contrasted with the government’s continued 
support for American global power, most clearly evident in the extent of British 
support for the Gulf War. In marked contrast to the divisions over European policy, 
Major reflected in his autobiography on the cross party support for the War and 
British involvement,:
‘Here was a nation working together. It was an enriching experience.’ (Major
1999: 237)
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Thus, behind the rhetoric of the new relationship with European partners remained a 
strong attachment to an Anglo-Saxon conception of the unity of the English speaking 
world, under American hegemony. As Wallace noted, the Gulf War was welcomed 
by commentators of the right as the re-emergence of an Anglo-Saxon partnership:
‘Pride in the past, pride in Britain as a military power, seeking to regain and 
reassert a status which marked us off form the defeated nations across the 
Channel; contrasting -  to use Peregrine Worsthome’s graphic revealing 
language -  the ‘selfless even self-sacrificing idealism’ of Britain’s response 
with the flabbiness of a European Community dominated by a lobotomised 
German economic giant, psychologically unable to spill blood even in a good 
cause.’ ‘ (1991:30)
This re-asserted Anglo-American nationalism, combined with the Thatcherite 
attachment to the free market, remained at the heart of the Conservative party and the 
Major government. Patten’s attempt to construct a project of British Christian 
Democracy that fitted with mainstream European developments was an exceptional 
attempt to shift the trajectory of the Conservative party and the British state. However, 
the undermining of the Maastricht Treaty and Britain’s marginalisation from the 
integration process was viewed as a success for Major both in the party and sections 
of the press. Major described it as the ‘modem equivalent of a Roman triumph’ (1999: 
288). Nevertheless, it was hollow victory, as Major had signed up to a Treaty that 
involved institutional developments that could not be ideologically incorporated into 
the British state. This was the dangerous consequence of the salvage operation on 
European policy carried by pro-European politicians such as Hurd, Heseltine and 
Clarke, who remained at the core of the governing elite.
For a short period Major had united the party and helped secure the election victory of 
1992. In retrospect, however, the truce within the Conservative party was inherently 
fragile because the Maastricht Treaty had moved the European Community in the 
direction of further integration, to an extent that it was never going to be acceptable to 
Eurosceptic forces. In early 1992, Delors told the European parliament that the 
Maastricht Treaty was a significant move in the direction of further integration 
(Turner 2000:155). Despite the limitations of the Treaty, this was certainly the case 
and it contradicted Major’s claim that he had halted the drive for further integration at
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Maastricht. Thus, the Major government entered into a highly dangerous political 
game with its own party as it attempted to ratify the Treaty in parliament and secure 
legitimacy for its Maastricht deal. What stood out however, was the extent to which 
loyalty to both party and leader began to breakdown during the ratification process of 
the Treaty in parliament. For an administration already weakened by a small majority 
of 21 after the 1992 election, the European issue was to result in a crisis that derailed 
the government to such an extent that it was unable to recover. Yet, before exploring 
more fully the Maastricht rebellion, we should note that the ferocity of this attack on 
the government became increasingly evident with the failure to Europeanise economic 
policy. I want to turn to the events surrounding British withdrawal of the ERM.
7.4 ‘Black’ or ‘white’ Wednesday, according to taste
As we have seen, a central plank of the Major government’s economic policy was 
membership of the ERM. As Chancellor, Major had persuaded Mrs Thatcher to enter 
the system. As shown in Chapter 6, this was part of an attempt to modernise monetary 
policy and move away from Thatcher’s outright acceptance of the autonomy of 
financial markets. At a time of recession, ERM membership was viewed as 
fundamental to keeping inflation under control and bringing interest rates down (Hogg 
and Hill 1995). In particular, membership was seen to give the government’s 
economic policy credibility in the eyes of the financial markets and thereby avoid 
destabilising speculations on the pound. It was a policy designed to break the stop-go 
cycle of the British economy by facilitating stable growth alongside low inflation 
(Stephens 1996:198). The value of sterling once again became the guiding principle 
of British economic policy. A questionable form of financial management was 
equated with a broader project of modernisation.
The difficulty for the government was the nature and depth of the recession of the
early 1990s. The bank base rate had risen to 15% in 1989 to take the heat out of the
housing market with the result that house prices collapsed in 1990. Between the first
and second halves of the same year GDP fell by 2% cent and manufacturing output
fell by 9% in nine months. Both consumers and companies faced problems of debt
and stopped spending. Unemployment began to rise and had increased by a million in
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early 1992 (Hogg and Hill 1995:186). Underlying these problems was the continued 
structural weakness of the British economy already evidenced by a current account 
deficit of twenty billion pounds in 1989 (ibid: 175). Therefore, the concern was that 
‘unless demands for higher pay could be resisted, and productivity increased, then 
rising inflation would lead to sustained pressure on the pound’ (Bonefield and 
Burnham 1996:14). The government entered the ERM at the relatively high rate of 
DM 2.95 in order to help bring down inflation and believed this rate could be 
sustained by the underlying competitiveness of the British economy rather than 
devaluation (ibid: 175). This strategy was thought to form the basis for a sustained 
recovery and ward off speculative pressure. However, the British economy nose-dived 
into a recession characterised by low output and disinflation, alongside an overvalued 
currency.
The real problems for the overvalued pound began to emerge once the ERM was 
discredited in the aftermath of the Danish no vote on the Maastricht Treaty. The result 
of the Danish poll had shaken confidence in the project of monetary union, and 
financial markets began to question the existing ERM parities. Furthermore, these 
problems were exacerbated by a German refusal to cut its interest rates, as Stephens 
notes:
‘The Deutschmark was the anchor for the system, but Germany was sailing in 
the opposite direction to its European partners. Its domestic economy 
demanded high interest rates to stifle inflationary pressures caused by 
reunification; elsewhere in Europe governments were struggling to pull their 
economies from recession and inflation was subdued. As long as interest rates 
in Germany remained high, its partners could not cut their own borrowing 
costs to stimulate economic expansion.’ (ibid: 194)
The ERM increasingly became the target for those attacking the government’s 
economic policy. The government, however, stuck to its chosen course and in a 
speech to the European Policy Forum on 10th July 1992, Norman Lamont mled out 
either a cut in interest rates or leaving the mechanism (Seldon 1998: 298). Although 
the economy required lower interest rates, it was believed that these were more likely 
to be delivered inside the ERM and that devaluation would ultimately lead to higher 
borrowing costs (Stephens 1996: 209-210). The argument was that a devaluation of
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the pound would undermine confidence in sterling and lead to depreciations which 
could only be halted by high interest rates (ibid). The Treasury believed that the 
consequence of a devalued pound would be similar to the 1980s when a weak 
currency had resulted in rising inflation (ibid: 210-211). Following Lamont’s speech, 
Major told the House of Commons that the government’s commitment to the ERM 
was 4100%’(ibid: 214). In late July, Major went so far as to state at a dinner hosted by 
the Sunday Times that he believed that sterling would become one of the world’s 
strongest currencies, possibly, stronger than the Deutschmark (Stephens 1996: 219; 
Seldon 1998: 298; Major 1999: 317). This led to headlines in the Sunday Times that 
emphasised the extent to which the ERM policy had now become a symbol of 
‘national pride’ for the Major government (Stephens 1998: 219). Indeed, the policy 
had come to represent the reversal of post-war decline by claiming to have halted the 
continued fall of sterling and the problem of high inflation (ibid). It was, however, a 
rather limited strategy considering the continued weakness of the British economy. In 
addition, without being linked to the broader project of monetary union the British 
commitment to membership appeared uncertain. Indeed, it was unfathomable why 
there was a return to a policy of strong and stable currency in the context of a deep 
recession that exposed continued problems in the British economy. As Bonefield and 
Burnham suggest, it could only be seen as a rather blunt instrument of economic 
management designed to impose low inflation discipline on wage demand (1996:18). 
In effect it was a short term instrument for renewing capitalist accumulation:
‘The discipline meant a prolonged period not merely of living on less but also
of working harder in the face of declining conditions.’ (ibid: 19)
The problem was that the 1980s had seen an attack on the Keynesian nexus between 
wages and public expenditure without any ‘breakthrough in levels of productivity, 
productive investment or a reduction in average wages relative to other European 
states’ (ibid: 24). The expansion of the economy had been built on deregulation of 
credit and the financial markets and not on any fundamental restructuring of the 
industrial base. This left the British economy particularly exposed to external shocks. 
Without a more sustained economic recovery the capacity to maintain confidence in 
the pound inside the ERM was impossible and could only be sustained in the short
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term with high interest rates. As the government defended its ERM policy, the extent 
of the British recession became clearly visible. Between 1990 and 1991, 
unemployment increased by 700,000 over the 1990 figure, business failures ran at 930 
a week, and house repossessions climbed continuously (Bonefield and Burnham 1996: 
20-21). The second quarter of 1992 saw Britain’s GDP fall 3.6% from its 1990 level 
whilst other EC nations experienced a rise of 2.8% and industrial production began to 
fall culminating a balance of payments deficit of £13,680 million in 1992 (ibid).
In effect, the British economy remained too weak to ride out a global recession. It was 
compounded by the depth of the American downturn and a weak dollar which made 
British exports uncompetitive. The continued appreciation of the Deutschmark in 
1992, to compensate for German reunification, left the government in a straitjacket as 
it was unable to lower interest rates to provide a stimulus to the economy. The pound 
continued to fall against the Deutschmark during 1992 while it rose against the falling 
dollar (Stephens 1996: 221). Meanwhile, at a meeting of European finance ministers 
at the beginning of September, Lamont criticised German economic policy for the 
growing turmoil within the exchange markets. This outraged the Bundesbank 
President, Helmut Shclesinger, and was indicative of the extent to which the Treasury 
had not become Europeanised. As Stephens argues:
‘Britain’s membership of the ERM was not followed by a coordinated attempt 
to make friends among those upon whom the government might well have to 
rely. In the summer of 1992 an imperious manner could not disguise the 
absence of reliable allies. As one Treasury official was to lament, “We were 
never much good with foreigners”.’ (1996: 233)
When Schlesinger announced only a small cut in German interest rates of 0.25% in 
response to an Italian devaluation, the markets began to put increased pressure on 
sterling. On Tuesday 15th September 1992, the Governor of the Bank of England 
sought approval to step up the scale of intervention to stabilise the value of the pound. 
The following day saw sterling driven out of the ERM by financial speculators. The 
extent of the speculation on sterling meant that intervention by central banks was 
ineffective. Indeed, the Bank of England’s holdings on foreign exchange amounted to 
just over 10% of the average £300 billion in the average daily turnover of the London
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markets (ibid: 249). Despite what was evidently the largest intervention into the 
currency markets ever seen by the Bank of England (exhausting the reserves see 
Stephens 1996: 254), and raising interest rates to 15 %, the government was unable to 
halt the massive speculation and by the end of the day the pound was forced to leave 
the ERM.
The government was overwhelmed by the events of black Wednesday, which it 
considered to be largely out of its control. In the Commons debate that followed, 
Major reported that sterling was forced out of the mechanism by events world wide 
and the severity of the attack by the markets (H.C. Deb. Vol. 212. Col. 2 24th 
September 1992). He implied that if responsibility lay anywhere it was with the 
Bundesbank which had encouraged the markets with ‘injudicious comments about 
realignment that should never have been made’ (ibid). There was no official apology 
or acceptance of responsibility by the government and no inquiry followed (Stephens 
1996: 255-256; Seldon 1998: 323).
Certainly, there were flaws with a system that depended so heavily on one anchor 
currency and this was evident once the Germany economy diverged from the rest of 
Europe as a consequence of unification. The British difficulties with the ERM, 
however, also reflected deeper political and institutional problems that were primarily 
of a domestic nature. The economic policy was inherently paradoxical. On the one 
hand, it was believed that an economic policy that focused on a stable exchange rate 
would secure stable growth without leading to high inflation. In this sense, it was 
viewed as an essential political instrument for the economic modernisation of a weak 
economy. On the other hand, this policy was only viable because a strong and stable 
exchange rate reflected the supposed underlying strength and competitiveness of the 
British economy. In this sense, it was considered to be symbolic of the new found 
strength of the British economy. The exchange rate became both a cause and an 
effect of British economic renewal. When the extent of the recession was evident in 
1992, it was clear that maintaining a high exchange rate was damaging the economy 
and the eventual fall in the pound reflected the reality of the British economy. As 
Stephens notes:
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‘Sterling’s steady depreciation over several decades had been a symptom as 
much as a cause of economic failure. Fixing the exchange rate would not solve 
the more fundamental structural problems besetting the economy -  a weak 
manufacturing base, a large current-account deficit, low investment, poor 
education and training among them.’ (1996: 259)
In a similar vein, Bonefield and Burnham point out that ‘the continued comparative 
decline of British competitiveness made an eventual devaluation of the pound 
inevitable, in spite of the ERM’ (1996: 29). What compounded the problem for Major 
was the fact that the exchange rate had been made into a symbol of national pride, 
particularly evident when he claimed that sterling would come to rival the 
Deutschmark. In effect, ERM membership and an exchange rate policy had been 
presented as a strategy of modernisation for the British economy by governing elites 
that would place Britain in the first division of European economic powers. According 
to an editorial in the Independent on Sunday, the failure of this policy represented an 
end of another British delusion akin to the Suez crisis of 1956 
(Comment 20th September 1992). It was a typical British policy of financial 
(mismanagement employed as an alternative to any more fundamental process of 
politico-economic restructuring. While it aimed to secure sustainable growth and low 
inflation there was no evidence that it was underpinned by a broader strategy designed 
to tackle the continued problems of poor productivity, social inequality and decaying 
public services. Increasingly the policy came to reflect the chronic absence of a 
coherent strategy of politico-economic modernisation. This was particularly evident in 
the fact that the Major government did not link its ERM policy to participation in 
monetary union. Equally the government seemed to lack any economic policy once 
blown of course by forced withdrawal from the ERM. This was highlighted by John 
Smith as opposition leader who picked up on Major’s previous comments that sterling 
could rival the Deutschmark:
‘To claim that the German economic miracle had been surpassed and then in 
the middle of the recession, to go on to foresee the pound replacing the 
Deutschmark takes a certain detachment from reality of which Walter Mitty 
would have been proud. The real lesson to be drawn from a comparison 
between the British and German economies is that, before one can have strong 
economy we need consistent investment, a recognition of the vital importance 
of manufacturing as the basic wealth creator, a strategy of training, for
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innovation and technology and for regional development. In short, an 
industrial strategy.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 212. Col. 13 24th September 1992).
In a devastating attack, Smith stated that with its ERM policy blown apart, any claim 
to economic competence by the Conservative party had been destroyed (H.C. Deb. 
Vol. 212. Col. 22 24th September 1992). Smith was right but it was not simply a 
verdict on the government. The ERM crisis reflected the general vulnerability of a 
globalised British economy and the underlying weakness of British economic 
governance. The Labour party did not call for the end of the pound which was the 
logical conclusion of the events of the black Wednesday.
The withdrawal from the ERM allowed the Major government to rethink its European 
strategy in the light of wider European developments and domestic political problems. 
The role of ERM membership was reduced to a policy designed to curb inflation and 
was no longer part of a broader ‘heart of Europe’ strategy (Major 1999: 340). The 
withdrawal from the ERM was re-written as an opportunity to push Europe further in 
a British direction, as Major told the Commons during the ERM debate:
‘We have the chance to build in our time, in our generation, the sort of Europe 
for which we have always longed for; the sort of Europe I believe its citizens 
want; a secure Europe of nation-states co-operating freely for the common 
good ; a prosperous Europe, generating new wealth within the biggest free 
trade area in the world; a free trade Europe in which Brussels is kept off 
industry’s back.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 212. Col. 11 24th September 1992).
In many of the member states, the problems and eventual collapse of the ERM only 
highlighted the weaknesses of the current arrangements and the need to press ahead 
with full EMU. It had proved the case for more extensive forms of economic 
governance beyond the nation-state to resist the autonomy of the financial markets. 
However, the British government and the Eurosceptics began to see the crisis over the 
European project as a validation of their different positions. For the Major 
administration, the viability of the whole EMU project was considered to be even 
more problematic and the government’s focus shifted further away from European 
monetary arrangements towards domestic reform of monetary policy. In effect, the 
capacity of the global financial markets to judge economic policy by speculating on a
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currency was accepted and the possibility of long term stability within a European set 
of arrangements was questioned". More specifically the possibility of getting rid of a 
debased currency chronically exposed to financial speculation was clearly not on the 
agenda. For Eurosceptics ‘White Wednesday’, as they called it, was validation of the 
crisis of legitimation at the heart of the European project and had proved that the 
Maastricht Treaty was fundamentally flawed and had to be defeated. Thus, the ERM 
debacle fuelled the emerging crisis over Maastricht ratification that was facing the 
Major government.
7.5 Eurosceptic mobilisation and the Danish no-vote
The Maastricht revolt can be seen as part of the continued failure to legitimise a 
European trajectory for the British state. As we have seen, the full manifestation of 
this crisis was kept at bay by the ability of the presentation of the issue in highly 
conservative terms, as one of continuity and stability alongside national renewal. It 
was presented as conservative modernisation or simply as a limited extension of 
national policies. The Major government attempted to revive this strategy. From this 
perspective, deeper processes of European integration were considered to be 
unrealistic and could be contained by a strong British presence the Community. 
However, the extensive nature of the second wave of integration, the withdrawal from 
the ERM and Eurosceptic mobilisation meant it was untenable. In effect, the 
depolitisation of the European issue within British politics could not be maintained. 
Initially, this was evident when a wider European legitimation crisis emerged over the 
Maastricht process with the Danish no vote on Maastricht in June 1992. It is at this 
point that the extent of Euroscepticism within, and beyond, the Conservative party 
became manifest.
As a number of commentators have shown, the Eurosceptical groupings that emerged
during the Maastricht ratification crossed the party divide and often consisted of
disparate political positions and motives (Norton 1996; Berrington and Hague 1998;
Seldon 1998: 341; Buller 2000a; Forster 2002:109). As a starting point a
chronological distinction can be made between those implacable marketeers who had
been opposed to Britain’s initial membership of the Community under Heath in 1972
232
and those who became later converts to the cause. In the first group were politicians 
such Teddy Taylor, John Biffen and Richard Body. This group consistently attacked 
the Community as primarily a political project that represented a profound attack on 
the British nation. As we saw in Chapter 4, the exemplar of this tradition had been 
Enoch Powell. Young refers to a second small group who came to prominence during 
the Thatcher years and who opposed the Single European Act. Notably, this group 
included Enoch Powell’s successor in Wolverhampton, Nicholas Budgen, but also the 
former party Chairman, Edward Du Cann. The Single European Act separates the 
latter two groups from those politicians who, with the departure of Mrs Thatcher, 
were no longer prepared to support the official party line (Young 1998: 384). Young 
notes that these conversions came in ‘many times and shapes’ and there is ‘a variety 
of motive and explanation’ (ibid: 385). This group included Bill Cash, a leading 
Eurosceptic politician during the Major government, who had been a supporter of 
both British entry in 1972 and the SEA in 1986. Young describes Conservative Euro­
sceptics as a,
‘confederacy of zealots and lurchers, with the latter amply outnumbering, 
often outreaching, the former. One might venture some conclusions from their 
history. Some were moved by disappointment bom of failed ambition. They 
resented their exclusion from office sufficiently to allow an embryonic 
scepticism, hitherto suppressed, to prepare them for full rebellion. Others were 
pushed by personal loyalty to Mrs Thatcher, over an edge they had already 
spent some time looking across.’ (ibid: 387)
However, what was distinctive about this group was that together they articulated a 
particular discourse of British nationalism constituted in opposition to the process of 
European integration. There were different variants of this that further separated out 
the various groupings. As Baker et al note (1994), some could be described as 
constitutionalists whose primary concern were the federalist intentions of the 
Community and its impact on parliamentary sovereignty. Others were English 
nationalists motivated by anti-German and anti-French sentiment. Nevertheless, the 
extent to which Eurosceptics were essentially inward looking was challenged by those 
who regarded themselves as internationalists opposing a regional European 
nationalism (Holmes 1996:1).
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Despite these differences, for the purposes of our discussion the key division within 
the political elite is between Eurosceptic Thatcherite ‘purists’ and those revisionist 
Thatcherites, as well as non Thatcherites, who continued to believe in the 
accommodation of the British state to the trajectory of European integration. As 
shown in Chapter 6, leading members of the political elite, such as Howe and Lawson, 
continued to see Europe as an essential part of British post-imperial renewal. What the 
European crisis indicated was the inability of the Major government, and its pro- 
European governing elite, to bring about this more revisionist Thatcherism that would 
allow for a positive European strategy. In particular, the problems that emerged over 
Maastricht indicated ‘the nature and depth of penetration of the ‘Thatcherite’ 
revolution in the party’ (Baker et al 1994: 57). As we shall see, what became 
strikingly evident was the extent to which Thatcherite Eurosceptics organised and 
dominated the campaign against the Maastricht Treaty.
Thatcher herself became a prominent spokesperson for the Eurosceptic cause and, out 
of office, she began to articulate an alternative free market vision of the European 
integration. In May 1992 she made a speech in The Hague where she called for a 
decentralised Community in ‘which the model should be a market -  not only a market 
of individuals and companies, but also a market in which the players are 
governments’ (1995: 489). In this scenario, governments would compete with each 
other for foreign investment, top management and high earners through lower taxes 
and lower regulation’ (ibid). She went on to call for a multi-track Europe and argued 
that ‘we have to face up to the fact that a united Germany was a problem’ (ibid: 489- 
491). The extent of Thatcher’s personal involvement in supporting the Eurosceptic 
cause was recalled by Major:
‘It was a unique occurrence in our party’s history: a former prime minister 
openly encouraging backbenchers in her own party, many of whom revered 
her, to overturn the policy of her successor -  a policy that had been a 
manifesto commitment in an election held less that six months before. It was 
Margarets’s support for the defeat of the Maastricht legislation which helped 
turn a difficult task for our whips into an almost impossible one. Beyond this 
she began to cast around to see how the party could be moved to a more Euro­
sceptic position. By the early autumn of 1993 she was telling friends that she 
hoped for a leadership contest a year before the next election, and for Michael 
Portillo to win it’ (ibid: 350-351)
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Thatcher’s speech at the Hague was made ten days after the Bill had gone though 
parliament to implement the Maastricht Treaty. Major made the decision not to try 
and force the Bill through parliament quickly but to allow time for a full debate on the 
Treaty. The Bill successfully went through its first and second readings then, as Major 
put it, ‘all hell broke loose’ (1999: 347). The cause of this was the Danish no vote on 
the Treaty. The government made the decision not to proceed with the Committee 
stage of the Bill as it believed this would reignite the divisions over Europe (ibid: 
349). In effect, this decision gave the Eurosceptics time to fully mobilise against the 
Treaty. The day after the Danish referendum result an Early Day Motion was signed 
by 69 MPs and called for a new approach on Europe.
At Prime Minister’s Questions on 3rd June 1993, Major defended his version of the 
Treaty:
‘The Maastricht Treaty began to build the kind of European Community that 
we wish to see. It introduced the concept of intergovernmental cooperation 
outside of the Treaty of Rome. It established the principle of subsidiarity 
rather than centralism. It established financial and other controls over the 
Commission’ (H.C. Deb.Vol. 208,col. 827 3rd June 1992)
Major consistently emphasised the themes of subsidiarity, enlargement and inter- 
govemmentalism as the guiding principles of the Maastricht Treaty. He presented the 
Treaty as a British victory for a decentralised Europe contradicting the interpretation 
of the Treaty that was presented by Delors and Mitterand. Adopting a position that 
was full of contradictions, the Maastricht Treaty was sold to the Conservative party as 
a victory for British exceptionalism. In the debate, Major’s version of the Treaty came 
under heavy criticism from Eurosceptics such as Bill Cash:
‘In the light of my right hon. Friend’s insistence on decentralisation in Europe, 
with which we all agree in principle, how is it that there is in the common 
provisions in title 1 of the Treaty an insistence that we comply as an obligation 
with the single institutional framework which implies centralisation together 
with those provisions that deal with the union, which imply that we will be 
citizens of a union with duties imposed on us, and as a result of which we shall 
be moving into a centralised Europe?’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 208, col. 831 3rd June 
1992)
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The central demand of the Eurosceptics and of the Liberal Democrats was for a 
referendum which Major refused to grant them. The statement to the House on the 
Danish result represented a turning point in the Conservative party. As a Foreign 
Office official recalled,
‘Behind him there were rows of sullen faces. He had virtually no support.
Suddenly, we had the sense that whatever goodwill and pro-European feeling
there had once been, was gone, and that the atmosphere from then on was
going to be ugly.’ (Michael Jay cited in Seldon 1998: 294)
The Eurosceptic cause found continued support within sections of the British press. 
Two of the three most powerful press proprietors, Rupert Murdoch and Conrad Black, 
questioned Britain’s European involvement and both of them had appointed editors 
with similar views (Major 1999: 358; Turner 2000:158). Notably, ‘both proprietors 
and their editors maintained close relations with Mrs Thatcher and her circle, and 
filled their columns with contributions from intellectuals she had encouraged’ (W. 
Wallace 1994: 286). The Murdoch owned Times and Sunday Times took a strongly 
anti-European line, while the Sun and News of the World became increasingly 
nationalistic and xenophobic in their attacks on European institutions and partners. 
Meanwhile the Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph and The Spectator took the side of the 
rebels and against the government’s policy. In particular, opposition to Europe and 
admiration for the United States were persistent themes of these publications (W. 
Wallace 1994: 286). Clearly, underlying this were the economic priorities of global 
media empires and their fear of a regulated and politicised European market.
The problem for the Major government, therefore, was that it did not only face a small 
group of zealous Eurosceptics within the parliamentary Conservative party, but this 
was part of a broad based mobilisation of anti-Europeanism that reached across key 
sections of the Conservative press, as well as the higher echelons of the party and the 
government itself. This was a particularly British variant of a broader crisis of 
legitimation for European unity, which was evident in the narrow Yes vote for 
Maastricht in France and the growing concern over monetary union in Germany. Its
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full impact, however, was not felt until the Maastricht Treaty finally came to 
parliament to be ratified at the end of 1992.
7.6 The Maastricht ratification and the European crisis of the British state
The Eurosceptic campaign in parliament during the process of ratification of the 
Maastricth Treaty represented one of the most significant rebellions in parliamentary 
history and, alongside the ERM debacle, helped destroy the credibility of the Major 
government. It was a profound attack on the governing elite by an emerging national 
movement. It undermined the legitimacy of the government’s strategy on Europe, 
exposed the contradictions on which British policy towards European integration had 
been based since Macmillan, and significantly, contributed to a potentially fatal split 
in the Conservative party. Indeed, it was a powerful reassertion of the extensive nature 
of Euroscepticism at the heart of the British political establishment and intensified the 
uncertainties about the European trajectory of the post-imperial state. A discussion of 
the dramatic events surrounding ratification will demonstrate the extensive opposition 
faced by the Major government.
The ratification of Maastricht was rescheduled to begin again in the autumn of 1992.
In the wake of the ERM crisis, the Major government came to the conclusion that it
was a way for the government to regain the initiative on the European issue and to
reassure its European partners of its commitment to the Treaty (Seldon 1998: 326).
The decision to press ahead immediately led to attacks on the government at the Tory
party conference in October. The former Party Chairman Norman Tebbitt made a
powerful speech that ignited the conference floor. He called on Major to ‘raise the
flags of patriots of all the states of Europe’ and that the conference wanted to see
‘policies for Britain first, Britain second and Britain third’ (ibid: 327). In response,
Hurd, as Foreign Secretary, defended a traditional Tory pragmatic policy on Europe
and that going back on Maastricht would destroy Britain’s future in Europe. However,
further attacks on the government came from Thatcher who argued in an article for
the European newspaper that Maastricht was a ‘ruinous straitjacket’ damaging
Britain’s ‘constitutional freedoms’ (ibid: 328). It was evident from the number of
Eurosceptical motions submitted to the conference that there was strong grassroots
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opposition to Maastricht within the party and this became crucial for legitimating the 
Eurosceptics cause within parliament (Turner 2000:162). Major made a speech that 
was sympathetic to Eurosceptic concerns but restated his commitment to the 
government’s policy of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty.
During the Maastricht rebellion, it is possible to identity three objectives adopted by 
the rebels in their bid to undermine the government (Baker et al 1994: 38). Firstly, 
they aimed to delay the bill hoping that it would be made invalid by external events 
such as another No vote in a second Danish referendum. Secondly, they campaigned 
for a referendum as they increasingly believed they had considerable public support. 
Thirdly, they put forward and supported Treaty amendments that they considered fatal 
to the Treaty and would force the government to abandon ratification. This added up 
to an extraordinary attack on the governing elite from within the ruling party.
The first test for the government was the paving motion introduced in November 
1992. In the debate, Major defended the government’s conception of the Community:
‘We can develop as a centralist institution, as some might want, or we can 
develop as a free-market, free trade, wider European Community more 
responsive to its citizens.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 213. Col. 284, 4th November 1992 
emphasis mine)
It expressed a Thatcherite strategy towards the Community that also drew on a 
traditional conservative fear of the negative consequence of being marginalised from 
European developments. Although the government won the paving motion, it did so 
by a small margin (319-316) and Eurosceptics were successful in getting a promise 
from the government that the third reading of the bill would be delayed until after the 
Danish referendum (Seldon 1998: 342). After the problems over the paving motion, 
some of the initiative appeared to return to the government with a successful 
European summit for Major in Edinburgh in December. Under the British Presidency, 
agreements on Denmark, enlargement of the Community and the European budget 
were reached. Furthermore, there was a stronger commitment to the principle of 
subsidiarity that had been incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty. Major was credited 
with having patched-up Maastricht while avoiding further moves along the road of
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political integration. With a second Danish referendum agreed to take place on the 
18th May 1993, the committee stage of the Maastricht bill began in December 1992. 
The rebels continued to attempt to delay the Bill in order to demonstrate the intensity 
of British Euroscepticism and hopefully contribute to another Danish rejection of the 
Treaty (Baker et al 1994: 39). By the time of the third reading of the bill, there had 
been 210 hours of debate and over 600 amendments (ibid). It was now recognised by 
the government that the rebels were unwhippable and had become a separate 
organised faction within the party with their own offices, unofficial whips and 
‘briefing books’ (Seldon 1998: 369). The rebels proved successful in defeating the 
government on the method for selecting UK members of the Committee of the 
Regions proposed at Maastricht. However, this did not stop ratification of the Treaty 
and the bill continued its passage through the Commons. Alongside delaying 
ratification, the rebels kept up their pressure on the government to hold a national 
referendum. This came to a head on the 21st of April when the rebel Richard Shepherd 
called on the government to ‘trust the people’ and that the bill had no mandate as the 
British people had been denied a choice on Maastricht during the election of 1992 
(Wintour, The Guardian April 22nd 1993). Major had already stated his opposition to a 
referendum in the June debate following the Danish referendum when he defended 
parliamentary sovereignty in a reply to Tony Benn. The rebels referendum 
amendment was defeated by the government but only with the support of the 
opposition.
With the defeat of the referendum amendment, the bill had finally passed through the 
Committee stage proceedings. Major celebrated with an upbeat speech to the 
Conservative Group for Europe that emphasised the importance of European trade and 
claimed that the Community was heading in Britain’s direction (White, The Guardian 
April 23rd 1993; Comment, The Guardian April 23rd 1992). The extent to which the 
party was now moving in Major’s direction was however another question, as the 
Guardian editorial noted:
‘The speech did not tell the Conservative party things it does not know. But it 
tells the party many things which large parts of it still prefer to ignore. Recent 
surveys have implied, not always convincingly, that the rank and file Tories
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are not only unhappy with the rows over Maastricht but are moving towards a 
more Thatcherite position on Europe.’ (Comment, April 23rd 1993)
The Maastricht crisis was already adding to the depth of the growing disillusionment 
with the Major government that was evident since ERM withdrawal. At the beginning 
of May during the local elections and the Newbury by-election, the Conservative 
party faced heavy defeats. The Conservatives lost 500 seats in county councils across 
the country and Newbury was its worst by-election defeat since 1979 with a 28.4% 
swing from the Conservatives to the Liberal Democrats.
The government eventually secured the passage of the bill through the committee 
stage and it was eventually ratified on the 20th May, two days after a positive vote in 
the Danish referendum. Yet the rebellion had not subsided and the number voting 
against the third reading of the bill had risen to 41 with 5 deliberate abstentions, from 
22 and 6 abstentions during the second reading in May 1992. The bill then went to the 
House of Lords where Thatcher led the attack claiming she would never have signed 
the Treaty and calling for a referendum (Seldon 1998: 384). In the Commons, the 
government’s problems were not yet over as they had to concede to a special vote on 
the Social Chapter. The rebels had joined with the Labour opposition in supporting 
the restoration of the Social Chapter, believing that Major would not proceed with the 
bill if the opt out was not included. There was considerable confusion over whether a 
vote on the Social Chapter could kill off the bill or whether the government could 
circumvent a defeat on the opt out using the Crown prerogative (Baker et al 1994: 41). 
Douglas Hurd confirmed that this was a possibility when he announced that ‘there 
was no question of our ratifying a treaty other than the one we negotiated’ (Comment, 
The Guardian 15th February 1993). The role of parliament in ratifying the Treaty 
became increasingly unclear.
In April, the government accepted the opposition’s clause 75 calling for a debate on 
the Social Chapter but it was delayed until after the bill had been ratified. The 
government continued to intimate that even if there was a majority vote for the 
Social Chapter they would not be bound by the vote (Wintour, The Guardian 16th 
April 1993). On the 22nd July, the government faced two votes, the first on Labour’s
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amendment on the Social Chapter and a second on the government’s motion noting 
the opt out. The first vote was won by a margin of one vote while on the second vote 
the government was defeated by 8 votes (324-316). Twenty two rebels had resisted 
the government and voted with the opposition. Baker et al described it as the most 
damaging Commons defeat for a Tory government in the twentieth century (1994:
47). Those rebels who went back to supporting the government only did so after they 
extracted government statements stating there would be no re-entry into the ERM or 
moves towards joining a single currency (ibid). On the 23rd July, the government was 
forced to call a confidence motion on its policy on the Social Chapter and only with 
the threat of a general election, which the Conservatives looked destined to lose, did 
the rebels support the government. It was a ‘pyrrhic victory’ for the government that 
had needed to resort to various deals and compromises with opposition parties, 
bullying of its own M.P.S and threats to use the Crown’s prerogative. In effect, there 
had been such a profound attack on the governing elite that only the full exploitation 
of the power at the disposal of the British executive secured ratification, and when 
Major threatened a general election did the rebels come back on board. In contrast, the 
rebels’ victory was considerable:
‘They had imposed longer-term constraints on the European stance of the 
government that would certainly not dare to bring any new treaty before 
Parliament that furthered European integration. ERM re-entry was off the 
agenda even before the collapse.’ (ibid: 47)
7.8 Euroscepticism: a national movement for British exceptionalism
When Major was interviewed about the affair he referred to the rebels as ‘a tiny 
minority’ (Seldon 1998: 389). However, the real sociological dilemma for the Major 
government was that by the July vote the Eurosceptics had become a significant right 
wing national movement. They drew strength from the extensive extra-parliamentary 
support that was emerging for their cause. Increasingly, their refusal to accept the 
government whip suggested that their primary loyalty was to the anti-European cause 
and not to the Conservative government under John Major. We should note that in 
comparison to many other social movements, Euroscepticism was able to exert
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considerable power because its members had access to, and were part of, the centre of 
British political authority. It was only when a general election threatened to remove 
this influence that they sided with the government. In this section, I want to explore 
the nature of this movement and aspects of its discourse. Rather than viewing it as a 
fragmented or extreme political movement, it is my contention that it must be seen as 
the manifestation and reassertion of macro-ideological norms within the British 
political order primarily centred around a reconstituted and populist articulation of 
British exceptionalism.
National Mobilisation
The extent of Euroscepticism as a national movement had been evident in the 
sustained attack on the government’s attempts to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. They 
had become organised into a number of cross-cutting alliances and groupings both 
inside and outside parliament. Indeed, some twenty seven separate groups had been 
created in the 18 months following the December 1991 Maastricht Council (Forster 
2002: 88). In particular, the Fresh Start Group set up after the debate on the Danish 
referendum provided the organisational dynamism for opposing the governments 
European policy and became the dominant parliamentary grouping. Its radical 
opposition to government legislation and fundraising activities outside the party 
dramatically altered the rule of political conduct (ibid; Young 1998: 366). Forster 
describes its impact as follows:
‘Until its creation, sceptics had been rather like individual fish who had been 
swimming in the same general direction. Fresh start offered a sense of 
community and purpose, transforming the sceptics into a shoal of fish 
synchronising their activities with a shared objective, opposition to the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Thanks to the Fresh Start Group, 
Euroscepticism thus matured rapidly within the parliamentary Conservative 
Party.’ (ibid: 87-88)
Alongside increased parliamentary organisation and support, Eurosceptics found that 
they could look to the press, the wider party and public opinion for support. 
Significant sections of the press continued to provide substantial backing for the 
cause. The Sunday Telegraph and the Murdoch press all supported the call for a
242
referendum (Baker et al 1994: 46). The Newbury by-election defeat led to vicious 
attacks in the Murdoch press on Major’s leadership which culminated in a notorious 
article by Lord Rees Mogg on how ‘Major fails the leadership test’ (ibid). Support 
was also evident across all sections of the Conservative party. A survey of 4,000 
grassroots Conservative supporters by the Conservative political centre and made 
public during April 1993 indicated widespread disaffection with the Maastricht bill 
and significant support for a referendum (Bates, The Guardian 19th April 1993). This 
trend was confirmed by surveys that showed a significant shift to the right on 
European issues amongst Conservative supporters between 1991 and 1996 (Turner 
2000:175). Furthermore there was significant financial support for the rebel’s 
Maastricht referendum campaign (Marc) from traditional Tory business fund raising 
channels and overseas supporters (Baker et al 1994: 46). In terms of public opinion, 
polls demonstrated that there was widespread support for a referendum alongside 
growing disillusionment with the process of European integration since the Maastricht 
summit of 1991 (ibid: 48; Marshall, The Independent 25th July 1993). The most vivid 
expression of this new movement was the founding of the European Foundation in 
October 1993, headed by Bill Cash. The European Foundation became an important 
vehicle for Eurosceptic arguments and for mobilising against the Major government.
It also introduced a significant figure into the European debate ‘Jimmy Goldsmith, its 
biggest patron, a man of gigantic wealth who had the quixotic idea of using some of it 
to promote the anti-EU cause in Britain’ (Young 1998: 407). Goldsmith went on to 
form the Referendum party and fight the 1997 general election and attracted 811, 827 
votes, the best ever showing by a minority party (Carter, Evans, Alderman and 
Gorham 1998: 483).
A populist right wing national movement had been established that had no loyalty to 
the Conservative government. What was increasingly evident during and after the 
Maastricht rebellion was the extent to which this movement became part of a project 
to re-configure and re-assert Thatcherism contra the Major government and European 
integration.
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The discourse o f right wing Euroscepticism
The most influential alliances and arguments developed by Eurosceptics were on the 
Thatcherite right of the Conservative party. These included significant Eurosceptics in 
the Major Cabinet (Lilley, Redwood and Portillo) and vocal ex-ministers from the 
Thatcher and Major administrations (Tebbitt, Baker, Lamont). The most prominent 
backbench rebel during the Maastricht crisis, William Cash, was essentially a 
Thatcherite as were the most prominent of the 1992 intake of MPs such as Iain 
Duncan Smith and Bernard Jenkin (Forster 2002: 109). The conflict over Maastricht 
struggle appeared to consolidate a shift to the right by the Conservative party 
(Berrington and Hague 1998: 54). In particular, with the Treaty the Eurosceptics had 
a clear object on which to focus their critique and begin to apply some of the 
arguments Thatcher had already developed in her Bruges speech (Forster 2002: 91). 
Euroscepticism became a populist reassertion of a Thatcherite belief in British 
exceptionalism.
A key feature of the right wing Eurosceptic discourse during the Maastricht debate 
was that they presented themselves as the representatives of the people and the 
guardians of popular sovereignty. For instance, in the debate following the Danish No 
vote Tony Marlow, MP for Northampton North, enquired of the Prime Minister:
‘Would my right hon. Friend suggest to Monsieur Napoleon Delors who today 
rather than showing humility, seems to be showing his customary arrogance 
that, henceforth 2n June should be a public holiday throughout Europe, to be 
known as the day of the people, the day of democracy or, even better, the day 
of the nation-state?’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 208. Col 835 3rd June 1992)
The argument was that the people of Europe, and in particular the British people, did 
not want the kind of Europe that had been envisaged at Maastricht. The freedom of 
the people was posited against a centralising European state. As the former Home 
Secretary, Kenneth Baker stated:
‘The Danish and French referenda have shown vividly in the past six months 
that there is a movement across Europe which is not anti-Europe but anti- 
bureaucratic and against a centralised and bossy Europe. That is what I believe
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the no-votes in France and Denmark were saying and what many people in 
Britain feel.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 212. Col. 56 24th September 1992)
Although, the Eurosceptics aligned themselves with the people of Europe, they 
articulated a conception of popular sovereignty that was rooted in a Thatcherite 
authoritarian-populism of nation-states and the free market. John Butcher claimed 
that,
‘Our people have always been in favour of a Europe-wide free trading area. 
They have never been in favour of the gradual and surrepticious building of a 
European state.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 208 Col. 838. 3rd June 1992)
While this discourse had much in common with the Major government’s claim that 
Maastricht was in line with the British conception of Europe, a distinctive feature of 
the Eurosceptic position was that the governing elites could no longer be trusted on 
Europe and had led the British people into a European state against their will. In the 
early Committee stages of the Maastricht bill, Cash made the point that Heath when 
Prime Minister had misled parliament and the people in a government White Paper 
claiming that Britain would retain its essential sovereignty on membership. Cash went 
onto argue ‘that it is the basis on which the process has tended to move, and I believe 
that the same thing is happening with the present treaty, too. The British people are 
not being told the truth; they are not being told exactly was is involved’ (H.C. Deb. 
Vol. 215. Col. 214.1st December 1992). Cash proved a tenacious opponent of the 
government. He tabled 240 amendments to the bill and voted 47 times against the 
government when a three line whip was in place (Young 1998: 395). Crucially, he 
set out to prove that the treaty was not the decentralising document that the 
government claimed. He claimed that ‘the bottom line is that the treaty creates a 
legally binding union within Europe, which is quite different from the treaties that are 
normally transacted among countries’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 215 Col. 205 1st December 
1992). Essentially, Cash argued that the government’s interpretation of the treaty 
was misleading and different from the other member-states:
‘The Government, in their booklet ‘Britain in Europe’, say that they do not 
want and will not have a united states of Europe, but that is the objective to 
which the German Chancellor has been moving...............................The
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problem is that on European union we are at loggerheads with the Germans, as 
we are with other member-states.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 215 Col. 210 1st December 
1992)
The fear that Britain was being incorporated into a European state was compounded 
by the in balance of power within the European Union. In particular, Cash highlighted 
concerns over German domination:
‘We must contain Germany by a balance of power and not by a spurious, 
academic, theoretical, theological attempt to contain it by pieces of paper. I 
remember Munich at least I remember that it was the waving of a piece of 
paper.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 215 Col. 222 I s* December 1992)
This echoed Thatcher’s comments in May 1992 in which she had argued that 
Maastricht and its federal agenda augmented German power rather than contained it 
(Thatcher 1995: 491). Evident in this discourse was the way in which German 
economic power was elided with a continued concern over a threatened renewal of 
German military power.
A central theme of the Eurosceptic discourse was the underlying instability of Europe. 
Evidently, the folly of the Maastricht Treaty was that it continued the European trend 
of centralising state building that had created the problems in Europe in the first place. 
European political modernisation was in essence flawed, fundamentally anti-British 
and potentially aggressive. With regards to the later, Cash warned the House of 
Commons of what he saw as some of the less explicit implications of the formation of 
a European Union:
‘What is the most important function, or certainly one of the prime functions, 
of a legal entity of the kind that this European union is to be? It is the call to 
arms. That is the direction in which this is going: to a common defence policy. 
What is the first requirement the first duty to imposed on citizens? It is that 
they may be conscripted.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 215 Col. 227 1st December 1992)
Another key argument was that the other member-states and the Commission 
effectively wanted to impose socialist policies onto Europe. This was an argument 
that Thatcher had set out in her Bruges speech. Teresa Gorman, MP for Billericay,
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restated this ‘threat’ when she claimed that this was the intention of the establishment 
of a social cohesion fund:
‘Is not the cohesion fund the essence of a communist ideal of taking from the 
people to redistribute to the people? Is not that socialism, the tooth and claw?’ 
(H.C. Deb. Vol. 215 Col. 225 1st December 1992)
This so-called ‘Euro-realism’ claimed that the Maastricht Treaty and, in particular, 
EMU represented an attack on the principles of free trade. It was an argument taken 
up once more by Cash who argued that the original free market agenda of the 
Community had been thwarted by the desire for political integration:
‘My hon. Friend asks whether it is possible to equate market forces and a fixed 
exchange rate. The answer is emphatically no, for this good reason: what these 
proposals are attempting to do is to pay lip service to free trading 
arrangements. This is what the treaty of Rome, the original basis of the 
European Economic Community, was all about, and I thoroughly endorse and 
agree with it. But, then, because of this extraordinary desire to impose systems 
within it and then to redistribute in the social engineering way that we are 
expected to agree to under the transfer of resources, they want to have fixed 
exchange rates not only to get a greater degree of control over the currencies 
but also to create one country.’ (H.C. Deb. Vol. 231 Col. 222 1st December 
1992)
7.9 Eurosceptics: the guardians of British exceptionalism
From this discussion, it was evident that key aspects of the Eurosceptic discourse 
were centred around a call for the re-assertion of a distinctive sovereign, independent 
British state and a free market economy. The second wave of European integration 
represented the antithesis of this project. In particular, the parliamentary debate over 
Maastricht reflected the continued political currency of the arguments made by 
Thatcher in her Bruges speech. In its claims to represent and defend the will of the 
people this discourse was fundamentally populist employing simple messages and 
emotive language. In this respect, it exposed the problems of legitimacy and 
democratic accountability that were undoubtedly features of the supranational elitism 
that was driving the second wave of integration. The Major government’s position 
was shown to be inherently contradictory and in many respects misleading. Cash
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dissected the Treaty and exposed the drive towards further political integration that 
the Major government had signed up to. Buller goes so far as to claim that the 
Eurosceptics’ campaign represented a significant defence of British 
parliamentarianism (2000a: 164). The danger with this argument is that it 
underestimates the underlying authoritarianism at the heart of the right wing 
Eurosceptic discourse. It was primarily a powerful defence of a strong and exceptional 
British state that was aligned with global capital interests, represented by the likes of 
Murdoch and Goldsmith. This was what Thatcherism had claimed to be at the core of 
British national identities and interests and was fundamentally threatened by 
European forms of political modernisation. While Eurosceptics appeared to recognise 
and fear a revived nationalism emerging from the process of European integration, 
they also seemed to welcome and incite these developments as evidence of the 
rightness of its cause.
Euroscepticism can be viewed as part of the development in modem politics of 
populist movements that challenge the existing governing order and party system. The 
aim is to force through new political agendas but do so in order to impose forms of 
state and capitalist domination through popular mobilisation. It was clearly evident in 
the extent it developed an exclusive discourse that constituted Europe as essentially 
the ‘other’ of British society. Young characterises it as follows:
‘Even where unanimity was required, the EU had its own momentum. It 
couldn’t be stopped without a massive, perhaps destructive, effort. All these 
features rendered it an unlovely, sometimes highly dangerous, menace to the 
British way of life and government. Above all, perhaps, it was not British. As 
the years passed, a critique developed which asserted that the differences 
between island and mainland were written into history; were unalterable: were, 
sadly, part of the ineluctable order of things.’ (Young 1998: 403 emphasis 
mine)
From the perspective of this thesis, this populist articulation of British exceptionalism 
and European ‘otherness’ was possible because it reflected the underlying continuities 
in a post-imperial state. A state in which comprehensive and creative forms of 
political modernisation had proved inextricably and chronically constrained. The hold 
of this rigid and exclusive discourse over the Conservative party left the Major
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government little room for statecraft beyond servicing mobile capital by the extension 
of neo-liberal policies. In relation to European policy, the Maastricht rebellion and the 
extensive nature of Eurosceptic mobilisation was to further push the Major 
government in a more explicitly aggressive neo-Thatcherite direction. This further 
undermined any constructive engagement with European developments. Its impact 
can be demonstrated by the exploration of policy shifts that took place in the 
aftermath of the rebellion, and as the government adjusted to sustained pressure from 
Eurosceptic forces.
7.10 Major’s Euroscepticism and the aftermath of the European crisis
Initially, the ‘heart of Europe’ strategy was an attempt at a revisionist Thatcherism 
designed to reinforce the distinctiveness of Major’s leadership and secure 
Conservative Europeanism. From the start of his premiership, however, Major’s 
position on Europe was ambiguous because his key objective was to maintain party 
unity and represent both the left and the right. Major reflected the impossible 
compromise at the heart of his European policy, at times appearing as the heir of 
Heath, while at other times claiming to be on the side of the Eurosceptics. However, 
in the long run the Major government responded to its European dilemma by trying to 
placate Eurosceptics and in so doing moved to the right. The government increasingly 
adopted an obstructivist, neo-Thatcherite approach to the European Union that left the 
government marginalized and damaged.
In the wake of the Maastricht rebellion, in article in The Economist in September 
1993 Major fleshed out what was to be the focus of government European policy for 
the next four years (Seldon 1998: 393). Here, Major came out as overtly hostile to the 
whole European project, claiming that ‘we take some convincing on any proposal 
from Brussels’. He effectively dismissed the Delor’s project and argued that ‘the new 
mood in Europe demands a new approach’ (Major 1993). As for this new approach, it 
can be read as a recapitulation of the Bruges address:
‘It is for nations to build Europe, not for Europe to attempt to supersede
nations. I want to see the Community become a wide union, embracing the
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whole of the democratic Europe, in a single market and with common security 
arrangements firmly linked to NATO. I want to see a competitive and 
confident Europe, generating jobs for its citizens and choice for its consumers. 
A community which ceases to nibble at national freedoms, and so commands 
the enthusiasm of its member-states.’ (Major 1993 cited in Major 1999: 586)
Major emphasised a vision of the European Community as one of independent nation­
states within a single market. In particular, he questioned the legitimacy of the EMU 
project:
T hope my fellow heads of government will resist the temptation to recite the 
mantra of full economic and monetary union as if nothing had changed. If they 
do recite it, it will have all the quaintness of a rain dance and about the same 
potency.’ (ibid)
The speech reflected the belief within the government that the problems of Maastricht 
ratification across the EU and the collapse of the ERM in 1993 meant that the drive 
for integration was over. The British government viewed this as an opportunity for it 
to act as a ‘Trojan horse’ for a conception of the world order centred around free 
markets and nation-states. British ‘exceptionalism’ was to be the driving force behind 
the construction of a residualised, European market society. Indeed, there was a 
growing belief that the European Union was now heading in a British direction. This 
was the position that Douglas Hurd, as Foreign Secretary, was increasingly 
advocating. As Young comments:
‘He developed the conceit that Europe was “ moving our way.” Those who 
called on him heard these words often. So did the Cabinet. They were a way of 
arguing that, if you took the long view, the problem between, say, Portillo and 
pro-Europe man like Michael Heseltine might be said not really to exist. For 
Britain’s objectives were coming about anyway. “ The climate is changing.” 
Hurd told me on several occasions between 1992 and 1996. The Commission, 
repeatedly, was said to have got the message about subsidiarity. So had Delors 
and Mitterrand personally. There was now a new stream of higher wisdom 
percolating through the Community from its source-bed in London. Ideas that 
had once been regarded as “ heresies, eccentricities of British thought”  were 
now beginning to prevail, a development that made it “ not sensible to back off 
into noisy and destructive isolation.” ‘ (1998: 451)
The post-Maastricht period was characterised by increased uncertainty about the
trajectory of the integration project (see Chapter 5). There were tensions between
Paris and Bonn over enlargement and the future of a single currency policy (Buller
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2000a: 147-149). The commitment to monetary union locked governments into an 
anti-inflationary policy that, during a recession, increasingly seemed to be at the 
expense of growth and jobs. Further problems emerged over the institutional reform 
of the Union in order to rectify the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ and make way for 
enlargement. For the remainder of its time in office, the Major government was not 
able to constructively exploit these differences. Instead it was pursuing a more 
aggressive and oppositional neo-Thatcherite approach in response to Eurosceptic 
mobilisation. On a number of issues, most notably over voting arrangements in the 
Coucil of Ministers after enlargement and on the non-cooperation policy during the 
beef crisis, the British government were isolated and obstructive. The government 
increasingly turned issues of Community business into totemic struggles over the 
preservation of national independence and identity.
The most significant problem for the government was, however, over EMU which, 
despite the predictions of the British government, was continuing to go ahead. The 
government, while sticking to its opt out position negotiated Maastricht, refused to 
rule out the possibility of membership. The Eurosceptics increasingly demanded that 
the government ruled membership altogether. In an attempt to placate its opponents, 
the government promised a referendum on the issue and that if it did go ahead, which 
if considered unlikely, then Britain would not be part of the first wave. It was further 
evidence of how little room was left for manoeuvre for the Major government in 
continuing to engage with European developments.
In conclusion we can say that the Major government was primarily a neo-Thatcherite
government and its European policy came to reflect this approach. In an attempt to
resolve the chronic problems of modernisation that continued to haunt the British
state, Conservative Europeans used the crisis of Thatcherism at the end of the 1980s
to try and push the party and government into a more constructive European policy.
This clearly came unstuck once the full implications of Maastricht were unravelled by
the Eurosceptics and Europe was constituted as the ‘other’ of British identity. The
Europeanisation of British political identity was fundamentally contested, as was the
possibility that engagement with the integrationist project could be a basis for
economic governance, once Britain was forced out of the ERM. Euroscepticism
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became a way of consolidating and reinforcing the Thatcherite legacy and securing its 
grip over the Conservative party. As it remained committed to continued EU 
membership100, the only viable strategy for the government was to try and push the 
EU towards its worldview. This meant a pursuing an agenda that was characterised 
by economic reductionism and policy exit. The main difference between the 
government’s position and the Eurosceptics was that the government continued to 
claim that the EU could be moved in a British direction and that it was necessary to 
stay in the game. However, the argument that this was indeed occurring failed to 
convince Eurosceptics and the government could not unite a bitterly divided 
Conservative party around a common European strategy. The Eurosceptics 
increasingly envisaged more radical forms of exit from the EU, without necessarily 
proposing complete withdrawal, and questioned the economic basis for Britain’s 
involvement in the integration process101.
In this intensely contested political terrain, the exceptionalism of the British state was 
once again reasserted against the European project. The political basis for the 
incorporation of British citizens within a European political order remained 
chronically undermined. We come back to the problems of British political 
modernisation. The inability of the political class to embed European strategies within 
a post-imperial project of fundamental political and economic restructuring. This 
would have implied a long-term commitment to the re-organisation of capital and 
other interests within a national/European framework and a re-assertion of the 
primacy of a British-European identity, a fundamental shift towards what Ruggie 
referred to as muliperspectivism (1993).
Rather than reflecting the exaggerated influence of a political faction or part of the 
subversion of national liberal traditions, Euroscepticim should be seen as continuous 
with the post-imperial re-articulation of British exceptionalism. This left the Major 
government without either the inclination or political resources to engage 
constructively with the process of integration as a project of political modernisation. 
Instead, the British government became a force for disintegration.
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Conclusion 
British Exceptionalism, European Integration and 
Political Modernisation
A structural analysis of the relationship between the British state and European 
integration has been developed in this thesis. The argument has been that the difficult 
nature of this relationship lies in the political reproduction of forms of British 
exceptionalism that are in opposition to European modernisation. The awkwardness of 
Britain’s role in the European Union is viewed as the product of a long history of 
British political and economic development. Nevertheless, the current work has also 
attempted to show that this structural logic is neither static nor straightforwardly 
deterministic but is played out in the context of real political struggle over the politics 
of modernisation. The relationship between the British state and European integration 
can be understood as a case study of the structure and process of modernisation.
There has been an explicit comparison built into this thesis between a process of 
European integration that is viewed as continuous with European political 
modernisation and the British state that is considered to be opposed to such 
developments. In Chapters 3 and 4 ,1 counterposed European integration as a facet of 
organised modernity consistent with national political modernisation with a British 
imperial state and a post-imperial crisis characterised by a distinct absence of coherent 
projects of political modernisation. This became evident in the attempts to legitimate 
and consolidate a European trajectory for the British state along the lines of post-war 
Fordism. The ‘turn to Europe’ was highly contested and problematic and this reflected 
an underlying structural tension over the relationship between the British state and 
political modernisation. In contrast, for a number of nation-states, post-war European 
Fordism was established within a context that linked national projects of
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modernisation with the political and economic organisation of Western Europe. As 
Milward (1992) has shown, there has been an interdependent relationship between 
national political modernisation and European integration. This has also been the case 
for later entrants into the EC/EU that have linked membership to national 
reconstruction and renewal. For a number of countries, it has been associated with 
democratisation, stabilisation and economic reconstruction (H. Wallace 1995: 49). A 
similar story can be told for many of the current applicant countries where 
membership of the European Union is considered to be central to post-Communist 
projects designed to establish stable liberal capitalist democracies. This has not meant, 
however, that the process of European integration can be reduced to nation-state 
trajectories. I have conceptualised it as an independent process of post-national 
political modernisation and as an important, albeit problematic, regional defence 
against economic globalisation. From this perspective, the British state stood in a 
distinctive relationship to the second wave of European integration because it asserted 
a global neo-liberalism against European politico-economic organisation. The key 
point is that Britain has not just expressed distinctive national interests in the process 
of European integration but has been a vehicle for international and global projects 
that represent an alternative model of political and economic development.
Both the structure and process of the politics of modernisation have been examined in
the course of the thesis in relation to the European issue in British politics. A central
argument has been that the British pursuit and achievement of membership of the
EC/EU should be conceived as a project of conservative modernisation emerging in
the context and aftermath of a post-imperial crisis. While historically specific, this
project of conservative modernisation was indicative of a political order that had
pursued incremental and limited forms of modernisation in response to social and
economic change. It was typical of a state whose history had been characterised by
offsetting and managing the domestic impact of capitalist modernisation rather than
generating economic development through broader forms of national political
modernisation. In contrast, the economic rationality of British civil society found
expression at the level of the state in the support for financial capitalism and free trade
imperialism. In this context, modernisation was associated with a dynamic globalised
free trade economy that transmitted capital across the generations and reinforced the
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conservatism of an existing status order that underpinned the stability of existing 
institutions. Britain was a market society at the centre of a global market society. Any 
challenges to this social and political order were accommodated within it and did not 
lead to any radical re-imagining of state and society.
The single most significant challenge to the post-war British state was the loss of 
Empire as it was imperialism that had provided the economic basis and ideological 
legitimation for its political hegemony. Nevertheless, as was shown in Chapters 3 and 
4, this dramatic shift in the global position of the British state was domestically 
contained by a traditional strategy of conservative modernisation. Thus at the very 
moment of imperial dissolution and a dramatic turn to Europe, the full implications 
were deadened by a re-asserted conservatism across key sections of the political elites, 
both Conservative and Labour. As we have seen, the pursuit and achievement of 
membership of the EC/EU was fundamental to this. A potentially radical policy was 
thus turned into a defensive policy of continuity through change. It became the ‘get 
out’ for the Labour government of 1966-1970 in the wake of the failure of the 
National Plan and, despite the achievement of membership, was pursued defensively 
by the Heath government of 1970-1974. The association of European policy with 
consensus politics at a time when this consensus was breaking down led to populist 
attacks on its legitimacy from the radical left and New Right. The ‘exclusion of 
Europe’ within the national political discourse did not represent the basis for an 
alternative British project of national political modernisation but reflected the post­
imperial crisis that infected the British political system and wider society. By the late 
1970s, the idea that membership of the European Community could provide the basis 
for a post-imperial British renewal was highly questionable. As a strategy of 
modernisation and renewal, the legitimacy of the European strategy proved fraught 
with difficulties for the main political parties.
In Chapter 5, we saw how the tensions over the process of European integration have
become particularly acute in recent years as a consequence of what we might refer to
as a crisis in the modernist vision of the nation-state. Globalisation has challenged
social bonds and relationships protected by the symbiotic development of capitalism
and formal democracy within the nation-state. At the European level, the response has
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been to drive through processes of national de-regulation and European regulation in 
order to construct a single market as well as locating this within a further political 
integration. The possibility and problems of constructing a political Europe were 
discussed. The reconfiguration of the state within a regulatory ‘Europe’ of multi-level 
governance and the establishment of a functioning European civil society were 
highlighted as possible forms of reflexive modernisation emerging at the European 
level in the context of flexible accumulation. The dangers of fragmentation, 
nationalism and divisive market integration were identified as possible threats to this 
process. Nevertheless, it was argued that clear processes of political modernisation 
were identifiable within the European Union and this formed the basis for the 
continued problems for the British state in pursuing a European trajectory.
The arrival of Thatcherism represented a particular response to the British post­
imperial crisis of modernisation. It signalled a revival of a national free market 
ideology that combined economic modernisation with institutional preservation and a 
regressive social agenda. In Chapter 6, this project was shown to be problematic but 
entrenched populist and exclusive notions of British ‘exceptionalism’ that brought it 
into direct opposition with the second wave of European integration. Thatcherism 
increasingly defined itself in opposition to European integration and in so doing 
openned up significant divisions within the Conservative party. The Thatcherite attack 
on a European trajectory represented an attack on those traditions of conservative 
modernisation within the Conservative that looked to an accommodation with 
European developments as part of Thatcherite revisionism. British exceptionalism 
was thereby reasserted and the inevitability of accommodation to project of European 
modernisation was questioned. In particular, Thatcherism successfully articulated a 
radically reactionary vision of Britain that resonated with global neo-liberalism. A 
combination of regressive Anglo-American nationalism and aggressive economic 
liberalism emerged as an alternative to the revival of a project of European 
modernisation initiated by the second wave of integration. In Chapter 7, this political 
project was shown to be critically articulated within the European Union by the Major 
government. It was argued that the capacity to revive a strategy of conservative 
modernisation through European accommodation was fatally undermined by a
Thatcherite Euroscepticism. The attacks on the governing elite during the Maastricht
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and post-Maastricht period by a Eurosceptic movement was a watershed moment, 
they illustrated the constraints imposed by Thatcherism on any accommodation with 
the European project. The current work explored this up until the height of the 
Maastricht crisis and considered its implications for the final years of the Major 
government.
The analysis of the Maastricht period of the Major government led to the conclusion 
that Thatcherism had entrenched the constraints on British political modernisation. 
The consequences of which were manifested in a European crisis of the British state 
that resolved itself in a fundamentally anti-European direction. Undoubtedly, this 
legacy has continued to haunt the New Labour government and its attempts to revive 
a strategy of British conservative modernisation through constructive engagement 
with the project of European integration. It is therefore pertinent to explore the 
implications of the trajectory outlined in this study to more recent developments.
The thesis has developed a particular interpretation of the events surrounding Britain’s 
relationship to the process of European integration. In so doing I have chosen to trace 
certain basic themes in order to highlight structural tensions. The election to power of 
a Labour government in 1997 committed to a constructive European policy may 
suggest that these tensions have weakened. New Labour committed itself not only to 
fundamental constitutional change in the UK but also to the institutions of 
transnational governance. The policy review after the election of 1987 had committed 
a future Labour government to a co-operative European policy. The 1990s witnessed 
the Europeanisation of the Labour party with growing support for the European 
Union’s economic and social agenda (Gamble and Kelly 2000: 3-5). This constructive 
approach was realised when the Blair government took office and immediately 
negotiated Britain’s incorporation into the Social Chapter. This signalled a new era in 
Britain’s relationship to the European Union and was followed by an ‘impressive 
investment of British politicians in all the European institutions’ (Elisabeth Gigou, 
member of the French parliament, cited in Baker 2003: 237).
On a number of areas, the New Labour government has placed itself in the
mainstream of European policy making and has taken on a leadership role in areas
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such as crime and immigration. This can be viewed as a reflection of the current 
government’s modernising agenda. There has been an apparent shift away from a 
British tradition of majoritarian rule towards a decentralised multi-level polity. The 
latter includes new regional authorities, the incorporation of the European Convention 
of Human Rights, the adoption of proportional representation in regional and 
European election and introduction of a directly elected London Mayor. Alongside 
these developments, the institutions European Union appear to have achieved a new 
legitimacy amongst the British governing classes that marks a break with the past. 
From this angle, the tortuous saga of Britain’s relationship to the European Union has 
culminated in the eventual accommodation of Britain to a system of European 
transnational governance. Such a conclusion would throw some doubt on the extent 
to which the themes discussed during the course of this thesis are indeed structural 
factors. In defence of the general arguments developed so far. I want to point to three 
inter-related issues that throw some doubt on this process of Europeanisation. Firstly, 
the domestic legitimation for further European integration remains difficult; secondly, 
the government’s commitment to a pluralist system of European governance is 
questionable; finally, the modernising agenda pursued by the current government may 
continue to be at odds with European political modernisation.
The complex coalition politics of the European Union is a ‘sitting duck’ for populist
attacks (Canovan 1999: 6). The European Union may have established a form of
transnational governance suited to the global age but faces significant problems of
legitimation. These problems are clearly not specific to the United Kingdom (Taggart
1998) but in contrast to many other member states, Euroscepticism has had an undue
significance (Aspinwall 2000). In those countries characterised by power-sharing
governments, Europeanism has been successfully ‘filtered out’. The argument of this
study has been that this reflected the post-imperial crisis of the British state. In the
context in which the traditional party system no longer seemed able to provide
effective government, the symbolic construction of ‘Europe’ as a threat to the nation
became a way to appeal to the people outside of the mechanisms of the party system.
As we have seen this populist re-imagining of ‘Europe’ as ‘other’ was particularly
evident during the Maastricht Treaty. Against this background the New Labour
government have been reluctant to seek popular legitimation for British engagement
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in an evolving European order. This has been most clearly evident over the issue of a 
referendum on the single currency on which the leadership appears increasingly split 
and unwilling to become ‘entangled in a ferocious battle for an unpopular cause’ 
(Rawnsley 2001). While public opinion may be volatile, it is noticeable that since the 
mid-1990s public attitudes towards membership of the European Union have moved 
in a more negative and sceptical direction (Northcott 1995: 330: Hix 2002: 54-55). 
For a government that has put considerable emphasis on its populist credentials, the 
idea of opening up a highly divisive issue that would re-ignite a populist right wing 
Euroscepticism remains extremely risky. This would suggest that the New Labour 
government continues to be affected by the problems of legitimation which have 
consistently undermined governments constructive approaches to the European 
integration.
The reluctance of the New Labour government to legitimise its European strategy 
leads us to question the extent it is genuinely committed to pluralist institutional 
arrangements. Marquand argues that there is a paradox in the New Labour project 
between its programme of constitutional reform and its continued commitment to a 
centralised democratic collectivism (1999: 240-241). The government continues to 
believe in the transformation of society through regulation and manipulation from the 
centre. This is reflected in the ‘Prussian discipline’ that has been imposed on the 
Labour party and the combination of ‘commanding premier and overmighty 
Chancellor’ at the top (Hennessey 2000: 527). Such continuities appear to contrast 
with a constitutional programme that implies a pluralistic ensemble of checks and 
balances (ibid: 241). Mair, however, has argued there may not in fact be a 
contradiction between the two sides of New Labour (2000; 2002). From his 
perspective, the defining chraracteristic of New Labour is its populism and this 
implies taking the party out of politics:
‘In other words, if we accept that the political strategy has not been developed 
as a means of strengthening party and partisanship, but rather as a means of 
taking party and partisanship out of the equation, the apparent paradox 
disappears. Indeed, seen in this light, both the political strategy and 
constitutional strategy are wholly compatible with one another. The point is 
that neither is driven by a partisan impulse. By exerting total control over their 
own members and representatives, the Labour leaders in government
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effectively substitute themselves for the party as a whole, thus denying the 
party writ large a separate or autonomous voice. This also leaves the 
leadership free to reach across in an effort to incorporate other parties or 
elements of other parties into a loose and potentially less partisan governing 
coalition.’ (2000: 95)
Thus New Labour constitutes itself as a populist all embracing governing coalition 
beyond left and right and the old party divides. This is legitimated by reference to the 
undifferentiated people as the source of political authority.
A non-partisan approach to politics has been evident in the European Union where the 
government has actively pursued co-alitions with right wing governments. The 
difference, however, is that in the domestic arena the government can employ the 
public power of the state in the pursuit of its populist consensus. This enables the 
effective pursuit of a centralised policy to be moderated but not necessarily 
undermined by a constitutional system of checks and balances. Clear limits have 
emerged in New Labour’s commitments to a broad constitutional agenda, such as 
those that were made on electoral reform. In the system of transnational governance at 
the European level, however, the British government is one, albeit significant player, 
in a more complex game. How far has the government embraced this transformation 
in British state power? Rather than committing to a pluralist system of European 
multi-level governance, there remains the suspicion that the New Labour government 
has adopted a traditional British approach towards the European Union. They have 
pursued a leadership role, attempting to undermine Franco-German dominance and 
construct an Anglo- conservative hegemony centred on security and economic de­
regulation. This has involved the characteristic pursuit of a looser European Union 
that concentrates on ‘economic policy, immigration and the environment while 
devolving everything else down to the national, regional and local level’ (Baker 2003: 
254). There are parallels here with the Major government i.e. the pursuit of British 
leadership of the European Union alongside attempts to undermine, or at least check, 
further integration. The prevarications over the Euro and the support for the US in the 
war in Iraq have exposed the continued tensions in Britain’s relationship with the 
process of European integration. The implication is that the New Labour
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government's European strategy reproduces the problems of post-imperial 
modernisation. As Naim comments:
‘For a world-power regime, being “in Europe” is neither successor nor 
alternative to the past. It is simply one amongst other ways of remaining Great. 
A Euro-UK may be alongside but will never be ahead of the Special 
Relationship with the USA, the Commonwealth, over-valued Sterling, and the 
Crown. For it to become more important would imply abandoning the 
treasured stigmata of Providence. It would mean downsizing, dilution, a 
retraction into the ordinariness of contemporary nationhood.’ (2001: 6)
The third issue concerns the specific character of New Labour’s centre-left project of 
modernisation. Marquand notes that despite New Labour’s acceptance of the 
centrality of the European Union to Britan’s economic interests, it fundamentally 
accepts the American perspective on the new capitalism (1999: 239). From the 
perspective of this thesis, therefore, New Labour can be viewed as consistent with a 
continued Thatcherite hegemony. Gamble and Kelly note that the New Labour project 
has ‘defined itself through its opposition to traditional social democratic concerns 
such as centralised wage bargaining, neo-corporatist approach to policy formation, 
higher marginal rates of taxation, extensions of economic demoracy, or an increasing 
ratio of public expenditure to GDP’ (2000: 22). It has ‘proselytised within the EU for 
an ‘Anglo-American’ model of capitalism’102 and ‘campaigned against the social 
model’ (Callaghan 2000:127). If anything the New Labour government has moved 
the British state towards a form of regulatory state not entirely incompatible with 
European developments, but one that continues to assert centralised British elite rule 
and the collapsing of political modernisation into economic modernisation. The New 
Labour project thereby completes the Thatcherite revolution by establishing the 
British political order as the archetypal ‘economic polity’ within which the economy 
has become the ontological principle for organising modernisation under late 
modernity (Wolin 1987:147; see Stewart 2001:13-117). New Labour continues to 
embody a distinctively British approach to modernisation. In the context of a 
European Union characterised by slow growth, high levels of unemployment and 
schlerotic labour markets the British model is not without its attractions. Yet despite 
considerable reforms in a number of member-states, the European social model has 
proved be be resilient (Hutton 2002) and there has been no wholesale adoption of
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Anglo-American free market policies. If, as I argued in Chapter 5, a core feature of 
European integration is the containment of economic globalisation within a 
programme of European political modernisation then the British economic approach 
to modernisation will remain at odds with this process.
I have restated the relevance of viewing the British position as exceptional in relation 
to the project of European integration. This is, however, dependent on the 
continuation of a successful European project of political modernisation along the 
lines of multi-level governance and an effective European civil society that continues 
to reconfigure state power103. This implies a renewal of projects geared towards the 
constitution of inclusive political communities, albeit ones that do not reproduce the 
problems of nation-state domination. The New Labour government may have a role to 
play in encouraging European economic modernisation, and may even provide models 
of effective economic governance and regulation, but presently it lacks the social and 
political radicalism that could sustain economic competitiveness within a cohesive 
and pluralist European civil society. The danger is that with the crisis of the nation­
state form and the deeper project of European integration, British exceptionalism 
becomes a model for political and economic development around which European 
states converge post-enlargement. In this context, civic and political identities are 
fundamentally expressed through market duties and activities. If the primary role 
that national and supranational polities have in the global economy is increasingly 
limited to establishing secure territorial containers for mobile capital then British 
exceptionalism its very lack of political modernisation, may indeed be the key 
political force in the establishment of a residualised, European market society.
For long standing historical reasons the process of Europeanisation in Britain is
chronically uncertain and critical. Britain has become a vehicle for economic
modernisation in opposition to broader conceptions of European political
modernisation. The tensions this creates have been played out in debates over Britain
and Europe and have found their expression in ideological reassertions of British
exceptionalism. The current uncertainty surrounding European integration and the
establishment of Britain as a model economic polity, have shifted the terms of this
relationship in ways that have yet to be resolved. At a fundamental level, Britain’s
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relationship with European integration reflects conflicts over the meaning of 
modernisation under late modernity.
Notes
1 The European Union was established in February 1992 with the signing of the 
Treaty of European Union at Maastricht although the Treaty was not implemented 
until November 1993 as it had to be ratified by each member state. The European 
Union incorporated within it the European Community, a common foreign and 
security policy and cooperation on justice and home affairs. The European 
Community in fact consists of three communities the European Economic Community 
(1957), European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (1957). I will in general refer to the European Community (EC) 
in this thesis or to the European Union/European Community (EU/EC) when 
incorporating more recent developments.
2 Bartolini has conceptualised Europeanisation within the broad process of European 
state formation as the ‘entire process of community building and integration among 
the varying set of European states’ (2002:130). It does not only imply institution 
building at the supranational European level but also the Europeanisation at the 
national level which does not necessarily imply a convergence of interests and 
identities across states. In this thesis, I am concerned with the problems that British 
political elites have in engaging with institution building at the European level as well 
as the limitations on Europeanisation at the national level. In particular, I am 
concerned with the possibility for, and the constraints on, the Europeanisation of 
British political projects. It is, however, important to note that Europeanisation has a 
dynamic that is not wholly dependent on state elites. Thus, while I highlight problems 
and constraints within the trajectory of British European policy I do not imply by this 
that either political institutions or British civil society are immune from these 
processes. Such developments however must take into account the context of 
structural constraints on forms of European political modernisation have been 
embedded in the British state. The discussion on Europeanisation and European 
integration is further developed in Chapters 2 and 5.
3A major contribution to this debate has come from Giddens (1991). Following 
Giddens, here, modernity refers to modes of social life and social organisation which 
emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which 
subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence (1991:1). From this 
perspective, the present epoch, or late modernity, is characterised by a universalising 
and intensification of the core institutions of modernity. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, the British state has had a distinctive relationship to European modernity 
and this is indicative of the extent to which the globalisation of modernity is riddled 
with complexities and particularities.
4 The literature on elites is extensive (Mosca 1939, Mills 1956, Meisel 1965, 
Bottomore 1966, Parry 1969). On the pluralist critique of classical elitism see Dahl, 
1958,1961. Following Mills (1956) I define the political elite as part of a power elite 
who have access to the means of power and occupy command positions. This concept
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allocates a degree of autonomy to the political order that is not identified within the 
concept of the ruling class. It is also useful to distinguish as Bottomore does between 
the political class and political elite (1966:14). The political class refers to all those 
groups which exercise political power and influence while the political elite refers to 
those who actually exercise political power in a society at any given time. Finally, we 
need to acknowledge Dahl’s (1961) critique of elitism which rejects the notion of a 
single cohesive power elite in favour of a plurality of elites. Electoral competition and 
interest group representation severely qualifies the notion of a unified ruling elite. 
However, fragmentation of elites should not detract from the considerable structural 
power that adheres to certain command positions in the state and which can be used 
by those occupants to restrict and control interest group representation and elite 
competition.
5 A useful starting point in defining this concept is Offe’s description of crises as 
‘processes in which the structure of a system is called into question.’ (1984:36 
emphasis mine). In the post-imperial British context we are looking at processes that 
call into question the raison d'etre of a form of political domination that was 
fundamentally associated with an imperial trajectory. The post-imperial crisis 
therefore represents a struggle to reconfigure British institutions. From the perspective 
of this thesis, this problematic reconfiguration is incompatible 'with the project of 
European integration.
6 A recent discussion from this point of view comes from Garton Ash (2001).
7 As an example see Forster’s empiricist modification of the ‘awkward partner thesis’
/\rcner reiers to emergent properties as internal and necessary relations rather than 
social relations which are external and contingent and can exist without one another 
(1995:173). A structural emergent property is defined in terms of its dependence 
upon material resources, both physical and human (ibid: 175).These emergent 
properties give structures their causal powers and to identify them and their impact is 
to identify generative mechanisms.
9 A strategy of economic modernisation does not necessarily relate to the actual 
institutional power of the state; a commitment to a ‘minimal’ non-interventionist state 
may require extensive state machinery to police and reinforce the boundary between 
private and public.
0 In the context of the current crisis of capitalism, the role of integration as a force of 
political modernisation remains uncertain. For contrasting positions on the European 
project see Hutton’s The World We’re In (2002) and the review by Blackburn (2002).
1 The changes to the English social structure that occurred in the seventeenth century 
have been a matter of intense debate amongst historians and, very briefly, has 
concerned the extent a rising middle class was replacing a landowning oligarchy 
(Campbell 1942; Hexter 1961; Tawney 1967; Mcfarlane 1978; Clark 1985; Langford 
1989). Here, I have adopted a ‘middle way’ and sided with those recent authors who I 
believe emphasise the development of capitalist innovation, particularly financial, 
alongside continuities in social and cultural structures that helped establish a distinct 
British politico-economic order (see Cain and Hopkins 1993a: 53-54).
12 The part-territorialist and part-capitalist structure of the British imperial state did 
not represent a supersession of the imperial endeavours of pre-modem times but its 
continuation by more effective means (Arrighi 1994: 58).
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13 However, this often became a necessary in order to establish and maintain imperial 
rule, most notably in India. It can also be argued that other states were forced to 
modernise to challenge British global rule.
14 Brockliss and Eastwood point out that ‘within and beyond Parliament political 
spaces remained within which separate cultural identities might be asserted and 
religious and national differences contested’ (1997:194). They go onto argue that the 
British state was ‘formally a union of multiple identities which made precisely limited 
demands on British subjects. Loyalty to the Crown, obedience to Parliament, 
tolerance of Church establishment, and acceptance of English as the primary public 
language constituted the principle pillars of the Unionist state. Crucially there was no 
formal attempt to make Britishness a primary cultural identity’ (ibid: 194-195). 
Considering this ‘domestic’ political development in the context of British 
imperialism, we can conclude that formally constituting an exclusive British identity 
would have been detrimental to an imperial mission which incorporated cultural 
differences into the imperial status order.
15 The mode of regulation is the ‘the overall unification and articulation of specific 
structural forms into a complex social formation’ and ‘regulation encompasses all the 
constraints acting upon the accumulation of capital at a particular phase’ (Aglietta 
cited in O’Connor 1987: 62). It enables a particular regime of accumulation to be 
reproduced over a period of time.
16 We should note here that Fordist arrangements were far from uniform and few 
states clearly fulfilled all the criteria associated with this ideal-type. However, here, 
the concept of Fordism is used because it is heuristically beneficial for elaborating 
both the process of European integration and highlighting British exceptionalism. It 
should not be read as a final statement on the substantive and diverse trajectories of 
post-war European nation-states.
7 Milward’s cursory dismissal of Federalist forces results in an unnecessary 
overstatement of his own argument.
18 As Milward notes: ‘The gulf between British views of a reconstructed world 
economic order and those of the other OEEC members by summer 1954 were so wide 
that they were talking about different worlds. The other OEEC members held certain 
ideas in common about the nature of that order; preserving the common trade rules 
and practices of EPU and disbarring retaliation and discrimination between its 
members; removing non-tariff barriers in common with a carefully balanced 
avoidance of any serious damage to national interest; maintaining predictable 
exchange rates; retaining a system of mutual consultation at least as institutionalised 
as that which existed in the Management Board of EPU. Behind these common 
positions was also the desire of Dutch and the Belgians to formalize the existing 
practices even further by creating a purely European political framework for the 
mutual reduction of tariffs. Against that, the United Kingdom could see no reason for 
any uniquely European commercial institutions once convertibility was established 
other than a rump body created out of OEEC to supervise the completion of the trade 
liberalization programme, the only one of the above interests they believed they had 
in common with the continent’ (1992: 385).
19 Hay argues that consensus and settlement are analytically separate; the former 
refers to a contingent agreement over policy while the latter reflects the broad 
architecture of the state (1996a: 45). Heffeman uses the idea of a ‘consensual
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settlement’ in order to reflect a broader state settlement that also includes policy 
convergence. He describes it as a form of ‘conformity (if not outright compliance) 
with an established political agenda which defines what governing actors can do and 
what they should aspire to do’ (2000:148). Consensus and settlement are both used 
here to refer to established paradigms and parameters of state activity.
20 The 1947 sterling convertibility crisis and the 1949 devaluation both resulted in cuts 
in social spending. A problem for the government was that a fragmented union 
movement would not accept wage restraint in return for social spending (Rhodes 
2000:165-167). It was early evidence of the incoherence and crisis of the British 
variant of the social democratic project.
21 Discussion on the idea of a European customs union had actually begun in 1947 at 
the instigation of the Americans. In 1949 the Council of Europe was established and 
called for greater unity. Although Churchill had been a key figure behind these 
developments, his position on European unity remained ambivalent and he did not 
appear to envisage any loss of British sovereignty or change in Britain’s world role.
The Labour government went on to obstruct attempts to give the Council of Eurorpe 
supranational powers (Young 1998: 20,43).
22 Here Anderson draws on Francois Duchene’s (1994) highly informative biography 
of Jean Monnet.
23 Although early in his career, Bevin had called for a United States of Europe by 
1950 his position was Atlanticist and in May 1950 he put forward the idea of an 
Atlantic Community and argued for the need to get away from ‘talk about Europe’ 
(Gowland and Turner 2000a: 26).
4 This was most clearly seen in the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 which was signed by 
Britain, France and the Benelux countries. It committed these countries to support one 
another in the case of attack and also put forward proposals for cooperation in social, 
economic and cultural matters.
25 However, opposition to European integration did not represent the opinion of the 
Labour party as a whole. The party remained split on the issue with a substantial 
minority of the Labour movement in a favour of Federal Europe. A motion proposed 
by a backbench MP at the 1948 conference for a United States of Europe was 
accepted by the Conference and opposed by the NEC (Moon 1985: 74). The issue 
was effectively diffused by Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who emphasised the 
need for a policy of gradualism and questioned the ‘political complexion’ of those 
involved in the European cause (ibid).
26 8.8% went on the financing of machinery and equipment in Britain compared to an 
average of 10.2% and in the case of France the figure was 11.9% (Overbeek 1990:
91).
27 The outlines of this policy are found in the Foreign Office memorandum of 12th 
December 1951 DBPO 1986, series II, vol. I no. 414.
28 Young cites a speech by Eden made at Columbia University in 1952 in which he stated 
that European Federation was something ‘we know in our bones we cannot do’ (1998: 
74).
29 The socialist opponents on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National 
Assembly voted against because of British refusal to take a stronger commitment to 
the EDC (Northedge 1974:166).
30 The Six were also frustrated by the depoliticisation of the OEEC that was being
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orchestrated by the British and was evident in the opposition to using the OEEC as a 
framework to discuss tariffs. Instead the British insisted that this could only take place 
inside GATT (Kaiser 1996: 25-26).
31 Northedge notes that this policy did little to help consolidate Anglo-American 
relations and suggests that the Americans increasingly viewed the British as ‘an 
ageing, self-satisfied prima-donna who insisted on holding the limelight though the 
glory and beauty of her youth were long passed, while her friends were forming 
successful business partnerships after their retirement from the political theatre’
(1974:171).
2 Kaiser notes that in 1955 ‘the economic ministries already operated against a 
backdrop of Britain’s relative economic decline relative to the Six’ (1996: 35).
33 Infact, Thomeycroft and the Board of Trade stand out in terms of their concern over 
British exclusion from the EEC (Kaiser 1996: 42).
34 As Cain and Hopkins note ‘Britain was concerned to hurry on the process of 
decolonisation with as much dignity as the pressures of nationalism and the need for 
economy would allow. The Sudan became independent in 1956, Malaya and the Gold 
Coast in 1957, Nigeria in 1960 and Kenya in 1963. The West Indies were bundled 
briefly into federation in 1957 before Jamaica broke free in 1962. Long held strategic 
bases were discarded: Cyprus in 1960, Malta in 1964 and Aden in 1967’ (1993b:
285).
35 On citizenship and immigration in post-war Britain see Hansen 2000. Interestingly, 
the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act contained important continuities with the 
existing 1948 British Nationality Act and failed to put into place a distinctive United 
Kingdom citizenship (ibd: 123).
36 Here I would endorse Kaiser’s reading of the official documents of the time. He 
points out that the geopolitical rhetoric of the first application that emphasised the 
unity of free world as the motivation for the British application hid a ‘national- 
egoistic perspective which was almost exclusively fixated on the internal economic 
problems of Britain with its continuing decline as a major international power.
To many in the Macmillan government, to accede and lead the EEC increasingly 
appeared the only way for Britain -  as junior partner of the United States -  to retain a 
world power role, a motive that was never explicitly mentioned in public because for 
domestic political reasons the government preferred not to confront the British with 
the harsh realities of relative international decline.’ (1996:118).
37 The influential Lee Report on membership came out in May 1960 and argued that 
‘it cannot be compatible with either our political or our economic interests to let the 
situation drift on indefinitely on the basis of a divided Europe, with the United 
Kingdom linked to the weaker group’ (The Six and the Seven: Long Term 
Arrangements PRO, CAB 134/1852, EQ.(60) 27).
38 In June 1962 there was a highly publicised statement by the Australian prime- 
minister and Canadian deputy prime-minister attacking arrangements with the EEC 
that been agreed on industrial exports from the Commonwealth (Gowland and Turner 
2000a: 128)
i n  '
Milward makes the important point that materialist and symbolic motives for 
allegiance to national and supranational institutions are relevant to the execution of an 
effective foreign policy (1997:15). He goes on to add that in the case of the Britain at 
the time of the first application the economic case may have been won but symbolic
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allegiance of the British people (and presumably large sections of the political class) 
continued to be to the Commonwealth (ibid: 15-16). The argument here is that the 
ideological and political resources that could generate such symbolic allegiance and, 
in particular, associate participation within the project of integration with British 
political transformation and modernisation have been chronically absent.
0 In the Cabinet debate on the Lee Report, Selwyn Lloyd, The Foreign Secretary, 
argued that ‘to become a member of the EEC could be positively harmful to our 
position in the world, since some of the political and economic policies of the EEC 
countries did not inspire respect’ (PRO, CAB 128/34, CC 41 (60), 36th Conclusions,
14 July 1960).
41 The most important event in this relaunch was the Hague summit in December 
1969 which made two important decisions. Firstly to enlarge the Community to 
include Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway; secondly, to move towards full 
economic and monetary union by 1980.
42 This concept of regulation is distinct from that used by neo-Marxist when they refer 
to a mode of regulation (see Aglietta 1979, Lipietz 1986, Boyer 1986). Majone 
defines regulation as ‘sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency, on 
the basis of a legislative mandate, over activities that are generally regarded as 
desirable to society’ (1996: 9). Thus, Majone questions the assumption that 
contemporary societies have primarily been characterised by deregulation and argues 
that there has been a corresponding re-regulation and shift towards new forms of 
regulatory control such as the EC/EU, ‘a striking example of deregulation followed by 
re-regulation’ (ibid: 2). This discussion supports the theoretical and substantive 
observations of Sassen (2000) who argues that globalisation is characterised by 
changes in territorial jurisdiction that involves the partial detachment of sovereign 
power from the nation-state and the establishment of a new legal regimes and new 
legal practices. These ideas substantiate the transformatory account of European 
integration that underpins this thesis.
43 The development of the Social Action Programme can be seen in this context as an 
attempt to shift elements social and employment policy to the European level.
44 The three failed projects economic modernisation during the period 1964-1979 
were the technocratic collectivism of the Wilson Government (1964-1970), the liberal 
version of this pursued by the Heath Government (1970-1974), and the corporatist 
‘Social Contract’ project of the Labour Government between 1974-1979.
45 Here I am extending on the analysis of the British post-war state begun in Chapter 
3.
46 This was most evident in the continued declining authority of Parliament at the 
expense of a powerful executive (Crick 1968; Mackintosh 1968). The power of the 
latter was particularly seen in the increased importance of the Cabinet Office as a 
coordinating and advisory body and the growth of large ministries supported by a 
range of quagos (quasi-govemmental organisations) and quangos (quasi non­
governmental organisations) answerable to ministers (Jessop 1980: 56-57). However, 
a key feature of these reorganisations was to continue to consolidate power in the 
Prime-Minister’s Office and the Treasury.
47 An interesting contrast to the British state is the post-Franco Spanish state which 
became a multi-national state democratically constituted by its various regions and 
autonomous communities and as part of the European Community (Naim 2000: 294).
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48 What is evident in the context of post-imperial crisis is that the nation could no 
longer be taken for granted but had to be continually re-imagined and reconstructed.
In doing so the British political class drew on the memory of a homogenous and stable 
imperial status order. This regressive national ideology inevitably conflicted with 
attempts to introduce progressive reforms of economy and society that required a 
recomposition of power relations.
49 This was evident in the area of industrial relations legislation (Labour’s 1969 
Industrial Relations Act and the Conservatives 1971 Industrial Relations Act), also in 
the resort to incomes policies (Jessop 1980: 49).
50 These had been set out in Gaitskell’s 1963 Labour Party Conference Speech. See 
Chapter 2.
51 Key figures here included Barbara Castle, Michael Foot and Peter Shore.
52 An interesting example of this was Tony Benn. Benn was opposed to British 
membership during the 1950s and early 1960s but came out in support of the 
Government’s application in 1967 because of a growing sense of British isolation 
(Benn 1996:121,171,177). In 1970 he was commenting that the EC was the right 
organisation necessary to control international companies (ibid: 222). However, he 
came out in opposition in 1971 because he did not want to align himself with pro- 
European Labour politicians on the right of the party. He increasingly regarding this 
grouping as a threat to socialism and, in working with the conservative Europeans, he 
claimed they represented ‘a new political Party under the surface in Britain’ (ibid: 
240). He came to see the anti-market case as a way maximising support for the left 
(ibid: 241). However, it was also Benn who put forward the case for a referendum in 
1971 in an attempt to unite the party (ibid: 238-239). In doing this, Benn was also 
attempting to subvert the conservative European strategy of the British state that 
involved limiting public discussion on the issue and generally underplaying its 
significance. In considering the implications of a referendum, he expressed concern 
over public reluctance to participate who, he commented, ‘had been told by its liberal 
elites that it shouldn’t be interested in these things’ (ibid: 251). Benn’s approach to the 
issue reflected his general concern over the lack of democracy in British politics on 
both the left and the right and his position on EC membership did not demonstrate the 
crude opportunism and nationalism of many of his colleagues on the left (Panitch and 
Leys 1997). However, in this attempt to bring about some sort of symbioses between 
the British state and democratic socialism, Benn ended up in the debate over the EC 
defending the chronically flawed British state structure as a form of ‘self-government’ 
and thereby endorsed a nationalist myth.
53 Dennis Healey was an example of a politician who demonstrated both principled 
opposition and pragmatic accommodation (Young 1998: 268).
5 The main supporters were the Jenkinsites European social democrats led by Roy 
Jenkins and included, George Thomson, Harold Lever, David Owen, Roy Hattersley, 
Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers.
55 This measure aimed to prevent the government from having to face the humiliation 
of devaluing the pound, however this became inevitable after another sterling crisis in 
the autumn of 1967.
56 Between 1961 and 1978 Britain’s share of world exports of manufacturing goods 
fell from 15.7% to 9.5% and the overall rate of profit declined from 14.2% in 1960 to 
4.7% in 1978 (Leys 1983: 64).
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57 Wilson appeared to have exaggerated his influence on de Gaulle and then 
overstated the possibility that the General would support membership (Crossman 
1979: 355; Young 1998:194;Gowland and Turner 2000a; 164-165).
58 These problems seemed to have abated after a reduced role for the pound was 
accepted after 1968. Nevertheless the fundamental orientation of British monetary 
policy did not move in a European direction.
9 By November 1970 polls indicated that there was a majority of 50% against 
membership (Butler 1979:152).
60 This became known as the Selsdon strategy after a Shadow Cabinet meeting at the 
Selsdon Park Hotel outside London. It stressed tax cuts, more selectivity in welfare 
provision and a tightening up on law and order. There was an apparent retreat from 
this programme in 1972 as a consequence of industrial unrest, rising unemployment, 
low levels of industrial investment and electoral unpopularity (Gamble 1994:125). 
The result of this was the introduction of an incomes policy and increased government 
intervention in industry. To what extent this was completely out of step with the 
position the party had taken in opposition is questionable considering that Heath 
himself was not a New Right politician but remained firmly committed to etatism 
(Cosgrove 1973: 441-446; Young 1991: 58-59).
1 For a discussion of how this impacts on Britain’s relationship to the EC/EU see 
Chapter 4.
62 The ‘snake in the tunnel’ was an agreement to keep exchange rates within the EC 
stable against each other and against the dollar.
63 It is therefore essential to emphasise the active support for membership of financial 
capital in the context of the dollar crisis and worsening domestic economic conditions 
(Naim 1973: 20-27). In support of this Naim refers to a report by the Committee on 
Invisible Exports (1971) summarised in The Economist, 24th July 1971 pp. 60-61.
64 On 28th October 1971, 69 Labour MPs voted with the Government in supporting 
entry on the terms negotiated by Heath. Jenkins commented that ‘it was remarkable 
to hold sixty-nine Labour members against the pressures from constituencies, trade 
unions, whips and the leadership, which all exploited the simple atavistic appeal to 
Party loyalty and solidarity’ (Jenkins 1991: 311). The vote was indicative of the 
extent of the split that had emerged in the Labour party.
65The structure of the Conservative party has historically allowed few opportunities 
for mobilising and making opposition to the leadership effective compared to the 
Labour party.
66 The ‘Social Contract’ primarily invoked a new relationship between the 
government and the Trade Unions that would guarantee future union involvement in a 
Labour government in return for extensive workers rights and social benefits. It also 
involved direct intervention of the government in the private economy to control large 
companies and strengthen manufacturing and investment. This was a far more explicit 
corporatist strategy than that pursued between 1964-1969 and involved the 
government directly intervening to negotiations between capital and labour. See 
Coates 1980: 2-7; also Warde 1982:145-147.
67 See Shore 1971.
68 On the negotiations see George 1990: 80-85.
69 Britain’s multi-nationals financed the Britain in Europe campaign (Butler and 
Kitzinger 1976).
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70 By the 1970s most key economic actors influencing the British economy were 
external to the domestic political scene (Coates 1980:15-16). They included oil 
sheikhs, international bankers, foreign governments and multi-national companies.
71 Castle quotes Wilson as saying in the run up to the campaign, ‘I intend to keep it 
low key throughout. The decision is purely a marginal one. I have always said so. I 
have never been a fanatic on Europe’ (1980: 379 emphasis mine).
72 On the ‘awkwardness’ of the Wilson Government in its dealings with the 
Community see George 1990: 96-104.
73 Between March and September 1976 the value of sterling depreciated by 26%.
74 The amount and conditions largely determined by the U.S. Government.
75 The argument at the time was that the British economy could not cope with the 
system of fixed exchange rates proposed by the Community (Stephens 1996: 5-6) . 
More precisely, the state had failed to develop the capacities to regulate financial 
capital that would allow it to successfully introduce such a system and not face the 
continual threat of currency crisis. Neither was it prepared to explore a broader 
European solution to these problems. The alternative economic policy proposed by 
the left envisaged reorganising British capitalism outside of the EC (Gamble 1994: 
177-178 emphasis mine).
76 This is particularly associated with Callaghan’s famous speech to the Labour Party 
Conference in 1976 (see Hennessy 2000: 382-383).
77 Healey stated in his reflections on the IMF crisis ‘I thought enough had been
done there is an area where the markets are supreme the markets decide
what is the value of your currency’ (cited in Hennessy 2000: 384). The Labour 
government was in effect faced with mounting pressure from the City to introduce 
monetarist policies and this was being supported in the Bank of England and Treasury 
(Overbeek 1990:170). Evidently ‘this mood was seized upon by the American 
Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon, and the president of the Federal Reserve, 
Arthur Bums, who wanted to use the fall in the sterling balances to ensnare the British 
government’ (ibid: 171).
8 Benn’s alternative economic strategy, which included import and exchange 
controls, was discussed and rejected by the Cabinet during the IMF crisis (Benn 1996: 
378-387).
79 During the 1970s, the US witnessed ‘a domestic move away from the New Deal 
compromise to a political economy that sought competitiveness through de-regulation 
and de-unionisation and abandoned the social democratic principle that wages and 
social conditions were to be taken out of competition’ (Schmitter and Streeck 1991: 
210).
80 Callaghan was now presenting himself as the country’s saviour. At the time Peter 
Jay described him as Moses (The Economist October 8th 1977:18).
81A position echoed by the leadership of the TUC (Vogler 2001: 321).
82 British Governments have persistently called for enlargements of the Community in 
order to weaken deeper integration.
83 The idea of the Washington Consensus can be seen as shorthand for what Susan 
Strange refers to as ‘a non-territorial empire with its imperial capital in Washington 
D.C. Where imperial capitals used to draw courtiers from outlying provinces, 
Washington draws lobbyists from outlying enterprises, outlying minority groups and 
globally organized pressure groups’ (1989 cited in Panitch 2000:17). From across the
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globe, the Washington Consensus draws in a diversity of people for whom the ‘U.S. 
examples have shown the way’ (ibid).
84 More recently, it can also be seen to include the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and 
Nice (2001) together with the moves towards enlargement. However, it is generally 
agreed that the integrationist dynamic culminated in Maastricht and developments 
since have been a consolidation of those processes. Indeed, it may be the case that the 
problems encountered by the EU post-Maastricht are in fact chronic and imply a 
reversal of the integration process.
85 For a theoretical discussion of the broader context of these developments see 
Chapter 2.
86 For a discussion of the problems faced by European states during the 1970s and the 
concomitant constraints on European integration see Chapter 4.
87 For a discussion of the events surrounding the French crisis and the role Delors see 
Grant 1994.
88 Schmitter proposes two possible ideal-types for understanding the political 
direction of the EU either a consortio or a condominio (2000:17-18). A ‘consortia 
assumes a fixed and irreversible set of member states within defined territorial 
boundaries, but with varying political responsibilities.’ A condominio is less easily 
defined and would consist of many Europes both functionally and territorially.
89 Schmitter identifies six reasons for the failure of European social citizenship (2000: 
43-44). These are (1) divergent economies (2) national differences over welfare 
policies (3) National orientations of associations that operate within distinct social 
policy regimes (4) the influence of neo-liberal ideology (5) a general lack of public 
power within the EU compared to member-states (6) the privileged access business 
interests within the EU system of representation. The real issue here is the problem of 
constructing a European project of mass social inclusion in the context of flexible 
accumulation.
90 Scharpf (1999) has conceptualised the integration process in terms of the 
dominance of negative integration over positive integration. In essence, the main 
focus has been on removing national economic controls without any corresponding 
reconstruction at the European level.
91 European concerns over US policy towards international monetary problems was 
evident from the early 1960s and found it expression in the bitter G-10 meetings of 
that period (Schenk 2002: 350).
92 This would mean a proactive, growth oriented and distinctly European industrial 
and social policy agenda. The risk is inflation and a lack of policy coordination that 
results in intense speculation against the Euro in favour of the dollar. It seems unlikely 
that such a policy could be pursued without a wider programme of international 
reform that places equity and the quality of economic performance over short term 
wealth creation (Strange 1998)
93 A process that is clearly going to exacerbate the problems of inequity and diversity 
within the European Union as the majority of countries who will join are poorer than 
the poorest of the existing member-states.
94 Despite the efforts of the European Convention, the idea that this could be resolved 
in the shape of a largely ‘top down’ supranational constitutionalism remains unlikely.
95 In many respects, Thatcher’s position of floating exchange rates was more realistic 
considering the problems of competitiveness within the British economy but was
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obviously based on the principle that the markets should dictate British monetary and 
economic policy.
96 The official position of the British government was that it could only accept stage 1 
of the Report, membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Nigel Lawson, as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, told a meeting of Community finance ministers that the 
‘UK could not accept the massive transfer of sovereignty over fiscal and monetary 
policy implied by the Report’ (Lawson 1992: 913).
Ridley referred to European integration as ‘a German racket designed to take over 
the whole of Europe’ (The Spectator 12th July 1990).
98 It was a process consolidated by New Labour and Gordon Brown’s decision to 
grant full independence to the Bank of England.
9 It should be noted however that Kenneth Clarke, Chancellor 1993-1997, remained 
committed to the possibility of British membership of EMU believing it offered the 
possibility of long-term stability for the British economy. The Labour party was also 
aware of the benefits and refused to rule out membership. However, the political base 
for the renewal of a European project remained weak as pro-Europeans, both 
Conservative and Labour, attempted to draw a neat line between the economic and 
political dimensions of membership. This became clear during New Labour’s first 
term in office when their reluctance to call a referendum or engage in a public debate 
over EMU membership became increasingly evident (see Stephens 2001).
100 Clearly, any political integrity the Major government had left would have been 
completely undermined by proposing withdrawal from the EU. Also the EUs 
economic importance to the consolidation of Britain’s role as the ‘Hong Kong’ of 
Europe has to be seen as the central reason why withdrawal has never seriously 
entered the political agenda. There is also the ‘just in case’ argument which has 
proved so powerful in the debate over Britain’s entry into the Euro. The argument 
here rests on the fear of British exclusion from a Europe which may prove to be 
successful in the future and British options much be kept open. A paradoxical 
argument because it is the ‘free rider’ position often pursued by British governments 
that proves to limit the actual political capacities of integration in the first place.
101 This was the position Thatcher fleshed out once she left office and she advocated a 
multi-track Europe but one which was not organised within an independent European 
legal order (1995: 49; 2002: 409-410).
1 The attempt to extend this model to the European Union is currently taking the 
form of proposals by the British government for a trans-Atlantic free trade area.
103 This is far from certain considering the recent tensions in the Franco-German 
alliance and the uncertainties surrounding enlargement.
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